

**Wartime Experiences and Political Life:
The Case of Post-War Aceh
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Introduction

How do the displacement and trauma that accompany civil war affect post-war society? How do they affect peoples' efforts to resume normal participation in their day-to-day lives? Questions of this kind have become especially important in the wake of the uptick in the total number of civil wars that has occurred in the last 20 years. While the scourge of civil war continues in many locations, other places that endured such wars have entered the post-conflict phase in which the chaos of the war is replaced by the distinctively pernicious chaos of peacebuilding.

This paper contributes to the understanding of post-conflict reconstruction by focusing on the ways in which displacement, return, and trauma affect post-conflict political life. If indeed there is a relationship between wartime experiences and post-conflict political life, the reasons we should be interested in this relationship are obvious. The contemporary situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are only the most recent and well known in a long list of places in which the international community has found itself trying to build a functioning political culture on a foundation whose wartime (and prewar) experiences make this a difficult proposition at best. Wartime experiences can be even more problematic in the more common post-conflict societies in which the international community's presence is not as muscular.

I distinguish in this paper between political participation and political attitudes. I also distinguish between displacement and return, on the one hand, and trauma in general on the other. To be sure, forced displacement is a type of trauma that is common during war. But displacement and return are worth distinguishing conceptually from trauma for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, both displacement and return, like migration, involve an added element of uncertainty in that they are defined by a change of location that brings with it complications that are distinct from the complications associated with traumatic experiences more generally. The vast literature on migration and displacement suggests these events could have an impact on political life that is distinct from the general impact of trauma on politics.

Practically, displacement and return are distinct from trauma in that the former are the focus of much more international attention than the latter. Since the founding of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1950, forced migration and population movement have been on the international community's agenda in a way that traumatic experiences more broadly defined cannot claim to have been. One policy implication of this research, then, is to question this focus; policies focused on forced migration may miss an issue that has important implications for post-conflict political life.

¹ The data on which this research is based were collected in Aceh, Indonesia through a project funded by the United Nations Development Program and jointly implemented with the International Organization for Migration. I owe a debt of gratitude to both organizations for allowing me to participate in the project. In particular, I want to thank Melina Nathan of UNDP and Jesse Grayman of IOM. I would also like to thank Scott Guggenheim, Susan Wong, and Sri Kuntari of the World Bank for making my research in Indonesia possible, and Junko Onishi, Laetitia LeMestre and John Voss for their assistance while I was in Jakarta. The flaws and errors in this paper are entirely my own. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in here do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM, the United Nations, or the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, I examine these relationships in Southeast Asia, a context that has been previously unexplored in the literature. The setting is post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia. Second, I study in a single population the separate effects of traumatic events on political participation and political attitudes. Existing research has focused on either participation or attitudes, but to my knowledge no other research has considered both sets of outcomes in a single population. Finally, in response to the focus in the policy world on displacement and the return of displaced people, I study their effects separately. In addition to the focus on displacement and return, I take advantage of a 42 question trauma checklist to identify and examine the varying effects of a range of other types of traumatic events.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I situate this research in the existing literature. Next I briefly describe the situation in Aceh to help frame our understanding of context in which the data were collected. I then discuss the data used in this analysis and the empirical strategy for investigating the questions above. I then present the findings and conclude.

Wartime Trauma and Political Life

Civil war and the traumatic events associated with it are generally expected to have an important impact on post-conflict political life. Cleavages are petrified during a war, moderation becomes a vice rather than a virtue, and the bonds of trust between people and groups, which are the grease that help the wheels of participatory governance turn, are damaged or destroyed. Limited evidence from the civil war and post-conflict literatures supports this notion. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), for example, find that higher levels of hostility during a civil war decrease the odds of peacebuilding success. Kaufmann's (1996, 1998) argument that ethnic partition is the most plausible "solution" to many ethnic conflicts implies that the impact of such conflict on political life will be long-lasting, though he does not directly examine this question. Other research in the peacebuilding literature emphasizes the need for reconciliation in order to achieve a durable peace (Bar Tal 2000; Kaufman 2006; Wilmer 2008), suggesting that absent reconciliation the wounds of war will affect post-conflict life. There is, however, less evidence on exactly how such a relationship might work. What are mechanisms through which wartime trauma can affect post-conflict political life?

The first step in examining this question is to be more specific about what is meant by political life. One fruitful way to do so is to distinguish between the level and the kind of participation in political life. Participation can be widespread or more limited, and the nature of that participation can be more or less polarized. The consequences of both participation and polarization are, in many respects, conditional on one another. During a conflict, for example, as Kaufmann (1996) stresses, polarization is typically quite high. The consequences of this polarization can depend in large part on the extent of political participation. From a peacebuilding perspective, widespread participation in a highly polarized setting may be a recipe for renewed conflict. Lower levels of participation in similarly polarized society, however, may lead to a very different outcome in the short and longer term.

While this paper does not examine the consequences of variation in participation and polarization, a recognition of their importance in a post-conflict setting begs the questions that are of interest in this paper. What factors affect participation and polarization? In particular, how are the traumatic events experienced during a conflict related to participation and polarization in the post-conflict setting?

The Effect of Traumatic Events on Participation

Traumatic events could affect post-conflict political participation in a variety of ways. Victims of trauma may, for example, suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and be unable or unwilling to re-engage in the lives they led before the trauma occurred. There is evidence that PTSD and other trauma-related psychological disorders are a significant, if underappreciated, fact of life in post-conflict Aceh and appear to be related to difficulties finding work, resuming normal livelihood activities, and finding proper food and shelter (IOM 2007). These kinds of findings suggest that resumption of participation in political life may be slower in coming to those who experienced higher levels of trauma.

On the other hand, traumatic events in a conflict setting do not occur in a vacuum. Perpetrators of such trauma rarely act indiscriminately. Rather, as Kalyvas (2007) discusses in detail, violence is typically selective in nature and is designed in large part to send a message both to its victims and to those around the victim. To the extent this is the case, it is not clear that the effects of trauma will be limited to those who experience it directly or even to those whose household members experience it directly. The difference in post-conflict political participation between those who directly experience traumatic events and those who only experience it vicariously may in fact be quite small.

What's more, there are also reasons to imagine that trauma during a conflict may lead to increased political participation in the post-conflict setting. Those who survive traumatic events not infrequently use their experiences as a private or public inspiration for growth, which sometimes includes involvement in politics. This expectation is consistent with Post-Traumatic Growth Theory, which emphasizes positive responses to trauma (Tedeschi and Calhoun 1996; Powell, Rosner et al. 2003). Research by Blattman (2008) and by Bellows and Miguel (2008) suggests that this has happened in post-conflict settings in Africa. Blattman finds a positive relationship between participation and what he argues is random abduction into the conflict as a child soldier in Uganda. He then unpacks this abduction treatment into its constituent parts and finds that the effects of abduction on the political outcomes appear to occur primarily through the experience of being the victim of violence. Bellows and Miguel (2008) also find a positive relationship between experiencing war violence and political participation in post-conflict Sierra Leone. On balance, this discussion suggests the following testable hypothesis:

- H1: Those exposed to higher levels of wartime trauma will participate at higher levels in post-conflict political life.

What to expect of the relationship between displacement and return, on the one hand, and participation, on the other, is also unclear. As a specific form of trauma, displacement could have effects similar to those discussed above with respect to trauma more broadly defined. In addition, displacement may generate its own unique obstacles to or inspirations for participation in post-conflict political life.

Displacement could lead to increased political participation if the displaced respond to their circumstances by mobilizing to demand support from political authorities, who in turn have their own incentives to encourage or discourage such mobilization. In some cases, especially after they have been displaced for a longer period of time and the prospects for a rapid return diminish, the displaced may demand increased support in their places of displacement. In other cases, the displaced may mobilize to demand increased support for their efforts to return to their homes of origin (Belloni 2005, Heimerl 2005). In either case, such efforts by the displaced

necessarily involve more extensive political activity than is common among those who were never displaced. This dynamic is probably both a cause and a consequence of the way the international community emphasizes the displaced as a target of post-conflict assistance.

At the same time, depending on the circumstances, the displaced often face obstacles to participation. Such obstacles can include a lack of access to identity-certifying documents, corruption or theft of such official documentation, simple bureaucratic obstacles to voting in a location other than that in which a person is registered, intimidation by those seeking to disrupt an election, and security concerns or difficult terrain and long distances to polling stations (Krznaric 1997; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2007). Obstacles such as these may be more difficult to overcome amid the chaos and corruption of most post-conflict settings, but they are not dissimilar to the experiences of many migrants. Thus the migration literature finds that most forms of participation are lower among immigrants and naturalized citizens than among native-born citizens (DeSipio 1996) and among recent or first generation migrants than among succeeding generations of migrants (Kellstedt 1974; Lamare 1982; Bass and Casper 2001; Bass and Casper 2001).

The effect of IDP return on participation is, if anything, even less clear. Some of the obstacles that can impede IDPs from voting, such as problems with identity cards and bureaucratic delays, may still exist for people even after they return to their homes of origin. To the extent this is true, those who have returned from displacement should participate at lower levels than those who were never displaced. However, if we assume that improved conditions in the home of origin are important to the return decision, then many of these obstacles may no longer exist. In such cases, the experience of having been displaced may more closely resemble other forms of trauma and have similar effects. The logic discussed here suggests the following testable hypotheses.

- H2: Those who were displaced during a conflict and have not returned will participate at lower levels in post-conflict political life than those who were never displaced.
- H3: Those who were displaced and have already returned will participate at higher levels in post-conflict political life than those who were never displaced.

The Effect of Traumatic Events on Polarization

It is somewhat easier to formulate predictions about the relationship between traumatic events and polarization. While it is possible to imagine cases in which victims of trauma and displacement respond with an “enlightened” attitude that leads to intra-cleavage understanding, such a response is likely quite rare. Instead, traumatic events experienced during a conflict are most likely to lead to increased political polarization. Existing research supports this contention, at least in the short term. Carmil and Breznitz (1991) find that Israeli Holocaust survivors and their children are more likely to support centrally located political parties than are non-survivors and their children, suggesting that a long-term effect of trauma is to moderate political opinions. However, other research suggests that pain and loss leads to more expressive modes of political activism and a decreased willingness to compromise (Itkonen 2007). More generally, wartime trauma seems to decrease confidence in the ability of local institutions to serve as a locus for mediation of cleavages. For example, Pham et al (2004) find that exposure to traumatic events during the 1994 Rwanda genocide is related to higher levels of support for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and lower support for local trials of perpetrators, belief in nonviolence, belief in community, and interdependence with other ethnic groups. Collectively, then, the existing research suggests the following hypothesis:

H4: Those exposed to higher levels of wartime trauma will be more likely to be polarized politically.

Place can also be expected to have a strong effect on the way post-conflict polarization evolves. At the time displacement occurs, as Kaufmann (1996) discusses in reference to ethnic conflict, polarization is likely to be extreme and an ethnic security dilemma is likely to exist. When the conflict is settled, however, and peace begins to be seen as a real possibility, strong incentives emerge among those households living in the conflict zone to move beyond the cleavages that define the conflict and toward making the accommodations that are necessary for daily survival. Survival strategies during the conflict often require an absence of trust in anyone who might fall on the other side of the conflict cleavage. When the macro-level conflict is resolved, this necessity is gradually replaced by a return to strategies of survival that more closely resemble pre-war strategies focused on livelihood, production, and trade. Those who are not displaced, therefore, have the strongest incentives in the post-conflict setting to put aside the divisions that defined the conflict and to return to pre-conflict behaviors.

In contrast, the vision of life in the conflict zone among the displaced who do not return is often frozen in the past (Zetter 1994). At the time of displacement, all who live in the conflict zone may have similarly polarized political attitudes. But while those who are not displaced have incentives to re-establish bonds across lines of cleavage once the conflict ends, those who remain displaced are unlikely to have such incentives. This is especially true when the displaced settle in areas in which there are few from the other side of the divide that defines the conflict. This dynamic can in part explain the frequency with which diasporas seem to be more extreme in their political attitudes than those who stay behind in the home of origin.

The relationship between return and polarization is less clear. To the extent that the logic discussed here reflects reality, we should expect to see less political polarization among those who return than among those who remain displaced, since returnees would face the same incentives to cooperate across lines of cleavage as the never displaced. And to the extent that polarization decays over time in the post-conflict phase for those in the former conflict zone, as suggested above, we should expect to see decreasing polarization as the time since return increases such that at some point in attitudes among returnees come to closely resemble those of people who were not displaced. The dynamics described here suggest the following hypotheses:

H5: Those who were displaced during a conflict and have not returned will be more likely to be polarized politically than those who were never displaced.

H6: Those who were displaced during a conflict and have returned will be more polarized politically than those who were never displaced but less polarized than those who were displaced and have not returned.

The IDP Situation in Aceh

This project focuses on the conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, where a longstanding and fierce streak of anti-colonialist sentiment has inspired a series of independence movements over the years, the most recent of which featured a secessionist civil war between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the *Free Aceh Movement* (GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). GAM's rebellion in Indonesia grew out of Aceh's important role in the Indonesian fight for independence from the Dutch in the post-World War II years and from local dissatisfaction with the role Aceh eventually came to play in the new state. In the mid-1970s, with a group of only about 200

supporters, Hasan di Tiro, GAM's leader, declared Aceh's independence from Indonesia. Counterinsurgency operations began a short time later, but the small GAM group, taking advantage as so many insurgent groups do of an intimate knowledge of the local terrain, was able to survive. By the end of the 1970s, the portion of GAM's leadership that had not already been captured or killed had fled Indonesia and begun, with marginal success, to try find ways to train and equip their supporters in Aceh while raising support for their cause among foreign governments and activists (Nessen 2006).

In its origins, the conflict had a significant religious dimension, with leaders of the independence and autonomy movements pushing for a more significant role for Islam in the way both Aceh and all of Indonesia were governed (Alfian 2006). Through the years, though, this religious dimension began to take a back seat to an ethnic dimension. Aceh has historically been a multi-ethnic province, as nearly all in Indonesia are. Acehnese have dominated the province, with Gayo, Kluet, and Alue Jamee as three of the other more prominent ethnic groups that have historically lived in the area. Beginning around 1966, the Javanese presence in Aceh began to increase significantly. Javanese, who historically hail from the island of Jawa, the most populous and densely populated island in the archipelago, are the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia. When Suharto took the reins of power in Indonesia in 1966, he instituted a transmigration policy that encouraged and provided assistance to Indonesians from Jawa who wanted to move to other islands. The policy was to serve multiple purposes: to relieve overcrowding in Jawa, to exploit undeveloped resources in other parts of the country, and to encourage and develop closer ties between the central government, which is located on Jawa and is dominated by ethnic Javanese, and the more remote islands. Unsurprisingly, especially in Aceh, the result often turned out to be quite different, with local conflicts emerging between the long-time residents and the newcomers. As the ethnic aspect of the war increased in importance, Javanese transmigrants in Aceh came to be viewed by some Acehnese as proxies for central government rule. GAM's push for autonomy emerged from these years with a strong ethnic component that to an extent pitted Acehnese against Javanese, with the remaining ethnic groups often caught in the middle (Hedman 2005; Nessen 2006).

The conflict in Aceh continued on a relatively small scale throughout the 1980s and 1990s, alternating between periods of higher and lower intensity. By 1999, after Aceh had been considered a zone of military operations for more than 10 years, the changes afoot in Indonesia were to have a significant effect on the situation in Aceh. The political opening that came with the fall of Suharto in 1998 facilitated public demonstrations in Aceh in support of a referendum on independence for the province. While a referendum was never held, the more public agitation for independence led to increased international pressure on Indonesia to negotiate an end to the conflict. Negotiations went on in fits and starts for several years while clashes between GAM and the Indonesian National Army (TNI – *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) continued. As is so common in such conflicts, civilians were often caught in the middle, and displacement began to become a significant issue in 1999. In May 2003, the Indonesian Government declared a military emergency and launched a full scale offensive (Schulze 2006).

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake struck off the coast of Aceh, leading to a devastating tsunami that is estimated to have taken the lives of more than 160,000 people in Aceh alone. One consequence of this tsunami was that the Indonesian government, unable to cope alone with a disaster on this scale, reopened Aceh to foreign aid workers. Since then, billions of dollars of foreign aid money have flowed to the province. Peace talks between GAM and the government

restarted in early 2005, and on August 15 of that year, the government and GAM leaders formally signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that included a comprehensive agreement for Acehese self-government within Indonesia. The combination of a peace agreement and the resources that have accompanied the tsunami recovery effort have for the most part been effective; free elections for provincial level officials were held for the first time in Aceh's history on December 11, 2006. The elections went off without any significant problems, and candidates associated with GAM succeeded beyond all expectations. Although circumstances have improved dramatically since the MOU signing, an estimated 36,000 households that were displaced due to the conflict had yet to return as of the end of 2006 (The Kecamatan Development Program 2007).

Data Collection

The data for this project were collected by the UN Development Program (UNDP) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the latter two phases of a three phase IDP assessment project in Aceh and its neighboring province, North Sumatra, in February and April, 2007. The first phase of the assessment involved identifying as many IDP settlement sites as possible. In this project, an IDP settlement site was identified as being a location in which resided: (a) people who were displaced by the conflict and have not returned; or (b) people who were displaced by the conflict and returned after the signing of the MoU on August 15, 2005. This was accomplished first through discussions with more than 150 different governmental and non-governmental organizations active in IDP and post-conflict issues in the province. There is little coordination between most of these agencies, and this initial effort was designed to get as broad a picture as possible of each one's perception of the overall situation. Next, field visits were conducted to 250 sites identified during these discussions as having one or both of the two kinds of IDPs described above. These sites were randomly selected from 400 that were identified during the initial conversations with key provincial-level stakeholders. Village heads were asked for a count of the number of each type of IDP currently located in the village. In 222 of the 250 field visits, of one or both of the two types was confirmed, while in 28 cases, it was learned that there were no households that matched either criteria. The 222 villages were then labeled according to whether they had IDPs of the first type (not yet returned), the second type (returned since the MoU), or a combination of the two.

Fifty survey sites for the second phase of the assessment were randomly selected from the 222 at which it had been confirmed in Phase 1 that there were IDPs. The selection of these 50 sites was first stratified based on province and IDP type present. Fourteen villages were selected from North Sumatra, the province that borders Aceh to the south and the place to which many IDPs, particularly non-Acehnese, fled. It is worth highlighting that, by definition, these villages consisted exclusively of the first type of IDPs, those who had not yet returned. Of the 36 villages selected in Aceh, 12 were identified as having IDPs who had not yet returned, 7 as having IDPs who had returned, and 17 as having a mixture of the two. Field teams of two enumerators then visited the sites and after collecting a list of qualifying households from the village head and/or IDP community leader, randomly selected 24 households to be interviewed. An actual interview subject was then selected randomly from each household such that there would be an equal number of male and female respondents, all of whom would be older than 17 years of age.

The third and final phase of the assessment focused on sites from which these IDPs originated. Twenty four villages were selected across 3 districts in Aceh. The goal in selecting these villages was to find 12 to which IDPs had mostly returned and another 12 to which IDPs had mostly not

returned.² In each village visited, enumerators asked the village head for a list of all the households that either had never been displaced or, if they had been displaced, had returned prior to the signing of the MOU. Selection of a primary respondent from each household was then done in the same manner as it was done in Phase 2. Approximately half of the Phase 3 respondents reported having been displaced during the conflict.

The surveys used in Phases 2 and 3 of the assessment were not identical, but included many questions in common. This analysis uses a dataset that is made up of a combination of the Phase 2 and Phase 3 data and includes a total of 1752 observations.

Missing Data

In some of the analyses in this paper, the traditional approach of listwise deletion for observations for which there is a missing value results in a significant number of observations being lost. This is especially the case when I include control variables, since only one variable must have missing data for an observation to be dropped. As King, Honaker et al (2001) discuss, listwise deletion is both inefficient and bias-inducing, except in the rare cases where the missingness is completely random (MCAR). That is, if there is any information that could predict whether or not an observation of a particular variable will be missing or not, then estimates obtained through listwise deletion are potentially biased.

Multiple imputation is almost uniformly an improvement on listwise deletion. It is more efficient because observations that would otherwise be dropped are not dropped. In addition, it is unbiased both if the missingness is completely random and if the missingness is related to any of the other variables in the data (MAR).³ The procedure relies on the distribution of the observed data across all variables to predict a distribution of values on the missing data. Its effectiveness is therefore improved by including in the process as many predictors of missingness as possible. I selected approximately 190 of the more than 700 indicators in the complete dataset on which this research is based for inclusion in the imputation process. The multiple imputation estimates presented in this paper are therefore based on a total of 5 datasets that have a complete 1752 observations for nearly all variables.⁴

Description of the Data

General Description

The large majority of the respondents in the dataset were both interviewed in and indicated they were originally from villages located in one of two districts in Aceh: Aceh Timur (593 interviews, 683 from Aceh Timur) and Bener Meriah (583 interviews, 413 from Bener Meriah).

² In the end, some of the villages visited were not on the list generated by this process. In some cases this was because the named home of origin could not be located. Sometimes this was because of an ongoing process of “pemekaran”, or blossoming, by which administrative units from the province to the sub-village are dividing and creating new units with new names. In at least one case, the enumeration team was told when they arrived in a listed village that no one from that village had been displaced. When a destination village could not be located, a nearby village was selected as a substitute.

³ See King et al (2001) for a detailed discussion of this. The only circumstance under which multiple imputation produces biased estimates is when the missingness is nonignorable (NI). This occurs when the missingness is a function of the value of the missing data *and* the values of that missing data cannot be predicted by other variables included in the imputation process. In such cases, both listwise deletion and multiple imputation produce biased estimates.

⁴ This was done using the R package *Amelia II*, an updated version of the *Amelia* package described in King et al (2001).

Aceh Timur is on the Eastern coast of the province and its population is concentrated in the coastal areas. It was a center of support for GAM during the conflict, partly because it is predominantly Acehnese and partly because it is relatively far from Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh. Aceh Timur was also the district most heavily affected by the conflict, according to data collected by the World Bank in Aceh (The World Bank 2006). The World Bank data draws on a variety of sources to rank the intensity of conflict experienced in each of 227 sub-districts in Aceh as high (3), medium (2), or low (1). Table 1, which gives the weighted mean of this ranking by district as well as the number of interviews conducted in and people from each site, shows that the mean conflict intensity in Aceh Timur was 2.79, considerably higher than any other district in the province.⁵

Bener Meriah is in many ways a study in contrast to Aceh Timur. Located in the central highlands of the province, Bener Meriah is home to a relatively large number of ethnic Gayo. Though it is a mountainous region with relatively difficult terrain, and though considerable displacement occurred in Bener Meriah, it was less heavily affected by the conflict than was Aceh Timur, ranking 1.27 on the World Bank Conflict Intensity Index. Interviews were also conducted in 10 other districts, four of which are in the neighboring province of Sumatra Utara.

[TABLE 1 HERE]

Dependent Variables

I use five indicators for political participation and four for political attitudes. The first political participation indicator (vote) is a count ranging from 0 to 2 of the number of the following questions to which the respondent answered ‘yes’:

- Did you vote in the latest village head election?
- Did you vote in the provincial elections for governor and district head in 2006?

The second political participation indicator (meetings) is based on the answer to the question:

- How often do you attend meetings in your current location?⁶

Responses to this indicator range from 1-5, where 1 indicates not at all and 5 indicates more than 5 times per month.

I draw three outcome indicators from a list of 12 questions in the survey about participation in various community organizations. The first (*leadership*) indicates whether a person says that a member of his/her household participates in “government founded groups or institutions such as *Rukun Tetangga (RT)*, *Rukun Warga (RW)*, *adat* institutions or hamlet groups.” Each of these groups is a government sanctioned administrative unit below the village level. Hamlet groups, RWs, and RTs are led by locals but usually subject to some oversight by the village head, who is

⁵ The mean intensity for the province is 1.81.

⁶ This was the exact wording used in Phase 3 of the survey. The Phase 2 question was confusing in that it was (unsuccessfully) designed to refer to the current place of displacement for those who had not yet returned and the most recent place of displacement for those who had already returned. Feedback from the enumerators made clear that this was widely misunderstood among those who had returned. Since we do not know which Phase 2 respondents among those who had returned referred to their most recent place of displacement and which referred to their current location, I changed the responses of all Phase 2 respondents who had returned to missing and imputed their values using the procedure described above. Recall this approach is consistent with the fact that the situation described here makes the missingness I have created MAR and that multiple imputation estimates are unbiased in cases of MAR.

in turn subject to oversight by higher levels in the administrative structure. The smallest unit is the RT, which usually consists of about 40 households and is sometimes roughly translated as a neighborhood watch group. Adat institutions are traditional inter and intra-village consultation and conflict resolution mechanisms.

The next indicator of participation (*political party*) is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if a respondent says that a member of his/her household participates in a “community organization such as a political party.” Finally, I created an index of community participation (*comorg*) by counting the total number of questions about community organizations to which a respondent answered that someone in the household does currently participate. This index could in theory range from 0 to 12, but in fact ranges only from 0 to 9.

My indicators for political attitudes are all generated from answers to the following four survey questions:

- Do you think people with a pro-GAM (pro-NKRI) background around here would vote for a person with a pro-NKRI (pro-GAM) background if he were standing for District Head?
- Would you vote for a person with a pro-NKRI (pro-GAM) background if he were standing for District Head?

The term NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*), translated as Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, is a somewhat provocative way in Aceh of referring to the state. In the survey, respondents could answer yes, no, or depends to each of these questions. For purpose of this analysis, I have coded as a 1 those who answer yes or depends and as 0 those who answer no.

Analyses using the first set of questions – those about the expectations of others’ voting preferences – are done using these measures. An increase in the variable *others_gam* thus indicates that the respondent thinks that others with a pro-NKRI background would vote for a candidate with a pro-GAM background. I interpret this (and the flipside question – *others_nkr*) to mean that the respondent perceives others of the type described in the question to be not polarized.

The questions about own voting preferences require a different approach. For example, a respondent who would vote for neither a candidate with a pro-GAM background nor a candidate with a pro-NKRI background may not properly be described as polarized, while a respondent who would vote for a candidate of one type but not the other could be so described. I have therefore developed two indicators of own polarization using the responses to the questions about own voting preferences. The first (*polar*) takes on a value of 0 for any respondent who answers yes to one of the questions and no to the other and as 1 anyone who answers yes to both questions or no to both questions. Similar to the interpretation of the measure of others’ voting practices, a decrease in the variable *polar* indicates that a respondent would vote for one kind of candidate but not the other. This coding scheme is illustrated in the figure below:

Figure 1: Coding for polarization of self

	Would you vote for a person with a pro-NKRI background?	
	Yes	No

Would you vote for a person with a pro-GAM background?	Yes	Not polarized (1)	Polarized (0)
	No	Polarized (0)	Not polarized (1)

The second polarization indicator (*polar_restrictive*) is more restrictive in that it codes as not polarized *only* those who answer yes to both questions about own vote choice while counting as polarized everyone who says no to either or both questions. In terms of figure 1, it codes respondents who fall into the southeast cell as polarized. Descriptive statistics for each of the outcome variables are provided in Table 2.

[TABLE 2 HERE]

Independent Variables

The variable indicating traumatic experiences is based on a list of 42 yes-no questions of traumatic events that were known to have occurred during the conflict. They range in seriousness from indicators of having suffered the confiscation or destruction of personal property to having suffered the murder or death of a child or spouse. The main indicator of trauma (*trauma_tot*) used in this paper is an additive index of these 42 questions. I take this as a very rough estimate of the level of trauma a person experienced during the conflict.

However, such an index is problematic in at least two ways. First, it provides equal weight to each response and thus effectively equates the destruction of property with the murder of a child or spouse. To address this shortcoming, I have also classified each of the responses into one of six categories: death of a loved one (*trauma_death*), sexual violence (*trauma_sexual*), personal physical violence (*trauma_violence*), victimized by TNI or GAM (*trauma_victim*), you or a loved one kidnapped or disappeared (*trauma_kid*), economic impact (*trauma_econ*), and forced to commit acts of violence against others (*trauma_commit*). The value a respondent takes on each of these 6 variables gives the percentage of questions in that category to which the respondent answered yes. In all cases, therefore, an increase in the variable indicates an increase in the level of trauma experienced.

The second shortcoming with the traumatic events index is that the yes-no format of the questions precludes the possibility of someone indicating they experienced a particular traumatic event more than once.⁷ The simplest response to this shortcoming is to more clearly specify that the index gives a measure of the number of types of traumatic events experienced rather than the overall level of trauma experienced.

Respondents in Phase 2 of the survey are all automatically coded as having been displaced, as this was a prerequisite for having been interviewed. Respondents in Phase 3 were asked whether they were ever displaced from their homes because of conflict for more than 30 days. Determination of return status is based on whether or not respondents are interviewed in the village they identify as their home of origin. In the analyses that follow, never displaced is the excluded category and two dummy variables are used: one to indicate displaced and returned (*return*), one to indicate displaced and not returned (*no_return*). Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables of interest are shown in Table 3.

[TABLE 3 HERE]

⁷ Thanks to Robert Person for pointing this out.

Control Variables

All of the analyses control for the respondents' gender (1=female, 0=male), age (years), and ethnicity. The survey offered 12 answer options to the ethnicity question, but the large majority of respondents identified themselves as Acehnese, Gayo, or Javanese. I have therefore collected all the responses outside of these three in a single excluded category of "Other". I control for education using a measure of the education level of the most highly educated person in the respondent's household (*edhigh*). I also control for socio-economic status using an index of the answers to three questions about whether or not the respondent possessed different kinds of assets (*assets*) prior to the time when displacement from the home of origin occurred.⁸

In the analyses of meeting attendance, leadership, political party, and community organizations, I also include as a control a measure of participation in each respective activity before displacement from the respondent's home of origin occurred. For example, the analyses of trauma's effect on meeting attendance includes as a control the response to a question about meeting attendance prior to when displacement from the respondent's home of origin occurred.

It is also worth pointing out some of the measures that are *not* included as control variables, even though they are considered in some existing literature to be predictors of political participation. Leighley and Vedlitz (1999), for example, argue that voter turnout is affected by socioeconomic status, psychological resources, social connectedness, group consciousness or identity, and group conflict. While indicators for some of these categories are available in the data, they are not included in these analyses because they are most likely to be mechanisms through which trauma or displacement could have an effect on political life. That is, while social connectedness likely has an independent effect on political participation, it is also likely a mechanism through which trauma affects political participation. Inclusion of a measure of social connectedness would absorb some of trauma's effect on participation, biasing downward the finding regarding the relationship of interest in this paper. The full list of variables and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.

[TABLE 4 HERE]

Empirical Strategy

The basic econometric model I estimate is straightforward:

$$y_i = b_0 + b_1x_i + b_2c_i + u_i$$

In this formulation, y_i represents the outcome variable for individual i (*vote*, *meetings*, *leadership*, *political party*, *community organizations*, *polar*, *polar_restrictive*, *others_nkr*, or *others_gam*), x_i represents the independent variable(s) of interest for individual i (*trauma_tot*, *trauma_death*, *trauma_sexual*, *trauma_violence*, *trauma_victim*, *trauma_kid*, *trauma_econ*, *trauma_commit*, *return*, or *no_return*), and c_i represents a matrix of all the control variables discussed above. I estimate a linear regression model for *vote*, *meetings*, and *community organizations* and a logit model for *leadership*, *political party*, and the polarization outcomes. Where I am interested in trauma, I separately estimate the total index and each of the categories.

⁸ Separate analyses using different measures of socio-economic status, including the log of pay received and a measure of house size, did not appreciably change the results presented here.

Where I am interested in displacement and return, I use both the indicator for return and no return, leaving not displaced as an excluded category against which each of these is compared.

For each linear model, in order to absorb any effects that might be common across all respondents within a particular location, I run two different versions of fixed effects: one including fixed effects for the enumeration site and one including fixed effects for the respondent's home of origin. In each case, I also use standard errors that are clustered on the same unit as the fixed effect. One consequence of including fixed effects is that I cannot estimate the effects of any village-level attributes. In general this is not a problem because I am interested in outcomes at a different level of analysis.

For each of the dichotomous outcome indicators, there are some locations (either in enumeration site or in the home of origin) for which there is no variation on the outcome. This results in observations from these locations being dropped from the analysis, which makes multiple imputation impossible in cases in which the observations being dropped vary from one imputed dataset to the next. Therefore, the logit analyses here do not include the fixed effects for enumeration site or home of origin, but rather a dummy variable for whether the respondent is located in North Sumatra or Aceh at the time of the interview. However, these analyses also use standard errors that are clustered on the enumeration site. In each of these cases I also estimate a linear regression model on the dichotomous outcome measure using fixed effects and clustered standard errors as discussed above.

Finally, in recognition of the fact that the sample selected for this interview is weighted heavily toward households that were displaced by the conflict, I use Aceh-level estimates of the number of people in each category (never displaced, displaced and returned, displaced and not returned) to weight the estimates accordingly.⁹ I present both weighted and unweighted findings.¹⁰

Results

To keep the presentation manageable, I present here only the estimates for the independent variables of interest for each outcome measure and do not discuss estimates for any of the control variables. The results are presented using a graphical representation of the point estimates of the coefficient of interest and 95% confidence intervals for each model estimated. Each graph shows several models run for each combination of independent and dependent variable of interest. The further the center of the confidence interval is from the dotted vertical line at 0, the larger the coefficient estimate. Where the horizontal line representing the confidence interval crosses the dotted vertical line at 0, the estimate does not reach statistical significance at the .05 level.

For the analyses of outcome measures that are not dichotomous (Vote, Meeting attendance, Community organizations) and the independent variables of interest are the traumatic events

⁹ These estimates come from data collected for a survey of villages in Aceh conducted by the World Bank in 2006 (The Kecamatan Development Program 2007).

¹⁰ The elephant in the room here is the selection problem. In spite of the controls and methods used here, my estimates will be biased if being selected into trauma, displacement, or return is correlated with unobserved determinants of the various outcomes of interest here. I think this is not a major problem in the analysis of the effect of trauma or displacement, but, as I explicitly acknowledge in the discussion about the effects of return, it is quite likely a problem with respect to that independent variable. Households are probably more likely to return to places they expect to be able to participate in political life. If this is true, we would be unable to trust a finding that return leads to higher levels of participation. Explicit attempts to address this concern will have to wait for future versions of the paper.

index or displacement and return, the four horizontal lines, from top to bottom, represent the following four models:

- Linear regression, fixed effects for enumeration site, weighted according to displacement status;
- Linear regression, fixed effects for enumeration site, not weighted;
- Linear regression, fixed effects for home of origin, weighted according to displacement status;
- Linear regression, fixed effects for home of origin, not weighted.

Where the outcome measure is dichotomous (Political leadership, Political party member, Polarized, Polarized restrictive, Others NKR, Others GAM) and the independent variables of interest are the traumatic events index or displacement and return, the four horizontal lines, from top to bottom, represent the following four models:

- Logit regression, control for province of enumeration, weighted according to displacement status;
- Logit regression, control for province of enumeration;
- Linear regression, fixed effects for enumeration site, weighted according to displacement status;
- Linear regression, fixed effects for home of origin, weighted according to displacement status.

In the analyses of the different types of trauma, findings are presented for only one model for each analysis and are grouped together according to the independent variable of interest. Thus the figure showing the relationship between different types of trauma and participation show one horizontal line for each participation outcome indicator (Vote, Meetings, Community organizations, Political leadership, and Political party) for each of the seven categories of traumatic events.

Political Participation

A first look at Figure 2, which shows the effect of trauma on participation, suggests some support for H1. There is a clear pattern across all the outcome measures of interest indicating that those who experienced trauma are more likely to participate. The outcomes are not always statistically significant at conventional levels, but the consistency of the responses across all models provides some confidence that the relationship exists. The same pattern is evident in Figure 3, which shows the same relationship broken down by type of traumatic event experienced. With only one exception in the 35 models presented, there is a positive relationship between traumatic events and post-conflict participation. These findings are consistent with previous findings in post-conflict Africa by Blattman (2008) and by Bellows and Miguel (2008) that traumatic experiences can lead to increased political participation.

[FIGURES 2 & 3 HERE]

A closer look at the coefficient estimates from Figure 2, however, suggest it is worth examining these results a bit more closely. The scale at the top of the figure shows that the coefficient estimates for every model shown is less than .1. The estimates for voting and meeting attendance, for example, are closer to .01. This begs the question: Even if there is a consistently statistically significant relationship between traumatic events and different measures of participation, how substantively significant is that effect? Simulation is a convenient way to

address this question.¹¹ Table 5 presents the results of simulations conducted to estimate the coefficients for traumatic events regressed on voting, meeting attendance, and participation in community organizations. These estimates are presented alongside the weighted means of each outcome and, in the case of meeting attendance and community organizations, the pre-conflict measure of the same outcome.¹²

[TABLE 5 HERE]

Looking first at the comparisons between the first and second columns for the latter two variables, we see just how much the conflict affected participation. Respondent indicated that prior to the conflict, members of the household participated in an average of slightly more than 5 types of community organizations. The current participation level stands at only 2.69 organizations. Similarly, meeting participation dropped from a mean on the scale of 2.48 to a mean of 2.12 (recall this variable is not a count, but an ordered response in which 1 indicates no participation and 5 indicates participating in more than 5 meetings per month).

Turning now to the two rightmost columns, however, we see that the impact of trauma on this participation is somewhat negligible. Respondents who are in the 10th percentile of the trauma index are expected to participate in 1.75 elections, while those in the 90th percentile are expected to participate in 1.81 elections (out of a possible 2). A similarly small effect is present in the simulations of meeting attendance, political party membership, and community organization participation. This latter is perhaps the clearest and most intuitive. Those who are at the 10th percentile on the trauma index are expected to report that their household participates in 2.43 organizations. Those in the 90th percentile are expected to report that their household participates in 3 organizations.

The standout in this regard is the estimate for political leadership. In this case, respondents who are in the 90th percentile of the trauma index are 10 percentage points more likely to report that someone in their household is a political leader of some kind than are respondents in the 10th percentile of the trauma index. At the same time, it is worth noting that even at this level, the mean level of participation for all respondents prior to the conflict was more than twice the level of participation afterward.

In summary, traumatic events experienced during a conflict seem to lead to increased political participation in the post-conflict phase, but the magnitude of these effects is generally quite small. The exception to this pattern is political leadership. Not only is the coefficient estimate for political leadership more statistically significant than the other estimates, it is also more substantively significant.

The findings with respect to the effect of displacement and return on participation are much more confused than the findings regarding the effect of trauma. As shown in Figure 4, there is no noticeable pattern for either the coefficient on return or the coefficient on displaced but not returned. Nearly every confidence interval crosses the horizontal dotted line indicating that it has not reached conventional levels of statistical significance. What's more, as with the findings on the effect of trauma, the substantive significance of the findings on displacement and return are generally quite small. Collectively, these findings suggest there is little support for H2 and H3.

¹¹ The simulations are all conducted using either the Stata program *Clarify* or the R program *Zelig*

¹² For simplicity, all the following results are calculated with all independent variables (including the dichotomous indicators of gender and ethnicity) set at their weighted mean. Also, the simulations use an indicator variable for living in North Sumatra rather than the fixed effects for enumeration site or home of origin.

[FIGURE 4 HERE]

Political Attitudes

The findings regarding the effect of traumatic events on own polarization and perceptions of others' polarization are given in Figures 5 and 6. As was the case with participation, there is a clear pattern in these two figures. With only two exceptions across all the models run in both tables combined, the coefficient estimates are negative. In the case of the traumatic events index, a majority of these estimates do reach conventional levels of statistical significance. There is a clear pattern to suggest that those who experience more trauma are more likely to say they would vote for a candidate with a pro-GAM background but not one with a pro-NKRI background or vice versa. Even more impressive is the consistency of the findings that people who experience more trauma are more likely to say that others would behave in this polarized fashion.

A similar pattern is evident, if at slightly weaker levels of statistical significance, when we look at the findings broken down by different types of traumatic events experienced. The only exceptions in this case are the two models testing the effect of sexual violence on own polarization. In sum, the evidence here generally supports H4.

[FIGURES 5 & 6 HERE]

In light of the consistency of these findings, it is worth examining the substantive significance of some of these relationships. As with the analysis of participation, I focus here on the findings for the traumatic events index, running simulations to generate expected values for each outcome. The results of the simulations are shown in Table 6.

[TABLE 6 HERE]

The first noteworthy point to emphasize here is that both polarization and perceptions of others' polarization appear to be relatively lower than might be expected in a post-conflict setting. Under even the more restrictive definition of polarization, 63% of respondents qualify as not polarized. And the number of people who think others would vote for someone across the lines of cleavage is similarly high (62% when asked whether pro-NKR people would vote pro-GAM; 59% when asked whether pro-GAM people would vote pro-NKR).

The effect of trauma on these findings is in the expected direction – those in the 90th percentile on the traumatic events index are more likely to be polarized than those in the 10th percentile. The magnitude of the change is only 3 percentage points in the standard definition of own polarization and eight percentage points in the more restrictive definition of own polarization. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect of traumatic events is quite large when people are asked for their perceptions of others' polarization. Respondents in the 90th percentile on the traumatic events index are 18 percentage points less likely to say pro-NKR people would vote pro-GAM and 17 percentage points less likely to say pro-GAM people would vote pro-NKR when compared to respondents in the 10th percentile of the traumatic events index.

As was the case with the analyses of the effect of displacement and return, there is little consistent evidence of any effect of either measure in the data. This is especially true of the measures of own polarization; estimates for these coefficients hover near zero. There appears to be a weak trend in the direction of *decreased* perceptions of others' polarization among those who return and those who do not return relative to those who were never displaced. The findings are inconsistent, though, and not strong enough to conclude that the effect happened other than by chance. Taken together, these findings provide little to no support for H5 or H6.

Conclusions

Perhaps the most noteworthy findings that emerge from this research are the non-findings. As much as intuition may suggest and as much as policy-makers tend to focus on displaced people when providing humanitarian and reintegration assistance, this study suggests such a focus may be misplaced if the goal is to stabilize post-conflict political life. Instead, consistent with previous research done in Africa, this paper suggests a more fruitful avenue might be to focus assistance on those who can be identified as having experienced traumatic events more generally defined.

This policy implication is particularly relevant given the direction of the effect identified here. Traumatic events are consistently related to increased levels of political participation *and* increased political polarization and perceptions of others' polarization. Of all the combinations of different levels of participation and polarization, this is the one with the most potential to undermine post-conflict political reconstruction. The perception that others are polarized is one important element in the security dilemma dynamic that surrounds a conflict. Furthermore, to the extent that political leaders can in fact "fan the flames" of intra-group conflict, the fact that the effect of wartime trauma on post-conflict participation seems to be largest with respect to participation in political leadership roles could be of special concern.

Of course some important caveats to the findings must be noted. The research was done in a context in post-war Aceh in which the international community had a major presence, largely as a consequence of a devastating tsunami that in many respects overwhelmed the province. The respondents to the survey were largely settled in the enumeration areas. Even where respondents indicated a desire to move elsewhere or return to their homes of origin, they were mostly living in housing in the community rather than in camps. In addition, although the war had been over for only about 18 months at the time of the surveys, peaceful elections had already been held whose results were recognized by both sides of the conflict cleavage as legitimate.

The findings discussed here must be considered preliminary. For as many measures of the relationships as have been examined here, even more robustness checks will be required. Possible selection problems abound; it is possible that people who experience trauma share certain characteristics that we cannot control for and that affect their levels of political participation. This issue is even more pronounced with respect to displacement and yet again more pronounced with respect to the decision to return. The general trauma index is problematic, but the more disaggregated indices show no clear patterns in their relationship to political attitudes and behavior.

However, there are some clear differences between the findings here and the findings of previous research on the topic. Traumatic experiences in general have no clear relationship to political behavior, unlike the findings of previous research and unlike the expectations derived from research on trauma in other contexts. This finding, and the fact that it contrasts with findings in other settings, raises questions about the ways in which context affects trauma's impact. On the other hand, the finding that on the whole those who are displaced appear to participate more politically than those who are never displaced seems consistent with the previous findings on trauma, even if it is the opposite of the expectations set out at the beginning of the paper.

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Table 1: Interview Sites

Province	District	Weighted mean of conflict in the district	Interviews conducted in the district	Respondents identifying this district as home of origin
Aceh	ACEH BARAT	1.45	0	8
	ACEH BARAT DAYA	1.06	0	0
	ACEH BESAR	1.20	0	7
	ACEH JAYA	1.78	24	22
	ACEH SELATAN	1.79	96	109
	ACEH SINGKIL	1.00	0	9
	ACEH TAMIANG	1.17	48	7
	ACEH TENGAH	1.22	24	35
	ACEH TENGGARA	1.00	24	16
	ACEH TIMUR	2.79	593	683
	ACEH UTARA	2.26	0	75
	BENER MERIAH	1.27	583	413
	BIREUEN	2.56	0	3
	GAYO LUES	1.43	24	20
	LHOKSEUMAWE	na	0	6
	NAGAN RAYA	2.21	0	0
	PIDIE	1.91	0	6
SIMEULUE	1.00	0	0	
Sumatra Utara	DAIRI	na	24	na
	DELI SERDANG	na	72	na
	LANGKAT	na	216	na
	TANAH KARO	na	24	na

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

Name	Min	Max	Before imputation*		After imputation	
			N	Mean	N	Mean
vote	0	2	1724	1.56	1752	1.55
meetings	1	5	836	2.11	1752	1.92
pol leadership	0	1	1731	0.17	1752	0.17
pol party	0	1	1716	0.02	1752	0.02
community orgs	0	10	na	na	1752	2.02
polar	0	1	na	na	1752	0.62
polar restrictive	0	1	na	na	1752	0.56
others nkr	0	1	1583	0.59	1752	0.59
others gam	0	1	1570	0.61	1752	0.62

* na is indicated for those variables compiled after imputation

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Name	Min	Max	Before imputation*		After imputation	
			N	Mean	N	Mean
trauma total	0	40	na	na	1752	8.28
trauma death	0	1	na	na	1752	0.16
trauma sexual	0	1	na	na	1752	0.02
trauma violence	0	1	na	na	1752	0.11
trauma victim	0	1	na	na	1752	0.11
trauma kid	0	1	na	na	1752	0.10
trauma econ	0	1	na	na	1752	0.30
trauma commit	0	1	na	na	1752	0.03
displaced	0	1	1752	0.84	1752	0.84
return	0	1	1715	0.55	1752	0.54
noreturn	0	1	1715	0.29	1752	0.30

* na is indicated for those variables compiled after imputation

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

Name	Min	Max	Before imputation*		After imputation	
			N	Mean	N	Mean
gender	0	1	1752	0.50	1752	0.50
age	12	95	1722	39.50	1752	39.53
aceh	0	1	1741	0.44	1752	0.44
gayo	0	1	1741	0.20	1752	0.20
jawa	0	1	1741	0.32	1752	0.32
edhigh	1	7	na	na	1752	4.01
q 133	1	5	1237	2.06	1752	2.33
q 259	0	1	1453	0.19	1752	0.33
q 268	0	1	1415	0.02	1752	0.21
comorg b4	0	10	na	na	1752	3.44
asset pri	0	3	na	na	1752	1.61
sumut	0	1	1752	0.19	1752	0.19

* na is indicated for those variables compiled after imputation

Table 5: Simulation of quantities of interest for the effect of traumatic events on participation

	Weighted mean before	Weighted mean current	10th % of trauma index	90th % of trauma index
Vote				
Mean	na	1.78	1.75	1.81
Std Error	na	0.02	0.03	0.03
95% CI	na	1.73	1.69	1.75
	na	1.82	1.82	1.87
Meetings				
Mean	2.48	2.12	2.09	2.16
Std Error	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.08
95% CI	2.34	2.01	1.93	1.99
	2.62	2.23	2.26	2.32
Community organizations				
Mean	5.02	2.69	2.43	3.00
Std Error	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.15
95% CI	4.77	2.52	2.19	2.70
	5.28	2.86	2.69	3.32
Political Leadership				
Mean	0.47	0.21	0.17	0.27
Std Error	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
95% CI	0.42	0.17	0.10	0.20
	0.52	0.25	0.24	0.33
Political Party				
Mean	0.35	0.02	0.01	0.04
Std Error	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
95% CI	0.30	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	0.39	0.04	0.03	0.07

Table 6: Simulation of quantities of interest for the effect of traumatic events on polarization

	Weighted mean current	10th % of trauma index	90th % of trauma index
Odds of not being polarized			
Mean	0.71	0.73	0.70
Std Error	0.03	0.04	0.04
95% CI	0.66	0.65	0.62
	0.77	0.80	0.77
Odds of not being polarized (restrictive def)			
Mean	0.63	0.67	0.59
Std Error	0.03	0.05	0.04
95% CI	0.57	0.57	0.51
	0.70	0.75	0.68
Other pro-NKR people would vote for a pro-GAM candidate			
Mean	0.62	0.70	0.52
Std Error	0.03	0.05	0.04
95% CI	0.56	0.60	0.45
	0.69	0.79	0.60
Other pro-GAM people would vote for a pro-NKR candidate			
Mean	0.59	0.67	0.50
Std Error	0.03	0.04	0.04
95% CI	0.53	0.59	0.42
	0.66	0.74	0.58

Figure 2: The effect of trauma on participation




Figure 3: The effect of different types of trauma on participation




Figure 4: The effect of displacement and return on participation




Figure 5: The effect of trauma on polarization and perceptions of polarization




Figure 6: The effect of different types of trauma on polarization and perceptions of polarization




Figure 7: The effect of displacement and return on polarization and perceptions of polarization

