Theories of International Relations
PLSC 150b
Spring 2000
Tuesday, Thursday 9:00-10:15
Alastair Smith
Alastair.Smith@Yale.edu
124 Prospect St. Rm. 205 432 5234

Tuesday/Thursday 9-10:15

What are the causes of war between nations? The first half of the class examines the major theoretical explanations for interstate conflict. The second half of the class uses these theories to examine a variety of topics in detail. These topics include the formation of alliance, the evolution of international cooperation through  nternational institutions, the use and success of sanctions, the role of domestic politics in influencing foreign policy and the democratic peace.

This course focuses on theory building and theory testing within the context of international relations. The first half of the class explores explanations for international conflict. The class examines a wide variety of contemporary theoretical approaches, asking what are the principle components of each theory, what do these  heoretical explanations imply about the behavior of nations and is there empirical support for these predictions?   The second half of this class focuses on more specific topics and current events. I examine what the various theories considered in the first half of the class predict in particular settings.  For
example, the class explores the topics of the formation of alliances, the evolution of international cooperation through international institutions, the use and success of sanctions, the role of domestic politics in influencing foreign policy and the democratic peace.  In additions, the theoretical approaches are applied to contemporary events to see what each of the various theories predicts.  The class takes the form of lectures, but students are expected to participate.

The class is designed to provoke critical thinking and rigorous analysis of contemporary theoretical perspectives. This class is not intended as a comprehensive survey. The emphasis is on evaluating and testing theory. I expect you to consider the implications of theoretical arguments and use these deductions to make predictions. We will not simply be reading theoretical arguments, but rather we will consider what each theory implies and what evidence would falsify or support the predictions. The exams and grading will reflect these goals.

Exams and Grading
There will be two mid term and a final exam. The mid term exams  will be in class on Thursday 24th February and Thursday 30th March and each is worth 25% of the final grade. The final exam accounts for the remaining 50% of the grade. The final exam is on Monday 1st May at 2pm. Please let me know immediately if this exam schedule poses any problems.
Readings
The required books for this class are:
Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. “The Causes of War” Free Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 1999. Principle in International Politics. CQ press.
Williams, Phil, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz. 1999. Classic Readings of
International Relations. Belmont CA: Wadworth Publishing Company.  2nd edition.

Syllabus
1) Causes of the First World War. Read Blainey. (Many explanations for the same event)
2) Need for a theoretical explanation. (Hempel, Chap 2,3). Falsification in international relations.
3) Realism. The security dilemma. Balance of Power. [WGS p.8-18, skim 18-38, read 39-59.
p215-234, p. 237-267 (Thucydides,   Waltz, Jervis, Morgenthau, Organski, Claude) .]
Polarity of the system.   BdM p. 56-73  [WGS 71-88]
4) Power transition theory (Kugler and Organski)
5) Assesment of systemic theory  BdM chap 15.
6) Expected Utility Theory. A story from 1492. BdM. Chap. 2
7) Decision making under uncertainty and an introduction to game theory.
8) Expected Utility Theories of war involvement (3rd party intervention). The initiation of
conflict. Chicken, PD. Nuclear confrontation and credibility (See the movie Dr. Strangelove!!)
[WGS p.358-366. (Schelling)]
9) Bargaining in crises: Why negotiations fail in take it or leave it bargaining. Fearon 1995.
“Rationalist explanations for war”
10) Selection effects and the reliability of alliances.
11) Alliance Formation
12) Collective action problems and behavior within alliances (review balancing vs.
bandwagoning, Olson and Zeckhauser)
13) The level of analysis problem. Who makes decisions?  [WGS Singer 99-118] Allison’s
analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. [WGS p.160-190.] (briefly look at BdM chap 4). Two level
Games.
14) Mid term exam
15) How domestic institutions aggregate preferences. cuban missile crisis p256-266 (Chapt 9 .
End of cold war example, 1992 presidential election). BdM Chap 12.
16) Evolution of cooperation BdM 79-90  [WGS 287-297, 298-310 (Keohane and Strange)]
Spring Break
17) Domestic Politics: The Democratic Peace. An inductive research agenda. The findings?
18) Who wins war?
19) Review of evaluating a theory BdM chap 5, 15. What requirements would you insist on to
test the democratic peace proposition?
20) Mid term exam
21) Theoretical models of the democratic peace. BdM Chap 13. BdM2S2
22) Diversionary war, public opinion and the use of force. BdM 495-499, Blainey Chap 5.
23) Current Topics
24) Current Topics
Final Exam 1st May 2pm.
 

Reader (available at TYCO)
Hempel, Carl 1966. “Philosophy of Natural Science” Chapters 2&3.
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist explanations for war” International Organization. v. 49 Summer '95 p. 379-414.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et. al. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace” APSR
Kugler and Organski 1993. The Power Transition in Midlarsky’s Handbook of War Studies.
Olson and Zeckhauser 1966. An Economic Theory of Alliances. Review of Economics and Statistics. 48:3 266-279.

Handouts
Falsification of Hypotheses,  answers