

Political Identities in Argentina's Interrupted Democracy

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Abstract

In countries that have shifted between dictatorship and democracy, what effect does each regime have on voters' partisan attachments? If competitive elections and party mobilization are the motors driving partisan identification, we would expect attachments to grow during democracy and erode under dictatorship. But some observers of today's new democracies have suggested that party affiliations become frozen during authoritarian interludes only to be destabilized under democracy, when party leaders have a chance to hold power, squabble with each other, and disappoint voters. We examine these questions in the context of Argentina, one of the world's most frequently interrupted democracies. Using surveys and disaggregated ecological data over the sweep of a century, and controlling for factors that may mask underlying processes of partisan identity formation, we show that democratic processes, when they are allowed to run their course, do produce a growing stability in people's electoral choices, a stability that erodes during authoritarian interludes.

In this paper we address a question central for democratic consolidation: whether voters' attachments to political parties stabilize over time in new democracies, as authoritarian interludes recede deeper into the past. Stability of partisan attachments, and hence of aggregate voting patterns, is the norm in the world's older democracies. Even though these attachments are thought to be weaker today than they were in the past, still most people who vote in countries like the U.S., Britain, or France vote repeatedly for the same party from one election to the next. Although the number of independent or swing voters may have grown, still they are not numerically preponderant in the advanced democracies (Bartels, 2000; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2005). Our question is whether today's new democracies are on a path toward a similar stability.

Much is at stake in the ability of party systems to offer voters a stable menu of choices, and for voters to be able to regularly identify a party as representing their interests, preferences, and aspirations. In closed-list proportional systems, or in systems with severe term limits, voters' only hope of holding governments accountable is to reward or punish incumbent *parties*. When party systems are highly volatile, this hope is thwarted. Theorists worry about a transition in the advanced democracies from *party democracy*, in which links between parties and their constituents are strong, to *audience democracy*, with its attendant distancing of party elites and hence governments from the people (Manin, 1997). These worries are intensified in new democracies, where parties appear especially aloof vis-à-vis voters (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

Indeed, in the world's new democracies – the Asian, Eastern European, African, and Latin American countries which democratized during the past quarter-century, and which, in some cases, have suffered authoritarian reversions – casual observation brings to light many instances in which party systems appear to become less, rather than more, stable over time. One might cite any number of examples, from Turkey to the Philippines to Russia. Latin America offers some clinical cases. One is Venezuela, where two parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, competed persistently against one another for decades. In the 30 years between 1958 and 1988, AD and COPEI's combined vote share fell to fifty percent only once (in 1968); in the 1970s and 1980s, it hovered around 80 percent. The AD-

COPEI duopoly began to fall apart in the early 1990s, and in 1998, the Chávez phenomenon basically swept these two parties into oblivion. The upending of Venezuela's traditional party system was all the more remarkable given that democracy in that country was 40 years old, antique by Latin-American standards.

On the surface, Argentina seems to be a country whose recent history demonstrates the power of democracy to dissolve voters' partisan affiliations. Since the Saenz Peña reforms of 1912, which introduced universal male suffrage and enforced the secret ballot, two parties have dominated politics at the national level, first the Radical party (*Unión Cívica Radical*) and Socialist party, then, starting in 1946, the Radicals and the Peronist party. Democracy in Argentina was frequently interrupted by coups d'état, most recently the 1976 coup that initiated eight years of repressive military rule. When democracy recommenced in 1983, the Radicals and the Peronists again dominated national elections.

But in the third decade of Argentina's most recent and longest period of democracy, the party system has frayed. After two terms in the presidency, both of which ended in debacles, the prospects of the Radical party are unclear; its presidential candidate in 2003 garnered a mere two percent of the vote.

For reasons having less to do with debacles in office and more to do with internecine fights, the Peronist party has also been unstable. The two-term Peronist president, Carlos Menem (1989-1995, 1995-1999), undertook a dramatic shift in the party's economic policy stance, from protectionism to neoliberalism, and (not unrelatedly) attenuated its ties with its traditional bases in the labor movement (see McGuire, 1997; Murillo, 2001; Stokes, 2001). It therefore began to attract higher-income voters and, among the poor, to rely more on clientelist payments and less on ideological support (see Auyero, 2000; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes, 2004; Levitsky, 2001; Mora y Araujo, 1991). The Peronists suffered a split in the mid-1990s, sloughing off important national leaders (one of whom became vice president in a coalition under a Radical president); in 2003, three Peronist presidential candidates competed against one another. The current Peronist president, Néstor Kirchner, popular and at odds with a segment of the party's apparatus, may form a new political party.

Observing stories like the Argentine one, it is tempting to infer that party affiliations may remain

relatively stable during authoritarian interludes only to be destabilized under democracy, when party leaders have a chance to hold power, squabble with one another, and disappoint voters. And indeed, some scholars posit that parties in new democracies, in contrast to those in old ones, are systematically less capable of generating loyalties and stabilizing electoral politics. In one account, the relative timing of democratization and the broadening of the franchise is what renders these parties less interested in forging strong links with voters. Whereas in the old democracies political parties struggled to enfranchise their constituents and instilled in them enduring partisan identities, the new democracies were born at a time when suffrage was already universal. Hence parties in new democracies “never had the far-reaching social functions or fostered the strong identities that they did in the early democratizers” (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006). Political parties in new democracies are more prone to elite-level reshufflings and changes in party labels, rendering them incapable of sowing social roots or building loyal constituencies (Rose and Munro, 2003).

Yet there are also good theoretical reasons to expect the workings of democracy everywhere to stabilize voters’ partisan attachments. If they do, the longer democracy lasts, the more stable electoral outcomes will tend to become. Whether or not suffrage is universal, at the moment of (re)democratization, office-seeking parties have an interest in building enduring attachments with potential constituents. Presumably such attachments increase a voter’s propensity to support the party, even through hard times. Yet at the outset of a new democratic period, political parties, banned or inactive under authoritarian rule, will find their organizational abilities atrophied. Only after a few electoral cycles do they gain the ability to mobilize their constituents. Voters may learn only over time which party best represents their interests (Achen, 1992; Fiorina, 1981); strategic voters may need a few electoral cycles to sort out hopeless parties from competitive ones (Roussias, 2007). The clientelist parties active in many new democracies need time in office to capture public resources required to oil patronage machines (Medina and Stokes, 2006). In old democracies, although beliefs (identification with a party) drive action (voting for it), actions also drive beliefs, so that repeatedly voting for a party makes people see themselves as adherents of it (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1969; Mullainathan and

Washington, 2006). If in new democracies as well, voting for a party drives voters' attachments to it, we would expect stability of the vote to increase over time.

Theory

We suggest the importance of distinguishing strong from moderate claims relating regime type to partisan attachments. A strong claim is that democratic processes in new democracies fail to deepen voters' attachments to parties; hence aggregate party vote shares fail to stabilize over time. A more moderate claim is that the process of identity formation is not absent in new democracies but is frequently masked by other factors that tend to destabilize electoral outcomes.

When party identities spread in an electorate, we expect a growing tendency for people's past votes to predict their current votes. Yet past votes (and partisan identities) are just one of a number of factors influencing current vote choices; the performance of incumbent parties, economic shocks, and interruptions of democratic rule also shape these choices. To clarify the plurality of factors influencing voters' choices, consider the following decision-theoretic model of a voter i 's probability of supporting incumbent party A :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(\text{Voter}_i \text{ supports party}_A) = & \beta_1(\text{performance evaluation}) + \beta_2(\text{policy distance}) + \\ & \beta_3(\text{clientelism}) + \beta_4(\text{propensity}) + \beta_5(\text{propensity*time}) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where *performance evaluation* is a subjective measure that the voter makes of how well party A has performed in office – how well the economy performed, whether there were scandals, and the like. *Policy distance* is the distance between voter i 's ideological or policy ideal points and that adopted by the party: the voter seeks to minimize this distance. *Clientelism* is the value of individualized payoffs that the voter receives from party A . *Propensity* toward A is a vector that might include parental influence, socialization, or social identity. The key question is whether this propensity becomes amplified over time as the voter has the chance to cast repeated votes for her preferred party and to be exposed to its mobilizing efforts. We model this hypothesized repeated-election effect as the interaction *propensity*time*.

To move from individual probabilities to district vote shares, suppose that individual i in district j votes for party A if and only if

$$\beta_1(\text{performance}) + \beta_2(\text{policy distance}) + \beta_3(\text{clientelism}) + \beta_4(\text{propensity}) + \beta_5(\text{propensity*time}) - \sigma_{ij} > 0 \quad (2)$$

where σ_{ij} is distributed according to a common cumulative distribution function within each district. The swing voter, one who is indifferent between voting for party A and another party is the voter with σ_{ij} such that

$$\sigma_{ij}^* = \beta_1(\text{performance}) + \beta_2(\text{policy distance}) + \beta_3(\text{clientelism}) + \beta_4(\text{propensity}) + \beta_5(\text{propensity*time}) \quad (3)$$

and all voters with $\sigma_{ij} < \sigma_{ij}^*$ will vote for party A . That is, the voter considers a series of factors (performance, policy distance, clientelism, socialization, repeated past support for A) and decides whether the sum of these factors place him below or above a threshold, σ_{ij}^* . A propensity to vote for party A , what might be called an identification with A , is just one of a number of factors that come into the voter's calculations. If σ_{ij} is distributed according to the standard normal distribution within each district, then party A 's vote share in district j is given by the integral over all voters with $\sigma_{ij} < \sigma_{ij}^*$:

$$\text{Vote share for } A \text{ in district } j = \Phi[\beta_1(\text{performance}) + \beta_2(\text{policy distance}) + \beta_3(\text{clientelism}) + \beta_4(\text{propensity}) + \beta_5(\text{propensity*time})] \quad (4)$$

The strong claim, that processes of identity formation are absent in new democracies, would be supported by the finding that the coefficient on the interaction between district propensity and time (β_5) is indistinguishable from zero. The moderate claim, that democracy deepens party identities but that this process may be masked by other factors and events, would be supported by the finding that the coefficient on the propensity/time interaction term was significantly greater than zero. If this second version were accurate, we might observe abrupt rises and falls in the fate of particular parties in new democracies, for instance when economic outcomes were volatile or parties' clientelist efforts expanded or contracted. But, given the proper data and controls, we would also be able to discern increasing stability of electoral choices over time, as new democracies age.

Turning to the effect of dictatorship on party attachments, if (as in the strong claim) political parties in new democracies do not build but actually damage people's party attachments, we might suppose that this damage ceases under dictatorship and hence that party identities freeze. In line with our more modest claim, if elections and party mobilization do indeed build voter attachments during democratic periods, it follows that, under dictatorship, when these processes are suspended, attachments should weaken.

By altering the conception of the passage of time in equation (4), we can generalize the model to dictatorships. Consider that we are modeling the vote share for party *A* in the first election after a period of dictatorship. The time elapsed in the model now represents the duration of the interruption of democracy. The strong claim, that attachments freeze under dictatorship, would again be supported if the coefficient on the *propensity*time* interaction were zero. The moderate claim would be supported if the coefficient on the *propensity*time* interaction were negative, meaning that the longer a period of dictatorship lasts, the weaker partisan attachments.

Cross-National Evidence

Empirical studies tracking electoral stability over time have produced mixed results. Cross-national studies of electoral volatility consistently reveal much higher volatility rates in new democracies than in old (Coppedge, 1998; Dalton, 2000; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006).¹ It is well documented that electoral volatility is greater in Latin America than in Europe. Coppedge (1998) calculates the average electoral volatility in twentieth-century Latin America at 21.3 (with Argentina toward the high end), versus Europe's 8.6. Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) note that previous lower-chamber votes predict current votes with an error rate in the United States of 3.2 percent, but in Ukraine of almost 60 percent. Such high volatility rates, though not directly addressing change in volatility over time, suggest a certain electoral disorderliness, if not chaos, in developing democracies.

Some studies do find increasing partisanship as democracy ages. Using panel survey data,

¹ The volatility index is $(.5 \sum |P_{i, t+1} - P_{i, t}|)$ is one-half of the sum of changes in vote shares for all parties from one election to the next. The index varies from 0 to 100. Volatility therefore is the aggregate percentage of the vote that shifts among parties from one election to the next.

Tucker and Brader (2001) find growing partisanship among Russian voters as time elapses under democracy (see also Miller and Klobucar, 2000; Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, 1998). But several ecological studies detect no decline in electoral volatility over time. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) identify several factors that influence party-system volatility in Latin America. But their regressions show that the mere passage of time under democracy is not one of these factors – it does not reduce volatility. Turning to the effect of dictatorial interludes on electoral stability, Remmer (1985) finds that the longer a dictatorship lasts, the greater the discontinuity in aggregate electoral returns between the last pre-authoritarian election and the first election marking a redemocratization. Yet Geddes (1995) is struck by the continuity of Latin American party systems (but not Eastern European ones) across authoritarian interludes, and Wittenberg (2006) demonstrates remarkable continuity in Hungarian electoral returns between two sets of elections separated by the nearly 50-year gap under Communist rule.

A simple cross-national illustration within Latin America is suggestive of stability of electoral outcomes. In Figure 1 we plot the relationship between the share of the vote received by the largest party in each of 18 Latin American countries against that party's share of the vote in the previous election. Each point on the scatter-plot represents a pair of elections, with the party's vote share in the previous election measured on the horizontal axis, its share in the subsequent one on the vertical axis. The positive slope of the regression line indicates some continuity in shares across pairs of elections, though the relation is weak and there are clear outlier cases. Still, this graphical relationship suggests that there may be more partisan stability in the region than previously thought.

* * * Figure 1 about here * * *

Several methodological considerations should make us wary of studies supporting the strong claim that in new – or frequently interrupted – democracies, trends toward the crystallization of partisan identities are absent. These studies typically rely on highly aggregated data, such as national-level vote shares, and pay little attention to the perils of drawing inferences from these data to the choices of individual voters. Volatility rates are particularly difficult to interpret: they do not distinguish demand-side changes in voter preferences from supply-side changes in the set of parties running for office.

Studies of trends in electoral volatility over time in new democracies typically consider a small number of elections. If we expect party identities to crystallize gradually under democracy, increased aggregate stability might not emerge clearly over the course of the first few electoral cycles. Most important, these studies typically fail to control for countervailing factors that can mask an underlying stabilization of the vote. Hence, if the period under study – generally, the 1980s and 1990s – was one in which parties in power in new democracies were buffeted by powerful economic shocks, the failure to control for these shocks would mask subtler processes of party-system stabilization.

We correct for these conceptual and empirical problems by studying the dynamics of electoral support for individual parties over a broad sweep of history. We examine the effect of repeated elections, and of interruptions of democracy, in Argentina over a long twentieth century: from 1912 until 2003. We avoid the problem of confusing supply- and demand-driven fluctuations by studying separately shifts in support for Argentina’s two major parties, the Radicals and the Peronists. Our use of relatively disaggregated data – voting returns at the department level (roughly equivalent to the county level in the U.S.) – attenuates problems of ecological inference. We also examine individual data which reassure us that our ecological analyses are unlikely to be vitiated by aggregation error. And to discern subtle processes of the stabilization of partisan identities, we introduce controls for factors which, in addition to previous voting behavior, influence a party’s share of the vote in any given election.

Data and Methods

To study the effects of political regime on the stabilization of the vote, we constructed a large ecological dataset. This dataset features election returns by department from 34 national elections dating from the Saenz Peña reforms to 2003.² To include demographic controls in our analyses, we matched

² Given Argentina’s highly fragmented federal system, party labels and inter-party alliances vary widely between provinces and over time. Still, there is considerable continuity in the presence of the two major parties and the ability of voters to identify them across provinces and election years. In a number of elections multiple candidates from the same party ran against each other. Most recently, as mentioned, in 2003, three Peronist candidates competed for the presidency. Our aggregation of these party labels under the general Radical and Peronist headings nevertheless seems justified. These were fleeting party divisions that generally disappeared by the following election. The single exception is that of the Intransigent Radicals and the People’s Radicals, two Radical factions that competed continuously during the 1957-65 period. Our combining of their votes biases us *against* finding a stabilizing effect; excluding one of the two party labels would thus bolster our results in the directions we

these returns with data from seven national censuses conducted over the course of the twentieth century and in 2001. We drew observations from 561 departments which, multiplied by 34 elections, yield over 17,000 observations. To our knowledge this is the most comprehensive database of Argentine electoral results assembled to date.³

Recall the theoretical model presented in equation (4):

$$\text{Vote share for } A \text{ in district } j = \Phi[\beta_1(\text{performance}) + \beta_2(\text{policy distance}) + \beta_3(\text{clientelism}) + \beta_4(\text{propensity}) + \beta_5(\text{propensity} \cdot \text{time})]$$

Our empirical strategy is as follows. Our dependent variable is the departmental vote share of each party (one party per model). To control for performance-related shifts in electoral support that result from economic volatility, scandals, and other discrete shocks, we include dummy variables for each election year. A shock that helps (hurts) the incumbent party tends to hurt (help) the opposition; therefore it is not necessary to distinguish whether the year in question found the party in or out of power.

As a proxy for a district's class structure, we use literacy rates.⁴ Our reasoning is that social class is the predominant cleavage in Argentina and that the class cleavage maps onto voter policy preferences (e.g., for or against a large, redistributive state). Though there is some debate, most political historians of Argentina hold that, before the appearance of the Peronists in 1946, lower-class voters supported the Radical Party against older, more oligarchic options. With the rise of Peronism and the emergence of the Radical vs. Peronist two-party system, lower-class support shifted to the Peronists (Cantón and Jorrat, 1978, 1998; Germani, 1955; Huerta Palau, 1963; Kirkpatrick, 1971; Little, 1973; Schoultz, 1977; Snow, 1969). Hence our expectation is that, before 1946, lower literacy rates would predict support for the

hypothesize.

³ For further explanation of our data, sources, and calculations, see Appendix A. Since voting is compulsory in Argentina and voter turnout is consistently in the 70-90 percent range, we do not expect significant discrepancies between census data covering entire district populations and electoral results covering only those who turn out to vote.

⁴ Although Argentina reached and maintained high levels of literacy early in the twentieth century, we have some evidence that literacy rates correlate closely with class. Using data from the partial census of 1927 (Cantón and Moreno, 1971), we calculated the correlation between literacy and the proportion of "Employees," a category that includes skilled or white-collar workers such as inspectors, pilots, and bankers. The correlation coefficient was 0.88. The correlation between literacy and the proportion of "Workers, Assistants and Day Laborers," a category that includes unskilled or blue-collar workers such as factory workers, merchants, and sweepers, was -0.72. Unfortunately, the other censuses either do not report data on occupations or collapse these two categories.

Radicals, after 1946, for the Peronists. We study these period effects by introducing an interaction term between literacy rates and elections that occurred before 1946.

We lack over-time measures of parties' clientelist efforts in particular departments. Whatever temporal or spatial variation occurred in clientelist efforts would be picked up by year dummies and by departmental fixed effects, which we also include in all specifications. Our individual data, drawn from surveys, does allow us to study separately the discrete effect of clientelism.

Turning to our independent variables of primary theoretical interest, we use a party's district vote share in the previous election as a measure of its propensity to vote for that party.⁵ To get at the *propensity*time* coefficients in our theoretical model, and hence at whether party attachments become more stable over time, we focus on interactions between lagged district vote shares and three distinct measures of time. Our first measure, *age of democracy*, counts the number of years that have elapsed since redemocratization.⁶ If the moderate claim is accurate, we expect that the predictiveness of lagged on current vote shares to grow over (democratic) time. The third election after redemocratization will be more highly predictive of the fourth than the second was of the third, the second will be more predictive of the third than the first was of the second, and so forth.

The second measure of time, *first election*, examines the impact of authoritarian interludes on partisan attachments. This measure is a dummy variable for the first election in each period of democracy. If partisanship is frozen during authoritarian regimes, only to be destabilized under democracy, we would expect the last election in the previous democratic period to be highly predictive of vote shares in the first election marking the transition to democracy. Indeed, we would expect it to be more predictive than it would have been had there been no interruption of democracy. If, by contrast, two elections are more highly correlated when the period between them was democratic than when it was

⁵ Achen (2000) has argued that a lagged dependent variable can "dominate" a regression, masking relationships between substantively interesting explanatory variables and the dependent variable. Given that in our case the lagged dependent variable *is* the explanatory variable of interest, we have no concern of this kind. Achen's finding is, moreover, disputed by Beck and Katz (2004) and Kelle and Kelly (2006).

⁶ Our coding of periods of democracy in Argentina, which differs slightly from that of other authors, is discussed in Appendix A and listed in Appendix B.

authoritarian, this would be evidence in favor of the moderate claim and against the authoritarian freezing hypothesis.

Our third measure of time, *years since election*, is the number of years that elapsed since the previous election in which the party in question was able to compete. If voting is stability-inducing – if the act of repeatedly voting for a particular party deepens one’s attachment to that party – then the longer the span of time between elections, the more likely a voter is to shift her attachment. This measure acknowledges that some elections were non-competitive: voters’ choices were limited either because parties were proscribed (as were the Peronists in 1957-60 and 1963), or because parties abstained from participating (as did the Radicals in the 1930s), or because electoral fraud was anticipated and widespread (as in the 1930s, early 1940s, 1951, and 1954).⁷ When citizens vote in elections in which the party they identify with is not allowed to run, their attachments may shift to one of the parties for which they are able to vote; hence their identities may weaken. Thus our expectation is that if partisan attachments erode when elections are not held, the more years that have elapsed since the previous competitive election, the less the predictive power of the lagged vote share.

The inclusion of the un-interacted lagged vote share in all the models controls for predispositions toward the party among the district’s voters. Our estimations also include additional controls, such as the log of the department’s population, the urbanization rate, and a time trend. They also include the lagged effective number of political parties in the department: we reason that the vote share of each party may be influenced by the number of alternative choices that were available to the district’s voters. All three models employ department fixed effects to control for the time-invariant characteristics specific to particular departments.⁸

Table 1 gives summary statistics for all the variables. The relatively low standard deviations of

⁷ See Appendix B for our coding of elections as competitive or non-competitive.

⁸ We are not concerned about collinearity between our lagged dependent variable and these department fixed effects because our data in fact show significant variation in electoral results between elections. The average difference within departments between vote shares in current and previous elections was over 14 percent for the Radicals and roughly 13 percent for the Peronists. The case of the 2003 election is particularly illustrative of this variation: the average difference between vote shares that year and the previous election was 24 percent for the Radicals and 23 percent for the Peronists.

Radical and Peronist vote shares across the dataset indicate that they center tightly around their means.⁹

For ease of interpretation we therefore do not transform these dependent variables.

* * * Table 1 about here * * *

Testing for Aggregation Error with Survey Data

Our premise in analyzing these department-level data is that continuity in the vote shares of political parties over time in any given *department* is a measure of the stability of *individuals'* vote choices in that department. This is the logic implied by the step from equation (1) to equation (2) in our theoretical model. If, in the presence of controls, past vote shares in a department fail to improve our predictions about current vote shares, then we infer that party attachments are absent or tenuous among voters in this department. If past vote shares are highly predictive of current vote shares, then we infer that partisan attachments are widespread among the department's voters (Bartels, 1998; Stokes, 1962).¹⁰

Yet, at least as a logical proposition, moving from district returns to individual attachments may be perilous. Consider a hypothetical district in which, in two consecutive elections, one half of the electorate supports the Radical Party, the other half the Peronists. By our logic, because vote shares in the first election perfectly predict vote shares in the second, party affinities must be widespread. But perhaps in each election the parties target voters who in the last election voted for their opponent, so that all of the Peronist votes in the second election come from people who in the first voted for the Radicals and all Radical votes in the second from people who in the first voted for Peronists. We would infer perfect stability when the reality is perfect instability. And we would falsely infer widespread partisan attachments when in fact such attachments were basically absent. The scenario is extreme and seems intuitively unlikely. Still, it illustrates the potential for aggregation error and flawed theoretical inferences.

If this scenario were true, it would mean that a vote for the Radical party in an election at time

⁹ This centering around the mean is true of both cross-sectional and over-time vote shares.

¹⁰ Our 2003 survey data show strong correlations between identifying with a particular party and voting for that party. The correlation of people saying that they identified with the Radicals and that they usually voted for the Radicals was 0.83, for the Peronists, 0.75, and for "other" parties, 0.57.

$t=1$ would increase (to $p=1$) the probability of a person's casting a Peronist vote in the subsequent election at $t=2$, just as a Peronist vote in $t=1$ would predict a Radical vote in $t=2$. We turn to survey data to show that, at least in the most recent democratic period, neither prediction holds. Stokes, in collaboration with Valeria Brusco and Marcelo Nazareno, conducted one survey in Argentina in 2001 and a follow-up in 2003 (see Appendix A for details). The surveys asked people about their voting histories. Certainly their responses only imperfectly reflected how they actually voted in the past; we can expect some slippage between actual and recalled votes. Yet we would expect the two to be highly correlated.

In the 2001 survey, people were asked whom they voted for in all presidential elections since the return to democracy: those of 1983, 1989, 1995, and 1999. And, indeed, we find evidence of a cumulative effect of past voting on electoral choices in later years.¹¹ Holding other variables at their sample means, if we assume a person who, coming into the 1999 election, had never in the current democratic period voted for the Radical candidate, the probability she would vote Radical in 1999 was 35 percent.¹² If she had voted Radical in the two previous elections – 1995 and 1989 – but not in 1983, the probability that she would vote Radical in 1999 rose to 70 percent. If she had voted Radical in every election beginning in 1983, the probability she would continue voting Radical in 1999 rose to 85 percent. In every instance, a Radical vote in previous elections reduced the probability that a voter would cast a Peronist vote in the next one.

In turn, the probability of an individual's voting for the Peronist presidential candidate in 1999 increased from 16 percent if she had never voted Peronist, to 22 percent if she had voted Peronist in 1995 and 1989, to 85 percent if she had voted Peronist consistently since 1983.¹³

¹¹ The results are basically the same when we analyze electoral histories as reported in the 2003 survey.

¹² These simulations draw on multivariate probit models (not shown).

¹³ To further probe the plausibility of aggregation error, using King's (1997) method for ecological inference we calculated the proportions of individual voters across the 561 departments who changed their votes and whose votes remained stable between subsequent elections (see Benoit and King, 2003; King, 1997). (The calculations assume that populations are stable over time, which is obviously not the case. This assumption is less troubling given that the time lags we are interested in are generally short: two years between elections in the majority of cases.) By these calculations, of every 10 people who voted Peronist in one election, nearly seven voted Peronist again in the next election. Of every 10 people who voted Radical in one election, six voted Radical again in the next election. This result is in line with Cantón and Jorrot's (1998; 2001) estimates of the high degree of stability in voting behavior between elections in Argentina.

These results offer scant evidence of any massive shifts back and forth between the parties and hence reassure us that aggregation error is unlikely.

Regime and Voting Stability: Aggregate Evidence

We begin with the results for the Radicals. In all three models reported in Table 2, coefficients on the time/lagged-vote-share interactions are significant and have the expected signs.¹⁴ The older the democratic regime, the better the Radical vote share in the last election predicted the Radical vote share in the current one (model 1). When transitional elections took place, these were less well predicted by the previous election than subsequent elections were by their lags (model 2). And the longer the time that elapsed between elections, the greater the erosion of stability (model 3).

* * * Table 2 about here * * *

Table 3 shows the marginal effect of lagged vote shares on current vote shares under the assumption that zero, ten, and twenty years have elapsed. In the first model, twenty additional years of democracy increase by a quarter the predictiveness of the last election on the current one (from 23 percent to 28 percent). In model 2, if the last election and the current one were separated by a period of authoritarianism, then the predictive power of the lagged Radical party vote share was 30 percent less than when no authoritarian interlude occurred. In model 3, if zero years elapsed since the last election, the Radical vote share in that earlier election explains 34 percent of the variation in the Radical vote share in the current election.¹⁵ If 20 years elapsed, the lagged and current vote shares were actually negatively related. A shift from zero to twenty years between consecutive elections predicts a loss of stability of the Radical vote of nearly 80 percent.

* * * Table 3 about here * * *

Turning to the Peronists (Table 4), the results are substantively the same. The longer democracy

¹⁴ Since our analyses are based on an unbalanced panel – in which certain departments have more observations than others – we tested the robustness of our results to ensure against systematic biases. Rerunning our analyses with only those departments with at least 30 observations (out of our total 34 elections), all of our results are stronger in the directions we hypothesize.

¹⁵ In two instances in the twentieth century (1948 and 1973), two national elections were held the same year and hence zero years elapsed between the two (see Appendix B).

was in existence, the more predictive the lagged on the current vote share (model 1). Transitional elections were less well predicted by the last vote in the previous democratic period than were later elections by their lags (model 2). And the longer the gap between elections, the less predictive was the lagged Peronist vote share on the current vote share (model 3).

* * * Table 4 about here * * *

Peronist identities appear more resilient than Radical identities. Peronists' electoral stability was less sensitive to the age of democracy (model 1) and declined much less sharply as the period between elections lengthened (model 3). And Peronist identities eroded considerably less sharply during periods of authoritarian rule than did those of Radicals (model 2). At the end of the paper we discuss how organizational and ideological differences between the two parties may explain the greater resilience of Peronist identities.

Recalling our theoretical concerns, we would like to compare directly the effect of the passage of time under democracy with the passage of time under dictatorship on electoral stability. The strong claim outlined earlier implies that stability will erode during “democratic time” and remain unchanged during “authoritarian time.” The weak claim implies just the opposite: that stability will increase under democratic time, erode under authoritarian time. Ideally, to make these comparisons, we would hold the amount of time that elapses constant and compare regime effects. We would especially like to do this because one might expect that, with ecological data, the passage of time will produce some discontinuities that have little to do with politics, as people enter and leave the electorate, and migrate among districts.¹⁶ But only in our first model do we hold time periods constant. Under democracy, elections were held quite regularly, about every two years. Therefore model 1 allows us to make *intra*-regime comparisons: it basically tells us that electoral stability was built up more slowly during a two-year period in a young democracy than during a two-year period in an older democracy.

¹⁶To reduce the possibility that population movements among districts were driving our results, we reran our analysis on a subset of departments in which annual population change was below the mean of 1.4 percent. We found that our substantive results were unchanged and that, if anything, the effects in this population-stable subset were slightly larger (and in the hypothesized direction).

Our data do not, however, allow us to draw direct comparisons between democratic and authoritarian effects, holding constant the length of time elapsed. We cannot do this because authoritarianism in Argentine always lengthened the time between elections; long gaps and authoritarian interludes are highly collinear.¹⁷ Had it been the case that, on several occasions, authoritarian rulers took power and then quickly turned things over to civilians who held elections, or (less imaginably) that democratic governments sometimes lengthened significantly the intervals between elections, we could make these direct comparisons.

Still, given our data, we do know the following: longer gaps between elections erode electoral stability; authoritarianism in Argentina lengthened the gaps between elections; and hence electoral stability deteriorated more under authoritarianism than under democracy. The syllogism at least tells us that authoritarian interludes did not freeze partisan identities, or even slow their erosion more than democracy did. Whether (hypothetical) short authoritarian inter-election gaps might have eroded identities less quickly than (hypothetical) long democratic inter-election gaps remains, in the Argentine case, an unanswerable question.

To summarize thus far, our aggregate data show that, when democracy was able to run its course, Argentine political outcomes tended to stabilize. During interruptions of democracy, they tended to erode. And these effects were more pronounced among Radicals than among Peronists.

Our ecological data allow us to weigh in on questions in Argentine political historiography about class and voting by documenting a shift in the way that social cleavages mapped onto the party system. Consistent with the expectations of much of twentieth-century Argentine historiography, we find that, before 1946, higher literacy significantly reduced the Radical vote share, as can be seen by summing the coefficients on *Literacy* and on the *Literacy*Elections pre-1946* interaction (Table 2). Figure 2 illustrates

¹⁷ We constructed three-way interactions between lagged vote shares, time elapsed since last election, and the dummy for first election after an authoritarian interlude, as a way to, in effect, split our samples and compare the effects of time elapsed in under authoritarianism and under democracy. But authoritarianism basically always increased the time between elections: the correlation coefficient between the two- and three-way interactions was 0.86 in the case of the Radicals, 0.94 in the case of the Peronists. Hence regression specifications including these terms would severely inflate standard errors.

the percentages of literates and illiterates who voted Radical each year as calculated using EzI (Benoit and King, 2003). It shows that, with few exceptions, in elections before 1946 a larger percentage of illiterates than literates voted for the Radicals. After 1946, again with a few exceptions, a larger percentage of literates than illiterates supported the Radicals.

* * * Figure 2 about here * * *

Turning to the Peronists, the coefficient on literacy was consistently positive but statistically insignificant (Table 4). All three models, however, include elections in which the Peronists were proscribed. Figure 3 shows that these elections were exceptional: the instructions Peronists gave (to cast blank ballots or to vote for non-Peronist candidates) seem to have been followed more by literates than by illiterates. Otherwise, illiterates formed the core of support of the Peronist party.

* * * Figure 3 about here * * *

Although the King (1997) method of ecological inference we utilize is far from conclusive (see Tam Cho, 1998), our year-by-year results do suggest that the intersection of class cleavages with party politics in our data is consistent with conventional political wisdom and with scholarly views: once the party system organized itself around the Radical-Peronist divide, the Radicals represented the middle and professional classes, the Peronists the working classes.

Democracy and the Growth of Party Identities: Evidence from Surveys

Our surveys allow another kind of test of the theoretical model developed earlier. The advantage of survey data is that they allow us to examine directly the factors influencing vote choices of individuals. Although they afford less insight into over-time dynamics than do our ecological data, still they can tell us something about these dynamics. And they allow us to compare, at a single (and chaotic) historical moment, the impact on electoral choices of partisan affinities and past voting choices, to the impact of performance, clientelism, and ideology.

In advanced democracies, the older a person is, the more likely he or she is to identify with a party and the more intense that identification is likely to be (Converse, 1969; 1976). This fact supports the repeated-election account of the origins of party identities: people who vote for a party come to see

themselves as supporters of it, and the more times they vote for it, the deeper their affinity with it. In an interrupted democracy like Argentina, assuming that the repeated-voting effect is also at work, we do not expect age to have such a straightforward effect on party identities. The older cohorts at the time of the 2003 survey had lived through multiple periods of dictatorship and democracy. Only among the cohorts that came of age with, or after, the transition to the most recent (and longest-lasting) democratic period (1983-present) – those whose voting lives corresponded with a period of uninterrupted democracy – do we expect a positive impact of age on partisanship. Hence our expectation is that, among the older cohorts, age would have no significant effect on partisanship, whereas among the younger cohort, it would have a positive effect.

To test this proposition, we split our sample between respondents who came of age at or after the moment of the 1983 redemocratization, and older respondents. Those who were 18 years old in 1983 were 38 in 2003, when the survey was conducted. Hence the cut point was between those who were 38 and younger (911 respondents) and those who were older than 38 (1,076 respondents). The survey asked voters which party they identified with most closely. One thousand one hundred thirty seven respondents, 59 percent of the sample, named some party; 806 (42 percent) said they identified with no party. We ran separate probit analyses among the older and younger cohorts of the probability of the respondent's holding some party identity. Results are reported in Tables 5. Among older cohorts (column 1), age had no impact on the probability of non-partisanship. Among younger cohorts (column 2), it had a positive, significant, and substantial effect. In simulations, holding other variables at their sample means, the probability that an 18-year-old would report that she identified with some party was 49 percent, that of a 38-year-old, 60 percent. By contrast, a twenty-year age difference among the older cohorts made no difference: shifting from a 40- to a 60-year-old changed the probability of holding a party identity by a mere 0.6 percent (and the effect was to *reduce* this probability). Shifting from a 40- to an 88-year-old (the oldest person in our sample) reduced the probability by a mere two percent.¹⁸ Argentines, like

¹⁸We use *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000) to generate these simulations. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for 18-year-olds were 42-56 percent, for 38-year-olds, 54-67 percent, for 40-year-olds, 60-70 percent, for

citizens in other countries, were likely to accrue party identities as they aged, but only if they aged during a period of sustained democratic rule.¹⁹

* * * Table 5 about here* * *

The survey also allowed us to study the impact of party identification and lagged vote choice on current choices, with controls for the other factors in our theoretical model. The survey followed the 2003 national election, a complex one from the voters' vantage point. As noted earlier, three Peronist candidates ran against one another and were among the four top vote-getters. Two former Radical leaders ran as candidates representing other parties and the Radical party's official candidate was uncompetitive. Indeed, as noted at the outset, this was exactly the sort of election that led many to doubt that party identities run very deep or intensify over the course of democratic periods.

Even in such chaotic circumstances past votes and party identification did guide the actions of many voters. This was particularly true of those who supported Menem. Menem received the largest number of votes among candidates from all parties. Our analysis indicates that Peronist voters were more likely to support Menem than to support other Peronists. They seem to have identified Menem as *the* Peronist candidate; the fact that Menem had served two terms as president may have enhanced his salience to Peronist voters as the party's true standard-bearer.

Recalling the individual model in equation (1), we capture performance evaluations through respondents' views of economic performance. They were asked, "In comparison with last year, do you believe that the national economy is worse, the same, or better?" To capture the ideological or policy distance between the voter and Menem, we asked two questions. One asked which statement they agreed with more, "When the national government increases public spending, people like me (1) benefit because

60-year-olds, 60-68 percent, and for 88-year-olds, 52-73 percent. We also attempted to explore the effect of age on partisan stability in our ecological dataset, but the age structure of departments was too similar to yield usable results.

¹⁹ Strictly speaking we cannot dismiss the possibility that these are cohort, rather than life-cycle, effects. Some younger cohorts entered the electorate when Menem's Peronist governments of the 1990s shifted toward a neoliberal economic model, and such voters might have remained less ideologically driven in their support of Peronists than were older cohorts. Yet given the regularity with which age influences the strength of partisan attachments in countries around the world (Converse, 1969), we doubt that such effects are absent in Argentina.

the economic situation improves, or (2) are hurt because the economic situation deteriorates.” Given Menem’s shift of the party toward neoliberalism in the 1990s, our *a priori* expectation was that people who agreed with the second option would be more likely to vote for him. The second ideology question asked respondents to locate themselves on a left-to-right ideological scale. For the same reasons that we included literacy in our aggregate-data specifications, we also included controls for income and education levels. To gauge whether the respondent received clientelist benefits, we asked whether, during the campaign, he or she had received any of a number of items (which we specified) and, if so, from which candidate. *Clientelism* is a dummy variable for people who said that they received something from the Menem campaign.

To explore the effect of party identity, we included a dummy indicating whether the respondent had voted for the Peronist candidate in the previous (1999) election and one indicating whether he or she identified most closely with the Peronists (see Table 6).

* * * Table 6 about here * * *

Retrospective economic assessments significantly influenced the vote. People who saw the economy as having worsened in the previous year (on the watch of an interim Peronist president, Eduardo Duhalde, Menem’s rival) were more likely to vote for Menem. Clientelism also made a difference: those who received handouts from the Menem campaign were more likely to support him. Interestingly, ideology had little effect. One observes a weak trend toward rightists supporting Menem, but respondents who thought increased state employment had bad economic effects were no more likely to cast votes for Menem. Perhaps Menem’s identity as a Peronist – a party historically associated with a program for a large, redistributive state – clouded voters’ perception of him as an advocate of a down-sized state.

Turning to the results of greatest theoretical interest here, we see continuity of votes from one election to the next. This is, in a sense, unsurprising: we chose to study the Menem vote as the Peronist vote because it displayed such continuity. It is more instructive to compare the magnitude of the effects of economic assessments, clientelism, party identification and previous Peronist votes on the Menem vote. In simulations, holding all other variables at their sample means, the probability of a Menem vote

by someone who thought the economy had worsened was twice that of someone who thought it had improved. The probability of a Menem vote by someone who had received a clientelist handout from the Menem campaign was three times that of someone who had not. And a person who had voted for Duhalde (the Peronist candidate in 1999) was 60 percent more likely to vote for Menem. A person who declared that she most identified with the Peronists was eight times as likely as someone who did not to vote for Menem.²⁰ Party identities and past votes were powerful forces in electoral choices.

To summarize, survey data reinforce the basic lessons of aggregate analyses. Over time, as people have repeated opportunities to vote for parties and to be exposed to their mobilizing efforts, they tend to acquire partisan identities; hence the probability of non-partisanship declines with age. But Argentine voters only had these identity-forming experiences during sustained democratic periods, and therefore age only predicted partisanship among those whose adult lives had coincided with uninterrupted democracy. Considering electoral choices, for many voters, past votes amplified the likelihood that they would support a candidate from the same party in the current election, even when the current election was one in which party labels and the partisan identities of candidates were relatively unhelpful guides for voters. Party identities also clearly conditioned vote choices. Although bad performance (i.e., bad economic outcomes) could certainly turn voters against a party, we find evidence that party identities tended to be reinforced over time and were not necessarily overshadowed by assessments of performance.

Discussion

Exploiting aggregate electoral returns in a large number of Argentine districts over the course of a century, we have found that democratic interludes tend to deepen party identities and hence to stabilize electoral outcomes. Dictatorships interrupt this process of identity formation. These findings go against the strong claim that political parties in new democracies are fundamentally different from those in old democracies. In both old and new democracies, parties are interested in fostering partisan identification

²⁰ We use *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000) to generate these simulations. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals were: for economic evaluations, better: 4-13, worse: 9-24; for clientelism, no handout: 7-14, handout: 9-24; for the lagged vote, did not vote for Duhalde: 5-13, voted for Duhalde: 9-22; for party ID, no Peronist identity: 1-6, Peronist identity: 18-31.

among their constituents, and to some degree capable of doing so. The findings should mitigate the fear that partisan identities freeze during dictatorships, only to be eroded by party leaders once democracy is reinitiated.

We asked at the outset whether today's developing democracies are on a path toward the electoral stability and entrenched party identifications that typify older democracies. The answer that emerges from our study is mixed. The country we have studied, Argentina, is in some ways an object lesson in the destabilizing forces acting on party systems and on voters' partisan attachments in new democracies. But our study helps to pinpoint the sources of this instability. Under democracy, parties and voters do things that solidify party-voter links: parties proselytize, send out campaign messages, distribute goodies, and build organizations, and voters receive these messages and goodies. Voters also vote, and in doing so come to see themselves as attached to the party they vote for. But other forces are also at work counteracting this process of stabilization. One obvious force is governmental debacles and bad economic outcomes, which discredit party leaders and erode the attachments of some voters. How quickly partisan attachments solidify, if at all, will depend on the relative power of these countervailing forces.

It bears emphasizing that another force that erodes stability in today's new democracies is the interruption of democracy. One would expect, given what we have learned, that frequently interrupted democracies will produce partisan attachments that are comparatively superficial and fleeting. And in places where voters' attachments are superficial and fleeting, we would expect aggregate electoral returns to be especially volatile. We therefore expect greater aggregate volatility of voting results in the Argentinas, South Koreas, and Pakistans of the world – places where democracy has been frequently interrupted – than in the Britains, U.S.s, or Indias. In explaining higher volatility rates in developing than in European democracies, scholars point toward changes in political conditions that are *concurrent* with the election in question: volatile economic conditions, political institutions, alliances and ruptures among parties, and extensions of the suffrage, (see Coppedge, 1998). Our study points toward an *historical* factor: a history of interruptions of democracy. Cumulatively over time these interruptions erode partisan

attachments. Indeed, the power of past interruptions of democracy to slow institutional development extends beyond political parties and party systems to other institutions (Spiller and Tommasi, 2007).

Although democracy builds party attachments and dictatorship erodes them, we have also detected some continuities in voting patterns in Argentina across periods of authoritarian rule. Ten years of dictatorship without elections, equivalent in Argentina to the military regime of the late 1970s and early 1980s, severely eroded partisan attachments. But both parties, and the Peronists in particular, managed to retain some continuity of vote shares nonetheless. These results point toward less continuity during authoritarian periods in Argentina than Wittenberg (2006) found in Hungary over a much longer interruption of democracy. Wittenberg attributed the surprising degree of stability of support for communists and rightists between 1948 and 1994 elections to an on-going process of identity formation and reaffirmation in which the purveyors of “church community” carried on a long struggle against socialists. The contrast between Hungary and Argentina raises a question for future research: why are some authoritarian experiences more corrosive than others of partisan attachments?

We have seen that parties vary in their ability to retain constituent loyalty over time and during authoritarian interludes. The Peronists were relatively effective at accomplishing this, the Radicals relatively ineffective. The kinds of parties that, like the Peronists, are effective are ones that manage to make adherence to its cause almost a kind of religious commitment. Indeed, the Hungarian case may be suggestive. Just as we would expect many religious believers to remain true to their church even in the face of persecution, so we would expect voters with a religious-like commitment to their party not to abandon it, even during long years of dictatorship. These are people who maintain shrines in their homes to a party’s founders, celebrate traditional party holidays, and inculcate in their children veneration for the party and hostility toward competitors. The Argentine Peronists cultivated just these sorts of true believers. In contrast, the Radicals’ appeal was more rationalistic. From the Peronist leaderships’ vantage point, of course, the cultivation of this pseudo-religious identity was highly functional,

particularly given the party's frequent proscription and persecution.²¹

Turning to comparative issues, our analysis says nothing about regime dynamics and the emergence of party identities in others of the world's new democracies. But we have laid out a research strategy that could be replicated elsewhere, in countries where survey data are scarce but electoral returns are increasingly available at district and local levels. Nor have we explicitly compared the dynamics of political identity formation in Argentina to those of more established democracies. In developed democracies, regime type does not vary. We therefore turn to developing democracies to study how electoral stability and hence partisan attachments vary as a function of political regime. Yet in parliamentary systems, the gaps in time between elections do vary. Our approach might therefore be repeated, with some modifications, in democracies with varying gaps between elections. And an analysis like the one carried out here, of the effect of the age of democracy on electoral stability, could certainly be undertaken.

²¹ Of course we have not explained the Peronists' ability to build relatively robust ties among their constituents. Instead we have simply demonstrated that this ability has, over a long sweep of history, left Peronist identities less exposed to erosion when democracy has been interrupted.

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
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Figure 1. *Partisan stability in Latin America, 1978-2005*



$r = .4935$

Note: Data points represent vote shares for a particular party. We include electoral results for one party per country (the party with the greatest average vote share across elections) for each election between 1978 and 2005. Countries and parties included are Argentina (PJ), Bolivia (MNR), Brazil (PSDB), Chile (PDC), Colombia (PLC), Costa Rica (PLN), Dominican Republic (PRD), Ecuador (PSC), El Salvador (ARENA), Guatemala (UCN), Honduras (PL), Mexico (PRI), Nicaragua (FSLN), Panama (PRD), Paraguay (ANR), Peru (APRA), Uruguay (PN), Venezuela (AD).

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Radical vote share ^a	16,973	0.389	0.206	0	1
Peronist vote share ^b	14,371	0.415	0.183	0	0.991
Age of democracy	16,895	7.632	6.538	0	20
Years since election (Radicals)	16,819	2.928	2.671	0	10
Years since election (Peronists)	11,887	3.499	3.490	0	14
Effective number of parties	17,069	3.015	1.099	0.942	11.80
Literacy rate	17,015	0.853	0.134	0.255	1
Urbanization rate	16,599	0.493	0.352	0	1
Population	16,301	49,587	99,268	159	1,305,885

a. Our calculation of the Radical vote shares included votes cast for the following parties and alliances: *Acción por la República Federal* (1999); *Alianza Concertación por el Desarrollo* (2003); *Alianza Salteña* (1983, 1997); *Alianza Frente Cívico y Social* (1991-2001); *Alianza Frente de Todos* (2003); *Alianza Frente Juntos por San Luis* (2003); *Alianza Frente Provincia Unida* (2003); *Alianza Frente Social Entre Ríos Tiene Futuro* (2003); *Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación* (1997-2001); *Alianza para Todos* (1997); *Alianza Unidos por Salta* (2003); *Confederación Federalista Independiente* (1989); *Convergencia por Santa Cruz* (2003); *Frente de Todos* (1997-2001); *Frente Social y Productivo* (2003); *Frente Unión por Tucumán* (2003); *Lema Riojano por el Trabajo y la Producción* (2003); *Mobilización* (1987, 1989); *Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo* (1965); *Movimiento Popular de Recuperación Radical* (1957-1962); *Partido Radical* (1916-1940); *Unión Cívica Radical* (1912-2003); and *Unión Democrática* (1946).

b. Our calculations of the Peronist vote shares included the following: *Acción Progresista* (1962); *Acción Provincial* (1965); *Alianza Frente Movimiento Popular* (2003); *Alianza Frente para la Victoria* (2003); *Alianza Frente por la Lealtad* (2003); *Alianza Unidos por Córdoba* (2003); *Concertación Justicialista para el Cambio* (1999); *Frente Fundacional por el Cambio* (2003); *Frente Justicialista* (1987-1995); *Frente Justicialista de la Esperanza* (1999); *Frente Justicialista Popular* (1989-1995); *Frente Justicialista por la Victoria* (1993-1995); *Movimiento Cívico Bandera Popular* (1962); *Movimiento Las Flores-Luján* (1965); *Movimiento Popular Mendocino* (1965); *Movimiento Popular Neuquino* (1962-1965); *Partido Blanco de Mendoza* (1965); *Partido Blanco de Río Negro* (1962, 1965); *Partido Blanco de Santa Fe* (1962); *Partido de la Justicia Social* (1963, 1965); *Partido de la Provincia de Chubut* (1962); *Partido Laborista* (1946-1965); *Partido Peronista* (1946-1954); *Partido Justicialista* (1963-2001); *Partido Socialista Argentino de Vanguardia* (1962); *Tres Banderas* (1962-1965); *Unión Cívica Radical Junta Renovadora* (1946); *Unión del Centro Democrático* (2003); *Unión Popular* (1962-1965); *Unión Provincial* (1965); *Unión y Libertad* (2003); and blank votes (1957, 1960, 1963). Many Peronist voters cast blank ballots in the elections of 1957, 1960 and 1963, when Perón and the Peronist party were proscribed. Indeed, the share of blank votes rose from a national average of 4.2 percent in 1948 to 19.4 percent in 1957 and 21.9 percent in 1960.

Table 2. Panel fixed-effects estimates of determinants of Radical vote share

Independent variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged vote share	0.226 ^{***} (0.016)	0.320 ^{***} (0.017)	0.367 ^{***} (0.022)
Age of democracy	-0.007 ^{***} (0.002)		
Age of democracy * Lagged vote share	0.004^{**} (0.002)		
First election		0.421 ^{***} (0.050)	
First election * Lagged vote share		-0.328^{***} (0.024)	
Years since election			0.046 ^{***} (0.001)
Years since election * Lagged vote share			-0.038^{***} (0.004)
Lagged effective number of parties (ENP)	0.004 [*] (0.002)	0.006 ^{***} (0.002)	0.005 ^{***} (0.002)
Elections prior to 1946		0.447 ^{***} (0.054)	0.615 ^{***} (0.052)
Literacy	0.271 ^{***} (0.058)	0.232 ^{***} (0.056)	0.274 ^{***} (0.052)
Literacy * Elections prior to 1946	-0.565 ^{***} (0.059)	-0.528 ^{***} (0.056)	-0.584 ^{***} (0.058)
Urbanization	0.012 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)
Population (ln)	-0.030 ^{***} (0.005)	-0.030 ^{***} (0.005)	-0.031 ^{***} (0.005)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.273 ^{***} (0.073)	0.274 ^{***} (0.100)	0.444 ^{***} (0.065)
Within-group R ²	0.691	0.670	0.697
Between-groups R ²	0.449	0.482	0.461
Overall R ²	0.660	0.672	0.668
Observations	11,247	11,247	11,174
Groups	504	504	504

Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level

Table 3. Compared effects of time measures on stability

Years	Age of democracy (model 1)		Years since election (model 3)	
	Radical	Peronist	Radical	Peronist
0	0.226 (0.015)	0.232 (0.013)	0.357 (0.022)	0.107 (0.023)
10	0.255 (0.017)	0.244 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.030)	0.008 (0.023)
20	0.284 (0.030)	0.255 (0.031)	-0.376 (0.070)	-0.091 (0.050)

	First election (model 2)	
	Radical	Peronist
Was not a first election	0.307 (0.017)	0.279 (0.017)
Was a first election	0.007 (0.021)	0.043 (0.027)

Note: Values indicate the marginal effect of the lagged vote share at different values of time measures, using panel fixed-effects estimates reported in Tables 3 and 5. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005).

Table 4. Panel fixed-effects estimates of determinants of Peronist vote share


Independent variables	(1) [†]	(2) [†]	(3)
Lagged vote share	0.192 ^{***} (0.015)	0.318 ^{***} (0.020)	0.185 ^{***} (0.027)
Age of democracy	0.016 ^{***} (0.001)		
Age of democracy * Lagged vote share	0.011^{***} (0.002)		
First election		0.128 ^{***} (0.015)	
First election * Lagged vote share		-0.302^{***} (0.037)	
Years since election			-0.017 ^{***} (0.002)
Years since election * Lagged vote share			-0.019^{***} (0.003)
Lagged effective number of parties (ENP)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 [*] (0.002)	-0.005 ^{**} (0.002)
Literacy	0.042 (0.069)	0.044 (0.068)	0.017 (0.067)
Urbanization	0.028 [*] (0.014)	0.029 ^{**} (0.014)	0.032 ^{**} (0.014)
Population (ln)	-0.032 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.029 ^{***} (0.009)	-0.023 ^{***} (0.008)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.064 ^{***} (0.108)	0.790 ^{***} (0.106)	0.803 ^{***} (0.103)
Within-group R ²	0.623	0.627	0.544
Between-groups R ²	0.419	0.460	0.391
Overall R ²	0.593	0.600	0.483
Observations	8,677	8,677	7,383
Groups	504	504	504

Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests.

*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level


[†] These models do not include the presidential election of 1958 since Peronist votes, most of which were cast for the Intransigent Radical candidate, could not be isolated for that election.

Figure 2. Year-by-year voter preference for the Radical party by literacy



Note: Values represent estimates of the overall percentage of literate and illiterate voters for the Radical party. Estimates are generated using Benoit and King’s EzI program (2003) and averaged using population weights across departments.

Figure 3. Year-by-year voter preference for the Peronist party by literacy



Note: Values represent estimates of the overall percentage of literate and illiterate voters for the Peronist party. Estimates are generated using Benoit and King’s EzI program (2003) and averaged using population weights across departments.

Table 5. *Probit estimates of the probability of non-partisanship, by cohort*

Independent variables	Older cohort (1)	Younger cohort (2)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	0.014** (0.007)
Income	0.170*** (0.079)	-0.097 (0.089)
Education	-0.086*** (0.028)	-0.055*** (0.027)
Gender	0.013 (0.085)	-0.126 (0.090)
Constant	0.281 (0.320)	0.299 (0.317)
Pseudo-R ²	0.009	0.013
Observations	924	809

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level

Note: “Older cohort” refers to respondents who came of age prior to redemocratization (1983). “Younger cohort” refers to respondents who came of age at or after redemocratization.

Table 6. Probit estimates of probability of vote for Menem, 2003

Independent variables	Coefficient
Economy has worsened ^a	0.212** (0.107)
Rightist economic ideology ^b	-0.097 (0.182)
Rightist political ideology ^c	0.068 (0.059)
Income	-0.224 (0.151)
Age	-0.015*** (0.006)
Education	-0.054 (0.055)
Clientelism ^d	0.748*** (0.384)
Lagged Peronist vote ^e	0.319*** (0.176)
Identifies with Peronists ^f	1.225*** (0.220)
Constant	-2.155*** (0.690)
Pseudo-R ²	0.2806
Observations	465

Standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies also included.

*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level

Dependent variable is responses of “Carlos Menem” to the question, “Who did you vote for in the 2003 presidential election?”

^a “In comparison with last year, do you believe that the national economy is better, the same, or worse?”

^b “When the national government increases public spending, people like me benefit because the economic situation improves, or are hurt because the economic situation deteriorates.” Variable is a dummy for the second response.

^c “Do you consider yourself leftist, center leftist, centrist, center rightist, rightist”; five-point scale, ascending from leftist to rightist.

^d Dummy indicating that respondent received an individualized payment from the Menem campaign.

^e Dummy indicating respondent voted for Peronist presidential candidate in 1999.

^f Dummy for response “Peronist” to the question, “With which party do you most identify?”

Appendix A: Data and Calculations

Each observation in our ecological dataset corresponds to an election in a department.

Electoral data: Our data consist of the department-level returns for 34 national elections between 1912 and 2003 (Cantón, 1968, 1973, 1986; Escolar, 2003; Ministerio del Interior, 1950, various; Zalduendo, 1958). In cases where departmental borders were redrawn, we used returns from that department only after the redistricting took place. Department name and boundary changes were determined using Cacopardo (1967) and notes in census publications. In cases where departmental lines were completely redrawn for an entire province (such as Chaco and Tucumán), we include both pre- and post-redistricting observations as distinct departments. For vote-share calculations, we used as the denominator the total number of votes, including blank and null ballots. In two-round presidential elections, our observations were of the first round of elections. When elections for National Deputies and President were simultaneous, we used only presidential election observations.

Census data: Argentina conducted national censuses with some regularity over the course of the twentieth century, in 1914, 1947, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991 and again in 2001. These censuses provided us with the data on population, literacy rates, and urbanization rates by department. Additional data are also available from provincial censuses for La Pampa (1920, 1935 and 1942), and for Santa Fe (1958). Results from the 1927 census (cf. note 4), which surveyed only eligible voters (at that time meaning Argentine men over 18), are reported only at the province level. Literacy measures vary somewhat across censuses, from the percentage of literate registered voters (1914) to the percentage of literate individuals over 14 years old (1947, 1980) to the percentage of literate individuals over 10 years old (1991, 2001).

We interpolated these variables using simple rates of growth for years between censuses.

Election coding: Based on the historical literature (e.g. Romero, 2002), we code the following periods as democratic: 1912-30, 1937-43, 1946-50, 1957-66, 1973-76 and 1983-present (see Appendix B). This coding differs slightly from those of previous studies (Boix, 2003; Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Przeworski et al., 2000) in that we consider democratic the period of Perón's first term (1946-50) in which relatively free and fair elections were held but in which no alternation of

executive power occurred. The opposition Radical Party was active and relatively free during this period, suggesting that voters could anticipate an opposition victory and would therefore be likely to vote on the basis of personal preference rather than limited choice.

Effective number of parties: We use the N_2 index (the inverse of the sum of squared vote shares) developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to calculate the effective number of parties in each department-year observed. We include blank votes as a party in these calculations, but exclude null votes. In cases where election returns are reported with an “others” category, we follow Taagepera’s (1997) suggested method: we take the average of the index value excluding the “others” category and the index value multiplied by the lower of a) the vote share of the “others” category alone, or b) the vote share of the “others” category multiplied by the lowest party vote share.

Survey data: Survey data were collected by Stokes in 2001 and 2003 in collaboration with Valeria Brusco and Marcelo Nazareno (see Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes, 2004). The samples in both surveys were drawn from clusters based on census tracks. The 2001 survey was of 480 adults each in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Misiones and in the department of General Pueyrredón. The margin of error was ± 4.5 percent. The 2003 survey was of 500 adults in each of four provinces (Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Misiones, and San Luis). The margin of error was ± 6 percent. The 2003 surveys excluded upper-middle and upper-income individuals; results thus are generalizable only to middle and lower-income strata. This fact should be kept in mind when interpreting the effect of socio-economic factors, factors that are not, however, of central theoretical importance in the survey-based analyses in this paper.

Appendix B: Coding of national elections in Argentina, 1912-2003

Year [†]	In Data	Office	Democracy ^{††}	Competitiveness ^{††}	
				Radicals	Peronists
1912	●	National Deputies	1	1	
1914	●	National Deputies	1	1	
1916	○	President and National Deputies	1	1	
1918	●	National Deputies	1	1	
1920	●	National Deputies	1	1	
1922	○	President and National Deputies	1	1	
1924		National Deputies	1	1	
1926	●	National Deputies	1	1	
1928	○	President and National Deputies	1	1	
1930	●	National Deputies	1	1	
1931		President and National Deputies	0	0	
1934		National Deputies	0	0	
1936		National Deputies	0	0	
1937	●	President	0	0	
1938		National Deputies	0	0	
1940	●	National Deputies	0	0	
1942		National Deputies	0	0	
1946	○	President and National Deputies	1	1	1
1948 (Mar)	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1948 (Dec)	●	Constituent Assembly	1	1	1
1951		President and National Deputies	0	0	0
1954	●	Vice President and National Deputies	0	0	0
1957	●	Constituent Assembly	1	1	0
1958	○	President and National Deputies	1	1	0
1960	●	National Deputies	1	1	0
1962	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1963	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	0
1965	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1973 (Mar)	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	1
1973 (Sep)	●	President	1	1	1
1983	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	1
1985	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1987	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1989	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	1
1991	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1993	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1995	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	1
1997	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
1999	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	1
2001	●	National Deputies	1	1	1
2003	●	President and National Deputies	1	1	1

● Data for election of all national offices is included in dataset

○ Data for election of some offices is included in dataset (National Deputies only: 1916; President only: 1922, 1928, 1946, 1958)

No symbol indicates elections that are missing from the dataset.

[†] Data for 1912-1920, 1937, 1940, 1948, 1960 and 1963 are available for some provinces (see Cantón, 1968).

^{††} For these variables, a value of 1 represents democracy/competitiveness and a value of 0 represents non-democracy/non-competitiveness (See Appendix A for further explanations of our coding).