

Better the Devil You Know: Third Party State-building After Conflict

Andrew Radin

Tuesday, April 1, 2008

A **DRAFT** dissertation prospectus. Please do not cite or quote
without permission.

Conflict, whether civil war or foreign intervention, destroys the existing institutions of government. A new state requires extensive (re-)building efforts, and renegotiation among the existing parties about the structure of all levels of government. Sometimes an outside party, such as the United Nations or a great power, intervenes and completes the erasure of the old institutions, and maintains an operation to have decisive influence over the establishment of new institutions. After 1990, these operations focused on establishing stable, responsible, and respectful democracies in countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This prospectus describes a project to seek to understand the political choices that best lead to these objectives. It asks: What political choices by third-party post-conflict state builders leads to success? Though a complete theory will have to wait for complete research, I hypothesize here that success is most likely when the state-builder selects a set of institutions that empowers existing local elites. Since most of the countries of concern are ethnically divided, the preferred form of the new state will acknowledge the power of local ethnic elites, and create an external political factor to help diminish the likelihood of secession.

Understanding the consequences of political choices in third-party post-conflict state-building is important for two reasons. First, there are ongoing state-building operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq that could benefit from a better understanding of the past. Second, despite the mixed success in these past operations, I have little doubt that we will see similar operations in the future. There is no shortage of conflict in the world, and the time of intervention is not at an end. Third, this research may have implications for the broader literature on state-building and moderating ethnic conflict.

The prospectus proceeds in six sections. The first section defines important terms and describes the scope of the project. The second provides a brief description of the three

overlapping sets of literature that draws on this question. The third section describes the three goals I describe as success. The fourth section explains the independent variable I hope to use, the conception of the state, and other variables that may affect outcomes. The fifth section describes the reasons I why believe the conception of the state is influential and the mechanisms by which it affects outcomes. The sixth section describes the methodology that I will use, and a final section summarizes.

I. Definitions and Scope

Third-party post-conflict state-building, or foreign administration as I will call it for short, involves three separate concepts. Post-conflict here means that there was some sort of violent conflict within the country in question. This conflict may have been a civil war, an interstate war, a foreign intervention, or what ever. The important element of the post-conflict status is that the institutions that formerly governed the country were destroyed or delegitimated. While the elites that were in charge may continue to be important, the former government, the regime, and the state apparatus are no longer dominant. There are many post-conflict cases, such as El Salvador, Rwanda, Congo, Bosnia, Kosovo, and so forth.

The second concept is that of the influence of a third-party. There must be an actor in the country that represents some external power. Oftentimes, the United Nations, or the victor in an inter-state war plays this role. For example, the UN in El Salvador, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, or the United States in Japan or Germany after World War II are examples of influential third-parties.

Third, there are many examples of limited mandates or weak third-parties, so we limit our cases to those where the third-party had an administrative role in state-building. That is, they had

legislative or executive power that ensured that their decision-making was decisive in determining the structure of the new state. State-building also implies that the third-party had relatively broad goals in establishing the new state. In particular, they sought to create stable and just democracies. For example, the UN operation in El Salvador or Rwanda would not be sufficient fall under this description, because its role was limited to negotiation and mediation. On the other hand, the international community role in Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, and East Timor was decisive, as is the American led effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. Requiring cases to incorporate all three aspects, especially that of a strong third-party actor, make these cases have a distinct logic from either post-conflict countries or third-party intervention cases.

I limit this study to cases after 1990. There are two reasons for this. First, many have argued that there was a fundamental transformation in the standards for international governance and the goals of third-part intervention after 1990. The end of the Cold War represented the beginning of the “end of history,” when it was widely acknowledged that democracy was the only acceptable form of government.¹ After 1990, third-party operations ceased to try and tilt the balance against communism and focused on creating responsible democracies in post-conflict countries. Although the scope of goals varied during this period, all relevant third-party actors generally shared similar overall objectives in these cases. The particular identity of the interveners altered their methods and specific ideas of how to achieve success, but it did not change the goals of the operations. Second, one of the purposes of this effort is to provide insight for future foreign administrations. Because of the changing standards and practice of foreign administration, I would claim that operations ending before 1990 are of limited utility for the present, and would confuse the theory more than they would improve the results.

¹ Fukuyama 2006, Chandler 2006

These scope conditions should allow a complete list of the relevant cases. Drawing from Doyle and Sambanis, Mohandas, and recent history, a complete list of cases is: Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Cases such as Somalia, El Salvador, Haiti, and the Congo are excluded since the third-party did not exercise sufficient political input in the new institutions.

In some cases – Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan – the post-conflict country has ethnic cleavages that make the state-building particularly difficult. I use the term ethnicity broadly, as meaning a shared, identifiable identity that comes from religion, race, region, and culture among others factors. The important point about ethnicity are that it leads to different political preferences for education, culture, and other affairs, so government by one ethnic group may be unacceptable to another. Because of the dominance of these cleavages in these countries and because of the dominance of these countries among foreign administrations, the main interest is in ethnically divided cases. I do not omit other cases, such as East Timor or Cambodia, from the analysis, however, since to some extent the theory may still be applicable. They also allow us to understand the impact of ethnic rather than ideological or regional division in these countries. Still, in many ways these non-ethnically divided countries are somehow less difficult.²

I also claim that the type of the conflict that spurred the third-party involvement does not differentiate cases. It does not matter whether there was ‘regime change’ or involvement following a civil war, so long as the previously existing institutions have been destroyed, and the third-party has decisive influence on the new institutions. For example, I would argue that there is little difference in the animosity between groups in Bosnia and Iraq even though in one case

² Doyle and Sambanis 2006

there was a civil war and the other a foreign intervention. Some argue that civil wars make citizens tired of fighting, but others argue that civil wars often recur regardless of the scope of hostility. The fundamental problem of a lack of social trust and the absence of institutions is the determinative problem in both cases, and the problem that the third-party seeks to address.

II. Literature Review

The literature on third-party post-conflict state-building involves the overlapping intersection of three different literatures. There is an extensive literature on state-building and the development of nationalism, primarily in the absence of an outside administrator. There is also an extensive literature on post-conflict countries, which examines peacebuilding. Finally, some have examined the role of third-parties in both post-conflict and newly established states. Most particularly, since the literature has not focused exclusively on the problem of third-party post-conflict state building, I am interested in the three overlap literatures – the post-conflict state building, third-party post-conflict, and the third-party state-building literature.

To begin, there is a wide literature in general dealing with post-conflict states. This literature is on ‘peacebuilding,’ and builds off the insight that most civil wars happen in states where there was recently a civil war, so that preventing further civil war must focus especially on post-conflict countries. The overall tendency in this literature is to treat peacebuilding as a question of resources. In one phrasing, the problem of civil war is that it is development in reverse. Improving the capacity of the state and the economic development of the country creates the conditions for peace by making insurgency more difficult and decreasing the incentives for rebellion.³

³ Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier et al. 2003.

Some of this literature emphasizes the role of third parties in solving these problems, pointing to the importance of foreign inputs to the country, and of the differences in organization and expertise among third-parties. Barbara Walter makes the general argument that credible commitment problems make a third-party a critical input to ensuring participation in an agreement. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis extend this claim by exploring the concept of a “peacebuilding triangle,” which claims that the relative likelihood of success stems from local capacities, hostility within the post-conflict state, and international capacities. International capacity measures the third-party involvement in terms of economic transfers and of the mandates of UN peace operations. They find, using a dataset of post-conflict countries that greater international presence leads to better outcomes, although some have challenged whether they have sufficient data to support these conclusions.⁴ Others, such as James Quinlivan and a series of studies from the RAND Corporation claim that the troop size is particularly critical.⁵ The particular practices of the third-party are also important. Roland Paris argues that the creation of institutions must precede liberalization, and Michael Barnett emphasizes the benefits of Republican government. Stephen Stedman argues that peacebuilders need a proper strategy to deal with spoilers, while others point to the importance of best practices.⁶

The literature on post-conflict state building is also developing. This literature emphasizes institutional factors over third-party involvement. It has much in common with the general literature on managing ethnic conflict.⁷ The best example is a recent volume edited by Phillip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, which combines a number of conflicting perspectives on the issue. The main question in this volume and related work is whether or not power-sharing

⁴ Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 108-115, King and Zeng 2007.

⁵ Quinlivan 1996 and Dobbins et al. 2003 and 2005.

⁶ Paris 2004, Barnett 2006, Stedman 1997.

⁷ Horowitz 1991, and Lijphart 1977, or example.

and ethnofederalism are helpful for dealing with ethnic conflict. Power-sharing and ethnofederalism acknowledge the concerns of dismayed groups, decreasing the likelihood of rebellion, but at the same time making secession and the reification of group differences easier. Scholars' views largely depend on which cases they examine. The large-n regressions, which mainly rely on the Minorities at Risk dataset, tend to find autonomy to be helpful.⁸ Studies focusing on former communist countries, and regional politics in India, find that federalism and decentralization to create the conditions for ethnic conflict to thrive and for dangerous regional parties to develop.⁹ Others find federalism and decentralization to have multifarious and complicated effects that cannot be easily disentangled.¹⁰

The other important literature to consider here is the state-building literature. Much of these authors focus on the development of the state in the 19th and 20th century, but their observations on the importance of nationalism and the different types of nationalism are still critical.¹¹ Jack Snyder has another prominent argument, which notes that democratizing states are particularly prone to conflict because they have a tendency to enfranchise ethnic elites and do not have strong institutions to moderate ethnic conflict.¹² Some state-building literature, that focuses on post-colonial cases, draws on the question of third-party state-building absent conflict.

Two main gaps in the literature on peacebuilding or international state building motivate this study. First, the focus on the inputs to peacebuilding has obscured the broader political questions of state-building. The key question of state-building is what kind of new state to build – what will be the source of its authority and how will be it structured. No doubt, the resources and competence of the administrator is important, but the third-party's actions must be

⁸ Gurr 2000, Bermeo 2002

⁹ Bunce 1999, Bunce and Watts 2005, Brancati 2006.

¹⁰ Hechter and Okamoto 2001, 204.

¹¹ Tilly, Anderson, Gellner, Greenfeld, etc.

¹² Snyder 2001.

considered in the political context of the new state. David Chandler argues that the theory and practice third-party state-building is “without politics”: the focus on governance and institutions before liberalization tries to create apolitical solutions to political problems. This apolitical mindset believes in ignoring or dismissing unpleasant elected politicians and reforming ‘governance’ without building consensus.¹³ The post-conflict state-building literature has examined some of the institutional issues of new states, but not with the awareness that these institutions are sometimes forced from without. This is especially true since the international actors often have an agenda independent from the historical state building narratives existing within the new state. Also, the institutional literature is relatively undeveloped and contradictory in its conclusions. To some extent, Paris and Doyle and Sambanis acknowledge the difficulties of insufficient attention to the political realities in their case studies, but the overall theoretical framework is not sensitive to the impact of different ideas of how to set up the institutions and allegiances of the new state.

The second criticism is methodological. There is a strong tendency within the existing studies to take a cross case or a cross-sectional approach without examining within case changes over time. Paris, for example, does look at the timing of events within cases, but his inference is based on cross case comparisons. Given that state-building requires a long-term approach, this methodology is flawed. The strategy and means of the third-party often shifts over time, and changes in their focus and beliefs may have important consequences for the outcome of the operation. Also, it is more useful to assess outcomes by considering a more detailed metric that evolves over time. For example, Doyle and Sambanis’s¹⁴ statistical analysis gathers evidence by taking snap-shots of the particular cases at two or five years after the departure of the third-party.

¹³ Chandler 2006, Chapter 3.

¹⁴ See also Mohandes 2008

While they acknowledge in the case studies that the mandates, personnel and outcomes often change over time, there are limits to how much they use these changes to explain success or failure. Because the operations must be classified as a whole as either a failure or a success, there is little room for flexibility in assessing the changes in the operations. Somalia is a key example of this problem. Three separate phases of the operation had radically different approaches, resources, and success. Arguing that Somalia is in general a failure does not take account of the internal variation of the case. Likewise, in Bosnia, personnel changes in the High Representative have meant major shifts in the overall approach and vision for the future of Bosnia. Of course, with short operations or operations that change little over time, this methodological criticism is less appropriate.

IV. Dependent Variable

I now discuss in more detail the dependent variable I hope to consider. I look at the success of the state-building operation by considering three separate elements over time – stability, democratization, and economic growth. Unlike previous studies, these factors are not dichotomous but vary over a wide range of values. While the practical goals of third-parties may vary to some degree in individual cases, I would argue that these three goals described below are representative of their best case scenarios. These goals are part of the overall state-building trend of the post-Cold War and for the most part are reflected in the individuals cases, although some goals take precedence over others.¹⁵

A major difficulty of this study is that because I select only cases after 1990, the third-party is often still present in the country. This makes the sustainability of their effort difficult to

¹⁵ See in particular the Dayton Accords, and Chandrasakaran 2008.

judge. Different authors have dealt with this problem by only looking after the third-party has left, or by examining whether the conditions for the war still exist.¹⁶ Nevertheless, I argue that the outcomes observed while the third-party is still present are important in their own right, as success is not guaranteed by the foreign presence, and because these outcomes are likely markers for the future success of the country.

Stability means both whether the existence of the new state is questioned, and the presence of political violence and crises. Others look only at whether or not there is a civil war as the prime marker for stability,¹⁷ but this measure is blind to the many lower level problems that could be happening. To create a more fine grained measure, I hope to use data on violence and/or on the presence of political crises. The difficulty here is that in Iraq, violence is rampant, but in Bosnia it was barely present even though Bosnia was not highly stable in the sense that there were crises that threatened the existence of the new state.

Democratization has been a particular focus of many scholars.¹⁸ Two processes are relevant. First, elections of any sort are an important aim. Reestablishing basic democratic rights, including the right to vote for one's leaders, is a critical component of the democratization efforts of nearly all post-Cold War international administrations. Second, international administrations try for a measure of moderation and reform in the leadership. In Bosnia, the international community quickly reestablished democracy, but were less successful at establishing a democracy that met international expectations. The most successful parties in elections are often those who fought in the war, so elections can reestablish the leadership and conditions that led to

¹⁶ Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 18; Downs and Stedman in Stedman, Rothchild, Cousens 2002, 50-52, 60. Paris 2004, 60.

¹⁷ Hartzell and Hoodie 2003, for example.

¹⁸ Mohandes 2008, for example.

the war in the first place.¹⁹ One measure for moderation would be the number of politicians elected to relatively ethnonationalist or cross-cutting parties.

Economic development is often a critical concern for state building, both on its own and as a means to achieving political stability. Post-conflict countries often have suffered dramatic losses to their GDP and without development there is little hope that they can provide critical services to their population. The improvement of the economy during the third-party administration is one marker of the future success of the country. Development often takes two parts: the initial reconstruction of critical infrastructure and the longer-term effort to grow the economy of the new state.²⁰

IV: Independent Variables

The primary variable of interest in this study is the political concept of the new state. The political concept means both the idea of the new state and the particular institutions composing it. The concept of the state hopes to represent where the state draws its authority and legitimacy from and what the principles underlying its governance are. I first describe in general what I mean by the political concept, and then the possible concepts that exist in practice and how I might measure them. I then describe other relevant control variables.

Barry Buzan argues that we can look at the state as having three components: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state.²¹ The idea of the state, roughly, is the purpose of the state. In other words, it encompasses the source of the

¹⁹ This is one of Paris's key criticisms.

²⁰ See especially Susan Woodward in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002, Chapter 7; Paris 2004, 199-205. The RAND case studies also include a section on economic reconstruction.

²¹ Buzan 1983, Chapter 2.

state's authority and describes the object of the state's protection. Some states, such as France, Germany or Japan, draw their purpose from the existence of a constituent ethnic or cultural nation. Others, such as the United States or the United Kingdom draw their authority from a civic nationalism. Belgium, however, is an example where the idea of the state is multinational, and the idea of the state includes the recognition of the autonomy and authority of substate ethnic groups.

The institutional base of the state is “the entire machinery of government.”²² The institutions are closely connected with the idea of the state, since they represent how the government draws and uses its authority. The institutions include the public services, such as police, schools, and hospitals; and the legislative and executive institutions at all levels. Some focus on particular fine-grained institutional facets, such as the type of elections. I am more interested in the overall distribution of authority. For example, in Bosnia, the idea of the state is based on the existence of two separate entities, the Serb-dominated *Republika Srpska*, and the Bosniak and Croat Federation. The institutions of government are divided accordingly, representing the authority of the entities while at the same time maintaining a central government. Similarly, the institutions of the United States represent our federal idea of the state, which grants different powers to the states and the central government.

The particular ethnic and political segmentation of a state condition the ideas of state and the institutions that may be applied to it, at least in the short term. In discussing the ideas of the state that a foreign administration can institute, we must first consider which groups are dominant in a particular society and how they are geographically distributed. First, there may be ethnic or ideological segments in conflict. Some post-war societies are relatively unified, such as

²² Buzan 1983, 53.

Germany or Japan, while others such as Cambodia or Iraq are quite divided. Division may come from ideological differences, as in Cambodia, or in terms of ethnicity as in Bosnia. The type of division conditions the political conflict of the post-war society. If the division is ethnic, then there will likely be conflict over either secession or dominance of the center. If the division is ideological, secession is likely to take a smaller role. Second, groups may be differently distributed throughout the society. Ethnic or ideological homogeneity make secession easier, as does preexisting federal institutions.²³

Given the post-conflict demographics, foreign administrations have a large number of choices of the idea of the state that they promulgate, and each idea of the state has a large number of different institutional expressions. Measuring and predicting the outcome of each possible choice is difficult or impossible. Instead, we notice that different concepts of the state lead to the intervening variable of different sets of elite and mass incentives. These incentives more directly connect to state-building outcomes. The concept of the state can either empower existing local elites, or try to empower new elites by adjusting voting and representation institutions. For example, the new concept of state could support ethnic voting so that local ethnic elites become powerful, or it could try and create cross-cutting cleavages to minimize their power. Likewise, Filipov et al. describe how institutions affect political parties and create incentives for elites to remain committed to the federal state. Mohandes, examining nation-building, argues that administrations that succeed in coopting local elites are likely to achieve stability but not democracy. My own view differs as I focus on the institutions and ideas behind the new state, examine both mass and elite incentives, believe that empowering elites leads to greater democracy, and examine elite incentives from the perspective of a new state rather than

²³ Bunce 1999.

from an occupation. Also, elite participation is not so much a question of success or failure of the administration so much as part of the question of how the foreign administration will transform the society.

In most cases, there are shifts over time in the concept of the state and in the particular incentives the concept creates. While the concept of the state may begin as a relatively unified state, it may end up as an ethnofederal one. One imagines a train being radically redesigned while it is still moving down the rails. The third-party often changes its leadership or ideas about the new state even while the old ideas are still being implemented.

We can measure both the institutions and the goals relatively easily, since in practice the third party goes out of their way to justify them. The third-party has an incentive to explain what it is trying to do and promulgate the proposed concept of the state since it believes that this knowledge will help encourage the local citizens to believe in the new government.²⁴ Oftentimes, since the foreign administration tries to work through elites, elites preferred set of incentives is public as well. Foreign administrations, however, also have an international audience. Their pronouncements to the home audience may vary based on the vicissitudes of domestic politics, so we should focus on the concept of the state promulgated to the target country. Democracy is believed to be popular and self-promoting.

One difficulty is that the institutions created by the third-party will differ from the institutions that they prefer. When in doubt, we must look at the institutions created, especially because the real incentives differ from the ideal incentives are we are interested in real outcomes. Elite participants in each post-conflict state will have a keen grasp of the realities of the existing concept of the state, and should be able to describe the realities on the mass level as well. While

²⁴ The widespread belief in the importance of democratization goes hand in hand with the belief that this message needs to be spread to the beneficiaries.

poor management by the third-party may exacerbate the gap between the real and desired concept of the state, the gap is typically when the ideal concept of the state does not make sense to local actors. These inappropriate concepts are likely to be especially detrimental.

Another variable is the external incentives for keeping the state together. William Riker argues that the foundation of the federal states is some sort of military-diplomatic concern from outside the state. The traditional incentive is some fear of military invasion. Though the fear of military invasion in most states today is minimal, some form of external incentive for keeping the country together could be an important factor. An example might be that a state cannot join the European Union unless it stays together.

There are other independent variables that are important to test for and consider. First, the inputs to third-party state-building, as Doyle and Sambanis describe, can have an important effects. Doyle and Sambanis's peacebuilding triangle includes international capacities with such factors as mandate and expenditures. Other factors such as troop size may also be important.²⁵ Second, the status of the country when the operation begins is clearly relevant to its future success. Mohandes focuses on the institutional legacy, while Doyle and Sambanis point to the importance of the lingering hostility and local economy. Third, other elements of the strategy of the third-party besides the concept of the state are also important. Paris argues that the timing of liberalization can be critical and Stedman describes the impact of the strategy to combat spoilers. Fourth, the competence and organization of the third party is also relevant. Foreign administrations crippled by logistical and bureaucratic difficulties will have trouble implementing any policy.

²⁵ Quinliven 1996

VI. Elements of a Theory


This section attempts to explain the connection between the different variables. It examines which connections I have to make for the project to make any sense, how the concept of the state leads to particular elite and mass incentives, and why we might think these incentives lead to better outcomes. It also hopes to describe what differentiates societies with foreign administrations from other societies. Finally, I discuss why some hypotheses about the impact of the concept of the state on outcomes. This logic is largely drawn from thinking about the situation in Bosnia and Iraq.

There are two political problems for the new state. The first is that the central government is illegitimate or unstable. It may be subject to take-over by one of the dominant political groups, military coup, or it may become a one party state. The second fear is secession. Disgruntled ethnic groups may decide to seek their future outside of the state.

The basic framework is a four-step process (See Figure 1). First, the third-party develops an idea of how it wants the post-conflict society to be. This idea is determined by its preconceptions of what the new state should be and of how democracy comes about. Though it aims at positive outcomes, it is often not closely driven by the realities of the politics of a particular country. For example, the Bush administration believed in the power of exiles to form a democratic Iraq, despite the reality of their limited influence. Second, the third-party's idea drives the establishment of the concept of the state. For better or worse, the third-party's decision creates the new idea of the state and the institutions in line with their preconceived notions. Third, the concept of the state interacts with the local elites and the mass preferences. Local elites here means people who would do well in an election among their group or at the national level. The concept of the state either enfranchises these people, or it goes out of its way to

disenfranchise them. Fourth, the elite and mass incentives lead them to either accept the concept of the state and participate in it, improving outcomes; or they reject the concept of the state and do not participate. The project described here takes the first and second stages as given and examines the third and fourth. The fourth stage – from incentives to outcomes – can proceed either through elites or the mass public. The outcomes from the previous timeframe can feedback into the third-party’s decision-making, and lead to an altered concept of state.

Figure 1:



future of their state. Their beliefs about the future of the state determine how they proceed. They remain popular even if they are not in power. They can either create crises or calm them depending on how the state recognizes their concerns. They therefore have a direct effect on the stability of the state in two ways. First, they have a role in avoiding political crises since a political crisis are of their own creation. Second, research has shown much ethnic and political violence to be motivated by elite action.²⁶ Satisfaction with the new regime is likely to therefore limit violence. Democratization is also affected since if the institutions enfranchise who would

²⁶ Wilkinson 2006.

win simple elections anyway, there is less likely to be tampering or interference. The concept of the state is also likely to affect the election of internationally perceived moderates – albeit in not necessarily a positive way. Finally, economic reconstruction is also affected by these incentives. Stable politics and democratization makes investment easier and more likely, and gives the business partners of local elites incentives to rebuild on their own.

The perceived legitimacy of the new idea of the state and the accompanying institutions influences mass participation. Mass participation in the new state is conditioned by how legitimate they believe the new idea of the state to be. By acknowledging the limited duration of the foreign administration, the third-party forecloses their ability to indefinitely control the concept of the state. If citizens believe that the current institutions are not very legitimate and are unlikely to persist after the departure of the third-party, they are unlikely to participate in them. Stability will be threatened since it will be easier to start riots among individuals who do not believe in the government. They will be less likely to vote, and may vote for parties that reflect their expectations for the future. Economic development may also stall because of limited trust of the current institutions.

From these mechanisms and political problems, the presence of foreign administrations can make two differences. First, foreign administrations can create ‘democratic’ institutions that do not actually reflect the apparent interests of the public. Only with the third-party deciding the institutions is it possible for someone other than the local elite to get elected. Regardless of why the public decides to vote for the evil nationalist leaders who they elect, the elites remain powerful. Second, the foreign administration can create a state where no one is happy. To be sure, new states frequently have competition over who is the legitimate party. What is

remarkable about the foreign administrations is that they can create a government that no major group is empowered, so that no group finds the new government legitimate.

I now discuss briefly some hypotheses for multiethnic societies. I first focus on societies with high concentration of ethnic groups within particular regions. Hypothesis 1A states, given high concentrations, a more ethnofederal concept of state is beneficial for all three sets of outcomes. This follows on the reasoning provided by Lijphart, Garr, and others, who argue that increasing the representation and autonomy of ethnic groups makes the state more stable and peaceful. Some argue the opposite, notably Brancusi, who tries to show that decentralization increases the power of regional parties that are more likely to incite violence. Hypothesis 1B tries to account for the risk of secession. It claims that given high concentration, ethnofederalism has beneficial effects, except that in the absence of external military-political concerns the new state is prone to secession or secession-related political crises. Existing research disagrees on the impact of decentralization on secession – some argue that greater autonomy and representation decreases the grievances of the group, while others argue that decentralization makes it ultimately easier for the groups to declare their own independence, so further research on this area could be influential.²⁷

In the case where the ethnic groups are less concentrated, Hypothesis 2A says that the more that concept of the state encourages ethnic voting and creates non-territorial ethnic autonomy, outcomes will be better. Donald Horowitz argues the exact opposite, claiming that all else being equal the concept of the state should encourage cross-cutting cleavages and interethnic engagement at the mass level. However, in the short-term, all is rarely equal. Though cross-cutting cleavages may form over time, the power of ethnic elites is likely to overwhelm the

²⁷ Gurr 2000 and Bunce 1999, respectively.

incentives when the concept of the state is first implemented.²⁸ The key therefore is to enfranchise these elites, while ensuring that they do not take over the state.

VI. Methodology

This dissertation hopes to use two different methods. First, it will use a regression on time series data from several different foreign administrations. Second, it will use a series of case studies to explore causal mechanisms and the specifics of the concept of the state in each case. Within this section I describe my initial ideas on each method, and then discuss some common complaints and why I do not think they are particularly problematic here. Clearly, this part of the project is still in its formative stages.

Via. Regression

For the sake of cross-case comparison, demonstrating correlation, replicability, and getting a job, this dissertation will contain a regression of state-building processes over time. The hope is to gather data as much data as possible from other people on state-building outcomes in the six cases listed above, Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Some of the variables can be pulled from other sources, while others would have to be independently constructed. I would gather variables to represent the three components of the dependent variables. I would need measures of stability as violence or political crises, democratization as elections and the election of moderates, and economic development as GDP. With regard to the independent variables things become even more complicated. I need to

²⁸ Lijphart 2004.

measure the concept of state as it evolves over time, which I would do by developing a scale of different concepts of the state and marking the changes over time. I have a few ideas of how to go about this, but each has its problems. Since the cases embodied very different concepts of states, a wide typology means there will be little overlap across cases, weakening the statistical results. Classifying particular setups into different categories is also a problem. Also, I would develop a dichotomous measure of whether there were complaints of the foreign administration being incompetent or disorganized. Inputs in terms of money and personnel over time could also be relatively easily coded. Some variables are constant over time, such as institutional capacities before the war (which can be taken from Doyle and Sambanis), and whether there was institutionalization before liberalization.

Given all this data, I hope to do some sort of panel data regression. Ideally, I would have four observations per year for each of the six cases (See Table 1). If we continue to collect data to after the third-party has departed, to a maximum of 12 years total, by my calculations the dataset would include 208 observations to December 2007. A major advantage of this design is the ability to compare within and across cases. The pooled cross-sectional analysis with clustered standard errors would not be beneficial, both because there are not sufficient cases for clustering by country, and because this obscures some of the advantages of the time series data. I am not sure how exactly I will set this up, however. One prominent difficulty is that there are different numbers of observations for each case.

Table 1:

Case	Start Date	Third-party End Date	Observations ²⁹	Third-party ³⁰
------	------------	----------------------	----------------------------	---------------------------

²⁹ Observations in parenthesis include observations after the third-party departs, up to a total of 48.

Cambodia	2/1992	9/1993	8 (48)	UNTAC
Bosnia	1/96	Present	48	PIC → EU
Kosovo	10/1999	Present	35	UNMIK → EU
East Timor	10/1999	5/2002	11 (33)	UNAMET
Afghanistan	12/2001	Present	25	US/ISAF
Iraq	5/2003	Present	19	US

Vib. Case Studies

I envision the case studies in this dissertation in two ways. First, I would like to have a short description of each of the six cases. Second, I would do far more detailed analysis of two or three of the cases.

The short description of the cases would provide necessary background for the regression, and would give a sense of the variety of foreign administration. It would include some sort of chart describing the different situations of the cases, and would discuss the evolution of the concept of the state in each case.

The key part of the dissertation would be to conduct a detailed analysis of two or three of the cases. These analyses would trace the concept of the state over time, the interactions between the foreign administration and elites, and the overall impact of the third-party's decision-making. The most important cases to examine are the ones that best reflect the scope conditions – they are the longest lasting and the third-party has the most influence. Two important cases to consider because of their prominence and ethnic divisions are Bosnia and Iraq. Bosnia has had a foreign administration for twelve years, has experienced multiple shifts in its concept of the state, and is quite accessible. I plan to do field work in Bosnia this summer, which will primarily consist of

³⁰ The third-party with decisive influence. In Bosnia, the Peace Implementation Council was the official manager of the powerful Office of the High Representative. It can be thought of as the international community as a whole. In Bosnia and Kosovo the EU is gradually taking over more and more responsibility.

elite interviews. Iraq is a critical case for today's policy discourse, and has experienced several major shifts in the concept of the state. It also has many differences from Bosnia – more violence, a different cause of the foreign administration, and a different economy. If the theory held true in both cases, it would be a good sign for its overall validity. For a third case, the ideal would be to examine either Cambodia, which has the difference of being an ideological conflict, or East Timor where the cleavages are quite different.

Vlc. Common complaints

There are two problems that frequently crop up with these types of questions. They fall under the broader headings of 'selection effects' and 'endogeneity.' I will describe what I think the most precise framing of these issues is, and why I do not find them particularly problematic.

An oft-identified problem in political science is that of 'selection effects.' In my mind, this means either that the cases or coding was selected in some way that biases the results, or the equivalent scientific problem that the treatment was not randomly assigned. Since I believe that I have described all of the relevant cases, the main problem is that the particular concept of the state that is selected is not randomly assigned.³¹ In observational studies, we cannot achieve random selection of the treatment, which here is the particular concept of the state. Indeed, the concept of the state that the foreign administration puts in place is likely to depend on the case. I argue, however, the study will not yield biased results so long as the selection of the concept of the state is not conditioned on the relative ease or difficulty of the case. If it were, then we would observe success disproportionately in these cases. In the case of post-conflict third-party state-building after 1990, we do not observe the relative ease of the mission affecting decision-making

³¹ Or, that there is a problem with the coding.

on the concept of the state. Instead, the third-party decides which goals to achieve and how to achieve them, and these preconceptions dominant the agenda. For example, David Chandler argues that the goals of improving governance and creating a type of representation that favors their preconceptions of legitimacy dominate third-party policy-making. The initial preferred concept of the state in Iraq centered on the role of the exiles in forming an interim government, which had little to do with the difficulty of government in Iraq.³² The preferred concept of the state in Bosnia centered on creating an integrated society, which was similarly irrelevant to the difficulty of the case. While the concept of the state may not be exogenous from the case, it does not bias the results, since the concept of the state is not correlated with the unobservable factors that lead to success or failure.

We also observe a fair amount of variation in the concept of the state within particular cases. For example, in Bosnia, the international community first supported a more discriminatory ethnofederalist system, moved towards a nondiscriminatory system, and is now trying to further weaken the power of the entities with respect to the center. In other cases, such as East Timor, the concept of the state seems relatively constant.

The next common critique is about ‘endogeneity.’ I think endogenously could mean either an omitted variable causing both the IV and the DV, or that the DV is in fact causing the IV. I believe that I have described all of the relevant IVs that we need to consider, though further research may prove me wrong. With regard to reverse causation, the timing of the changes of the concept of the state and outcomes will determine the validity of this argument.

VII. Conclusion

³² Chandrasekaran 2007.

This proposal seeks to understand the causes of success in post-conflict third-party state-building. It claims that the political choices of the third-party are especially important – the concept of the state that they create has a critical impact on stability, democratization, and economic development. I also claim that an external political incentive can help keep together fractious countries. I hope to test this theory by creating a data set for six post-conflict countries and by doing detailed case studies on two to three of these cases.

Works Cited

- Barnett, Michael. 2006. "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after Civil War." *International Security* 30 (Spring): 87-112.
- Bermejo, Nancy. 2002. "The Import of Institutions." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 96-110.
- Brancati, Dawn. 2006. "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict or Secessionism." *International Organization* 60 (3): 651-85.
- Bunce, Valerie and Stephan Watts. "Managing Diversity and Sustaining Democracy: Ethnofederal versus unitary States in the Postcommunist World." In *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 51-82.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1999. *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press.
- Chandler, David. *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building*. London: Pluto Press.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2007. *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Collier, Paul, et al. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Copublication of the World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- Dobbins, James et al. 2003. *America's Role in National Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Dobbins, James et al. 2005. *The UN's Role in National Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fearon, James and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *APSR* 97:75-90
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2006. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. *Peoples versus States*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoodie. 2003. "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (April): 318-332.
- Hechter, Michael and Dina Okamoto. 2001. "Political Consequences of Minority Group Formation." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 4:189-215.
- Horowitz, Donald. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 2004. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* Volume 15, Number 2 (April): 97-109.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2007. "When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference." *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 183-210.
- Mohandes, Siddarth. 2008. Unpublished manuscript.
- Paris, Roland. 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Quinlivan, James T. 1996. "Force Requirements in Stability Operations." *Parameters*. Winter. pp. 59-69.
- Snyder, Jack. 2001. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Stedman, Steven. 1997. "Spoiler Problem in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22 (Autumn): 5-33.
- Wilkinson, Steven. 2006. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.