Publications

Publications

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Green, A. E., Munafo, M. E., DeYoung, C. G., Fossella, J., Fan, J. A., & Gray, J. R. (in press). Using genetic data in cognitive neuroscience: From growing pains to genuine insight. Nature Reviews Neuroscience.

Abstract: Research combining genetic and cognitive neuroscience data aims to elucidate the mechanisms that underlie human behavior and experience by way of "intermediate phenotypes": variation in brain function. This appealing approach is poised to transition from health-focused investigations to inquiry into cognitive, affective, and social functions, including ones that do not readily lend themselves to animal models. The growing pains of this emerging field are evident, yet there are also reasons for a measured optimism.

Shamosh, N. A., DeYoung, C. G., Green, A. E., Reis, D. L., Johnson, M. R., Conway, A. R. A., Engle, R. W., Braver, T. S., & Gray, J. R. (in press). Individual differences in delay discounting: Relation to intelligence, working memory, and anterior prefrontal cortex. Psychological Science.

Abstract: Lower delay discounting (better self-control) is linked to higher intelligence, but the basis of this
relation is uncertain. To investigate the potential role of working memory processes (WM), we
assessed delay discounting, intelligence (g), WM (span tasks, 3-back task), and WM-related
neural activity (using fMRI) in 103 healthy adults. Delay discounting was negatively correlated
with g and WM. Of note, WM explained no variance in delay discounting beyond that explained
by g, suggesting that processes through which WM relates to delay discounting are shared by g.
WM-related neural activity in left anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC, BA 10) covaried with g, r =
.26, and delay discounting, r = -.40, and partially mediated the relation between g and delay
discounting. Overall, the results suggest that delay discounting is associated with intelligence in
part due to processes instantiated in aPFC, a region known to support the integration of diverse
information.

Shamosh, N. A., & Gray, J. R. (2008). Delay discounting and intelligence: A meta-analysis. Intelligence, 36, 289-305. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2007.09.004

Abstract: Delay discounting (DD), the tendency to prefer smaller, sooner rewards to larger, later ones, is an important indicator of self-control. Assessments of DD superficially require individuals to make choices based on motivational processes. However, several lines of evidence suggest that DD may be systematically related to cognitive ability. We sought to provide a definitive assessment of the relation between DD and intelligence via quantitative research synthesis. A comprehensive literature search in two electronic databases yielded 24 eligible studies with 26 effect sizes in total. Meta-analysis revealed that, across studies, higher intelligence was associated with lower DD (random effects model weighted mean r = - 0.23). Studies using reward schemes in which payoffs were subject to chance (i.e., involving either a chance of receiving one choice or random selection of one choice) showed weaker associations between DD and intelligence than did studies in which payoffs were all hypothetical or all real. Other moderator analyses revealed no influence of DD measure, DD choice paradigm, or intelligence type. There was no evidence of publication bias. Given clear evidence for a negative relation between DD and intelligence, investigating the processes that support or moderate this relation would be worthwhile.

Reis, D. L., & Gray, J. R. (in press). Affect and action control. In E. Morsella, J. A. Bargh, and P. Gollwitzer (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Human Action. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

DeYoung, C. G., & Gray, J. R. (in press). Personality neuroscience: Explaining individual differences in cognition, affect, and behavior. To appear in G. Matthews and P. J. Corr (Eds.) Handbook of Personality. Cambridge University Press.

Weisberg, D., Keil, F., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E. & Gray, J. R. (2008). Illusions of insight: The curious allure of neuroscience explanations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 470-477. [see also The New York Times Year in Ideas, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/magazine/09neurorealism.html ]

Schaefer, A., & Gray, J. R. (2007). A role for the human amygdala in higher cognition. Reviews in the Neurosciences, 18, 355-363.

Shamosh, N. A., & Gray, J. R. (2007). The relation between fluid intelligence and self-regulatory depletion. Cognition & Emotion, 21, 1833 1843.

Abstract: Self-regulation depends on a limited resource that can be depleted temporarily, but little is known about how this resource relates to individual differences in cognitive ability. We investigated whether self-regulatory depletion would vary with individual differences in fluid intelligence (gF), a stable index of cognitive ability with ties to executive function. Participants performed an emotion regulation task varying in self-regulatory demand, followed by the Multi-Source Interference Task to assess depletion. On a separate day, participants completed Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices to assess gF. Emotion suppression led to impairment on the interference task, indicating self-regulatory depletion. Critically, higher gF was associated with greater depletion. Controlling for variables reflecting susceptibility to task demands and trait motivation did not influence this effect. The results have implications for theories of the relation between self-regulatory and cognitive abilities, and the mechanisms supporting the control of behavior.

Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., & Burgess, G. C. (2007). Explaining the many varieties of working memory variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. In A. R. A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. J. Kane, A. Miyake, J. N. Towse (Eds.), Variation in Working Memory, Oxford University Press, pp. 76-106.

Lee, K. H., Choi, Y. Y. & Gray, J. R. (2007). What about the neural basis of crystallized intelligence? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 30, p159-161. [comment on R. E. Jung & R. J. Haier's target article].

Reis, D. L., Brackett, M. A., Shamosh, N. A., Kiehl, K. A., Salovey, P., & Gray, J. R. (2007). Emotional Intelligence predicts individual differences in social exchange reasoning. NeuroImage, 35, 1385-1391.

Abstract: When assessed with performance measures, Emotional Intelligence (EI) correlates positively with the quality of social relationships. However, the bases of such correlations are not understood in terms of cognitive and neural information processing mechanisms. We investigated whether a performance measure of EI is related to reasoning about social situations (specifically social exchange reasoning) using versions of the Wason Card Selection Task. In an fMRI study (N=16), higher EI predicted hemodynamic responses during social reasoning in the left frontal polar and left anterior temporal brain regions, even when controlling for responses on a very closely matched task (precautionary reasoning). In a larger behavioral study (N=48), higher EI predicted faster social exchange reasoning, after controlling for precautionary reasoning. The results are the first to directly suggest that EI is mediated in part by mechanisms supporting social reasoning, and validate a new approach to investigating EI in terms of more basic information-processing mechanisms.

Schaefer, A., Braver, T. S., Reynolds, J. R., Burgess, G. C., Yarkoni, T., & Gray, J. R. (2006). Individual differences in amygdala activity predict response speed during working memory. Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 10120 – 10128.

Abstract: The human amygdala has classically been viewed as a brain structure primarily related to emotions and dissociated from higher cognition. We report here findings suggesting that the human amygdala also has a role in supporting working memory (WM), a canonical higher cognitive function. In a first functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (n = 53), individual differences in amygdala activity predicted behavioral performance in a 3-back WM task. Specifically, higher event-related amygdala amplitude predicted faster response time (RT; r = .64), with no loss of accuracy. This relationship was not contingent on mood state, task content, or personality variables. In a second fMRI study (n = 21), we replicated the key finding (r = .47) and further showed that the correlation between the amygdala and faster RT was specific to a high working memory load condition (3-back) compared with a low working memory load condition (1-back). These results support models of amygdala function that can account for its involvement not only in emotion but also higher cognition.

Burgess, G. C., Braver, T. S., & Gray, J. R. (2006). A cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating individual differences: Illustrating a relationship between fluid intelligence, working memory span, and interference control. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 29, 128-129. [comment on C. Blair target article]

Lee, K. H., Choi, Y. Y., Gray, J. R., Cho, S. H., Chae, J.-H., Lee, S., & Kim, K. (2006). Neural correlates of superior intelligence: Stronger recruitment of posterior parietal cortex. NeuroImage, 29, 578 – 586.

Abstract: General intelligence (g) is a common factor in diverse cognitive abilities and a major influence on life outcomes. Neuroimaging studies in adults suggest that the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices play a crucial role in related cognitive activities including fluid reasoning, the control of attention, and working memory. Here we investigated the neural bases for intellectual giftedness (superior g) in adolescents, using fMRI. The participants consisted of a superior-g group (n = 18, mean RAPM score = 33.9 ± 0.8 (SD), > 99%) from the national academy for gifted adolescents and the control group (n = 18, mean RAPM = 22.8 ± 1.6 (SD), 60%) from local high schools in Korea (mean age = 16.5 ± 0.8). fMRI data were acquired while they performed two reasoning tasks with high and low g-loadings. In both groups, the high g-loaded tasks specifically increased regional activities in the bilateral fronto-parietal network including the lateral prefrontal, anterior cingulate and posterior parietal cortices. However, the regional activations of the superior-g group were significantly stronger than those of the control group, especially in the posterior parietal cortex. Moreover, regression analysis revealed that activity of the superior and intraparietal cortices (BA 7/40) strongly covaried with individual differences in g (r = .71 to .81). These results suggest that superior g may not be due to the recruitment of additional brain regions, but to the functional facilitation of the fronto-parietal network particularly driven by the posterior parietal activation.

Bracha, A., Gray, J. R., Ibragimov, I., Nadler, B., Shapiro, D., Ames, G., & Brown, D. J. (2005). Randomized sign tests for dependent observations on discrete choice under risk. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 1526. Cowles Foundation, Yale University.

Yarkoni, T., Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., Green, L. (2005). Prefrontal brain activity predicts temporally extended decision-making behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. [special issue on neuroscience]

Glickman, M. E., Gray, J. R., Morales, C. J. (2005). Combining speed and accuracy to assess error-free cognitive processes. Psychometrika, 70(3), 405 – 425. [see comment by Rouder and rejoinder ]

Abstract: Both the speed and accuracy of responding are important measures of performance. A well-known interpretive difficulty is that participants may differ in their strategy, trading speed for accuracy, with no change in underlying competence. Another difficulty arises when participants respond slowly and inaccurately (rather than quickly but inaccurately), e.g., due to a lapse of attention. We introduce an approach that combines response time and accuracy information and addresses both situations. The modeling framework assumes two latent competing processes. The first, the error-free process, always produces correct responses. The second, the guessing process, results in all observed errors and some of the correct responses (but does so via non-specific processes, e.g., guessing in compliance with instructions to respond on each trial). Inferential summaries of the speed of the error-free process provide a principled assessment of cognitive performance reducing the influences of both fast and slow guesses. Likelihood analysis is discussed for the basic model and extensions. The approach is applied to a data set on response times in a working memory test.

Lazar, S. W., Kerr, C., Wasserman, R., Gray, J. R., McGarvey, M., Quinn, B. T., Dusek, J., Benson, H., Rauch, S. L., Moore, C. I., & Fischl, B. (2005). Meditation experience is associated with increased cortical thickness. NeuroReport, 16(17), 1893-1897.

Abstract: Previous research indicates that long-term meditation practice is associated with altered resting electroencephalogram patterns, suggestive of long lasting changes in brain activity. We hypothesized that meditation practice might also be associated with changes in the brain’s physical structure. Magnetic resonance imaging was used to assess cortical thickness in 20 participants with extensive Insight meditation experience, which involves focused attention to internal experiences.Brain regions associated with attention, interoception and sensory processing were thicker in meditation participants than matched controls, including the prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula. Between-group di¡erences in prefrontal cortical thickness were most pronounced in older participants, suggesting that meditation might o¡set age-related cortical thinning. Finally, the thickness of two regions correlated with meditation experience. These data provide the first structural evidence for experience-dependent corticalplasticity associated with meditation practice.

Gray, J. R., Burgess, G. C., Schaefer, A., Yarkoni, T., Larsen, R. J., & Braver, T. S. (2005). Affective personality differences in neural processing efficiency confirmed using fMRI. Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 182 – 190. [special issue on individual differences]

Abstract: To test for a relation between individual differences in personality and neural processing efficiency, we used fMRI to assess brain activity within regions associated with cognitive control during a demanding working memory task. Fifty-three participants completed both the self-report BIS-BAS personality scales and a standard measure of fluid intelligence (Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices). They were then scanned as they performed a 3-back working memory task. A mixed blocked / event-related fMRI design enabled us to identify both sustained and transient neural activity. Higher BAS was negatively related to event-related activity in dorsal anterior cingulate, lateral prefrontal cortex, and parietal areas in regions of interest identified in previous work. These relationships were not explained by differences in either behavioral performance or fluid intelligence, consistent with greater neural efficiency. The results reveal high specificity of the relationships among personality, cognition, and brain activity. The data confirm that affective dimensions of personality are independent of intelligence, yet also suggest that they might be inter-related in subtle ways, because they modulate activity in overlapping brain regions that appear critical for task performance.

Kane, M. J., & Gray, J. R. (2005). Fluid intelligence. In N. J. Salkind (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Human Development. vol 3, 528 – 529.

Yarkoni, T., Gray, J. R., Chrastil, E. R., Barch, D. M., Green, L, & Braver, T. S. (2005). Sustained neural activity associated with cognitive control during temporally extended decision making. Cognitive Brain Research,23, 71 – 84.

Abstract: Decision-making has both cognitive and affective components, but previous neuroimaging studies in this domain predominantly have focused on affect and reward. The current study examined a decision-making paradigm that placed strong demands on cognitive control processes by making reward payoffs contingent upon decision-making history. Payoffs were maximized by choosing the option that, paradoxically, was associated with a lower payoff on the immediate trial. Temporal integration requirements were manipulated by varying, across conditions, the window of previous trials over which the reward function was calculated. The cognitive demands of the task were hypothesized to engage neural systems responsible for integrating actions and outcomes over time, and involving active maintenance and top-down biasing of response selection. Brain activation was monitored with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using a mixed-blocked and event-related design to extract both transient and sustained neural responses. A network of brain regions commonly associated with cognitive control functions, including bilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), bilateral parietal cortex, and medial frontal cortex, showed selectively sustained activation during the task. Increasing temporal integration demands led to a shift from transient to sustained activity in additional regions, including right hemisphere dorsolateral and frontopolar PFC. These results demonstrate the contribution of cognitive control mechanisms to temporally extended decision-making paradigms and highlight the benefits of decomposing activation responses into sustained and transient components.

Gray, J. R., & Thompson, P. M. (2004). Neurobiology of intelligence: Health implications? Discovery Medicine, 22, 157 – 162.

Gray, J. R., & Thompson, P. M. (2004). Neurobiology of intelligence: Science and ethics. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 5, 471 – 482 | NRN featured article (free access)

Abstract: Human mental abilities, such as intelligence, are complex and profoundly important, both in a practical sense and for what they imply about the human condition. Understanding these abilities in mechanistic terms has the potential to facilitate their enhancement. There is strong evidence that the lateral prefrontal cortex, and possibly other areas, support intelligent behaviour. Variations in intelligence and brain structure are heritable, but are also influenced by factors such as education, family environment and environmental hazards. Cognitive, psychometric, genetic and neuroimaging studies are converging, and the emergence of mechanistic models of intelligence is inevitable. These exciting scientific advances encourage renewed responsiveness to the social and ethical implications of conducting such research.

Gray, J. R. (2004). Integration of emotion and cognitive control. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 13, 46-48.

Abstract: Emotion is easily type-cast as the nemesis of self-control. However, recent advances suggest a more nuanced view in which emotion and cognitive control functions are integrated, at times working in harmony. Emotional states can enhance high-level cognition, and can modulate the neural mechanisms that support cognitive control (executive function). Such an integrated neural organization might be adaptive: Emotional states could help resolve control dilemmas, facilitating the transition of the whole system into a more unified, situationally appropriate control state. This computational perspective is intriguing because control dilemmas are pervasive in human affairs (e.g., risk vs. reward, exploration vs. exploitation, short-term vs. long-term effects, personal advantage vs. group advantage). Although many challenging questions remain, understanding emotion-cognition interactions at multiple levels of analysis is a realistic and exciting scientific goal.

Gray, J. R., Chabris, C. F., & Braver, T. S. (2003). Neural mechanisms of general fluid intelligence. Nature Neuroscience, 6, 316-322. doi: 10.1038/nn1014 | journal cover | commentary by John Duncan | focus article by Michael J. Kane, 2003,Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 375-377

Abstract: We used an individual-differences approach to test whether general fluid intelligence (gF) is mediated by brain regions that support attentional (executive) control, including subregions of the prefrontal cortex. Forty-eight participants first completed a standard measure of gF (Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices). They then performed verbal and nonverbal versions of a challenging working-memory task (three-back) while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Trials within the three-back task varied greatly in the demand for attentional control because of differences in trial-to-trial interference. On high-interference trials specifically, participants with higher gF were more accurate and had greater event-related neural activity in several brain regions. Multiple regression analyses indicated that lateral prefrontal and parietal regions may mediate the relation between ability (gF) and performance (accuracy despite interference), providing constraints on the neural mechanisms that support gF.

see: New York Times | Reuters | The Times (London) | The State | San Diego Union Tribune News | Sun-Sentinel | International Herald Tribune | Wash. U. | Yahoo Italia | innovationsreport.com | salon.com | sentara.com | ScienceDaily | Hum-Molgen

Gray, J. R., Braver, T. S., & Raichle, M. E. (2002). Integration of emotion and cognition in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 99, 4115 – 4120.

Abstract: We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to test the hypothesis that emotional states can selectively influence cognition-related neural activity in lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), as evidence for an integration of emotion and cognition. Participants (n=14) watched short videos intended to induce emotional states (pleasant/approach-related, unpleasant/withdrawal-related, or neutral). After each video, they were scanned while performing a 3-back working memory task having either words or faces as stimuli. Task-related neural activity in bilateral PFC showed a predicted pattern: an Emotion x Stimulus crossover interaction, with no main effects, with activity predicting task performance. This highly specific result indicates that emotion and higher cognition can be truly integrated, i.e., at some point of processing, functional specialization is lost, and emotion and cognition conjointly and equally contribute to the control of thought and behavior. Other regions in lateral PFC showed hemispheric specialization for emotion and for stimuli separately, consistent with a hierarchical and hemisphere-based mechanism of integration.

see: APA Monitor | Psychology Today | Wash. U. | wissenschaft-online | sciencedaily | brainconnection | nootropics | psychwatch | advanceforirt | cosmiverse | cyberplayground

Gray, J. R., & Braver, T. S. (2002). Personality predicts working memory related activation in caudal anterior cingulate cortex. Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2, 64 – 75.

Abstract: Behavioral studies suggest that two affective dimensions of personality are associated with working memory (WM) function. WM load is known to modulate neural activity in caudal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain region critical for the cognitive control of behavior. On this basis, we hypothesized that neural activity in caudal ACC during a WM task should be associated with personality: negatively with behavioral approach sensitivity (BAS), and positively with behavioral inhibition sensitivity (BIS). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measured brain activity in 14 participants performing a 3-back WM task. Higher self-reported BAS predicted better WM performance, r = .27, and lower WM-related activation in caudal ACC, r = -.84, suggesting personality differences in cognitive control. The data bolster approach-withdrawal (action control) theories of personality, and suggest refinements to the dominant views of ACC and personality.

Gray, J. R., & Braver, T. S. (2002). Cognitive control in altruism and self-control: A social cognitive neuroscience perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 260. [commentary on H. Rachlin, Altruism and selfishness | full text of commentary]

Gray, J. R. (2002). Does a prosocial-selfish distinction help explain the biological affects? Comment on Buck (1999). Psychological Review, 109, 729 – 738.

Abstract: R. Buck (1999) argued that a conceptual distinction between prosocial and selfish motivation is necessary to understand the biological affects, i.e., consciously experienced feelings and desires having an innate neurochemical basis. However, at a biological level of analysis, a prosocial-selfish distinction is doubtful empirically and conceptually. For this reason, the proposed typology of biological affects is unclear. Moreover, a prosocial-selfish distinction is not necessary to explain hemispheric differences in brain activity associated with affect. In contrast, an approach-withdrawal distinction explains some data uniquely well, although numerous exceptions imply that simple models are inadequate. To extend hemispheric models of experienced emotion, a prosocial-selfish distinction is unlikely to be explanatory, whereas an alternative account based on a distinction between verbal and non-verbal working memory appears to be useful.

Gray, J. R., & Braver, T. S. (2002). Integration of emotion and cognitive control: A neurocomputational hypothesis of dynamic goal regulation. In S. C. Moore & M. R. Oaksford (Eds.), Emotional cognition (pp. 289 – 316). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Abstract: Emotional states can have selective effects on cognitive control, i.e., can prioritize some aspects of cognitive control over others temporarily and reversibly. In this chapter we present a computational perspective on why such selectivity might be useful. Specifically, it would enable goal regulation to be selective in response to changing threat versus reward conditions. Active goals are likely to be held in working memory. In response to cues of impending reward, approach-related states should prioritize the active maintenance of approach goals over withdrawal goals. In response to cues of impending punishment, withdrawal states should prioritize withdrawal goals in working memory. By modulating working memory subsystems, emotional states could dynamically alter the balance between approach and withdrawal goals held active within those subsystems, thereby selectively regulating the influence that active goals can exert on behavior.

Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Gray, J. R., Molfese, D. L., & Snyder, A. Z. (2001). Anterior cingulate and response conflict: Effects of frequency, inhibition, and errors. Cerebral Cortex, 11, 825 – 836.

Gray, J. R. (2001). Emotional modulation of cognitive control: Approach-withdrawal states double-dissociate spatial from verbal two-back task performance. Journal of Experiment Psychology: General, 130, 436 – 452. | Received APA New Investigator Award in Experimental Psychology General

Abstract: Emotional states might selectively modulate components of cognitive control. To test this hypothesis, the author randomly assigned 152 undergraduates (equal numbers men and women) to watch short videos intended to induce emotional states (approach, neutral, withdrawal). Each video was followed by a computerized 2-back working memory task (spatial or verbal, equated for difficulty and appearance). Spatial 2-back performance was enhanced by a withdrawal state and impaired by an approach state; the opposite pattern held for verbal performance. The double dissociation held more strongly for participants who made more errors than average across conditions. The results suggest that approach-withdrawal states can have selective influences on components of cognitive control, possibly on a hemispheric basis. They support and extend several frameworks for conceptualizing emotion-cognition interactions.

Gray, J. R. & Kagan, J. (2000). The challenge of predicting which children with ADHD respond positively to Methylphenidate. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 21, 471 – 489. | supplementary table

Abstract: Predicting which children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) will respond to methylphenidate (MPH, Ritalin) is of theoretical interest, e.g., for understanding catecholamine contributions to self-regulation. Large individual differences in response to MPH and the wide prescription of MPH for ADHD have encouraged research on response prediction. We review 59 studies since the last major review (Barkley, 1976), and examine responder definition, comorbidities, demographics, intelligence, inhibitory control, physiological measures, and placebo responding. Strong responders are more easily predicted; children with anxiety, who are older, or have less severe symptoms do not respond as well. Measures of inhibitory control and catecholamines are weakly associated. Prediction on a case by case basis is not possible, and group findings have not generalized well. We discuss implications of these findings for the validity of the disorder.

Gray, J. R. (1999). A bias toward short-term thinking in threat-related negative emotional states. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 65 – 75.

Abstract: Some decisions must be repeatedly enacted and have consequences that change depending on how often each alternative is chosen. Such temporally extended decisions are pervasive and important, and often involve short-term/long-term tradeoffs. Can unrelated emotion and stress influence such decisions? In negative emotional states involving threats, people should favor what is better at the time regardless of possible long-term consequences. Supporting this hypothesis, in Experiment 1, college students randomly assigned to see aversive images repeatedly made choices that had better short-term but poorer long-term effects, and so earned less money than students shown neutral images, effect size r=.71. In Experiment 2, students reporting stress about impending exams showed a similar bias, r=.53. The hypothesis and results are relevant to decision making, delay of gratification, distributed choice, and self-control.