This class examines a variety of formal and game theoretic models of international processes. Although the substantive issues are international, the class focuses on explaining how models work, the intuition behind them and how the modeling details relate to ubstantive questions. As such the class should be of relevance to anyone interested in modeling and not just those with an interest in international relations.

The class will examine contemporary models, in both conflict studies and international political economy. I emphasize student participation. I believe that to really understand something you must be able to explain it to someone else. For this reason, each student will be assigned a different model that they will be responsible to present. Obviously, I do not expect that every one will be able to present every detail of every model, but I expect students to grasp the central themes. You should aim to discuss your presentation with me prior to class.

In addition to presenting an occasional model, all participants are expect to have throughly read each of the paper and come prepared to discuss the models. In particular, students should thought about the following: How does the model answer the substantive question? What are the limits to the modeling strategy? How could the model be extended, or used to address other questions? What empirically falsifiable predictions does the model generate? What other modeling approaches could be used to address the substantive questions?

Beyond an interest in the modeling endeavor, there are no formal prerequisites for the class. However, students with no experience of game theory or other models will find the class particularly hard.

Your evaluation will be determined by your participation and a research paper. This paper can take one of two forms. 1) A comprehensive review of modeling strategies used to address a specific research question. 2) (The much preferred option). Write a research paper where you use a model to address a substantive question.

We will typically examine two papers per class (Hence we will not cover all the papers in each section in detail). I have divided the material into sections.
Robert Powell's book is avaible in the bookstore. I have prepared a course reader which will be available at Tyco.
 

Materials to be covered.

General Introduction
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Sahdow of Power. Princeton University Press.

Models of International Crises.
Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war" International Organization. v. 49 Summer '95 p. 379-414.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
 

Crisis Bargaining
Banks, Jeffrey. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games" American Journal of Political Science. 34(August); 599-614.
Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs." Journal of Conflict Resolution. v. 41 Feb. '97 p. 68-90.
Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, uncertainty, and resolve: a limited information model of crisis bargaining." American Journal of Political Science. v. 33
Nov. '89 p. 941-72.
Fearon, James D. 1996. "Bargaining Over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power." Manuscript, University of Chicago.

Shifting Power
Kim, Woosang, Morrow, James D. 1992. "When do power shifts lead to war?" American Journal of Political Science. v. 36 Nov. '92 p. 896-922.
Powell, Robert. 1996. "Uncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement." American Political Science Review. v. 90 Dec. '96 p. 749-64.
Powell, Robert. 1996. "Stability and the distribution of power." World Politics. v. 48 Jan. '96 p. 239-67.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Morrow, James D; Zorick, Ethan R. 1997. "Capabilities, perception, and escalation." American Political Science Review. v. 91 Mar. '97 p. 15-27.

Diversionary Foreign Policy
Downs, George W; Rocke, David M. 1994. "Conflict, agency, and gambling for resurrection: the principal-agent problem goes to war" American Journal of Political Science. v. 38 May '94 p. 362-80.
Downs, George W; Rocke, David M. 1995. Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and institutions in International Relations. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Chapter 3.
Smith, Alastair. 1996. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 133-153.
Hess, Gregory D. and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. "War politics; An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework" American Economic Review 85(4, September): 828-846.
Richards, D., C. Morgan, R. K. Wilson, V. L. Schwebach, and G. D. Young. 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force." Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(Sept.): 504-535.

Democratic Peace
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce , James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 1998. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace" American Political Science Review Decmeber 1999.
Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful pacifists: democratic states and war" American Political Science Review. 86(Mar.): 24-37.

International Institutions
Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." International Organization. 52: 269-305.
Morrow, James D., 1994. Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information International Organization. v. 48 Summer '94 p. 387-423.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Harper Collins.
 

Regime Type, Audience Cost and Crises.
Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes." American Political Science Review. v. 88 Sept. '94 p. 577-92.
Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics" American Political Science Review, September Vol. 92. No.3. p. 623-638.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." American Political Science Review 92(Dec. 4): 829-844.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999a. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” International Organization. 53:233-266.
 

Regime Type and the Ability to Fight.
Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. "Limited Governments, Powerful States" in Randolph M. Siverson (ed.) Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. P. 15- 49.

2-level Games
Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two Level Games." International Organization 42: 427-60.
Morrow, James D. 1991. "Electoral and congressional incentives and arms control" Journal of Conflict Resolution. v. 35 June '91 p. 245-65.
Smith, Alastair and David Hayes. 1997. "The Shadow of the Polls: Electoral Effects On International Agreements" International Interactions Vol. 23 No. 1. p.
79-108.
Mo, Jongryn. 1994. "The Logic of two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions" Journal of Conflict Resolution. 38(3, September): 402-422.
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42: 427-460.
Iida, Keisuke. 1993. When and How do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two Level Games with Uncertainty. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 403-426.
Milner, Helen and Peter Rosendorff. 1997. Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 117-146.
Lohmann, Susanne and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. International Organization 48(4, Autumn):
595-632.
Pahre, Robert. 1997. "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union." Journal of Conflict
Resolution 41(1, Feb.): 147-174.

Alliances
Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs" Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1, Feb):68-90.
Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances, credibility, and peacetime costs." Journal of Conflict Resolution. v. 38 June '94 p. 270-97.
Morrow, James D. 1993. "Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security." International Organization. v. 47 Spring '93 p. 207-33.
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Forthcoming Princeton University Press. Chapter 5
Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 4, p.405-425.

Nuclear Deterrence
Powell, Robert. 1989. "Nuclear deterrence and the strategy of limited retaliation" American Political Science Review. v. 83 June '89 p. 503-19.
Powell, Robert. 1989. "Crisis stability in the nuclear age" American Political Science Review. v. 83 Mar. '89 p. 61-76.
Powell, Robert. 1988. "Nuclear brinkmanship with two-sided incomplete information" American Political Science Review. v. 82 Mar. '88 p. 155-78.
Powell, Robert. 1987. "Crisis bargaining, escalation, and MAD" American Political Science Review. v. 81 Sept. '87 p. 717-35.
Powell, Robert. 1990. Nuclear deterrence theory : the search for credibility. New York : Cambridge University Press.

Armaments and Weapons
Powell, Robert. 1993. "Guns, butter, and anarchy." American Political Science Review. v. 87 Mar. '93 p. 115-32.
Witman, Donald. 1989. "Arms Control and other Games Involving Imperfect Detection"
American Political Science Review, 923-948 (1989)
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Forthcoming Princeton University Press. Chapter 2.
Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke. 1990. Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control. Ann Arbor, MI; University of Michigan Press.

Reputation
Alt, James, Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes. 1988. "Reputation and hegemonic stability: a game-theoretic analysis." American Political Science Review. v. 82 June '88 p. 445-66.
Gates, Scott and Brian D. Humes. 1997. Games, Information and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 6.
Sartori, Anne. 1996. "The Use of Effective Cheap-Talk Signals in International Disputes." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.
Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith. 1999. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." Manuscript, Yale University.