Domestic Determinants of International Relations
PLSC 154a
Fall 2001
Tuesday 1:30-3:20
Alastair Smith
Alastair.Smith@Yale.edu
124 Prospect St. Rm. 205 432 5234





Brief Description.
Domestic political circumstances affect the policy incentives of leaders. Hence domestic political institutions, economic performance and popularity all influence foreign policy. In turn,international outcomes influence the domestic survival of leaders. This seminar explores the theoretical linkages between domestic and international events.  During the seminar we will focus on the theoretical explanations and the empirical evidence used to support these hypotheses.  The readings should be considered in this light. Rather than simply reading each work at face value, a primary goal is uncovering the exact relationship that each author characterizes and then to evaluate whether the evidence supports or falsifies their claims

Requirements and grading
 All students are expected to come to class and have done the readings. In addition students are expected to present the readings. Although the number of reading will vary with the exact enrolment, I envision that students should expect to present two or three times during the semester. These presentations should take the form of a 10 to15 minutes summary of the reading. Presentations should include consideration of the following questions: 1) What does the author seek to explain (the dependent variable)? 2) How does he or she measure this dependent variable? 3) What is the author’s explanation for the variance in the dependent variable? 4) What predictions does the author generate (the relationship between independent, or explanatory, variables and the dependent variable)? 5) What evidence would support the authors predictions? What would falsify them? 6) What evidence does the author provide?  In addition to these presentations, students are expected to write a term paper and 5 additional “think pieces.” These “think pieces” should be around 2 pages long and discuss how the research in the readings could be improved or extended. They should not be a simple summary. However, beyond these criteria students are free to write on any topic they wish. The term paper should represent further developments of a think piece.  As you will note in the schedule, I have left one session free for students to present their ideas for their term paper. For this class students should prepare a brief summary and be prepared to present their idea for about 10mins. I hope this session will provide valuable feedback and help sharpen projects.   The term paper is due in my mailbox in 124 Prospect st. by 12 noon on Monday 17th December. This deadline in final and non-negotiable. Late papers will result in a grade F. The think pieces should be given to me at the start of the relevant class (preferably a few hours earlier so that I
have an opportunity to read them before class). You may only write one think piece per week (Warning: do not leave the think pieces until the end of the semester. You cannot write 5 papers in 4 weeks).  The final paper represents 40% of the overall grade, think pieces make up 30% (i.e., 6% each) of the final grade and presentations account for remaining 30%.
 

Topics
Democracies are Different: The Democratic Peace
1) An Empirical Law? Democracies don’t fight each other!
Ray. 1995. Democracy and International Peace Chapts 1, 3.
Russett 1993 Grasping the Democratic peace. Chapt. 1, 2 and skim 4.
Gowa 1999 Ballots and Bullets Chapt. 1, 2. Look at the conclusion to chapt 3, 4, and 5 and chapt
6 from p100 onwards. Read Chapt 7 (the conclusion).
For an additional case studies approach I recommend Weart’s Never at War.

2)  How Domestic Political Institutions Affect Foreign Policy and Leader Survival.
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995.  Goemans 2000.

3) Theoretical Explanations of the Democratic Peace.
Lake 1992. Powerful pacifists  Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2001 chapt4.

3) Internal Institutions Affect How Nations Fight.
Schultz and Weingast. 1997 Limited Gov., Powerful States. Reiter and Stam 1999 The Myth of
the Democratic Arsenal.

4) Audience Costs.
Schultz 1999. Fearon 1994; Smith 1998, McGillivray and Smith. 2000. Trust and Cooperation
through Agent Specific Punishments.

5) Revising the Democratic peace: Theoretical Explanations and War Aims.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001 Testing the ...
Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2001 Chapt. 7.   (Introduction to Putnam’s two level games).

International Political Economy
6) How Domestic Political Institutions Influence International Negotiations?
Evans et. al. 1993. Double Edged Diplomacy. All read Putnam’s article in the appendix. Students
to present specific chapters.

7) Domestic Determinants of Trade Policy and International Cooperation
Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information : Domestic Politics and International Relations
or as a shorter but technically much harder paper, read Milner and Rosendorff 1997.
Martin 2000. Democratic Commitments.

Domestic Pressures and the Formation of Foreign Policy
8) Diversionary War Theory: Theory and case studies.
Levy 1989; Norpoth 1991; Smith 1996;

9) American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion.
Foyle 1999. Counting the Public In.  Ostrom and Job 1986.
Extra reading:  Fordham Building the Cold War Consensus

10) Student Presentations of Papers.

The Domestic Politics in Foreign Policy in Practice.
11) Allison 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.

12) Gelb, Leslie. The Irony of Vietnam. 1979.

Readings
Required Books:
     Ray, James Lee  1995. Democracies in International Conflict University of South Carolina Press,   Columbia, SC.
     Russett, Bruce 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
     Gowa, Joanne. 1999. Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton University  Press
     Goemans, H. E. 2000. War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. Princeton University Press.
     Evans Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (ed) 1993. Double-Edged Diplomacy;   International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley CA: University of California  Press.
     Martin, Lisa. 2000. Democratic Commitments. Princeton University Press.
     Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and  International Relations. Princeton Univ Pr.
     Foyle, Douglas C. 1999. Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.  New York: Columbia University Press.
     Gelb, Leslie and Richard K. Betts. 1979. The Irony of Vietnam : The System Worked. Brookings  Institute.
     Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow.  1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile  Crisis.  New York: Longman (2nd ed).
Recommended Books:
     Weart, Spencer R. 1998. Never at War: Why Democracies will not Fight One Another. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
     Fordham, Benjamin O. “Building the Cold War Consensus.” 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: University of  Michigan Press.

Articles:
     Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes.”  American Political Science Review 88(Sept.): 577-92.
     Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of Political   Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.''  American Political Science Review  89(December): 841-55.
     Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions  or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War” International Organization Vol 53 (2, spring) p. 233-266.
     Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. Limited Government and Powerful States. In  Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy. (Ed.) Randolph Siverson. Ann
     Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
      Lake, David A. 1992. “Powerful pacifists: democratic states and war” American Political Science Review 86(Mar.): 24-37.
     Milner, Helen and Peter B. Rosendorff 1997. “Democratic Politics and International Trade  Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on trade Liberalization.”  Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1): 117-146.
     McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. Trust and Cooperation through Agent Specific  Punishments. International Organization 54(4): 809-824.
     Norpoth, Helmet. 1991. The Falklands War and British Public Opinion. In International Crisis and Domestic Politics (ed) James W. Lamare. New York: Praeger.
     Levy, Jack. 1989. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.” in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed)  Handbook of War Studies. Boston: Unwin Hyman p. 259-288.
     Smith, Alastair 1996. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems" International  Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 133-153.
     Ostrom, Charles W. and Brian L. Job. 1986. “The President and the Political Use of Force.”  American Political Science Review 80: 541-566.
     Material Available Electronically:
     Reiter and Stam 2002 The Myth of the Democratic Arsenal forthcoming book
     Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2001. The Logic of Survival. Chapt. 5.&6
     Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith. 2001. Testing  the Selectorate Explanation of the Democratic Peace Working paper.