

**Partners in Defending Democracy: Regional Intergovernmental Organizations
And Opposition Mobilization after Flawed Elections**

Daniela Donno
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
Yale University

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Abstract

In the post-cold war era, elections have become the central front in the battle for democracy. Political change following flawed elections—either through institutional reform, a negotiated settlement or alternation in power—is now the modal form of democratization. In recent years, regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have come to play a high-profile role in flawed elections by monitoring electoral conduct, pressuring manipulating incumbents to clean up their acts, and mediating negotiations between the government and opposition. But analysts disagree as to whether international actors play a causal role in promoting democratic change, or whether they simply choose to involve themselves in cases with already favorable domestic conditions, chief among them, the presence of a strong, mobilized opposition. This paper provides a theory, tested with systematic, quantitative evidence, showing that the relationship between regional IGO involvement, opposition mobilization and democratic change following flawed elections is causal, not coincidental. The theory accounts for the strategic dynamics between the domestic opposition and the IGO, illuminating how, under certain conditions, the IGO helps mobilize and empower the opposition. Using a new dataset of opposition mobilization and IGO democracy promotion following flawed elections in Latin America and the post-communist region, I present statistical evidence that opposition mobilization and IGO involvement, both alone, but especially in combination, significantly increase the likelihood of democratic change in the wake of flawed elections.

I. Introduction

Elections are now the central front in the battle for democracy. Since the end of the cold war, the prevalence of so-called “hybrid” regimes that hold semi-competitive multiparty elections is on the rise, blurring the distinction between “façade” authoritarian elections and “free and fair” democratic ones. Unlike fully free and fair elections, semi-competitive multi-party elections feature significant distortions in the translation of voter preferences to election outcomes. But unlike single-party façade elections, they cannot be dismissed as meaningless. Despite irregularities or outright manipulation, these contests serve as an institutionalized mechanism for opposition forces to attempt to break through the barriers that block access to power. For this reason, flawed elections do matter, sometimes dramatically so, for the allocation and exercise of political power (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002a).

As recent events have shown, democratic change following flawed elections can occur in a variety of ways, some more spectacular than others. The government may implement institutional reforms that improve the conduct of elections in the future (e.g., Mexico 1990-1994, Albania 1997-1998); negotiations between the government and opposition may lead to a settlement that provides for repeat elections or grants the opposition greater representation (e.g., Dominican Republic 1994, Ukraine 2004); the government may be forced to concede defeat after a stolen victory (e.g., Serbia 2000); or, most dramatically, the incumbent may step down under pressure after winning the election (e.g., Peru 2000, Kyrgyzstan 2005). The common element in all these scenarios is an opening of the political space that provides for improved democratic competition in the next round. Analysts highlight several different factors, some region- and context-specific, that drive this process of “democratization through elections” (Schedler 2002b), but one factor elevated in nearly all accounts is a strong, unified and mobilized domestic opposition (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a; 2006b; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006; McFaul 2005; Vachudova 2005; Van de Walle 2006).¹

Mexico is often cited as the paradigmatic case of democratization through elections. Its democratic breakthrough in the 1997 midterm elections—the first time the ruling PRI lost its majority in congress—resulted from comprehensive electoral reforms which finally allowed all

¹ To be more specific, Bunce and Wolchik (2006b) highlight the relative balance of power between the incumbent and opposition. Levitsky and Way (2006) also focus on the degree of the incumbent’s authoritarian skill and resources, vis-à-vis the opposition.

political parties to compete on a level playing field. The reforms were achieved gradually, via an iterative process of mobilization and negotiation that occurred over several electoral cycles. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the two largest opposition parties (the right-wing PAN and left-wing PRD) exhibited increasing strength at the polls. They also frequently organized protests against unfair conditions and stolen victories. In response, the government engaged the opposition in post-election bargains, or *concertaciones*, that gradually gave opposition parties (the PAN in particular) greater representation and access to power (Eisenstadt 1999). By 1994, the PAN had achieved a significant enough presence in government to effectively pressure the PRI leadership into accepting full-scale reform of Mexico's federal election administration (Magaloni 2005). In sum, the growing strength and assertive tactics of the opposition were the key factors that forced the government to cede ground.

While Mexico is emblematic for the central role played by the opposition in democratization through elections, *it is unusual for the conspicuous absence of international actors*. While there may have been an implicit understanding in NAFTA negotiations that Mexico would continue to liberalize politically, in general, the international community took a hands-off approach. In the post-cold war world, this lack of overt international involvement is the exception rather than the rule. Perhaps the most common form of involvement—and the one I focus on in this project—is multilateral, via regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). By my estimates, 19 of 31 cases (61 percent) of democratic change following flawed elections in Latin America and the post-communist region were the recipients of targeted pressure, diplomacy or assistance from regional IGOs. These measures are often intimately linked with the efforts of the opposition.

Consider the Dominican Republic. Its May 1994 elections were marked by irregularities and outright fraud at polling stations. In addition, a vast number of opposition supporters—up to 200,000 by some accounts—could not cast ballots because their names were mysteriously missing from voter lists. Counting and tabulation of the votes proceeded for weeks on end, with no transparency and little explanation for the delays. An international election observation mission, composed of Organization of American States (OAS), Carter Center and National Democratic Institute (NDI) delegations, openly questioned the legitimacy of the election and refused to certify the process. Opposition-organized popular protests followed, led by PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party) opposition candidate José Peña Gomez, paralyzing Santo

Domingo. In response to the election observers' report, the United States entered the fray, sending a State Department mission to the country to pressure Balaguer to allow a fair recount. In August, more than two months after the elections, the Electoral Board finally declared incumbent Joaquin Balaguer the winner of the election. But this result was not accepted by the opposition. The OAS sent a high-level delegation to mediate the crisis, and soon thereafter, much to the nation's surprise, Balaguer, opposition leaders and civil society groups announced the signing of a "Pact for Democracy" that provided for early elections in eighteen months, as well as comprehensive reforms of the judiciary and election administration bodies (Espinal 1998). The Pact paved the way for free and fair elections in 1996 that brought an opposition candidate to the presidency for the first time in fourteen years.

Consider now another country with an entirely different history that experienced a remarkably similar chain of events. In the Ukraine, the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) played prominent roles in the 2004 "Orange Revolution" that toppled the corrupt regime led by president Kuchma, who had rigged the elections in favor of his designated successor, Victor Yanukovich. The OSCE organized the largest, most thorough election monitoring mission in its history, which issued a scathing report of the election's conduct that served as a rallying point for domestic protestors and international actors (Kuzio 2005). More than half a million protestors took to the streets of Kiev following the second round of the elections on November 21. Initially, the government was intransigent, insisting (with Russian support) that Yanukovich was the rightful winner of the election. Within days, the EU and United States began levying strong diplomatic pressure, making clear that their relations with Ukraine would be jeopardized unless clean repeat elections were held. On December 3, the Ukrainian Supreme Court, recognizing that momentum clearly lay with the opposition, nullified the election results. The EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, traveled to Ukraine multiple times during the crisis to mediate talks between the government and opposition. Kuchma ultimately agreed to hold clean repeat elections at the end of December, which swept the opposition candidate Victor Yushenko to power.

As these accounts illustrate, regional IGOs played high-profile roles in the Dominican Republic and Ukraine. But the simultaneous presence of strong, mobilized opposition forces in these countries begs the question: did IGOs play a *causal* role? Analysts disagree. The one quantitative study that speaks to this question finds that membership in densely democratic

regional IGOs is significantly associated with democratization and democratic survival (Pevehouse 2005). Other accounts specific to the OAS and EU argue for the causal importance of these IGOs in producing (or, at the least, shaping the direction of) democratic change in their member states or membership candidates (Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Cooper and Legler 2001a; Halperin and Lomasney 1998; Leonard 2005; Millett 1994; Schimmelfennig 2002; Smith 2003; Vachudova 2005). However, skeptics often cite the very same cases to argue that multilateral efforts to promote and protect democracy may be real, but their effects are marginal at best.² Domestic factors are of over-riding importance and IGO involvement is little more than “window-dressing.” Influential accounts of the post-communist ‘electoral revolutions,’ including Ukraine, have argued that international involvement was largely a response to favorable domestic conditions (particularly opposition mobilization), and did little to influence the political outcomes.³ Thus, in the absence of a theory and systematic evidence, our understanding of the causality of IGO involvement in flawed elections rests on how one interprets the cases. While in-depth country studies are of immense value, it is difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from a small number of cases.

This project provides a theory, tested with systematic, quantitative evidence, showing that the relationship between regional IGO involvement, opposition mobilization and democratic change following flawed elections is causal, not coincidental. In so doing, it provides a mechanism for the relationship—long touted by proponents of the liberal peace—between IGO membership and democracy (Russett and Oneal 2001). The theory accounts for the strategic dynamics between the domestic opposition and the IGO, illuminating an important, yet overlooked causal relationship: under certain conditions, IGOs influence domestic outcomes *by mobilizing and empowering the domestic opposition*. In Part II, I summarize the main features of a game theoretic model that centers on the domestic effects of IGO involvement in the wake of flawed elections. Involvement—which can include coercive (sanctions), cooperative and assistance-based tools—exerts both (a) a direct effect on domestic outcomes by pressuring the government, and (b) an indirect effect by empowering the domestic opposition.

² See for example, the debate between Cooper and Legler (2001b; 2005) and McClintock (2001) on the OAS’s role in Peru following its fraudulent 2000 elections.

³ On the marginality of western influence on the electoral revolutions in Ukraine and other post-communist countries, see Bunce and Wolchik (2006b), McFaul (2005) and Way (2005a; 2005b).

In limiting my focus to regional IGOs, I examine only a subset of the many overlapping bilateral, nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors engaged in international democracy promotion. While this strategy runs the risk of ignoring other actors that may have had an important causal impact in certain cases, focusing on all the actors is hardly feasible, given the lack of good data.⁴ I therefore settle for a thorough study of just one class of theoretically significant actors (regional IGOs), but I check the validity of my conclusions by assessing whether my estimates are actually picking up the impact of other influential international actors—chiefly, the United States and global IGOs—in the same cases.

A second methodological issue is how to limit the range of IGO tools to be analyzed. IGOs are involved in a variety of areas that extend far beyond elections. But the causal impact of long-term programs of civil society and/or “rule of law” assistance is impossible to assess without very detailed process-tracing, and even then, the effects of these programs should be reflected in key domestic factors, such as opposition strength, media freedom, judicial independence or civil society activism. For this reason, I focus only on targeted IGO policies of pressure, incentives, mediation or assistance that are *specifically tailored to the election in question*, rather than diffuse, long-term programs of democracy assistance. This choice is defensible because most cases of democratization now occur through elections. In addition, limiting my focus to targeted electoral policies brings an important pragmatic advantage: these policies can be systematically coded by examining documents from a reasonably short window of time before and after the election.

Using a new dataset of opposition mobilization and IGO involvement in flawed elections, I present statistical evidence that mobilization and involvement, both alone, but especially in combination, significantly increase the likelihood of democratic change. The domestic opposition and the IGO have an interactive, synergistic effect on domestic outcomes. The shadow of IGO involvement helps mobilize the domestic opposition when it otherwise would stay quiet (the “mobilization mechanism”). And by validating the opposition’s claims, giving the opposition a seat at the negotiating table or increasing the incumbent’s costs of repression, IGO involvement magnifies the effect of opposition mobilization (the “empowerment mechanism”). In turn, under certain conditions, opposition mobilization is pivotal in inducing the IGO to levy

⁴ To my knowledge, there is no systematic dataset of the implementation of the full range of democracy promotion tools by international actors. At best, existing data focuses on a small number of cases, or on a circumscribed set of tools (i.e., data examining foreign aid or sanctions only).

tools of democracy promotion in a country when it otherwise would not. A strong opposition increases the impact of the IGO's efforts because it gives them greater domestic traction, thereby increasing incentives for the IGO to implement enforcement and assistance.

The paper proceeds as follows. Part II discusses in more detail the need to understand the role—causal or coincidental?—of IGO involvement in the process of democratization through elections. I then summarize the structure, assumptions and equilibrium strategies of a model of election manipulation, and I identify five testable predictions. Part III turns to the empirical tests, which feature an original dataset of election irregularities and manipulation, opposition mobilization and IGO involvement following flawed elections. Part IV concludes.

II. A Theory of IGO Democracy Promotion, Opposition Mobilization and Democratic Change

It is a familiar observation, yet true all the same: most theories of democratization ignore or dismiss the role of international actors.⁵ The post-cold war boom in democracy promotion renders this conclusion obsolete. To some extent, the growing interest in “hybrid” regimes has helped correct this omission, as analysts have noted the importance of international norms and the international context for explaining the rise and persistence of regimes that look, but don't act, like democracies (Hyde 2005; Levitsky and Way 2005). But, as highlighted in the introduction, the problematic fact is that, in a given case, international and domestic conditions that are favorable to democratic change often appear together. For this reason, many have dismissed international actors as playing only a marginal role. Weighing the relative importance of international versus domestic factors, the near-universal conclusion is that domestic factors come out on top (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski et al. 2000). But weighing domestic and international factors, or simply ignoring international factors, reifies an artificial distinction. What existing accounts largely miss are the *dynamic and strategic linkages between domestic and international actors*.

Studies of the European Union's enlargement policy are an important exception. Vachudova (2005), Kelley (2004), Jacoby (2006) and others have convincingly bridged the gap between domestic and international politics, showing the dynamic and interactive effects of EU

⁵ The classic statement comes from O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986). One early exception to the rule is Whitehead (1996).

conditionality and socialization on domestic change. Vachudova (2005: 162-177) in particular underscores how EU leverage helped strengthen and unite the domestic opposition in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. These conclusions, while solid, are as yet context-specific, limited to the EU's role in its ten new member states.

Tackling the question of IGO influence on democracy from a completely different vantage point, quantitative studies in international relations have found robust evidence of a relationship between democracy or democratization and membership in regional IGOs (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2002; Pevehouse 2005). Importantly, this relationship holds across several regions and organizations, beyond just the European Union. The main causal mechanism hypothesized, but not tested, is one of “tying hands” or “lock-in,” by which joining an IGO entails making a commitment to democracy that will be costly to violate (Pevehouse 2003). Indeed, a growing number of scholars now highlight the role of international institutions in helping states make credible commitments in a variety of issue areas, and there appears to be a general recognition that the validity of the commitment (or “tying hands”) mechanism rests crucially on enforcement as the primary source of *ex post* costs if norms are violated (Hafner-Burton 2005; Moravcsik 2000; Reinhardt 2003; Vreeland 2003). Autonomous IGOs with developed bureaucracies, the capacity to intervene in their member states and to make independent decisions are particularly good venues for delegation and commitment-making (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Majone 2001; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 1997; Snidal and Thompson 2003).

Thus, the importance of enforcement (or, more broadly, “involvement”) as the primary link between IGO membership and democracy is generally taken for granted, but to date, no study has actually tested the empirical validity of this link.⁶ The need for systematic testing is pressing, because, as already discussed, the role of IGO involvement in a given case can be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, inconsistency or selectivity in enforcement of democratic conditionality is widespread, even within those IGOs most active in democracy promotion (Crawford 1997; Dunning 2004; Santiso 2003; Smith 2001; Stokke 1995; Youngs

⁶ Usually “enforcement” is used to refer to sanctions or other coercive measures. I use the term “involvement” to refer to a broader class of tools, including assistance, mediation/diplomacy and rhetorical pressure. While these tools work differently from coercion, they are similar in that they all generate *ex post* costs if democratic norms are violated.

2001). This fact raises questions as to (a) whether the effect of IGO membership on democracy holds across-the-board (if enforcement is predictably selective, leaders can anticipate whether their violations will be punished), and (b) whether enforcement is levied disproportionately in “easy” cases, meaning our estimates of its effect may be spurious.

This study speaks to both these issues. The model that I present explains variation in enforcement (defined broadly as “involvement” that seeks to defend democracy), and the empirical evidence suggests that it is indeed predictably selective. While this casts doubt as to the general effect of IGO *membership* on deterring democratic norm violation, it still leaves open the possibility that involvement matters in the subset of cases where it is implemented. In the next section, I find that this is in fact the case. IGO involvement—through conditionality, assistance, mediation or rhetorical pressure—does increase the likelihood of democratic change, both alone and in combination with domestic opposition mobilization. Thus even after controlling for a strong opposition and a host of other factors associated with “easy” or successful cases, IGO pressure, assistance or diplomacy has a democratic effect. In sum, my findings indicate that it is *active involvement* by an IGO, and not simply association with an IGO, that matters for democracy.

A Model of Flawed Elections and Democratic Change

An incumbent contemplates whether to manipulate an election. Can he get away with it? Is it worth it? He must consider several potential obstacles, namely how the domestic opposition and the IGO will react, as well as how much he can count on popular support to back his actions. For its part, the opposition must weigh the costs and risks associated with mobilizing against the likelihood of successfully producing democratic change. The incumbent and opposition know that their actions may result in, or increase the level of, IGO punishment. In other words, the domestic actors interact in the shadow of international enforcement.

This section summarizes the structure, payoffs and empirical predictions of a game-theoretic model of flawed elections.⁷ I do not identify the formal equilibrium conditions here (see

⁷ The model is innovative in two ways: first, it represents one of the few attempts to capture the strategic dynamics of *incumbent-led* democratic erosion. Scholars have developed game theory models of democratic transitions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski 1991), and breakdown via coups or revolution (ibid., Cohen 1994), but not of democratic backsliding perpetrated by an elected incumbent himself. Second, the model fully incorporates international actors—namely, election observers and the IGO—into the domestic game.

Donno 2007). The game builds on previous studies that explore why manipulation occurs (Cox and Kousser 1981; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Simpson 2005; 2006), as well as the role of the opposition in alleging and exposing fraud (Beaulieu 2006; Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2003; Lindberg 2006). It differs from existing work in its incorporation of an IGO as a strategic actor in the domestic game. I treat the IGO as a unitary actor with preferences and payoffs, albeit one that must overcome the costs of intergovernmental bargaining among its member states in order to act. This is a reasonable assumption for IGOs that exhibit at least some degree of institutionalization and independence; such IGOs often possess powerful officials or autonomous agencies with significant scope for action within the general constraints set by their member states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006).

Figure 1 depicts the game tree.⁸ The basic structure of the game entails an incumbent's choice whether to manipulate the election (M) or not (\sim M),⁹ followed by a move by Nature deciding whether the incumbent wins the election (W) or loses (L). If the incumbent does not manipulate, his probability of winning the election is ω , which represents his share of pre-election popular support. If he chooses to manipulate, however, his probability of winning the election increases to $\omega + f$, where f represents the increase in vote share that results from manipulation. For simplicity, I assume a two candidate/party majoritarian contest, where the opposition enjoys the opposite level of popular support, $1 - \omega$. If the incumbent loses, only the IGO chooses whether to implement tools of democracy promotion (the opposition will never mobilize if it wins the election). But if the incumbent wins, both the opposition and IGO must choose how to respond. In particular, the opposition chooses the level of effort (e_O) to expend on mobilizing—taking to the streets to protest the election's conduct, while the IGO simultaneously chooses its own level of effort (e_I) to expend on involvement. Intuitively, higher IGO effort is associated with stronger (more costly) tools, i.e., the linkage of material punishments or incentives to a change in conduct. Weaker measures may entail a long-term mediation mission or a formal statement criticizing the election, but which does not link this criticism to punishment or rewards.¹⁰

⁸ Donno (2007) includes a move for international election observers to issue a verdict on the election's conduct. I omit election observers from the model and empirical tests here due to space limitations.

⁹ All other actors observe this choice. This is a simplifying assumption; in reality incumbents can hide certain forms of manipulation. For a model in which incumbents may conceal their cheating, see Hyde (2005).


¹⁰ The model is similar to Weingast's (1997) game of constitutional transgression. In it, a government chooses whether to violate the constitution, and two groups of citizens face a coordination dilemma in deciding whether to

Note that the opposition may mobilize and the IGO may levy tools of democracy promotion even if the incumbent did not manipulate the election. Opposition mobilization at the lower node (following a choice of $\sim M$ by the incumbent) represents protests against technical or administrative irregularities. Similarly, IGO enforcement at the lower node represents measures geared toward conflict resolution or capacity building, not necessarily punishing the incumbent. Empirically, election irregularities—those without clear evidence of intentionality—may generate just as much controversy as manipulation, particularly if they are perceived to disadvantage the opposition. Omissions and inaccuracies in voter lists are just one example of a highly combustible type of electoral irregularity.¹¹

protest the incumbent's actions. This model differs from Weingast in that the opposition and IGO have continuous action spaces, and may prefer (under certain conditions) to act even absent coordination.

¹¹ For example, despite a clean verdict from international election observers, the losing party in Guyana's 1992 general elections rioted in the streets, claiming that many of its supporters were missing from electoral lists. See *Associated Press*, 5 October 1992. "Mobs Stone Guyana Election Offices, Charging Fraud."

Figure 1. Election Manipulation Game



At the end of the game Nature determines whether democratic change occurs (D) with probability π . Change can occur in a variety of ways: via a negotiated settlement, institutional reform, repeat elections or, most extremely, via the incumbent stepping down under pressure. The key is that in all these scenarios, the occurrence of accommodation, reform or alternation of power leads to an opening of the political space that improves democratic competition. While the occurrence of democratic change is largely in the incumbent's hands, I model this as a move by Nature because it is also a contingent process, involving other actors and events that are exogenous to the model. Most notably, decisions by the military or security forces whether to repress demonstrations or break with the incumbent are key to the ultimate outcome.

The baseline probability of democratic change is low. Usually incumbents get away with their actions. But democratic change is more likely to occur if the incumbent's popular support, relative to the opposition, is low. This is so because a strong opposition may be perceived as literally on the cusp of success, thereby motivating pivotal actors in the media or military/security forces to throw their weight behind the opposition. Hale (2005) and Bunce and Wolchik (2006a) describe precisely this chain of events in the Ukrainian and Serbian electoral revolutions. In addition, *both opposition mobilization and strong IGO enforcement serve to increase the likelihood of democratic change*. The intuition behind this assertion relates to the government's tradeoff between repression and accommodation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). All else equal, as opposition mobilization increases, and as international pressure increases, repression becomes more costly relative to accommodation.


I make three basic assumptions about the relationship between opposition and IGO effort and the probability of democratic change:

1. As opposition or IGO effort increases, the probability of democratic change (π) also increases.
2. There are decreasing marginal returns to opposition and IGO effort, such that the increase in π is greater when effort shifts from, say, .1 to .2, versus when effort shifts from .5 to .6.
3. There is synergy between the opposition and IGO. A one-unit increase in opposition effort given some positive level of IGO involvement has a greater impact on π than a one-unit increase in opposition effort given no IGO involvement.

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between opposition and IGO effort and the probability of democratic change. The curve e_I^0 shows the effect of opposition effort when the IGO expends no effort on democracy promotion, and the curves e_I^1 and e_I^2 show the effect of opposition effort at increasingly higher levels of IGO effort. Note that e_I^1 and e_I^2 have a steeper slope than e_I^0 , representing the synergy between opposition and IGO effort. A given change in opposition effort given some positive level of IGO effort has a greater effect on π than when the IGO does nothing.

Evidence supports this idea of synergy between the opposition and IGO. When an IGO intervenes following flawed elections, it often plays an important role in convincing the government to negotiate, validating the opposition's claims and giving the opposition an equal voice at the negotiating table. This process of opposition empowerment occurred in the Dominican Republic (1994-1996), Haiti (1993-1995), Peru (2000) and Ukraine (2001), among others. In turn, a unified and mobilized opposition increases the effectiveness of the IGO's efforts because it provides it with a natural conduit for its democracy promotion policies. Democratization is rarely achieved "from scratch," without strong domestic political organizations that are willing to push for democracy when the time is right.

Figure 2. The Effect of Opposition and IGO Effort on Democratic Change



I test the validity of these assumptions about opposition and IGO effort in the next section with the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Democratic change following a flawed election is more likely when the opposition mobilizes or the IGO enforces.

Hypothesis 2. Opposition mobilization and IGO enforcement have a positive interactive effect on the probability of democratic change.

The payoffs to the game, summarized informally, are as follows. The incumbent enjoys a positive payoff if he wins the election. But if democratic change occurs at the end of the game, he receives a negative payoff, representing the new conditions that allow the opposition to more effectively compete.¹² The size of this cost depends on the magnitude of democratic change (i.e.,

¹² I assume that the incumbent always prefers the status quo ($\sim D$) to change (D). In other words, any democratic change advantages the opposition vis-à-vis the incumbent, even if it occurs at the lower node, following no incumbent manipulation.

incremental institutional reform is less costly than outright loss of power, at least in the current period). If he manipulates, the incumbent increases his chances of winning from ω to $\omega+f$, where ω represents the incumbent's share of popular support (and $1-\omega$ the opposition's).

Manipulation is costly, so the incumbent's decision rests on the balance between the benefits (in terms of increased vote share, f) and the costs. The incumbent's marginal benefit from manipulating increases as his level of popular support decreases. Intuitively this captures the idea that incumbents with lower levels of popular support need manipulation more in order to win the election. However, recall that democratic change following manipulation is also more likely at lower levels of incumbent popular support. Thus, the effect of popular support (ω) on the incumbent cuts two ways: a higher level of support is associated with lower marginal benefits from manipulation, but also a lower risk that manipulation will be followed by democratic change that hurts the incumbent. For this reason, no firm comparative static prediction can be made about how a change in popular support affects the incumbent's choice. But it may help explain the seemingly puzzling fact that manipulation is often undertaken by incumbents in strong positions that already expect to win the election (Simpser 2005).

However, with an increase in opposition mobilization and/or IGO involvement, the benefits from manipulation (relative to no manipulation) decrease. This is so because mobilization and involvement increase the likelihood of democratic change that is costly to the incumbent, thereby decreasing the net benefit from winning an election.¹³ This means that a credible threat of opposition mobilization and/or IGO enforcement should deter some incumbents from manipulating. While it is impossible to directly test the deterrent effect of credible opposition and IGO threats (because they occur off-the-equilibrium path), we can test whether past mobilization and involvement reduce the likelihood of manipulation in time t . This yields an empirical prediction:

Proposition 1. Past opposition mobilization and IGO involvement decrease the probability of incumbent manipulation.

If the opposition wins the election, it receives the benefit from winning. If democratic change occurs in the last move of the game, the opposition receives an additional benefit (which

¹³ To be more precise, this result holds as long as π is greater after an incumbent win than an incumbent loss. This will always be the case if (a) opposition effort is greater than zero, or (b) IGO effort is higher after an incumbent win than a loss.

is symmetric to the incumbent's negative payoff from democratic change). If it mobilizes following an incumbent win, the opposition increases the probability of such change. Note that the opposition's motivation to mobilize is purely instrumental, stemming from the positive effect on democratic change. Mobilization entails a cost, however, which is increasing in opposition effort and decreasing in popular support. The higher the opposition's pre-election popular support, the more credible are its claims that victory was stolen. This in turn serves as an effective motivation and focal point for potential protesters.

There are some cases, when the opposition enjoys low popular support, in which it does not pay to mobilize (i.e., it expends no effort). This is so because at low levels of opposition popular support, the costs of mobilization are high and the likelihood of democratic change is low, decreasing the benefit associated with mobilization. Under these conditions, IGO involvement—because it increases the effectiveness of opposition effort—can be pivotal in inducing the opposition to mobilize when it otherwise would not. The IGO, being a strategic actor, knows when its effort will be pivotal, and its incentives to become involved are greater when opposition popular support is low rather than high.¹⁴ This is a counter-intuitive result; because democratic change is more likely at higher levels of opposition popular support, it would otherwise seem more advantageous for the IGO to involve itself in these cases. We come to a second (two-part) prediction:

Proposition 2a. When the opposition's level of popular support is low, it is more likely to condition mobilization on IGO involvement than when its support is high.

Proposition 2b. The IGO is more likely to implement tools of democracy promotion when opposition support is low than when it is high.

The IGO also receives a benefit if democratic change occurs in the target state, and like the opposition, this benefit is the only source of motivation for involvement. The assumption that the IGO benefits from democratization in a member (or associated) state applies reasonably only to those IGOs that have adopted a formal, collective commitment to democracy *and* have a history of putting this principle into practice, through some combination of monitoring or enforcement. The model therefore pertains only to a subset of international organizations that

¹⁴ This result rests on the assumption of decreasing marginal returns to opposition effort. The benefit of a one-unit increase in opposition mobilization (to the IGO) given a starting point of no opposition effort is greater than the benefit (to the IGO) from the same increase in mobilization given a higher starting point of opposition effort.

both “talk the talk” and “walk the walk.” IGOs with no formal commitment to democracy or whose commitment is no more than a piece of paper cannot be said to experience a positive payoff from increased democracy in a member state.

However enforcement is costly. The IGO’s cost of involvement is a function first of its level of effort (where higher effort is more costly), and second, of its bargaining costs. IGO responses to flawed elections must be agreed to via a sometimes long and complex intergovernmental decision-making process, usually under a unanimous decision rule.¹⁵ Some member states must be convinced, cajoled or even paid off in order to support measures perceived as interfering in the sovereignty of a neighboring state. But implementing responses to flawed elections is easier in some countries than in others. In particular, the magnitude of bargaining costs associated with country i may be influenced by its size and economic strength, geo-political considerations, its proximity to the regional hegemon, or a history of international intervention (Levitt 2006). To give some intuitive examples, it is more difficult for the EU and OSCE to agree on responding to manipulated elections in Russia than in Belarus. For the OAS, intervention in Haiti was a much easier sell than intervention in, say, Mexico.

Like the opposition, there are certain cases—namely, when intergovernmental bargaining costs are high—in which the IGO will not involve itself alone, because it is too costly. Under these conditions, opposition mobilization can induce the IGO to implement democracy promotion when it otherwise would not.¹⁶ Because IGO involvement benefits the opposition, the opposition’s incentives to mobilize are higher in these cases, when its efforts are pivotal. This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 2. When bargaining costs are high, an n -unit increase in opposition mobilization can induce the IGO to shift its equilibrium level of effort from e_I^0 to e_I^1 . The opposition’s benefit (in terms of an increase in π) from this n -unit increase in effort is greater in this scenario than in any other. This yields a third empirical prediction:

Proposition 3a. When intergovernmental bargaining costs are high, the IGO is more likely to condition its involvement on opposition mobilization.

Proposition 3b. The opposition is more likely to mobilize when intergovernmental bargaining costs are high for the IGO.

¹⁵ On how unanimity can stymie the OSCE, see Brett (1996) and Ghebali (2002).

¹⁶ More specifically, bargaining costs must be high enough to lean against involvement absent an increase in opposition mobilization but *not so high* that no level of opposition mobilization could ever induce the IGO to become involved.

III. Data and Hypothesis Testing

To test the model's propositions, I constructed an original dataset of incumbent manipulation, opposition mobilization, and IGO involvement in the post-communist and Latin American/Caribbean countries, from 1990-2005. The units of analysis are national elections (including presidential, parliamentary and constitutional referenda) taken from all countries that held multi-party elections between 1990-2005.¹⁷ I considered an election to be "flawed" if it was marked by either irregularities (problems with election administration or technical capacity) or intentional government-orchestrated manipulation.¹⁸ A list of all flawed elections appears in Appendix 1 and coding rules appear in Appendix 2. Irregularities and manipulation were coded based only on violations of procedural and competitive norms, not participatory norms. So, for example, Estonia's disenfranchisement of its ethnic Russian minority is not considered election manipulation.¹⁹ Some countries experienced as few as one flawed election during this period, e.g., Paraguay 1993, while others experienced up to eight, e.g., Serbia & Montenegro. It should be noted that the dataset includes several countries that are considered fully democratic by the conventional measures (i.e., Freedom House, Polity, or Przeworski et al.'s (2000) dichotomous classification) and several that are not. The phenomena of interest—namely, manipulation, opposition mobilization and IGO enforcement—transcend regime type. They frequently occur in regimes classified as "partly free" or "partial democracies" on a continuous scale,²⁰ or possibly

¹⁷ Elections boycotted by the opposition were not considered to be in violation of the multi-party criterion. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Cuba were the only countries excluded on the grounds that they did not hold multi-party contests at any point between 1990-2005. While certain other countries, particularly former Soviet Republics such as Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan, regularly excluded some parties and candidates from elections, they exhibited at least a minimal level of pluralism.

¹⁸ Multiple sources were used to code for the presence of manipulation and irregularities. I relied first on election observation reports from four credible organizations: the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OAS, Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). These reports generally contained very detailed information on the nature of irregularities, as well as whether they were intentionally perpetrated by the government. Note that the coding of whether manipulation or irregularities were present is separate from the observers' verdict (see footnote 32). Most reports are available online at the following websites:

<http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/documents.html> for the OSCE,

http://www.upd.oas.org/lab/special/eoms_spa.html for the OAS,

<http://www.cartercenter.org/news/election.asp?catID=9&submenu=news> for the Carter Center, and

www.accessdemocracy.org for NDI. For each observation, I cross-checked this coding with information from reliable news sources (obtained from the Lexis-Nexis database at web.lexis-nexis.com), Keesings Record of World Events (www.keesings.com), and Europa World Yearbook (www.europaworld.com). For some elections, observer reports were not available or observers were not present. In these cases, I relied solely on the other sources (Lexis-Nexis, Keesings, Europa World Yearbook), but only if two or more sources confirmed the coding.

¹⁹ The issue of how to define citizenship is normatively contested and too difficult to code objectively.

²⁰ On the substantive importance of "partial" democracies or "hybrid" regimes, see Collier and Levitsky (1997), Epstein et al. (2006), Diamond (2002) and Mainwaring et al. (2001).


even as dictatorships on a dichotomous scale.²¹ But, perhaps surprisingly, they also regularly occur in countries classified as full democracies.²² For this reason, I rely solely on the multi-party criterion for inclusion and do not limit the sample by Polity or Freedom House score.

To get a sense of just how widespread flawed elections are, Figure 3 shows the percent of total elections in Latin America and the post-communist region that experienced flaws and manipulation, by year. Recall that “flaws” indicate either irregularities or manipulation. It also shows, in green, the percent of elections that were followed by regional IGO involvement. A rate of .4 corresponds to 40% of elections held in that year. The rate of flawed and manipulated elections fluctuate greatly, but there is no clear increasing or decreasing trend over time.²³ On average, about half of all elections in a given year were flawed. IGO involvement does appear to exhibit an increasing trend over time, though the fluctuations in involvement closely track concurrent variation in flaws and manipulation. Notably, after the year 2000, the percent of elections met by involvement was roughly equal to the percent experiencing flaws. This increase in IGO involvement is not due to an increase in opposition mobilization, however, which remained roughly constant over time in the sample (not shown in graph). Rather, it appears to be the result of processes internal to the IGOs, namely increased expertise and bureaucratic capacity for democracy promotion.

²¹ A country is coded as a dictatorship by Przeworski et al. (2000) if it held multi-party elections but did not experience an alternation in power.

²² Of the 81 manipulated elections in the sample, 17 (21 percent) took place in countries with Polity scores greater than 6 (full democracies). Of the 167 flawed elections in the sample, 66 (40%) took place in full democracies.

²³ The patterns are also not being driven by one region. While the average rate of manipulation is higher in the post-communist countries (.40) than in Latin America (.18), neither of the two regions exhibit an increasing or decreasing trend over time.

Figure 3. Flawed Elections and IGO Involvement Over Time

Predicting Democratic Change

Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that opposition mobilization and IGO involvement, both alone, but especially in combination, will increase the likelihood that a country experiences democratic change following a flawed election. To test these predictions, I estimated logit regressions with a dummy variable for positive change in a country's Polity score as the dependent variable. This variable captures whether the election in question resulted in political liberalization or democratization. Any positive change in Polity score (no matter how large or small) *that occurred as a result of the election* was coded as a "1" for democratic change.²⁴ Despite the fact that the theoretical model focuses only on flawed elections, I run the logit models on the universe of elections in the dataset (both flawed and clean). Some cases of democratic change may occur via clean elections in countries that were the targets of opposition mobilization and IGO involvement in the previous electoral cycle. Running the models on the whole sample also

²⁴ I used the variables in the Polity IV dataset that record the exact date of the change in Polity score ("emonth, eday, eyear, bmonth, bday and byear") to ensure that I only included changes resulting from the election in question. Polity is coded retrospectively, so it is possible that IGO involvement occurring up to four months after the election could still be associated with a change in Polity score coded (retrospectively) at the date of the election.

increases the number of observations and includes several cases of IGO involvement in clean elections, allowing me to estimate the effects of these policies in the entire universe of cases.²⁵

Thirty-eight cases of positive change occurred in the dataset. The mean value of change was 5.4 points (on a Polity scale from -10 to 10), the minimum change was 1 point (e.g., Serbia 1997) and the maximum 15 points (e.g., Bulgaria 1990). I use a dummy variable for positive change as my dependent variable because my hypotheses relate to the probability of democratic change occurring, but do not make specific predictions about the magnitude or type of change.²⁶ Note that the dependent variable captures the occurrence of democratic change in a subset of cases—either during or immediately following an election—and the models should therefore not be confused for general models of democratization.

The independent variables of interest are dummy variables for opposition mobilization and regional IGO involvement. Both variables are entered in time t and lagged one period ($t-1$), to control for the likely possibility that the effects of opposition and IGO effort are not immediate, but rather produce democratic change in the next electoral cycle. Recall from the examples in the introduction that mobilization and IGO involvement in Ukraine and the Dominican Republic following flawed elections (in time t) led to improvement in repeat or early elections in time $t+1$. Similarly, in Mexico, reform in time t led to improvements in electoral conduct in future rounds.

Opposition mobilization is coded as occurring if one or more opposition political parties organized a public protest within four months following the election. The stated purpose of the protest had to be related to flaws in the election in order to be counted.²⁷ IGO involvement was coded as having occurred if the IGO implemented one or more of the following policy tools:²⁸

- *Conditionality* – the threat or application of punishments or rewards (political or economic) conditional on a specified democratic political change

²⁵ When I limited the sample to flawed elections only, results for opposition mobilization and IGO involvement remained unchanged, with the exception of the interaction term between these two variables, which was always positive and more significant than in the full sample.

²⁶ Because it is possible that some factors may be associated with small political change and others with larger change, I also ran the models using an ordered logit specification that does account for the magnitude of democratic change. The results were substantively identical.

²⁷ I coded this variable using news sources drawn from the Lexis-Nexis database, as well as reports from Keesings Record of World Events and Europa World Yearbook.

²⁸ Detailed coding rules available on request.

- *Assistance* – financial or technical support to democratic political institutions (including, but not limited to, elections) with no strings attached
- *Mediation and Diplomatic Missions* – high-level missions sent to the target country with the aim of conflict resolution or exerting pressure for democracy
- *Rhetorical Engagement* – official declarations, resolutions or diplomatic statements issued by one of the IGO’s intergovernmental decision-making bodies that criticize election flaws or urge democratization, but that do not link changes in the target state to punishments or rewards²⁹

Note that my definition of involvement is broad, including both coercive (“hard”) and cooperative (“soft”) tools. In order for a policy to be coded, it has to be (a) clearly targeted toward the country and election in question (regional or ongoing policies of democracy assistance are not counted), and (b) implemented at least four months prior or at most four months after the election. Data on implementation of these policy tools was collected for seven regional IGOs active in Latin America and the post-communist region: the Organization of American States (OAS), Mercosur (Common Market of the South), the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly known as the CSCE), Council of Europe (COE), and NATO. These IGOs were chosen based on two criteria: (1) they possess formal commitments to democracy within their constitutive documents, and (2) they exhibit at least a minimal level of institutionalization (i.e., they possess a permanent secretariat, constitutive treaties or founding documents, and they possess formal decision-making procedures) that distinguish them from “lifeless” non-institutionalized organizations.

This data represents the first comprehensive and detailed record of IGO democracy promotion activity. An ideal test of the model would use continuous measures of IGO involvement and opposition mobilization that more accurately capture variation in the levels of effort across cases. However, detailed information on the size, strength and length of protests is difficult to come by. Moreover, the relationship between effort and the strength of protests and IGO policies is likely country specific, so I settle for the more crude but valid dichotomous measures.

²⁹ This definition is similar to Kelley’s (2004) concept of socialization.

I include several control variables. The first two capture the effects of other international actors. First, I include a dummy variable for United States democracy promotion activity, coded using the same criteria as for regional IGOs.³⁰ The U.S. is the most powerful bilateral actor in international politics, is active in democracy promotion, and often coordinates its efforts with those of regional IGOs, so it is important to control for the possibility that it is involvement by the U.S.—rather than regional IGOs—that carries the causal weight. I enter variables for U.S. involvement in both time t and lagged one period ($t-1$). Second, as narratives of democratic change in Latin America and the post-Soviet “electoral revolutions” suggest, a negative verdict from election observers may play an important role in generating momentum for democratic change (McFaul 2005; Middlebrook 1998; Kuzio 2005; Espinal 1998).³¹ I include a dummy variable for a rejection of the election by one of four credible election observer groups: the OSCE (for the post-communist countries only), the OAS, the Carter Center (both, for Latin America only) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).³²

The second set of control variables capture political conditions in the target country, namely, whether conditions were favorable or unfavorable for successful democratic change. These variables are central to the model because, taken together, they account for the factors that make for an “easy” versus “hard” case, thereby allowing me to isolate the effect of IGO involvement independent of other domestic conditions that predict success. First, to test the model’s assumption that cases with high opposition support (relative to the incumbent) are more likely to experience change, I created a dummy variable coded as “1” if pre-election polls indicated that the opposition was expected to win the election.³³ Second, countries that are more

³⁰ I.e., only policies targeted to the election in question were coded. Involvement was coded as a “1” if the U.S. implemented any one of the four policy tools listed on pp.23-24.

³¹ See also: *Associated Press*, “Election monitors were key in setting up Peru election runoff,” April 13, 2000.

³² This variable is highly, but not perfectly, correlated with manipulation. Sometimes a clearly manipulated election had no international observers, and sometimes observers issued a mixed or acceptant verdict despite the presence of manipulation. Verdicts were coded using the observer reports, which are mostly available at the following websites: <http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/documents.html> for the OSCE, http://www.upd.oas.org/lab/special/eoms_spa.html for the OAS, <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/election.asp?catID=9&submenu=news> for the Carter Center, and www.accessdemocracy.org for NDI.

³³ Expected vote share was coded using news reports that cite the results of reliable pre-election polls (prior to the first round in multi-round elections). Reports accessed via the Lexis-Nexis database. For parliamentary elections, data coded for individual parties, not coalitions, i.e., the difference in popular support between the largest party in the ruling coalition and the closest opposition party. For simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections, data for the presidential elections was used. If doubt about the reliability of polls was reported, the variable was coded as missing. Ideally, I would use a ratio of incumbent to opposition popular support, but detailed and accurate information on expected margin of victory is difficult to find, leading to too many missing data points.

democratic and liberal to begin with are more likely to experience democratic change (Bunce and Wolchik 2006b; Vachudova 2005). More liberal countries tend to exhibit a freer press, a more politically aware population and a more developed NGO community, all factors that facilitate further democratization. I therefore include a variable for the country's Polity score in time t (Marshall and Jaggers 2004).³⁴ In keeping with recent studies that have found regional diffusion effects to be significant predictors of regime type, I also include a variable for the average Polity score in country i 's region (either Latin America, post-communist Europe or former Soviet Union), in year t (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch 2002; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; O'Loughlin et al. 2003).

Fourth, to identify the most intransigent cases, I include a variable for past violations of democratic norms. Two common types of (incumbent-led) norm violation are considered: election manipulation and presidential consolidation of power, defined as an extra-constitutional increase in executive power vis-à-vis the legislative or judicial branches. The past violation variable sums the number of instances in years $t-n$ that an incumbent manipulated an election or consolidated his power. I expect democratic change to become less likely as the number of past norm violations increases.³⁵ Finally, I control for a country's level of development (GDP per capita, logged, taken from Heston, Summers and Aten (2006)). The positive association between economic development and democracy is well-known (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000).

Table 1 reports the results of four logit models that test both the direct (non-interactive) and interactive effects of opposition mobilization and IGO involvement on the likelihood of democratic change.³⁶ Robust standard errors are reported, clustered by country to correct for spatial dependence.³⁷ Model 1 is the baseline model that omits the variables for regional IGO

³⁴ In cases where the Polity score changed following the election, I always used the Polity score prior to the change.

³⁵ In the future, I plan to include two additional control variables: a measure of voter turnout and a measure of press freedom. Qualitative accounts have noted both as factors associated with democratization following flawed elections.

³⁶ To check the robustness of these results, I also ran the models using rare events logit, which adjusts the estimates to correct for biased estimates if the dependent variable contains many fewer ones than zeros (King and Zeng 2001). All results remained substantively unchanged, with the exception of a loss of significance for opposition mobilization (lagged) in models 1 and 2. I also ran a VIF test to check for multicollinearity among the independent variables, but the results were well below the threshold for concern.

³⁷ Ideally I would have used panel-corrected standard-errors (Beck and Katz 1995), but the panel dataset is unbalanced and has too few time periods, so PCSEs are not unbiased. Fixed effects are also not a good option because several of the variables are constant over time, and several countries do not exhibit variation on the dependent variable, causing many observations to drop out, so I opted for clustering. I nevertheless checked the

involvement. Model 2 adds regional IGO involvement (in time t and $t-1$). Models 3 and 4 include interactions between opposition mobilization and regional IGO involvement (both lagged one period).

robustness of results using a country-level fixed effects (conditional logit) model. The number of observations dropped from 174 to 86. While the results for opposition mobilization lost significance, dropping to marginal levels, the significant effect of IGO involvement (lagged) remained. Results available on request.

Table 1. Determinants of Democratic Change

Independent Variables	1	2	3	4
	Baseline Model	IGO Involvement	Interaction	Interaction
<i>Opposition Mobilization (t)</i>	-.06	.40	.39	.55
SE	(.84)	(.86)	(.85)	(.87)
P-value	.95	.65	.65	.53
<i>Opposition Mobilization lag (t-1)</i>	1.43	1.53	1.55	1.44
SE	(.83)	(.96)	(.88)	(.82)
P-value	.08	.11	.08	.08
<i>IGO Involvement (t)</i>		-1.01	-1.02	-1.22
SE		(.88)	(.87)	(.94)
P-value		.25	.24	.20
<i>IGO Involvement lag (t-1)</i>		2.20	2.21	2.25 [^]
SE		(.77)	(.66)	(.68)
P-value		.00	.00	.00
<i>IGO (t-1) * Opposition (t-1)</i>			-.04	-.91 [^]
SE			(1.27)	(1.10)
P-value			.97	.41
<i>IGO (t-1) * Opp.(t-1) * High Support</i>				2.19 [^]
SE				(1.08)
P-value				.04
<i>U.S. Involvement (t)</i>	.56	.52	.52	.59
SE	(.66)	(.70)	(.71)	(.75)
P-value	.39	.45	.46	.43
<i>U.S. Involvement lag (t-1)</i>	.48	.09	.08	-.05
SE	(.65)	(.61)	(.65)	(.62)
P-value	.39	.88	.89	.94
<i>Elec.Observer Reject</i>	-.53	-1.01	-1.01	-.82
SE	(.62)	(.70)	(.76)	(.77)
P-value	.39	.15	.18	.29
<i>Opposition High Popular Support</i>	1.49	1.33	1.34	1.06
SE	(.56)	(.52)	(.51)	(.53)
P-value	.01	.01	.01	.04
<i>Polity Score</i>	.06	.08	.08	.05
SE	(.13)	(.14)	(.15)	(.15)
P-value	.67	.59	.61	.73
<i>Democracy in the Region</i>	-.13	-.18	-.18	-.19
SE	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.14)
P-value	.29	.18	.17	.18
<i>Past Norm Violation</i>	.00	-.16	-.16	-.15
SE	(.14)	(.15)	(.15)	(.17)
P-value	.99	.28	.29	.37
<i>GDP Per Capita (log)</i>	-.40	-.44	-.44	-.30
SE	(.45)	(.46)	(.45)	(.46)
P-value	.38	.34	.32	.51
<i>Constant</i>	.54	.87	.88	.05
SE	(4.05)	(4.16)	(4.12)	(4.17)
P-value	.89	.83	.83	.99
N	174	174	174	174
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-59.4	-53.52	-53.52	-52.59
Pseudo R2	.15	.23	.23	.25

Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clusters by country.

Coefficients in bold are significant at $p < .10$. [^] indicates joint significance at $p < .10$.

All p-values taken for two-tailed tests.

Of note first is the positive and highly significant effect of regional IGO involvement (lagged one period) on democratic change.³⁸ Even after controlling for US involvement and a host of theoretically relevant domestic factors, involvement by regional IGOs has an important (and highly robust) causal effect on the prospects for democratic change. Opposition mobilization also has a positive effect, when it occurs in the previous period. This result is important because it lends quantitative, large-N support to the claim featured in many qualitative studies that a mobilized opposition is a key condition for democratic change. But the coefficients on both opposition mobilization and IGO involvement in time t are not significant—and sometimes negative—supporting a dynamic causal story: because opposition and IGO efforts to promote democratization occur mainly in response to flawed elections, the effects of these efforts are not immediate. Rather, they produce concessions from incumbents and change the behavior of other pivotal domestic actors (namely, the military, police or the press) that, in turn, lead to democratic change in the next electoral cycle.

To test the interactive hypothesis, I include in Model 3 a variable that captures the effect of cases in which *both* opposition mobilization (lagged) and IGO involvement (lagged) are present. Evidence is mixed. The interaction term in Model 3 is negative, contrary to expectations.³⁹ However, when a triple interaction term—between IGO involvement (lagged), opposition mobilization (lagged) and high opposition popular support—is included, the coefficient is positive and highly significant. It appears, then, that IGO and opposition effort are more effective when implemented together, but only in elections in which the opposition enjoyed the majority of popular support. Notably, the constituent terms for opposition mobilization and IGO involvement retain their significance in Models 3 and 4, indicating that the effects of opposition and IGO effort hold even when implemented alone (absent action from the other actor).

The only other variable in the models that exhibits a robustly significant effect is the dummy variable for high opposition popular support. Elections in which the opposition commanded a majority of pre-election popular support were more likely to experience change.

³⁸ When I divided the four different IGO tools into separate variables, the coefficients for diplomacy/mediation and rhetorical engagement (lagged) are positive and significant, but the coefficients for assistance and (surprisingly) conditionality are not. It appears that the main form of IGO influence is via “soft,” cooperative tools. However, EU conditionality is significant when implemented in countries recognized as future member states.

³⁹ However, when I ran Model 3 on flawed elections only, the interaction term is positive and joint tests of the interaction and constituent terms are statistically significant. Tests of joint significance are conducted (using Stata’s “lincom” command) by adding the coefficients and testing whether the sum was statistically significant from zero.

The results for all other control variables were not significant, revealing some surprising non-findings. A country's starting level of democracy (Polity score) is not an important predictor of democratic change through elections.⁴⁰ Neither is the level of democracy in a country's region—which actually exhibits a negative coefficient in all four models—nor the level of economic development.⁴¹ A rejection of the election by international observers is also not significant and seems to actually exhibit a negative effect. In other work, I identify the *indirect effects* of election observers on domestic outcomes, via mobilization of the domestic opposition and the IGO (Donno 2007b).

Perhaps most surprisingly, U.S. democracy promotion activity does not predict democratic change, either in time t or in $t-1$. (Though when I ran the models on the two regions separately, U.S. involvement in $t-1$ was positive and significant in Latin America). It is striking that regional IGO involvement is significant while U.S. involvement is not. Because of its economic and military dominance, and its ability to act more quickly and coherently than multilateral actors, the United States is generally considered to be the most influential international actor. Previous studies have found its efforts to promote democracy and economic liberalization to be effective (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2006b; Stone 2004; but see Carothers 1999). But these results indicate—at least with respect to elections—that democracy promotion undertaken by the relatively weak and “soft” regional IGOs is more effective at producing democratic change than the same policies implemented by the United States.

In sum, as the theory predicts, elections met by IGO involvement and domestic opposition mobilization are more likely to be followed by democratization. The overall predictive power of the models is low, but this is consistent with the prominent view that democratization (both in general and especially through elections) is largely a contingent, context-dependent process (Bunce and Wolchik 2006b; Geddes 1999; McFaul 2005; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Stokes 2007; Whitehead 1999). Thus, while the models identify

⁴⁰ I also ran the models using (a) Freedom House instead of Polity, and (b) a quadratic transformation of Polity, to test whether countries at middle-range levels of democracy were more likely to experience democratization. Neither was significant.

⁴¹ In specifications not reported here, I also included three other economic control variables—economic growth, trade openness and dependence on fuel exports. Only fuel exports was significant (and negative), but because of many missing observations, this result was not robust.

a few factors that reliably and significantly facilitate democratic change via elections, they do not predict all (or even most) of the variation in the dependent variable.

Proposition 1: Deterrence

We have seen that opposition mobilization and IGO involvement increase the probability of democratic change following flawed elections. Because such change is costly to the incumbent, the model predicts that IGO involvement and opposition mobilization have a deterrent effect on the incumbent; under certain (not restrictive) conditions, IGO and opposition effort reduce the incumbent's expected benefits from manipulating. Proposition 1 forwards an indirect test of the deterrence hypothesis: IGO involvement and opposition mobilization in the previous period should be associated with lower rates of manipulation in the current period. Involvement and mobilization in $t-1$ are highly correlated with time t , making this a realistic proposition; it is likely that the incumbent uses the past to predict the future.

A variety of other factors likely influence the incumbent's decision, so to test this proposition, I estimate multivariate logit models with manipulation as the dependent variable. (For the coding of this variable, see footnote 18 and Appendix 2). The independent variables of interest are opposition mobilization and IGO involvement, both lagged one period. I also include a lagged dependent variable ($t-1$) to control for time dependence. Three additional variables capture domestic political conditions. First, to control for the potential effect of popular support, I include a dummy variable for elections which the incumbent expected to win.⁴² Though I have no priors about the direction of this effect, previous studies of manipulation indicate that it is an important factor, and the bivariate correlation between manipulation and an incumbent expected win is positive and significant. I also control for a country's Polity score at the time of the election as well as the level of democracy in the region. Both are expected to have a negative effect on manipulation (see p.25 for coding rules).

Table 2 displays the results. Standard errors are robust, clustered by country.⁴³ Contrary to expectations, in Model 1, neither IGO involvement nor opposition mobilization appears to deter manipulation, and mobilization actually exhibits a positive effect. I suspected these results

⁴² For the coding rules and sources used to create this variable, see footnote 33.

⁴³ As with the previous models in Table 1, fixed effects led to too many dropped observations, from 145 to 58 (see footnote 37). I checked the robustness of the models using rare events logit. All results were substantively unchanged.

were masking some important conditional effects, so Model 2 includes interaction terms between IGO involvement (lagged) and all other independent variables. The positive coefficient on the interaction term between the IGO and incumbent support indicates that when IGO involvement (lagged) occurs in elections which the incumbent expected to win, its effect is attenuated. Similarly, the higher the country's Polity score, the weaker the deterrent power of the IGO. After controlling for these interactive effects, IGO involvement is indeed negative and highly significant, with a large coefficient of -5 on its constituent term. A test for the joint significance of IGO involvement reveals a coefficient of -3.43 at $p=.095$. Polity and democracy in the region are also jointly significant with their interaction terms, and their effect on manipulation remains negative. Surprisingly, however, opposition mobilization does not significantly affect the probability of incumbent manipulation, even after controlling for all interactive effects (results not shown).

Table 2. Determinants of Incumbent Manipulation

Independent Variables	1 Baseline Model	2 Interactions
<i>Manipulation lag (t-1)</i>	.92	1.06
<i>SE</i>	(.63)	.71
<i>P-value</i>	.15	.14
<i>Opposition Mobilization lag (t-1)</i>	1.24	1.22
<i>SE</i>	(.64)	(.92)
<i>P-value</i>	.05	.19
<i>IGO Involvement lag (t-1)</i>	.13	-5.27[^]
<i>SE</i>	(.49)	(2.15)
<i>P-value</i>	.79	.01
<i>Incumbent High Popular Support</i>	.48	-.09
<i>SE</i>	(.70)	(.72)
<i>P-value</i>	.49	.90
<i>Polity Score</i>	-.40	-1.01[^]
<i>SE</i>	(.16)	(.33)
<i>P-value</i>	.01	.00
<i>Democracy in the Region</i>	-.18	-.13[^]
<i>SE</i>	(.09)	(.18)
<i>P-value</i>	.04	.47
<i>IGO (t-1) * Manipulation (t-1)</i>		-.00
<i>SE</i>		(1.38)
<i>P-value</i>		.99
<i>IGO (t-1) * Opposition (t-1)</i>		-.04
<i>SE</i>		(1.15)
<i>P-value</i>		.97
<i>IGO (t-1) * Inc.High Support</i>		1.13
<i>SE</i>		(1.32)
<i>P-value</i>		.39
<i>IGO (t-1) * Polity</i>		.79
<i>SE</i>		(.36)
<i>P-value</i>		.03
<i>IGO (t-1) * Democ. in Region</i>		-.04
<i>SE</i>		(.20)
<i>P-value</i>		.84
<i>Constant</i>	1.09	5.18
<i>SE</i>	(1.40)	(1.71)
<i>P-value</i>	.44	.00
N	145	145
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-42.61	-40
Pseudo R2	.49	.52

Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clusters by country.

Coefficients in bold are significant at $p < .10$. [^] indicates joint significance at $p < .10$.


All p-values taken for two-tailed tests.

Propositions 2 and 3: Synergy between the Opposition and IGO

The statistical evidence presented in Table 1 points to a synergistic relationship between the opposition and IGO; each is more effective at producing democratic change when the other also acts. But each actor faces constraints that may sometimes prevent them from expending any effort on mobilization or democracy promotion. The theory identifies low popular support as a constraint on opposition action and bargaining costs as a constraint on IGO action. Propositions 2 and 3 predict that when these constraints are high, action by the other actor can provide enough extra incentives to induce mobilization or involvement when it otherwise would not occur. Thus, when opposition support is low (relative to the incumbent), the opposition should be more likely to mobilize conditional on IGO involvement (Proposition 2a). And when bargaining costs are high for the IGO, it should be more likely to implement tools of democracy promotion conditional on opposition mobilization (Proposition 3a). As strategic actors, both the opposition and IGO know when their efforts are pivotal in inducing the other to act. Because their incentives to act are greater when they are pivotal, all else equal, we should observe higher levels of IGO involvement when opposition support is low, and higher levels of opposition mobilization when IGO bargaining costs are high (Propositions 2b and 3b).

Figure 4 graphs the rate of opposition mobilization conditional on IGO involvement in three categories: first, when the opposition was not expected to win the election; second, when it was expected to win (i.e., its popular support was high); and third, when no reliable pre-election polls could be found (“No Info”).⁴⁴ A rate of .4 corresponds to 40% of flawed elections in that sub-group. The graph includes only flawed elections that were won by the incumbent.

⁴⁴ See footnote 33 for coding rules and sources.

Figure 4. Opposition Mobilization

At first glance, the patterns appear not to support the prediction because opposition mobilization is more likely when the IGO is involved in *all three categories*. However, the relationship between mobilization and involvement is not statistically significant in the elections which the opposition expected to win (columns 3 and 4). Because there are only eight observations in this group, and only four of them experience IGO involvement, no firm conclusions can be inferred. By contrast, the difference in the rates of opposition mobilization with and without IGO involvement are statistically significant in the other two groups (at $p=.09$ and $p=.03$ respectively). It should be noted that the “No Information” group is composed mainly of elections in repressive regimes, including Belarus (1995, 2000), Haiti (1997, 2000) and Serbia (1992), in which the opposition likely commanded only a small minority of popular support.

Further confirmation of this prediction comes from examining the rates of IGO involvement in elections with low versus high opposition popular support. Proposition 3b predicts that IGO involvement will be (counter-intuitively) higher when the opposition enjoys low popular support because its efforts here are more likely to be pivotal. In fact, the IGO involved itself in a full 48% of elections when the opposition was not expected to win, but only 36% when the opposition was. This difference is significant at $p=.05$.

Turning to the second prediction, I now explore whether the evidence supports the claim that the opposition can cause the IGO to implement tools of democracy promotion despite high

bargaining costs. Figure 5 shows the relationship between IGO involvement and opposition mobilization following flawed elections. Columns 1 and 2 show the rate of IGO involvement when bargaining costs are low, and columns 3 and 4 when bargaining costs are high. I measure bargaining costs using a simple, retrospective coding scheme: any country that experienced two or more consecutively flawed elections *that were not met by any IGO involvement* is coded as a country with high bargaining costs. All other countries were coded as ones with low bargaining costs. Though admittedly this measure is not based on the actual characteristics (e.g., country size, proximity to the regional hegemon, oil wealth) that influence IGO bargaining costs, it has the advantage of being easily and uncontroversially coded. If regional IGOs allowed two consecutive flawed elections to pass without even rhetorical criticism, clearly some combination of country characteristics made it difficult for the IGO to respond. Of all the countries that held flawed elections in the sample, 19 are coded as high bargaining cost and 16 as low cost.

Figure 5. IGO Involvement




Figure 5 clearly shows that the rate of IGO involvement in the low bargaining cost group is unaffected by whether the opposition mobilized or not. By contrast, in the high cost group, the rate of IGO involvement conditional on opposition mobilization was significantly higher than

with no mobilization.⁴⁵ In sum, the evidence clearly supports the prediction of a conditional relationship between IGO involvement and opposition mobilization. Because it knows its efforts may be pivotal, the opposition should be more likely to mobilize in high bargaining cost countries. This prediction is also corroborated: the overall rate of opposition mobilization in low bargaining cost countries is .17 (or 17%), while the rate of mobilization in high bargaining cost countries is .23 (23%). This difference is marginally significant at $p=.10$.

Evidence from the cases supports the general story of an interdependent relationship between IGOs and the domestic opposition. IGO documents and first-person interviews with officials at the EU and OAS indicate that member states and IGO officials do take into account domestic conditions when determining whether to become involved or not. Mass opposition mobilization serves as a particularly effective attention getter because it generates publicity and provides the IGO with an additional motivation—namely, conflict resolution—to intervene. There is also ample evidence that domestic opposition parties desire IGO support, that they are aware of how protests affect their international audience, and that they consider the IGO's actions when deciding on their own strategies. It is not uncommon for opposition parties to directly appeal to regional IGOs to punish an incumbent. For example, the Venezuelan opposition issued several formal requests to the OAS to help stop Chavez's drive to change the constitution in 1999.⁴⁶ Albanian opposition leader Sali Berisha traveled to Brussels in September 2001 to convince the EU that the June elections were fraudulent. Azerbaijan appealed to the UN and OSCE to not recognize rigged constitutional referendum held in August 2002.⁴⁷ As the 'electoral revolution' model has spread across the post-communist world, opposition forces seem to recognize the important role played by the European Union, OSCE and other international actors. While strong IGO support is not a necessary condition for political change (e.g., Kyrgyzstan), it is certainly associated with the more deep and durable cases of change (e.g., Croatia).

⁴⁵ A difference of means test was significant at $p=.00$.

⁴⁶ Associated Press, April 12, 1999. "Opposition party asks OAS to intervene after Chavez threat."

⁴⁷ Financial Times Information. August 27, 2002. "Azeri Opposition Appeals to UN, OSCE Over Referendum Vote-Rigging."

IV. Conclusion

This paper provides a theory and systematic evidence showing that regional intergovernmental organizations play an important causal role in producing democratic change in the wake of flawed elections. By pressuring incumbents, providing assistance to democratic institutions and facilitating compromise between opposing domestic parties, IGO enforcement increases the likelihood of democratization. But by highlighting the strategic interdependence between the IGO and the domestic opposition, this paper also uncovers novel insights about the important *indirect* effects of IGO involvement, which serves to mobilize and empower the opposition. While previous studies have focused almost exclusively on the role of the domestic opposition in democratization, I highlight the intimate linkages between the opposition and regional IGOs. Their efforts are synergistic; when they act together, each becomes more powerful than if it were acting alone. Moreover, under certain conditions, the IGO and opposition can spur each other to action, inducing mobilization and involvement where it is otherwise unlikely to occur.

The most simple take-away message, then: IGOs matter for democracy. They matter not as passive sites for states to make commitments or agreements, but rather as *actors* that involve themselves in the nitty-gritty of domestic politics. IGO democracy promotion may be inconsistent and selectively applied, but where it is implemented, it has a robust and positive effect on domestic outcomes.

Appendix. List of Flawed Elections in the Dataset

COUNTRY	Month	Year	Election Type	Opp.Mob.?	IGO Enfct.?	Observers?
Albania	March	1991	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Albania	March	1992	Legislative	No	No	Accept
Albania	November	1994	Referendum	No	No	No Observers
Albania	May	1996	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Albania	June	1997	Legislative + Referendum	No	Yes	Irregular
Albania	November	1998	Referendum	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Albania	June	2001	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Albania	July	2005	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Armenia	July	1995	Legislative + Referendum	Yes	No	Reject
Armenia	August	1996	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Armenia	March	1998	Presidential	No	No	Reject
Armenia	May	1999	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Armenia	February	2003	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Armenia	May	2003	Legislative + Referendum	No	Yes	Reject
Armenia	November	2005	Referendum	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Azerbaijan	August	1993	Presidential + Referendum	No	No	No Observers
Azerbaijan	November	1995	Legislative + Referendum	Yes	No	Reject
Azerbaijan	October	1998	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Azerbaijan	November	2000	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Azerbaijan	August	2002	Referendum	Yes	Yes	No Observers
Azerbaijan	October	2003	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Azerbaijan	November	2005	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Belarus	May	1995	Legislative + Referendum	No	Yes	Irregular
Belarus	November	1996	Referendum	Yes	Yes	No Observers
Belarus	October	2000	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Belarus	September	2001	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Belarus	September	2004	Legislative + Referendum	No	Yes	Reject
Bolivia	June	1993	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	No Observers
Bolivia	June	2002	Legislative	No	Yes	Accept
Bosnia	September	1996	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Bosnia	September	1998	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Bosnia	November	2000	Legislative	No	Yes	No Observers
Bosnia	October	2002	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Brazil	October	1994	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	No Observers

COUNTRY	Month	Year	Election Type	Opp.Mob.?	IGO Enft.?	Observers?
Bulgaria	June	1990	Legislative	Yes	No	Irregular
Bulgaria	October	1991	Legislative	No	No	Accept
Bulgaria	June	2005	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Colombia	March	1990	Legislative	Yes	No	Verdict Not Found
Colombia	May	1990	Presidential + Referendum	Yes	No	No Observers
Colombia	October	1991	Legislative	No	No	No Observers
Colombia	March	1994	Legislative	No	No	No Observers
Colombia	May	1994	Presidential	No	No	Accept
Colombia	March	1998	Legislative	No	No	No Observers
Colombia	May	1998	Presidential	No	No	No Observers
Colombia	March	2002	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Colombia	May	2002	Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Colombia	October	2003	Referendum	No	No	No Observers
Croatia	August	1992	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Croatia	February	1993	Legislative	No	No	No Observers
Croatia	October	1995	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Croatia	April	1997	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Croatia	June	1997	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Croatia	January	2000	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Croatia	January	2000	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Dominican Republic	May	1990	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	No	Irregular
Dominican Republic	May	1994	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Dominican Republic	May	1996	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Dominican Republic	May	2000	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Ecuador	October	2002	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
El Salvador	March	1991	Legislative	Yes	No	Irregular
El Salvador	March	1994	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
El Salvador	March	1997	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
El Salvador	March	1999	Presidential	No	No	Irregular
El Salvador	March	2000	Legislative	No	No	Verdict Not Found
El Salvador	March	2003	Legislative	No	No	Verdict Not Found
Georgia	November	1995	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Georgia	October	1999	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Georgia	April	2000	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Georgia	November	2003	Legislative + Referendum	Yes	Yes	Reject
Georgia	January	2004	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Georgia	March	2004	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular

COUNTRY	Month	Year	Election Type	Opp.Mob.?	IGO Enfct.?	Observers?
Guatemala	November	1990	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Verdict Not Found
Guatemala	August	1994	Legislative	No	No	Verdict Not Found
Guatemala	November	1995	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Verdict Not Found
Guatemala	November	1999	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Guatemala	November	2003	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Guyana	October	1992	Legislative	Yes	No	Irregular
Guyana	December	1997	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Guyana	March	2001	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Haiti	December	1990	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	No	Irregular
Haiti	June	1995	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Haiti	December	1995	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Haiti	April	1997	Legislative	No	No	Reject
Haiti	May	2000	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Haiti	November	2000	Presidential	Yes	Yes	No Observers
Honduras	November	1993	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Honduras	November	1997	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Honduras	November	2001	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Accept
Honduras	November	2005	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Hungary	April	1990	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Hungary	May	1994	Legislative	No	No	Accept
Jamaica	March	1993	Legislative	No	No	No Observers
Jamaica	December	1997	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Jamaica	October	2002	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Kazakhstan	March	1994	Legislative	No	No	Reject
Kazakhstan	December	1995	Legislative	No	No	Reject
Kazakhstan	January	1999	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Kazakhstan	September	1999	Legislative	No	No	Reject
Kazakhstan	September	2004	Legislative	No	Yes	Reject
Kazakhstan	August	2005	Legislative	No	Yes	No Observers
Kazakhstan	December	2005	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Kyrgyzstan	February	1995	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Kyrgyzstan	December	1995	Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Kyrgyzstan	February	2000	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Kyrgyzstan	October	2000	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Kyrgyzstan	February	2005	Legislative	Yes	Yes	Reject
Kyrgyzstan	July	2005	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular

COUNTRY	Month	Year	Election Type	Opp.Mob.?	IGO Enfct.?	Observers?
Lithuania	October	1996	Legislative	No	No	Accept
Macedonia	October	1994	Presidential	Yes	No	Irregular
Macedonia	October	1998	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Macedonia	October	1999	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Macedonia	September	2002	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Macedonia	April	2004	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Mexico	August	1991	Legislative	Yes	Yes	No Observers
Mexico	August	1994	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	No	Irregular
Mexico	June	1997	Legislative	Yes	No	Irregular
Mexico	July	2000	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Moldova	November	1996	Presidential	No	No	Accept
Moldova	March	1998	Legislative	No	No	Accept
Moldova	February	2001	Legislative	No	Yes	Accept
Moldova	March	2005	Legislative	No	Yes	Accept
Nicaragua	February	1990	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Nicaragua	October	1996	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Paraguay	May	1993	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Peru	October	1993	Referendum	Yes	No	Verdict Not Found
Peru	April	1995	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Peru	May	2000	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Peru	April	2001	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Accept
Romania	May	1990	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Reject
Romania	September	1992	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Romania	November	1996	Legislative + Presidential	No	No	Irregular
Romania	November	2004	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Russia	December	1993	Legislative + Referendum	No	Yes	Irregular
Russia	June	1996	Presidential	No	Yes	Irregular
Russia	December	1999	Legislative	No	Yes	Accept
Russia	March	2000	Presidential	No	Yes	Accept
Russia	December	2003	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Russia	March	2004	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject

COUNTRY	Month	Year	Election Type	Opp.Mob.?	IGO Enft.?	Observers?
Serbia & Montenegro	May	1992	Legislative	Yes	Yes	No Observers
Serbia & Montenegro	December	1992	Presidential	No	No	Reject
Serbia & Montenegro	December	1993	Legislative	No	No	No Observers
Serbia & Montenegro	September	1997	Legislative + Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Serbia & Montenegro	September	2000	Presidential	Yes	Yes	No Observers
Serbia & Montenegro	December	2000	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Serbia & Montenegro	November	2003	Presidential	No	Yes	Accept
Serbia & Montenegro	December	2003	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Slovakia	August	1994	Legislative	No	No	Verdict Not Found
Slovakia	August	1998	Legislative	No	Yes	Accept
Tajikistan	November	1994	Presidential + Referendum	No	Yes	No Observers
Tajikistan	February	1995	Legislative	No	Yes	No Observers
Tajikistan	November	1999	Presidential + Referendum	No	Yes	No Observers
Tajikistan	February	2000	Legislative	No	Yes	Reject
Tajikistan	June	2003	Referendum	No	Yes	No Observers
Tajikistan	February	2005	Legislative	No	Yes	Reject
Trinidad & Tobago	December	2000	Legislative	Yes	No	Accept
Trinidad & Tobago	December	2001	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Trinidad & Tobago	October	2002	Legislative	No	Yes	No Observers
Ukraine	December	1991	Presidential + Referendum	No	No	Accept
Ukraine	March	1994	Legislative	No	Yes	Irregular
Ukraine	March	1998	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Ukraine	November	1999	Presidential	No	Yes	Reject
Ukraine	March	2002	Legislative	No	Yes	Reject
Ukraine	October	2004	Presidential	Yes	Yes	Reject
Venezuela	November	1998	Legislative	No	No	Irregular
Venezuela	July	1999	Legislative	No	No	Accept
Venezuela	July	2000	Legislative + Presidential	Yes	Yes	Irregular
Venezuela	August	2004	Referendum	Yes	Yes	Irregular

Appendix 2. Coding Rules for Electoral Manipulation and Irregularities

Multiple-round elections are coded as one observation. Manipulation is coded as having occurred if one or more of the following actions were *intentionally* taken by government/ruling party/incumbent within four months prior to the election (all measures must be specifically targeted to the election; general repression of civil liberties not counted). Irregularities are coded if problems (technical or administrative) occurred in one or more of the same areas, but these problems could not be linked to intentional action on the part of the government:

Pre-election period:

- (a) Restrictions or systematic bias in the state-owned media, including censoring, closing opposition media outlets, intimidation, and grossly unbalanced coverage
- (b) Opposition parties/candidates are intimidated or the targets of violence
- (c) Registration of opposition parties/candidates is unduly burdensome, and/or parties/candidates are removed from the ballot without legitimate cause
- (d) Restriction on opposition party/candidate campaign activity, including limitation of access to the media, holding rallies and other campaign-related public events

Election day:

- (a) Voter intimidation by police and/or military at polling stations
- (b) Systematic omission of opposition supporters from voter lists
- (c) Multiple voting
- (d) Ballot box tampering or stuffing
- (e) Destruction and/or alteration of ballots by polling officials or by state authorities
- (f) Faulty counting/tallying of ballots
- (g) Certification of fraudulent results by central electoral commission

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