Associate Professor
406B CT Hall
(203) 432-1684
katalin.balog@yale.edu

Home page: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kb237/

Education
PhD 1998, Rutgers University

Areas of Interest

My primary areas of research are the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. In philosophy of mind I am especially interested in and have been working on the nature of consciousness and on the theory of concepts. In metaphysics I have been working on metaphysical necessity, its relations to conceptual necessity and on the proper formulation and evaluation of physicalism. These interests come together in my work on the conceivability arguments concerning qualia. Recent philosophical discussion of these arguments involves discussion of zombies (these zombies are not those of "Night of the Living Dead” but an invention of philosophers). I show (contra David Chalmers and others) that the conceivability of zombies does not entail their metaphysical possibility. In my view, the very feature of the concepts we apply to our conscious experiences that allow for the conceivability of zombies also shows that the required links between conceivability and possibility fail.

I am currently writing a book on consciousness and phenomenal concepts. The book provides a treatment of the history of the conceivability arguments, and presents a refutation that is applicable to all their manifestations, irrespective of the semantic framework in which they are formulated. Even though, in my view, the conceivability and explanatory gap arguments are answerable, the physicalist nevertheless has to face the problem that it is very hard to understand how purely physical processes add up to the phenomenon of consciousness. I argue that our lack of understanding the psycho-physical connection is not due to consciousness being non-physical but rather to the nature of phenomenal concepts. In my view, phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by the phenomenal states they apply to. My theory of phenomenal concepts, “quotational account” explains the puzzling features of consciousness, including the conceivability of zombies and the explanatory gap in a physicalist framework.

I am also interested in intentionality, free choice, and personal identity. I suspect that each of these involve concepts that, as in the case of consciousness, are metaphysically misleading. Some further interests are psychoanalysis and Buddhist accounts of mind.