| Alastair Smith
Department of Political Science Yale University 124 Prospect St. PO BOX 208301 New Haven CT 06520-8301
|
| Alastair Smith
Department of Political Science Yale University 124 Prospect St. PO BOX 208301 New Haven CT 06520-8301
|
| Alastair Smith is an associate professor of political science at Yale University. He obtained his PhD in political science from theUniversity of Rochester in 1995, and his BA in chemistry from Oxford University in 1990. Prior to arriving at Yale he taught at Washington University in St Louis. His main research interests are formal models of international behavior. |
Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political
Institutions in International Crises
Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Main text in pdf.
The mathematical appendix to this article was exclude at the resquest
of the editor. It appears head as a pdf
file.
Abstract. We examine the role of an honest record in the credibility of diplomatic communications: why, on the brink of a crisis, an aggressive state may be deterred by a claim to resist. In contrast to traditional arguments linking credibility to a reputation for resolve, power, or strength, we posit that credibility arises from the expectation of future, continued gains from retaining an honest record. Diplomatic statements are believed only if a country's or leader's credibility is unmarred. Leaders keep their word so that they are believed in later crises. Two environments are contrasted: one in which a country's record for honesty resides within the country as a whole and another in which reputation resides with individual leaders. In this later case, citizens have an incentive to remove leaders caught bluffing. More robust than previous reputation theories, this model also offers comparative statics for when diplomacy will be more effective, namely when leaders are domestically accountable.
Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments.
in pdf and ps
Abstract I propose and test an informational
theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate
estimates of future outcomes that the citizens. The prospect of declining
future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders
condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance,
early elections signal a leader’s lack of confidence in future outcomes.
The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the
signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments from 1945, I test the
theories predicted relationship between the timing of elections, electoral
support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who
call elections early, relative to expectations, experience a decline in
their popular support (relative to re-announcement levels). The theory
also relates post-electoral measures of performance and the timing election.
As predicted, snap elections signal a decline in
subsequent performance.
Cooperating Democrats, Defecting Autocrats,
by Fiona E.S. McGillivray and Alastair Smith
Postscript, PDF,
zipfile(various
versions)
Abstract
Using the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma as a modeling platform,
we examine how the domestic political institutions of nations affect their
ability to cooperate internationally. We propose a strategy, the Leader
Specific Grim Trigger, in which leaders direct punishments for past defections
at the leader responsible rather than at the nation she represents. Leaders
refuse to cooperate with those leaders that have cheated them in the past.
However, by being prepare to cooperate with new leaders, cooperation can
be restored. The focus of punishment on specific leaders rather than the
nation means that domestic electorates want to remove leaders that defect.
Hence, leaders that are held domestically accountable pay audience costs
for failing to cooperate. In addition to showing that democratic dyads
can cooperate to a greater extent than other pairs of nations, the model
produces hypotheses about both the domestic consequences of international
cooperation and the relationship between leadership change and the restoration
of cooperative agreements.
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,
by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair
Smith.
postscript, pdf
Abstract
We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions
and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that
constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders,
when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the
war effort than are autocrats. This follows ecause the survival of
political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy.
The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage
ver autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets since their institutional
constraints cause them to mobilize resources toward the war effort.
In addition to trying harder, democrats are also more selective in their
choice of targets. Since defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement
for democrats than for utocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect
to win. These two factors lead to the interactions between polities that
is often referred to as the democratic peace.
Election Timing
I have a variety of projects that fall under this title.
I have a forthcoming article in the British Journal of Political Science.
Due to space constraints the editors requested that I suppress part of
the analysis from that article. It is imcluded here as an electronic appendix.
I have also written a book on election timing. The manuscript and the
data can be found here.
Election Timing