SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, when the Court adjourned, I was dealing with some points in the memorandum of Dr. Klefisch, and I continue to deal with that document.

Much emphasis has been laid by Dr. Klefisch and by all defense counsel on the serious consequences which will accrue to the persons affected by a declaration of guilt, not only to those against whom subsequent proceedings may be taken, but to the others besides. It is said "that the stigma inflicted upon members of organizations declared criminal would...prove indelible.... Millions of members of organizations declared criminal would remain branded for the rest of their lives. One would point at them, saying, 'Look, there goes an SA criminal!'" But if they are guilty, if they have supported and assisted in a system which entailed throwing the world into war, reviving the horrors of slavery, persecution, and mass murder, ought they not to be so branded? This can be no injustice: It is less--far less--than their deserts. It is the only hope for Germany and the world that her people realize and repent their responsibility for what has happened. Dr. Servatius has asked you to excuse Ortsgruppenleiter because they are members of the lower middle class who lacked political experience. Can it really be that only the upper classes of the German people are able to recognize aggressive war for world domination, slavery, murder, and persecution, as crimes?

Yet there may be more truth in this than any dare to think. You have now seen and heard many witnesses who, some on their own admission, were themselves deeply involved in hideous crime. Have you been able to discern a sense of guilt or shame or repentance? Always it is someone who gave the orders that is to blame; never he who puts these orders into execution. Always it is some other agency of the State who was responsible; to support that State and co-operate with those other agencies is without criticism. If this is the mind of these people today, there can be no more pressing need nor greater justification for branding the guilty as criminal.

It is my intention to discuss the evidence in respect of these three organizations for which the British Delegation has taken

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particular responsibility and which, in the considered submission of all the four prosecuting powers, are criminal. But before dealing with that evidence I trust the Tribunal will bear with me if I make one or two general observations upon the defense which has been put forward on behalf of all these organizations.

In view of the words of Dr. Boehm, I desire to submit that no one can say hereafter that every opportunity has not been afforded them for their defense. An elaborate procedure has been evolved to obtain and place before you their evidence. 102 witnesses have been heard before your Commissioners--witnesses selected by Defense Counsel from the many thousands of members of the organizations available. You have the transcripts of their evidence. Of these witnesses Defense Counsel have selected 20, who have given evidence in this Court and whom you have seen and heard yourselves. In addition to this oral testimony, you have also had submitted to you the substance of no less than 136,213 affidavits, for the SS, 155,000 for the Political Leaders, 2,000 for the Gestapo, 10,000 for the SA and 7,000 for the SD, a total of 310,213. And you have also had presented before your Commissioners another 1,809 affidavits either in substance or in whole, the majority of which are now contained in the transcript of the Commissioners' proceedings.

On the face of it, the evidence which has been given by almost all the witnesses called before your Commissioners is untrue. You yourselves have seen and heard some of these witnesses, selected by Defense Counsel presumably because they were thought to be the most reliable and the ones most likely to impress you. Their evidence is no better.

You will remember Sievers, called for the SS, who denied knowledge of and participation in the experiments on human beings and was presented with a file of his own incriminating correspondence.

The witness Morgen described the variety theater, the cinema, the bookstalls, and the other amenities of Buchenwald. Dachau, he said, was a recreation camp.

Brill, who had served as an Obersturmbannfuehrer in the SS Division Leibstandarte from June until August 1941 on the Eastern Front, knew nothing of the Einsatzgruppen, the slaughter of Jews in the Eastern territories, or of the treatment of the peoples of Poland and Russia taken into captivity for forced labor. Had the conditions in June become so changed from what they had been 2 months before, when Himmler had said to all the officers of that division:

"Very frequently the members of the Waffen-SS think about the deportation of this people here. These thoughts

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come to me today when watching the very difficult work out there performed by the Security Police, supported by your men, who help them a great deal. Exactly the same thing happened in Poland, in weather 40 degrees below zero, where we had to haul away thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands; where we had to have the toughness--you should hear this but also forget it again immediately-to shoot thousands of leading Poles" (1918-PS, US-304).

General Hauser, one time Commander of the SS Division "Das Reich," and subsequently commander of a corps, army, and army group, knew nothing of SS atrocities. He had never heard of the massacre of Lidice.

Gauleiter Hoffmann, who gave evidence before your Commission to explain away his order of 25 February 1945, encouraging the lynching of Allied pilots, said that the order "slipped out" from his command post after he had refused to issue the draft submitted to him by his staff officer.

Hupfauer, of the German Labor Front, supervising the work of that organization in Essen during the latter part of the war, and himself responsible for circulating Himmler's orders to ensure "the discipline and output of foreign workers," denied all knowledge of the brutal treatment of slave labor.

Rathcke, called for the SA, before your Commissioner described how "in the spring of 1933, the SA in all German localities streamed into the churches."

Schneider, another Political Leader called before your Commission, aged 55, denied having ever heard of the boycott of April 1933.

Best, the enslaver of Denmark, gave evidence before you for the Gestapo. Having seen the documents that were presented to him in cross-examination, can you believe one word of what he said? Examples of evidence of this kind could be quoted from the transcript of almost every witness that has been called to defend these organizations.

Consider this evidence from another angle. We know that so-called "demonstrations" were organized and carried out throughout the whole Reich against the Jews on the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, during the course of which 35 Jews were murdered, 20,000 seized and incarcerated for no other offense than that they were Jews; we know that 177 synagogues were destroyed by fire or demolished, that 7,500 stores were destroyed, and that the cost of damage to glass windows alone amounted to 6 million Reichsmark. Even the Supreme Party Court reported:

"The public, down to the last man, realizes that political drives like those of 9 November were organized and directed

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by the Party, whether this is admitted or not. When all the synagogues burn down in the night, it must have been organized by the Party" (3063-PS, US-332).

"Whether this is admitted or not!" Can you find one single man among the 102 witnesses that have been called on behalf of the Party organizations who is prepared to admit it--or anything like it? Can you find one word of admission from among the affidavits that have been submitted by over 312,000 members of these Party organizations? If it was not the Political Leaders, if it was not the SA or the SS, if it was not the Gestapo or SD--what in the name of all common sense was it that organized and directed these demonstrations?

We know that slave labor was employed and brutally maltreated throughout Germany. We know that in 1943, it even became necessary--necessary only in order to increase production and for no reasons of humanity--to alter, I quote, "the hitherto prevailing treatment of Eastern Workers," and for the Party Chancellery and the RSHA to issue orders to all Political Leaders down to Ortsgruppenleiter, and presumably to all stations of the SD and Gestapo that "injustices, insults, trickery, mistreatments, et cetera must be discontinued. Punishment by beating is forbidden" (205-PS, GB-538).

But can you find one single one from all the 102 witnesses and the persons who have sworn affidavits on oath, who has ever seen or heard of the mistreatment of foreign laborers, save only in one or two exceptional instances?

The evidence of all of them is the same. They are asked if they knew of the persecution and annihilation of the Jews, of the dread work of the Gestapo, of the atrocities within the concentration camps, of the ill-treatment of slave labor, of the intention and preparation to wage aggressive war, of the murder of brave soldiers, sailors, and airmen. And they reply with "the everlasting No."

You may be reminded of the words of a great Irishman: "Falsehood has a perennial spring."

Let me turn to consider these three organizations for which I am responsible--the Corps of Political Leaders, the SA, and the SS.

With regard to the Corps of Political Leaders, certain general points have been made by counsel and witnesses for the Defense, which it is convenient to mention before dealing with the evidence. It is said that the Zellen- and Blockleiter ought not to be included as Political Leaders; that they were never regarded as such, and had no authority or political tasks; that they were subordinate to the staff officers in the Ortsgruppe whom the Prosecution has

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agreed to exclude; that they were completely unimportant and in practice little more than the messenger boys of their Ortsgruppenleiter.

We submit that there is overwhelming evidence that this was not so. When you examine the evidence you find them implicated in criminal activities of many kinds. I would ask you particularly to bear this in mind--that it was the normal procedure in the Corps of Political Leaders to pass nothing in writing below the rank of Ortsgruppenleiter. The Organization Book of the Party prescribed, I quote:

"In principle, the Blockleiter will settle his official business verbally, and he will receive messages verbally, and pass them on in the same way. Correspondence will only be used in cases of absolute necessity and practicality."

The witness Meyer-Wendeborn confirmed that this was so in practice:

"Between the Blockleiter and the Zellenleiter on one side, and the Ortsgruppenleiter and the staff on the other, there was supposed to be no written instruction in order not to give these people of lower rank or lower position too much work."

In view of that, you may well think it remarkable that we have happened to find so many written documents as we have which directly implicate the Zellen- and Blockleiter. In dealing with the evidence I shall draw your attention to these documents. But I would also emphasize the other evidence you have of the vitally important role the Zellen- and Blockleiter played.

It has been argued that they were not Hoheitstraeger, as the Prosecution suggest, and various documents have been submitted by the Defense Counsel to establish this contention. Be it right or wrong, it matters little. You will remember that they were included as Hoheitstraeger in the Party's Organization Book, which states: "Among the Politische Leiter, the Hoheitstraeger assume a special position."

It is answered that the Organization Book is inaccurate. The same is said of the SA-Mann--an equally inconvenient publication for the members of the SA. Is there any official publication issued by the official Party publishers which is accurate?

The fact is that by whatever title they may have been known, the Zellen- and Blockleiter formed the essential basis of the whole Party system. Gauleiter Kaufmann admitted:

"Blockleiter and Zellerileiter were the executive organs of the Ortsgrupperileiter."

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Zellenleiter Schneider was asked:

"Would you agree with me that without the Zellenleiter and Blockleiter, the Ortsgruppenleiter could never have carried on the tasks they had to perform?"

and answered:

"Yes, that is correct."

They were much more than the messenger boys they are now made out to have been. Hirt stated that only persons who were "completely politically reliable" were appointed either as staff officers in the Gaue, Kreise, and Orte or as Zellen- and Blockleiter, and that the people who held the positions of Zellen- and Blockleiter appeared to be supporters of the Nazi Party. The evidence shows the kind of tasks with which they were entrusted, which included the responsibility of "assisting in forming the political judgment" on the members of their area.

It has been suggested that Political Leaders--particularly in war time--were compelled against their will to assume their appointments. But the whole basis of the system was voluntary service, paid or unpaid, and it is confirmed by their own witness Meyer-Wendeborn. Let me quote from his cross-examination before the Commission:

"Question: 'May I take it that Political Leaders were all voluntarily occupying their offices?'

"Answer: 'Yes.'

"Question: 'And that also applies, does it not, to the Zellenleiter and Blockleiter?'

"Answer: 'The Zellenleiter and Blockleiter were appointed through the Ortsgruppenleiter after he had had a discussion with the staff. However, if a person considered himself not up to the part, or that he was unable to do the job, or that he did not have the time, we looked for another one.'

"Question: 'And it was decidedly voluntary on the part of the Zellenleiter or Blockleiter whether or not they accepted the position?'

"Answer: 'Yes.'"

If pressure was brought to bear on some, as the witness Hirt suggested, it could only have happened in the most exceptional cases. If the holders of these offices were required to be "completely politically reliable" it would be remarkable to find among them many opponents of the Party forced unwillingly to act.

It is said also that because, as in peace time, their appointments were not confirmed, their oath taken only at irregular intervals, and because they were given no uniform they were not, in the words

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of the Indictment, "according to common Nazi terminology Politische Leiter of any grade or rank."

I submit that there can be no substance in such an argument. They performed the same tasks, were regarded as the same officials and held the same authority and influence as those whom they replaced.

Again, it is suggested that there was no "Corps" or organization of Political Leaders; but the evidence shows that Politische Leiter of all classes formed a close and well-defined corps. They are described as a "Corps" in the Organization Book. Together they had a common purpose, I quote, "the complete penetration of the German nation with the National Socialist spirit."

They wore a common uniform. They were issued with a common identity card--common to themselves but distinct from the rest of the population. Yearly they took their common oath to their Fuehrer:

"I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditional obedience to him and the leaders appointed by him."

And, as the Organization Book says of each one of them:

"The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and the organization of the NSDAP."

there is one further matter upon which I ought to say a word of explanation. It has been argued by the Defense that a great number of the Amtsleiter on the staffs of the various Hoheitstraeger ought not to be included in any declaration of criminality that you make against the Corps of Political Leaders. In the same way as the Blockleiter were said to be innocent, harmless messenger boys, so, too, it is said that these Amtsleiter were harmless and innocent expert advisers to their repective Gau-, Kreis-, or Ortsgruppenleiter. They may have been expert advisers, but they were much more besides, and they certainly were neither innocent nor harmless. They were properly appointed Political Leaders--persons who were "completely politically reliable" and supporters of the Nazi Party. All of them, just as the Hoheitstraeger themselves, took their annual oath of allegiance binding them in blind obedience to their Fuehrer. All of them, although they naturally received their instructions concerning their particular fields of activity from the State Department to which they belonged, nevertheless were subject to the orders of their Hoheitstraeger upon all political matters and in all matters of Party discipline. You may think that these men exercised as dangerous an influence as any other Political Leader because between them they were in closest contact with all grades

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of society and with all professions and trades. We have not documents directly implicating every class of these so-called nonpolitical Political Leaders, but a great many are directly involved by the documents you have seen. I will not enumerate them now. I shall draw your attention to them as I discuss the evidence. It is the submission of the Prosecution that from that evidence, and from the general evidence of the conditions in Germany and of the influence of the Political Leaders, you are entitled and, indeed, compelled to draw the inference that if the purpose and activity of that organization was criminal, then every member of the staffs of the Gau, Kreis, and Ortsgruppen ought to be included. Let it not be thought that because we have all deliberately excluded those members of the Ortsgruppenleiter staffs, we have done so on account of their innocence. That decision was taken for practical rather than any other reasons, and it may well be that that decision was wrong.

It has been suggested by the Defense that there were officers in the various Party organizations such as the DAF, NSV, labor welfare, students' and womens' organizations who were also known as Politische Leiter. Their numbers are given as one and a half million. Let me once again make it clear that if such Political Leaders existed the Prosecution do not seek a declaration of criminality against them. We include only Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, Zellenleiter, and Blockleiter and the Amtsleiter or heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung, Gauleitung, and Kreisleitung--those Political Leaders who, organized on a geographical basis, were responsible for the political control of the people and the execution and administration of Nazi policy. All others are excluded.

You have had a schedule showing the numbers that are thus involved. According to the Party Organization Book for 1943 they number 600,000. It is said by the Defense that that figure allows for no replacements and that the total figure of all who have at any time held these positions is much greater. Upon that I make two points. First, the figures given in the Organization Book show the maximum establishment allowed for each Gau and Kreis. In practice not all these offices were filled-in urban districts there would be no agricultural Amt; in Gaue where there were no universities there would be no political Amtsleiter for university teachers. Secondly, the 1943 figure of 600,000 includes the Political Leaders of nine foreign Gau--six Austrian, two Polish and one in the Sudetenland--none of which had existed before 1938, so that during the first 5 years of the Nazi regime the total possible number of Political Leaders must have been considerably less than 600,000. The extract submitted by the Defense from the pamphlet Der Hoheitstraeger illustrates the increase which took place in the Hoheitstraeger alone between 1935 and 1939: the figure rose from

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291,671 to 581,650. In view of these considerations it is submitted that, allowing for replacements, the total number of persons, who at any time held those positions in the Corps of Political Leaders which we include for the purposes of a declaration of criminality, cannot have greatly exceeded the figure of 600,000 which we have submitted. And I add that ample allowance must be made for decease, not only through natural causes, but through active service and bombings. It was these men and women who constituted the very core of the National Socialism which led the 48 million voters of Germany in the way and to the end which we have seen.

Let us consider the evidence against them under its main headings. We will see not only how they themselves directly participated in crime, but also how they actively and knowingly assisted and co-operated with the other organizations in the execution of their common criminal purpose.

With regard to the control of the State, Bormann, writing to the Gauleiter in June 1941, stated: "For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consciously and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand..." (D-75, USA-348).

We see one of the ways in which the Leadership Corps assisted in putting the leadership of the people into the Fuehrer's own hand from the evidence of the Political Leaders' activity during the voting in 1936 and 1938, and we see here the participation of all ranks of Political Leaders.

We have a complete file from the Kreis of Erfurt, Thuringia, in connection with the plebiscite of 1938. Stuetzpunktleiter were to report beforehand all persons in their district whom they might assume with certainty would vote "no" (D-897, GB-541). The orders were issued by the SD jointly to the Stuetzpunktleiter and to all heads of sections of the Security Service. The heads of sections were to support the Stuetzpunktleiter locally as much as possible. It was said by the Defense that the Stuetzpunktleiter referred to in that file were Stuetzpunktleiter of the SD and not of the Political Leadership. Even if you accept that explanation it makes no difference, for it was expressly stated that the whole matter was to be "carried out in the closest collaboration with the Ortsgruppenleiter of the Party" (D-897, GB-541). The Political Leaders could hardly have had any doubts as to what was in store for the people whom they reported when the orders contain the significant paragraph:

"The tremendous responsibility which the Stuetzpunktleiter have, in particular with regard to this report, is stressed once more. The Stuetzpunktleiter must clearly understand the potential consequences for the persons contained in their report."

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The Tribunal will remember the reports that were rendered by the SD after the plebiscite had taken place, showing the means by which the voting papers of suspected persons were checked by the use of skimmed milk and colorless typewriters. You will remember also the methods employed to force doubtful supporters of the Party to vote, I quote:

"The wife of the Jew Bielschowski, who was dragged along just before closing time, voted 'no,' as can be proved.

"The laborer Otto Wiegand had to be requested four times to record his vote on the day of the election and finally only voted under force....

"The husband... recorded his vote. To be sure this was probably exclusively for fear of renewed arrest" (D-902).

And yet again in what must be, perhaps, one of the most dreadful documents in all this Trial:

"The Jehovah's witness Robert Siering and his wife ... deposited their vote after both had been advised of their duty to vote by the police in Griefstedt and had been threatened with the removal of their child in case of non-participation" (D-897).

No one can pretend that these things were happening only in Erfurt. In the Gau Coblenz the Kreisgeschaeftsfuehrer of Kochem, "where supervisory control was ordered in several Ortsgruppen," assured the SD that it was mostly women who voted "no" or invalidly (R-142, USA-481).

In Rothenburg the Party carried out demonstrations against the Bishop who had refused to vote, demonstrations which Mr. Justice Jackson so vividly described in his opening speech.

Nor was it only in the 1938 plebiscite that the Political Leadership was active. It will be remembered that in Bremen Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, and Stuetzpunktleiter were concerned in reporting all civil servants who did not vote in the election which took place on 29 March 1936.

Dr. Servatius brushes this evidence aside with a comment for which there is no scrap of evidence in support. He says:

"It is shown that the commanding agency of the Party in no way enters into action. These are merely individual measures of other agencies. No general practice or knowledge can be deduced from that."

It is unnecessary for me to say more.

The control and supervision of the German people was as much the task of the Political, Leaders as of the SD and Gestapo. Of all the Political Leaders the Blockleiter were the most essential for this

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purpose. They kept their index cards of every householder, index cards which formed the basis of the "political judgment," which the Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, and Ortsgruppenleiter, in co-operation with each other, were to pronounce (D-901 A, GB-546). Again and again the Defense, both before the Commission and before the Tribunal, have bridled at and denied the suggestion that Blockleiter were used as spies. But what else were they when their index cards were to be completed from information which they would, I quote: "have sufficient opportunity ... to obtain by means of conversations ... with the Germans"? They too were urged to make certain of the accuracy of their reports (D-901 A, GB-546).

There is other evidence to show this wretched role the Blockleiter played. In the Party Organization Book the Blockleiter is directed that:

"It is his duty to find people disseminating damaging rumors and to report them to the Ortsgruppe so that they may be reported to the respective State authorities" (1893-PS, USA-323).

We see him spying again when we review the evidence of the part played by Political Leaders in the persecution of the Churches. In co-operation with the Gestapo and the SD the Political Leaders, from the highest to the lowest, took active part in suppressing the influence of the Churches.

Your Lordship, I think I can omit the rest of Page 17 and the first 8 lines of Page 18, which deals with Bormann's decree, which is well known to the Tribunal, and I can go on at the words on Page 18.

How can we doubt that it was the generally accepted policy of all Political Leaders when, whatever Hitler may have said in the Party Program about a "positive Christianity," Bormann was writing to the Gauleiter in 1941 after his notorious denunciation of Christianity:

"National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable."

Gauleiter Kaufmann was at pains to explain that that directive had been withdrawn a week later. But there is no mention of such withdrawal in the letter from the SD concerning it, written 6 months later in December 1941. And you may think that it is remarkably similar to the policy of the Fuehrer's Deputy Hess, as it was explained to Rosenberg 2 months earlier in April 1941:

"We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and abolish religious morning services. Similarly the confessional and general prayers in several parts of the Reich have already been replaced by National Socialist mottoes."

There is abundant other evidence of the policy being pursued by the higher ranks of the Political Leaders in regard to the Church, with which I need not worry the Tribunal.

Let me confine myself to the lowest ranks, the Ortsgruppenleiter, Blockleiter, and Zellenleiter. You will remember the file of reports for February 1939 of the Ortsgruppenleiter in Darmstadt on ecclesiastical questions.

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"Blockleiter and Party member Kiel informs me ... that meetings of the Confessional Front... are again taking place" (D-901, GB-536).

And another in connection with a Pastor Strack:

"This gentleman should really be rapped on the knuckles seriously for once."

You will remember also the action taken by the Kreisleiter on these reports. The SD and the Gestapo were informed about the Confessional Front meetings reported by the Blockleiter. So also was the unfortunate Pastor Strack, the priest who was "sufficiently well known and ripe for the concentration camp or special court."

Can you doubt that it was also the Blockleiter and Zellenleiter in Thuringia who would have to make the reports required on the way in which the results of the 1938 plebiscite were received by the people "particularly in small towns and villages"? (D-897).

Who else but Blockleiter and Zellenleiter could be employed to find out what the Catholic and Protestant clergy were saying about the Anschluss during their services? Who else but they were in a position to report whether the church bells were rung in the evening after the Anschluss speech in Vienna? (D-897).

Lastly, upon this subject you have the evidence of demonstrations being organized to disrupt the service in Freising Church in 1935, in which the Kreisleiterin of the Nazi Party women's organization was taking a leading part (1507-PS, GB-535).

It was only by acquiring complete control of the State and of the people that the Nazi Government were enabled to carry out their criminal aims. The Political Leaders were an essential element in the acquisition of this control. They supported and executed the orders of a Government which they knew from the first pursued policies which were wrong by methods which were criminal. All knew of their avowed purpose to persecute the Jews. All knew of the Gestapo, the concentration camps, and the Nazi practice of arrest and incarceration without trial. Yet they continued actively to support that Government and to tighten its stranglehold upon the German people. The whole of Dr. Servatius' argument as to the position of the Political Leaders after 1933 shows the grip in which Germany was held by the iron framework of the Party--a political "Iron Maiden" squeezing a people to their death.

With regard to the Jews, when the persecution of the Jews was an openly recognized policy and practice of the Nazi Party, the fact that men voluntarily served their Party in an executive position is in itself sufficient to prove their participation in criminal activity. But we have concrete evidence of the direct participation in the persecution of the Jews by Political Leaders--and again by Political Leaders of all ranks. Within less than a year of the Nazi

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Government coming to power there is evidence that the Corps of Political Leaders were inciting the people of Germany to persecute the Jews. It is hardly possible to imagine that in a civilized State in the year 1933 instructions should be issued to the Political Leaders under the title "Jew Baiting." Yet that was happening. Kreisleiter in the Gau Coblenz were to check lists of Jewish firms and businesses in their district. Once again the importance of accuracy is emphasized. Committees were to be set up within the various Kreise, Ortsgruppen, and Stuetzpunkte which had, I quote, "the task of directing and supervising the communities" in Jew baiting (374-PS). They were to continue the policy which had been inaugurated by the Party with the boycott in April of that year. I quote:

"The Kreisleiter will point out in all gatherings of members or in all public gatherings that the Jew in all countries is again carrying out a low attack which is greatly harmful to Germany. It must be made clear to the masses that no German may buy from a Jew" (374-PS).

In view of this evidence; in view of Dr. Servatius' admission that there was no objection on the part of the Political Leaders to the Nuremberg Decrees, and that they welcomed measures which tended to restrict the influence of the Jews; in view of the part we know they played in the 1938 demonstrations--can there be any doubt that throughout these years they were actively participating in the continuous slander and persecution of the Jewish people? It would be strange indeed if it were not so, when we see Heydrich's order to the SD issued on the night of 9 to 10 November 1938:

"The Chiefs of the State Police Offices or their deputies must immediately get in telephonic contact with the Political Leaders--Gauleitung or Kreisleitung--who have jurisdiction over their districts and arrange a joint meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the Ordnungspolizei to discuss the organization of the demonstration. At these discussions the Political Leaders will be informed that the German Police have received from the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police the following instructions, in accordance with which the Political Leaders should adjust their own measures" (351-PS, USA-240).

It is indeed curious that these instructions should have been issued if all the Gauleiter had been so strongly opposed to such measures as Gauleiter Kaufmann, Streicher, Sauckel, and Wahl say that they were.

Whatever these witnesses you have heard may say of the attitude of the Political Leaders at these demonstrations, we know that 36 Jews were killed (358-PS, USA-508). Of those 36 killed, 4 were murdered either by Ortsgruppenleiter or Blockleiter. It was a court

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composed of Gauleiter and other Political Leaders who saw fit to suspend or pronounce only minor punishments in the case of all the murders committed during these demonstrations by members of the Party, the SS, the SA, and of the Corps of Political Leaders. And for what reasons? I quote:

"In such cases as when Jews were killed without an order or contrary to orders, ignoble motives could not be determined. At heart the men were convinced that they had done a service to their Fuehrer and to the Party" (3063-PS, USA-332).

If these witnesses for the Defense that you have heard here did not understand who was responsible for these demonstrations, it was perfectly clear to the members of the Supreme Party Court.

In France lists of Jews for "collective expatriation"--which meant, of course, deportation to the East--were made out in agreement with the Hoheitstraeger (EC-265, RF-1504). But knowledge of these deportations and of the treatment of Jews in the occupied territories was not confined to the Political Leaders in France. The August 1944 edition of the information circular, Die Lage, contained exact particulars of what was happening in Hungary. I quote:

"It was a matter of course that the German offices in Hungary did everything possible after 19 March to eliminate the Jewish element as rapidly and as completely as was at all possible. In view of the proximity of the Russian front, they commenced with the cleaning up of the Northeastern area, (Northern Transylvania and Carpathian territory) where the Jewish element was the strongest numerically. Then the Jews were collected in the remaining Hungarian provinces and transported to Germany or German-controlled territories.... 100,000 Jews remained in the hands of the Hungarians to be employed in labor battalions. By the appointed day, 19 July, the Hungarian province was without any Jew. Here remarkable consistency and severity were used in the shortest possible time" (D 908, GB-534).

We do not know who received copies of that paper, but we do know that the Defendant Doenitz contributed and that Gauleiter Kaufmann "might have received it." Moreover, it appears from what has been written on the copy we possess that that copy found its way to the NSDAP in the village of Hoechen near Aachen. Doenitz must have known what it contained; so must every other high-ranking Nazi official. Did Kaufmann and all his fellow Gauleiter know nothing of this hideous policy that their Government was pursuing? They say so, but they lie. Will you look at Document 49 of the document book which has been submitted in defense of the Corps of Political Leaders? It is a confidential information bulletin issued by the Nazi Party from the Party Chancellery on 9 October

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1942. It deals with the preparatory measures for the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe and rumors concerning the conditions of the Jews in the East. It is a document which bears in the margin the remark "Open only for G and K," which may mean for Gau and Kreis. But it shows beyond all question that knowledge of these things went far below Kreis. Listen to what it says:

"While the final solution of the Jewish question is being worked out, discussions are lately going on among the population of various parts of the Reich territory concerning 'very severe measures' against the Jews, particularly those in the Eastern territories. Investigations have shown that such statements-mostly in distorted or exaggerated form-were passed on by men on leave from various armies employed in the East who personally had the opportunity to observe such measures."

You may think after what you have heard that it was not possible to exaggerate the "very severe measures" which the soldiers on leave from the East were discussing--and must have been discussing ever since September 1941 in every village and homestead throughout Germany. But even if they were exaggerated they are not denied. The article, which I append as a footnote, makes five main points:

"a) The measures carried out up to that date, namely, elimination of Jews from the various walks of the German people, and expelling the Jews completely from Reich territory, were no longer possible by emigration.

"b) The next generation will no longer consider this question as so vital. Therefore the problem must be solved by this generation.

"c) The complete segregation and elimination of the millions of Jews residing in the European economic sphere remains a compelling necessity in the German people's struggle for existence.

"d) Starting with the Reich territory and then going over to the other European countries included in the final solution, the Jews will in a steady plan be shipped to the East into large camps ... from where they will be either used for labor or sent still further to the East.

"e) These very difficult problems will only be solved with ruthless severity."

If they still deny knowledge of the real fate that awaited these Jews, not one of these defendants, not one of the witnesses who have given evidence before you or before your Commissioners, not one of the members of these organizations can deny knowledge of

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their deportation. And what could they have thought was the meaning of the phrase: "Their complete elimination is no longer possible by emigration"?

On the mildest interpretation, this treatment of Jews in occupied territory is a war crime. The Leadership Corps is being mobilized to ensure that public opinion will not only condone, but support and encourage this war crime. If there were nothing else, this would stamp it as criminal.

But it does not stop there.

In the occupied territories the Corps of Political Leaders were as responsible as any others for the crimes committed against the local population. Frick on 16 December 1941, in giving Rainer his instructions on his appointment as Gauleiter of Carinthia, urged him in the strongest terms to germanize the Slovenes in the incorporated territory and eradicate the Slovenic language (USSR-449). My Lord, we strongly contest the suggestion of Dr. Servatius that it was admissible to germanize former German nations. The claim to germanize any Slav who was held in the old Empire has only to be stated, we submit, for its preposterous character to be seen.

Gauleiter by themselves could not execute such orders. Their subordinates had to play their part. You will remember the instructions of 30 April 1942, issued by the Kreisleiter in Pettau to all Ortsgruppenleiter, for the removal of all Slovenian inscriptions from all religious and lay sites (USSR-143).

We know that the business discussed at the Gauleiter Staff Conference at Marburg included the transfer to Serbia of 2,000, the placing of hundreds in concentration camps, and retaliatory shootings. In June of 1942, when the subject was the evacuation of the prison of Cilli, it is stated that the prisoners were to be transferred or shot to create the necessary space for a large-scale operation. On 13 July half of the 400 arrested are to be rendered harmless through delivery to a concentration camp or shooting. A similar incident, including this time the shooting of a priest, is told in the minutes for March.

In Poland, too, the Political Leaders are co-operating in the appalling treatment of the local people. A letter from the Reich Security Headquarters in November 1942 to the directors of the SD Sections informs them of the iniquitous agreement between Himmler and Thierack by which a trial is to be denied to Poles, Eastern Nationals, Jews, and Gypsies (US-346). It is based on the impudent theory that they are inferior people living in the German Reich's territory. What is interesting in this argument is that there is to be no hesitation in informing the Gauleiter. What possible need could there be to inform the latter unless it was that his assistance and co-operation might be required?

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I pass to consider the evidence in connection with slave labor, which shows perhaps more clearly than the evidence we have in respect of any other particular crime, how deeply every branch of the Corps of Political Leaders was involved. Every witness that has been called by the Defense has denied all knowledge of or participation in the mistreatment of foreign laborers; but what is such evidence worth when you consider the documents which have been presented? The treatment of Polish agricultural workers, for whose care the Bauernfuehrer on the staffs of the Gau-, Kreis-, and Ortsgruppenleiter were particularly responsible, can be seen from the instructions issued to the Kreisbauernschaften in Karlsruhe in March 1941. They were instructions which were issued as a result of' negotiations between the State Peasant Association of Baden and the Higher SS and Police Leader in Stuttgart, and they were received with, I quote, "great satisfaction." The Polish laborer was no longer to have any right to complain. He was prohibited transport, entertainment, and religious worship; he was forbidden to change his employment; there were to be no time Emits to his working hours. I quote:

"Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to farm workers of Polish nationality.... The employer may not be held accountable in any such case by an official agency. Farm workers of Polish nationality should, if possible, be removed from the community of the home and can be quartered in stables, et cetera. No remorse whatever should restrict such action" (EC-68, USA-205).

We ask: can it really be possible that instructions of that nature were issued in Karlsruhe and nowhere else? Is it possible that while the Poles in Baden were being treated like animals, in the next-door Gau they were being accepted as members of the family? This is the evidence of the witness Mohr, called on behalf of the Bauernfuehrer before the Commission. I quote:

"In practically all cases, I think with very few exceptions, the foreign laborer was accepted in the farmer's family unit. He ate with the family and moved around in the circle of the farmer's family."

In the industrial areas the responsibility for the care of foreign workers was in the hands of the DAF (Labor Front) Political Leaders. Sauckel had decreed in March 1942:

"The food supply for the industrial workers in transit within the Reich is the duty of the DAF.... The care for the foreign workers employed in the Reich will be carried out... by the DAF in the case of non-farm laborers... All camps with foreign non-agrarian workers, regardless of who furnishes or maintains the camps, will be cared for by the DAP.... In

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the German Gaue, the Gauleiter will have the rights of inspection and control of the execution of these orders" (3044-PS, US-206).

It is unnecessary to remind you of the appalling conditions in which the workers of Essen barely existed (D-382, US-897). Once again I ask: is it possible that the Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, Zellen- and Blockleiter, and the Political Leaders of the DAF in Essen were unaware of these conditions, when the hutments in which the workers lived and the punishment cells in which they were confined and tortured are situated, as the photographs show, in the very grounds of the Krupp foundries and workshops, with the works railway running within a few feet of their doors, and with the Krupp cranes stretching almost above their roofs?

It is said that if indeed any such conditions did exist in Essen, they were exceptional and due only to the chaos caused by Allied bombing. But it is not so. Before the bombing of Essen had started, the office chief of Krupp's Locomotive Construction Works was complaining that

"the people came in the morning without bread and tools. During both breaks the prisoners of war crept up to the German workers and begged for bread, pitifully pointing out their hunger." (D-361, US-893).

He went to the kitchens to try and find them food:

"Since a few Russians had collapsed already, I telephoned Fraeulein Block and asked for an increase In the food as the special ration had ceased from the second day onwards. As my telephone conversations were unsuccessful, I again visited Fraeulein Block personally. Fraeulein Block refused in a very abrupt manner to give any further special ration."

Fraeulein Block did not let the matter rest there. She reported it to the DAF, who requested Krupp's office chief to go and see them. The DAF representative

"accused me, gesticulating in a very insulting manner, saying that I had taken the part of the Bolsheviks in too apparent a way. He referred to the law paragraphs of the Reich Government which spoke against it.... I then tried to make it clear with special emphasis that the Russian prisoners of war were assigned to us as workers and not as Bolsheviks. The people were starved and were not in a position to perform the heavy work in boiler-making which they were supposed to do."

My Lord, I have stated, and Your Lordship can see, the fun story of how the manager tried to get bread for his workers, and I ask Your Lordship to pass on to the top of Page 29 and just look at the last sentence of the quotation; the last is typical of all I have said. The last two sentences of that paragraph:

"Sick people are a liability to us and not a help to production. To this remark Herr Prior stated that if one was worth nothing then another was, that the Bolsheviks were soulless people, and if 100,000 of them died, another 100,000 would replace them" (D-361, USA-893).

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Nor can it be true that these conditions and this treatment were confined only to Essen. In March 1943 Goebbels found it necessary to hold a conference on the question of increasing production. The minutes of that conference report:

"The hitherto prevailing treatment of the Eastern Workers has led not only to diminished production but has also most disadvantageously influenced the political orientation of the people in conquered Eastern territories and has resulted in the well-known difficulties for our troops.... The treatment of foreigners which, until now, was markedly different for subjects of Western and Eastern countries, will be put on a uniform basis as much as possible, particularly the living standards of the Eastern Workers will be raised" (315-PS, GB-537).

We see from these minutes the attitude of the Party Chancellery-the Party Chancellery from which the Corps of Political Leaders received their orders. Its representative--I quote:

"pointed out the controversies which are already appearing and which would result for the German population if more freedom were granted for the foreigners" (315-PS).

But the need for increased war production was all-important and, notwithstanding the fears his representative had expressed at the meeting in March, on 5 May 1943 Bormann issued from the Party Chancellery a memorandum to all Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Verbandsfuehrer, Kreisleiter and Ortsgruppenleiter. They were instructed that the treatment of foreign laborers should become more humane, although at the same time it was

"demanded by members of the German race that they observe the difference between themselves and foreign nationals as a patriotic duty.... Injustices, insults, trickery, mistreatment, and so forth must be discontinued. Punishment by beating is forbidden" (205-PS).

Does not that document illustrate the utter lie that every one of these witnesses for the Defense has told? Does it not show more clearly than any other document the savage brutality with which the Political Leaders of the National Socialist Party were encouraging the people of Germany? Is it not almost beyond our comprehension that in these days of enlightenment in a great and civilized country orders should have been necessary from the Government to its Political Leaders to discontinue the mistreatment of men and women that they had deported into slavery? I pass on to the next paragraph.

Lastly, upon this aspect of the case, you will remember the instructions issued by the Gauamtsleiter from Strasbourg in the Gau Baden-Alsace. Foreign women workers induced to sexual

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intercourse by Germans were to be taken temporarily into protective custody and then sent to another place of work. "In other cases the foreign female worker will be sent to a concentration camp for women" (D-884A). Their children, if they were racially satisfactory and hereditarily healthy, were to be seized from them immediately after birth to "go to homes for foreign children to be looked after by, the National Socialist welfare organization."

The provisions of that order do little more than add a detail to the evidence we already have of the callous brutality which was prescribed by the Party for the treatment of foreign workers. But it is an important document because it shows how many branches of the Political Leaders were involved in this trafficking in slaves. Kreisleiter and the Kreisobmann of the German Labor Front were to report cases of pregnancy. In fact, as one might expect, it was the Ortsgruppenleiter that made the necessary enquiries. As well as to the DAF and NSV, the order was circulated to the Gau Propaganda Leiter, the Gau Press Leiter, the Gauamtsleiter for Racial Policy, for National Health, for Peasantry, for National Welfare, for Questions of Race, the Gau Political Leader of the National Socialist women's organization, and to similar staff officers on the Kreisleiters' staff. It is perhaps worth noting the action--or as it might more accurately be described, as a lack of action--which the National Socialist welfare organization took ...

THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Sir David, could you tell us what the word "Kreisobmann" means?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the representative of the Labor Front on the Kreisleiter Staff, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quote:

"As far as I can find out up to now"--reports the Kreisleiter of Villingen--"there have been about 21 pregnancies; of these four abortions are said to have been carried out, during which two of the women died. Of the remaining 17 births, five were still-born. Welfare by the NSV has not taken place anywhere" (D-884A).

You see again the Corps of Political Leaders working hand in hand with the Security Police and the SD and the Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German Race, another institution over which Himmler reigned supreme.

On this subject it would almost be enough to say: It is admitted by Dr. Servatius, that the Political Leaders knew that the majority of the workers were forced. It is admitted that they supervised the condition of that labor. Thereafter res ipsa loquitur.

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Now the Attorney General has already addressed you upon the vast scale on which the murder of sick and aged persons was carried out. That "action" commenced some time in the summer of 1940, but long before, in pursuance of their racial policy, the Nazi Government were taking steps to improve the German race. One document we have, dated January 1937, is illuminating upon the part the Political Leaders were expected to take. It is a letter from the Gauleiter of Southern Westfalen setting out Hess's decree of 14 January 1937--I add: the eugenics--given by him and appropriated for the Party record; no other words can describe it; here is the quotation:

"The question whether the person is an imbecile cannot be ascertained solely by carrying out an intelligence test, but requires detailed evaluation of the whole personality of the human being. This review shall not only take into consideration the knowledge and intellectual abilities of the supposed imbecile, but also his ethical, moral, and political attitude. A number of civil service doctors have, up to date, attached little importance to the reviewing of the personality as a whole. They have, up to now, hardly ever called for or used information regarding the political conduct of the supposed patient. Now that the Party, by virtue of the decree of the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, is consulted in the proceedings on matters of hereditary diseases against Party members, it is the task of all Gauleiter to ascertain that the law regarding hereditary health will in future be used in the sense in which it was designed.... He must investigate whether the person about to be sterilized has achieved very outstanding merits for the National Socialist Movement. If the Gauleiter reaches this conviction and feels that he must use his influence to prevent the sterilization, he will report to this department" (D-181, GB-528). It needs little imagination to see the abuses to which a decree such as this might be put, abuses which might well prove a convenient weapon for the Nazi Party. That letter from a Gauleiter went to all Gauamtsleiter, Gau Inspectors, and Kreisleiter in his Gau. From the fact that it is stated that the Department for National Health was to carry out preparations for cases to be put before the- Gauleiter, it is clear that the Amtsleiter for that Department of National Health were also closely involved.

My Lord, I have then collected the evidence on euthanasia, as the Tribunal was addressed by- the Attorney General and the evidence was being called to their attention by my learned friend Colonel Griffith-Jones.

May I summarize what the pages contain in the interest of time? My Lord, the remainder of Pages 32 and 33 show the

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Church opposition to euthanasia and the Party support, and the addition at the foot of Page 33, and from there Pages 33a and 34 deal with the question of whether euthanasia is a war crime, and show the evidence that it was deliberately used in order to organize the population for war and restrict the number of useless mouths in the country during the war.

You will remember the evidence of the extent to which mercy killing became general knowledge within a few months of its commencement.

By July 1940 Bishop Wurm was writing to Frick. In August he was writing to the Minister of Justice. In September, having attained no satisfaction, he was writing again both to Frick and to the Minister of Justice. Bishop Wurm was talking about events in Wuerttemberg. They were not confined to Wuerttemberg, to Stuttgart, and Naumburg. several hundred miles away the same thing was happening in Stettin, as the letters of the Stettin supervisor to the Ministry of Justice and to Lammers of 6 September 1940 (M-151, GB-529), and Lammers' letter to the Minister of Justice of 2 October 1940 (M-621, 715-PIS) indicate. By August of next year the same thing was happening around Wiesbaden, as we see from the Bishop of Limburg's letter (615-PS, USA-717) to Frick, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister for Church Affairs. It was happening in Franconia also, and we happen to have a file which shows the part the Political Leaders of Franconia were taking. Can one doubt, when one reads those letters, that the same thing must have been happening in every other area in Germany where these murderous commissions were at work? Bormann writes to the Gauleiter of Franconia and one of his Kreisleiter on 24 September 1940:

"It is natural that the representatives of Christian ideology speak against the Commission's measures: It must be equally natural that all Party offices should, as far as necessary, support the work of the Commission" (D-906).

How can Dr. Servatius say of this evidence that it shows the Political Leaders had no part in the carrying out of these measures and that they had no knowledge of them? That one sentence from Bormann's letter is alone sufficient to justify a declaration of criminality against the Corps of Political Leaders, the corps which provided the heads of the Party offices which were to support those commissions.

It was questioned during the cross-examination of the Defense witnesses for the Corps of Political Leaders as to whether this crime of euthanasia came within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal under Paragraph 6 of the Charter. Surely there can be no serious doubt that the murder of 270,000 persons is a crime against humanity. 270,000 corpses may pale into insignificance beside the slaughter in the occupied territories and the concentration camps; it is, nevertheless, a crime of almost unimaginable proportions. Neither can there be any doubt that it was a crime committed in connection with aggressive war. From Bishop Wurm's letter to Frick on 19 July 1940 (M-152, GB-530) we learn that these murders were taking place on the orders of the Reich Defense Council. Goering, Keitel, Frick, Raeder, Funk, Hess, and Ribbentrop were members of the Reich Defense Council. When the Bishop wrote again on 5 September 1940, he stated:

"If the leadership of the State is convinced that it is a question of an inevitable war measure, why does it not issue a decree with legal force?" (M-152, GE-530).

The purpose of these crimes is clear, as it was clear to the Catholic population of Absberg whom the Ortsgruppenleiter reported as asserting:

"The State must be in a bad way now or it could not happen that these poor people should simply be sent to their death solely in order that the means which until now have been used for the upkeep of these people may be made available for the prosecution of the war" (D-906).

I merely remind the Tribunal in the shortest terms of Bormann's remarks as to similarly worded letters to various families; of the Gaustabsamtsleiter of Nuremberg demanding notification in a more clever form when 30,000 had been

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dispatched and four times as many were waiting; of the doubts of the Kreisleiter of Erlangen; of the grave difficulties as to notification which faced the Kreisleiter of Ansbach. Neither the Kreisleiter nor any of the others appear to have felt any concern at the fact that they themselves were actively supporting an administration conducting mass-murder. If their oath of allegiance to their Fuehrer absolved them from qualms of conscience, can it also acquit them of moral or criminal guilt?

Then, My Lord, if I might resume, after these matters contained in the intervening pages, on Page 35, Line 6. My Lord, I just want to show how it is related to the lower groups of the Political Leaders which we are considering. My Lord, that is after dealing with the various reports and objections to the murder of 270,000 persons on this excuse of euthanasia.

Kreisleiter from all over Franconia were reporting in similar terms. The Kreisleiter from Lauf wrote to the Gaustabsamtsleiter:

"The doctor also informed me that it was well known that the Commission consisted of one SS doctor and several subordinate doctors, that the patients were not even examined and that they only pronounced the verdict in accordance with the medical history noted down."

Then Mrs. Marie Kehr lost two of her sisters in that way and wrote to ask the Reich Minister of the Interior under what decree they had been killed. The Defendant Frick's office passed the matter on to the Gaustabsamtsleiter in Nuremberg. I quote:

"I request that you investigate whether Kehr is politically reliable, especially whether she does not have Church connections. In case this should be so, for my part there are no objections if you give Kehr the desired information orally."

The Gaustabsamtsleiter passed that, letter on to the Kreisleiter. The Kreisleiter passed it on to the Ortsgruppenleiter, who reported--I quote: "That one can inform Mrs. Kehr. She is calm and circumspect."

In February 1941 the Ortsgruppenleiter of Absberg reported on the "wildest scenes imaginable" which had occurred in his village when the local sanatorium had been cleared of patients. You may think his attitude was typical of the great mass of Political Leaders. I quote:

"These incidents during this action, which is after all necessary, are to be condemned all the more because even Party members did not shrink from joining in the lamentations of the other weeping spectators.... It is even said that these poor victims--as they are regarded by the clergy and the religious inhabitants of Absberg--were taken to the Catholic Church for confession and communion shortly before their departure. It seems absolutely ridiculous to want to take

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away by an oral confession the possible sins of people some of whom completely lack all mental powers" (D-906).

My Lord, it has become manifest during these proceedings that other Political Leaders share the views of that Ortsgruppenleiter as to the absurdity of any oral confession.

It is unnecessary for me to remind you of the other reports, except to mention that in addition to the Gaustabsamtsleiter, the Kreisleiter, and the Ortsgruppenleiter, the Gauorganisationsleiter also becomes involved. The Leadership Corps was up to, its elbows in this bloody business.

The Corps of Political Leaders take their share of responsibility for the mistreatment of prisoners of war. In September 1941 Bormann circulated to Gauleiter and Kreisleiter the regulations of the OKW for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. From the receipt stamp of that document it appears that the Gauschulungsleiter was the official on the Gau staff chiefly concerned with these matters. You remember the directives contained in those regulations. They were based on the fact that

"Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany.... The Bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honorable opponent in accordance with the Geneva Convention.... The feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet prisoners of war must at all times be visible even in public.... The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of Bolshevist fanatics.... With Soviet prisoners of war it is necessary already for reasons of discipline that the use of arms should be severe" (1519-PS, GB-525).

You will remember the special Einsatz; groups set up by the SD to screen Soviet prisoners of war in the prisoner-of-war camps in order to discover and eliminate their leaders and intelligentsia. These orders, circulated to Gauleiter and Kreisleiter, explain the purpose and the method of work of those special purpose units and state:

"The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all elements among the prisoners of war which must be considered as the driving force of Bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern campaign demand special measures which can be carried out on their own responsibility free from bureaucratic and administrative influence" (1519-PS, GB-525).

No Gauleiter or Kreisleiter can tell this Court that he did not know that Russian prisoners of war were being murdered.

It was not only for their information that Political Leaders received these instructions. Bormann, writing to all Reichsleiter,

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Gauleiter, Verbaendefuehrer, and Kreisleiter in September 1944 emphasized:

"The co-operation of the Party In the commitment of prisoners of war is inevitable. Therefore the officers assigned to the Prisoner-of-War Organization have been instructed to co-operate most closely with the Hoheitstraeger; the commanders at the prisoner-of-war camps have to detail immediately liaison officers to the Kreisleiters. Thus the opportunity will be afforded the Hoheitstraeger to alleviate existing difficulties locally, to exercise influence on the behavior of the guard units, and better to assimilate the commitment of the prisoners of war to the political and economic demands."

It was to be the task of the Political Leaders to orientate both the guards and the plant owners "again and again politically and ideologically," and this was to be. done in co-operation with the DAF.

It is unnecessary to repeat the evidence of the treatment of Russian and other prisoners of war employed by Krupp. The Political Leaders were as callous of their prisoner-of-war slaves when they died as they had been while they lived. Gauleiter and Kreisleiter received from Bormann Frick's instructions for the burial of Soviet prisoners of war. Tarred paper was made to serve for coffins, no burial ceremonies or decorations of the graves were to be allowed, costs were to be kept as low as possible and the "transfer and burial is to be carried out unobtrusively; if a number of corpses have to be disposed of, the burial will be carried out in a communal grave" (D-163, USA-694).

What did the last rites of those whom they had worked to death matter to the Nazi Government and its Political Leaders? They mattered just as much or just as little as any recognized form of simple decency or honor.

As early as March 1940 Hess had circularized the Political Leaders with directives for behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or parachutists. You will remember the order, "Likewise enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or made harmless." In view of less ambiguous orders which were to follow and of the extraordinary precautions to maintain secrecy in respect of that order, can you now doubt what that somewhat ambiguous phrase was intended to convey? You remember that it was to be disseminated orally only to Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, Zellen and Blockleiter. Transmittal of the order by official orders, poster, press, or radio was prohibited, and amongst the other precautions it was declared to be a State secret document. You will remember also that in addition to all the Hoheitstraeger being informed, the order went to the Reich Organization Directorate, the Reich Propaganda Directorate, and the Reich Student Leadership office, which

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each had their own representative included in the Amtsleiter of the Gau, Kreis, and Ortsgruppen staffs, and that it went also to SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, would that be a good time to break off?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In August 1943 Himmler instructed the Police that it was not their task to interfere in clashes between Germans and terror fliers (R-110, USA-333). Gauleiter were to be informed verbally.

In May 1944 Goebbels was writing to the Voelkischer Beobachter that it was not bearable to use German Police to protect murderers. The next day Bormann directed all Gauleiter, VerbaendeFuehrer, Kreisleiter, and Ortsgruppenleiter that several instances had occurred in which aircraft crews who had bailed out or had made forced landings had been lynched on the spot by the incensed populace. I quote: "No police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the German civilians who participated in these incidents" (057-PS).

It was hardly necessary for us, in order to understand the purpose of that letter, to have captured a Gauleiter's order taking advantage of the invitation that Bormann had extended. In February 1945 the Gauleiter for Westfalen-South expressly directed his Kreisleiter to encourage the lynching of Allied airmen:

"Fighter bomber pilots"--he wrote--"who are shot down are on principle not to be protected against the indignation of the people. I expect from all police offices that they will refuse to lend their protection to these gangster types" (L-194).

You will have seen Gauleiter Hoffmann's evidence before your Commissioners upon this matter and you will pay such attention to it as you think it deserves.

Let me conclude this review of the evidence against the Corps of Political Leaders by reminding you of the evidence of two witnesses called in defense of the organization, Von Eberstein, whom

you yourselves heard give evidence for the SS, and Wahl, a Gauleiter, who testified before your Commissioners.

You know the evidence that all the Political Leaders have given as to concentration camps--that they had nothing to do with them, that they knew nothing of what was happening inside them.

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But what did the witness Eberstein tell you? I quote from his evidence:

"In the beginning of March 1945, the Gauleiter and Reich Defense Commissioner Giesler in Munich ordered me to come to him and demanded that I should influence the commandant of Dachau to the effect that when the American troops approached, the prisoners--there were 25,000 people there at the time--were to be shot. I refused this demand with indignation, and I pointed out that I could not give any orders to the commandant, whereupon Giesler said to me that he, as Reich Defense Commissioner, would see to it that the camp would be bombed by our own forces. I told him that I considered it impossible that any German Air Force commander would be willing to do this. Then Giesler said he would see to it that something would be put into the soup of the prisoners, that is, he threatened to poison them. On my own initiative I sent an inquiry to the Inspector of Concentration Camps by teletype and asked for a decision from Himmler as to what was to be done with the prisoners in case the American troops approached. Shortly thereafter the news came that the camps were to be surrendered to the enemy. I showed that to Giesler. He was quite indignant because I had frustrated his plans" (Record of 5 August 1946, Morning Session).

And lastly, the witness Wahl, Gauleiter of Schwaben, gave this evidence:

"Question: 'Witness, I was asking you about the conversation which you had with your wife on the question whether or not you should resign your position as Gauleiter. Isn't the implication to be drawn from that conversation this: that you were ashamed of what other Gauleiter were doing and that all around you you saw things going on which you disapproved and wanted to disassociate yourself from?'

"Answer: 'Yes.'

"Question: 'That is true, isn't it?'

"Answer: 'Yes, that is true.'"

And in answer to another question he said:

"I want to stress the point that it is not my task and not my wish here to justify all the Gaue. Among the Gauleiter there were maniacs and bloodthirsty fools as everywhere else."

I pass to the SA.

Before dealing with the evidence against this organization, I would say a word upon the question of voluntary membership.

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Counsel for the SA has argued that membership was not voluntary; it is said that great pressure was brought to bear upon the German people to make them join one or other of the Nazi Party organizations and that, in the case of certain sections of the SA, not only was pressure brought to bear but membership was enforced by decree. On the evidence to which I shall draw your attention you may well think that if, as in certain cases, undoubtedly pressure was exerted upon individuals to join the Party, and in some cases, perhaps, to join this particular organization, the consequences of refusal as they have been pictured by the Defense are very much exaggerated. It is submitted that even if you accept without qualification the evidence of some of those witnesses as to particular cases of compulsion, the evidence which you have as to the organization as a whole is perfectly clear: the membership was from the first until the last voluntary; never was there at any time compulsion recognizable in law as such, either physical or as a result of legal decrees.

Then, My Lord, I have set out, for the assistance of the Tribunal, the English law on compulsion. I do not intend to trouble the Tribunal with it for the moment. It takes the rest of Pages 4l and 42. If I might, My Lord, I should like to continue at the top of Page 43.

The English law upon what constitutes physical compulsion sufficient to excuse crime has been clearly established for many years and is stated in Halsbury's "Laws of England" (Hailsham Edition, volume 9, Pages 23-24, Paragraph 20) in these words:

"A person compelled by physical force to do an act which, if voluntarily done, would be a crime, is free from criminal responsibility, but the person compelling him is criminally liable.

"The use of threats inducing a person, from present fear of death, to join with rebels is, it seems, an excuse, so long as the person is under the influence of such fear.

"Subject to this exception, a person who commits a- crime when influenced by threats or 'moral force,' or by the confining of his person, or by violence not amounting to actual compulsion is not excused. Necessity, in the sense of compulsion arising from hunger or from imminent danger

to a person's own life or property, is no excuse for crime."

Let me shortly discuss the evidence upon this point. The General Service Regulations for the SA, published in 1933, laid it down that, I quote,

"He who cannot or will not subordinate himself is not suited to the SA and has to withdraw" (2820-PS, USA-427).

The Organization Book of 1940 states again, I quote:

"Service with the SA is and remains voluntary.... As in recruitment for the SA no advantages may be promised and no pressure whatever may be exercised, the SA man should have the possibility to withdraw."

The witness Juettner agreed with that statement as correct. He was asked: "Did it always remain a fundamental principle of the

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SA that membership should be voluntary?" and answered: "That was always the principle adhered to by the leadership." He was asked again: "If a man no longer agreed with the SA views, was he expected to withdraw?" and said: "Numerous men left the SA for a variety of reasons."

By no stretch of imagination can the evidence given in respect of the Reiterkorps be said to constitute compulsion, physical or by decree. It is true that the original riding organizations were arbitrarily amalgamated into the SA, but as the witness Walle, called on behalf of this branch of the SA, himself admitted:

"Membership in the SA was voluntary in 1933 and this did not change.... A man could resign from the Reiterkorps, but he had to give up his sport inasmuch as the riding installations were no longer at his disposal.

"The Riders' Association"--he said--"submitted to the process of co-ordination because it enabled them to continue their athletic activity."

You may think that it was during the years 1933 and 1934 that the activities of the SA were more obviously criminal to all the people of Germany than at any other time. How then can the loss of "sporting activities" constitute compulsion and afford an excuse for membership? Is the risk of the loss of a horse and stable to be regarded as legal justification for participation in murder?

It should be remembered also that both in the case of the Reiterkorps and the Stahlhelm, although those organizations may have been amalgamated with the SA by legal decree, there is no evidence before you that the decrees contained one word which might be construed as compulsion upon individual members to take up membership in the SA.

The Stahlhelm. is in much the same position as the Reiterkorps, except that the evidence that Juettner gave before the Commission is clearer still. Let me quote from the transcript of his evidence:

"Question: 'There was nothing, was there, to stop a member of the Stahlhelm from withdrawing from the SA when the two organizations were combined in 1933?'

"Answer: 'As far as I was concerned in my district no member of the Stahlhelm who did not desire to do so would have been compelled to join the SA.'

"Question: 'And that goes generally for the whole of Germany, does it not?'

"Answer: 'It is reported that there were instances in which members of the Stahlhelm agreed to transfer only because it was ordered.'

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"Question: 'But there is no instance where a man was forced to join or continue his membership?'

"Answer: 'No, Sir.'"

Almost pathetic evidence was given of the fate that awaited civil servants if they refused to join--refused to join not the SA, be it noted, but any Party organization. But the witness Boley, who himself gave this evidence, showed how exaggerated it was when he admitted to the Commissioner that in those offices in which he was, himself employed, only 18 percent of the civil servants had become members of the Party or of one of its organizations. And those offices were the Reich Finance Ministry and Reich Chancellery--the very heart of the Nazi Government.

The witness Freiherr von Waldenfels is another outstanding example of how a German who had the character to stand up for what he believed to be right could continue to do so without any dire results. Himself a civil servant and a leading member of the Stahlhelm in 1933, he resigned on its amalgamation with the SA, refused to join the SA, the Party, or any other Party organization, yet nevertheless continued to hold his position until the end of the war.

Evidence has been given by the Defense that university students were compelled by decree to become members of the SA. This contention has been supported by an order of the SA University Department in Munich, dated 16 April 1934, which is contained in the SA Defense Document Book.

Upon that document I make two submissions. First, the reference to "SA service" does not connote membership of the SA but a course of training under SA direction; secondly, the sentence in Paragraph 3, "All newly matriculated students are therefore bound to join the SA," is not in accordance with the policy of the SA Leadership and does not represent the practice in universities generally.

We have submitted to you another similar order issued by the SA University Department at Cologne 2 days before. When that order is read with the Munich order, it becomes apparent that this submission is well founded.

Paragraph 1 of both orders is identical. All students are to be, I quote, "regimented by the SA University Department in order ... to be physically and mentally trained in a uniform manner in the spirit of the National Socialist revolution" (D-971). In Paragraph 2 it is expressly stated that it is a matter of indifference whether they are members of the SA at all. Paragraph 3, while following the same form in both orders, differs essentially. In both cases the orders are said to be based upon the same decree of the Supreme SA Leadership of 27 March 1934. We have not seen that decree,

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but Paragraph 3 of the Cologne order makes it clear that membership of the SA was not intended to be compulsory as is suggested by the Munich order. It is evident also that the SA service with which both orders are concerned is something different and independent from membership in the organization. How can compulsory "SA service" mean compulsory SA membership when it is expressly stated that except during the 11 days from 25 April to 5 May there is a ban on the enrolment of new members? The next words in both orders mark the essential difference between the two. In Munich students "are therefore bound to join the SA," while in Cologne they are, I quote, "thereby offered the possibility of joining the SA." If the SA service, which was to be compulsory for all German students, connoted membership of the SA, there could be no question of "offering" them "the possibility" of joining. You may think that in Munich, the heart of National Socialism, the decree of the Supreme SA Leadership of 27 March was deliberately misinterpreted to suit the desire of a particularly fanatical Sturmfuehrer. On the face of the documents it is apparent that whatever was happening in Munich was not characteristic of every other university in Germany.

Juettner confirms the case for the Prosecution. He states: "I have already expressed that in some instances pressure was exercised by organizations outside the SA, for instance, in the case of students and in the case of Finance Schools."

But in answer to the question: "There was nothing which compelled a student to join the SA if he disapproved of what the SA stood for?" he said: "I share that opinion."

I add, the Tribunal will observe that on the points of which I quote in the evidence of Juettner, there is corroboration in writing of that evidence. The fact is as he explained: where organizations were amalgamated with the SA "the vast majority of men were proud of the SA and proud to serve in the SA." If further evidence were wanted of the voluntary nature of this organization, both in theory and in practice, it is to be found in the steps which were taken by the SA leadership itself to reduce its members after the large influx that had taken place in 1933 and 1934 by the incorporation of such organizations as the Stahlhelm and Reiterkorps, and by the large numbers of candidates that flocked to every Party organization after the Nazi seizure of power. From 4,500,000 in 1934, the membership of the SA had dropped to 1,500,000 at the outbreak of war in 1939. Juettner explained the causes of this reduction. It was due partly to the Kyffhaeuserbund, another old soldiers' organization, being excluded from the SA. But it was due also to the introduction of examinations for their members, failure to pass which resulted in dismissal, and to the fact that those who, I quote, "for reasons of their occupation were unable to do service and accordingly did

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not cheerfully continue to serve us in the SA," were also dismissed. Such a weeding out and reduction in numbers from 4 1/2 to 1 1/2 millions in 5 years is hardly compatible with the story of the whole of the German youth, the whole of the German civil service and of the population generally being compelled to become members of this organization. It is submitted that this is conclusive evidence of the voluntary nature of this organization.

How can it be maintained that all civil servants, whose total number the witness Boley gave as 3 million, a million Stahlhelm members, 100,000 students, 200,000 Reiterkorps members, and others besides, were all compelled to join the SA, when the total membership of that organization in 1939 was only 1,500,000?

It may well be that upon a small unwilling minority pressure was brought to bear; that the consequences of refusal would have been serious. But this issue is to be decided upon recognized and established principles of law. Even were it not so, could we feel sympathy for these people? Did they show sympathy for the thousands of their fellow-countrymen that were taken to the horrors of the concentration camps? Did they sympathize with the thousands of Jews that were slandered and persecuted unceasingly over the years?

You will remember, however, that when certain questions in connection with the organizations were argued before you in February, I stated on behalf of the Prosecution that we did not seek a declaration of criminality against certain sections of the SA. We excluded

(1) All wearers of the SA Party badge who were not strictly members of the SA.

(2) Members of the SA Wehrmannschaften who were not otherwise members of the SA. You may well think, having heard the evidence that you have of the crimes committed by the Wehrmannschaften in Poland and in the Eastern territories, that that branch of the SA ought not to be excluded. Nevertheless, we feel that many members of the units which were involved in those atrocities were also members of the SA proper, and We therefore respectfully submit that our original statement can properly stand.

(3) Members of the SA Reserve who at no time served in any other formation of the organization.

(4) The National Socialist League for Disabled Veterans.

It has been reiterated time and again that the Prosecution are anxious to obtain a declaration of criminality only against those who bear a major responsibility for the crimes that have been committed. In view of this and in view of the evidence that has been presented to you since February, we desire respectfully to recommend certain additional exclusions from among the general membership of the organization.

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First, the total strength of the SA in 1934 was given you by Juettner as 4 1/2 million. That figure included 1,500,000 members of the Kyffhaeuserbund. Shortly after the amalgamation of that organization with the SA in 1933 the two were again separated. We respectfully recommend the exclusion of all those members of the Kyffhaeuserbund who did not retain their membership of the SA after that separation.

Secondly, we believe that we are also justified in asking for the exclusion of certain sections of the Stahlhelm. So that you may understand the grounds for this recommendation, it may be of assistance if I briefly remind you of the structure and history of that organization. It was composed of:

(1) The Scharnhorst, which was the Stahlhelm youth organization for boys under 14, with a strength of about 500,000.

(2) The Wehrstahlhelm, which included the Jungstahlhelm (boys from 14-24 years of age) and the Stahlhelm sports formations (men from 24-35 years of age). The total strength of the Wehrstahlhelm was 500,000.

3) The Kernstahlhelm which consisted of men between 36-45 years of age. Its strength has been given as 450,000.

The total strength of the Stahlhelm was therefore approximately 1 1/2 million men and boys.

In 1933 the Stahlhelm. was placed under the control of the Nazi Party. The Scharnhorst was transferred to the Hitler Jugend, the Wehrstahlhelm to the SA proper, and the Kernstahlhelm to the SA Reserve. Since we have already excluded the SA Reserve, we are left to consider only that part of the Stahlhelm which was incorporated into the SA proper--500,000 members of the Wehrstahlhelm.

You have evidence both from witnesses and from documents contained in the Defense Document Book that many of these 500,000 Stahlhelm members were opposed to their transfer to the SA, and to the policies and aim of the SA and the Nazi Party. Many, including the witness Von Waldenfels, refused to join the SA. It is a possible hypothesis that many more, although opposed to the policies of the SA, were prepared to join in view of the assurance that was given to them that they would retain their independent character, identity, and leaders in the same way as did the Reiterkorps, and that they would never be called actively to associate themselves with the SA proper. On the other hand, there can be no doubt whatsoever that many wholeheartedly joined the SA, and participated to the fullest extent in its criminal activities. Juettner himself is an

example, and he declared that he was by no means alone. You will

remember his evidence:

"Numerous SA men came to me in the first few months who had formerly belonged to the Stahlhelm; like myself they felt

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regret that their fine old organization was no longer in existence. But together with me they hailed the fact that they were now permitted to participate in this large community of the SA."

Speaking of his own district he said: "Really, after 1935, the nucleus of the SA was my old Steel Helmet organization; therefore many Steel Helmet men remained in the SA."

To exclude the whole of the Stahlhelm would entail the exclusion of men like Juettner and many other Stahlhelm members who were to form the nucleus of the SA.

We believe that a just and practical distinction may be drawn between these two classes. In July and August of 1935 the assurance which had been held out to the Stahlhelm, that they would retain their independent status side by side with their membership of the SA was broken. The organization of the Stahlhelm was finally dissolved; their uniforms, their meetings, and all their previous activities were prohibited. From that time the Stahlhelm, members who remained in the SA were indistinguishable from the rest of that body. They had joined the SA in 1933, knowing, as one of their own witnesses has declared, the criminal nature of the policies and activities of the SA. Now in 1935 they could have had no illusion that by remaining members they would be expected to support that policy and participate in these activities. None who remained members after that date can absolve themselves from a major responsibility for the crimes committed by the SA and by the Nazi Government, of which the SA was one of the essential bulwarks. We therefore respectfully recommend for your consideration whether all those members of the Stahlhelm who resigned or were ejected from the SA prior to 31 December 1935 might also be excluded. We submit that. those who remained are rightly included in the criminal organization of the SA.

You will appreciate the effect of these exclusions upon the number of SA members involved in these proceedings. The exclusion of the 1,500,000 Kyffhaeuserbund and 500,000 Kernstahlhelm alone reduces Juettner's total to 2 1/2 million, and that takes no account of the other exclusions which the Prosecution have suggested.

Lastly, I would say a word about the Reiterkorps. I have already submitted that there is no legal basis for suggesting that their membership was involuntary. The Prosecution recognizes, however, that in so far as the Reiterkorps retained its separate organization of riding clubs, its own identity, and its own leaders, you may find that it is in a somewhat special position when you are considering the criminal responsibility of the SA. It is of course open to the Tribunal to give effect to that special position of the

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Reiterkorps if it so desires. You will remember that its membership totalled 200,000.

Upon one further point which has been raised by the Defense I ought, perhaps, to say a word. It has been urged that the weekly paper Der SA-Mann, upon which the Prosecution have drawn for a small part of their evidence against this organization, is inaccurate and does not truly represent either the policy or the activities of the SA. You have heard the evidence for and against this proposition. I need only remind you that the paper was published by the official Nazi publishing house, the Eher Company, which published also Mein Kampf, the Organization Books, the orders and decrees of the Nazi Government, and all other official Nazi publications.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, before you pass from the subject of numbers, does the figure which you gave of 2 1/2 million allow for replacements?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord; the same applies with regard to replacements. We submit that it would have to bear against that the very heavy number of deaths which had occurred during the years of the war. You have only got to figure a period of 5 years after the outbreak of the war. During that period, the 4 1/2 million were reduced to 1,500,000. After that, the replacements, we submit, would be offset by deaths during the war. Your Lordship will also appreciate that what we are trying to do is to take the original figure--Juettner's original figure of 4 1/2 million. We submit that that is reduced to 2 1/2 million. If you accede to our suggestion with regard to the Kyffhaeuserbund and the Kernstahlhelm alone, that would reduce it to 2 1/2 million. You then have to take into account our suggested exclusion of the Stahlhelm. members who left before the end of 1935, and then, of course, we leave the question of the Reiterkorps to the Tribunal; but after you have done that, after you have arrived at a figure which may be somewhere about 2 million, the fact is that that figure was reduced in the 5 years to 1,500,000 according to Juettner's evidence.

I was dealing with the SA-Mann and I continue: it carries under its title the description "The official organ of the Supreme SA Leadership." Its editor, writing to the Defendant Rosenberg, describes it without contradiction as the "combat publication and official organ of the Supreme SA Leadership," with a circulation of 750,000 (4009-PS, GB-614). Lutze himself recommends it in his annual training directive for 1939 as one of the official, I quote, "aids to the preparation and carrying out of training." I submit to you that in the face of that evidence the testimony of witnesses for the Defense upon this matter ought not to be accepted.

I invite you to consider the whole of the literature you have seen in connection with this organization. It is all the same all about

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war, about lawless violence, about racial hatred. There is not one word on the ordinary matters of decent living, of the interests and activities and the ways of life of ordinary, decent, civilized, peaceful citizens--the things which fill great portions of the newspapers and literature of decent, law-abiding, peaceful countries. Compare, the literature of the SA with that of any organization or society in any other country in Europe. The SA, the organization which prided itself upon its responsibility of educating and training the manhood of Germany, spoke only of militarism, of arrogance, of bullying and hatred. What need for this if their purpose was what they say? I turn to consider very briefly the evidence upon which we base our submission that this organization was criminal. The aims of the SA were the aims of the Nazi Party itself. Training in the SA is described in the Organization Book as--I quote:

"Education and training according to the doctrines and aims of the Fuehrer as they are set forth in Mein Kampf and in the Party Program for all, phases of our lives and our National Socialist ideology..." (2354-PS, USA-323).

Lutze, Chief of the SA, speaking to the Diplomatic Corps and foreign press in 1936 told them:

"When I state in the beginning that the obligations of the SA are those of the Party, and vice versa, I only mean that the SA considers the Party Program its own as well.... The SA cannot be independent of the National Socialist Movement but can only exist as a part of it. In the framework of the Party the SA are its protective troops, its fighting shock troops, to which belong the most active members of the Movement, politically speaking. The tasks of the SA are those of the Party, and vice versa. They are therefore of an internal political nature" (2471-PS, USA-413).

In the interests of time I do not propose to dwell upon the evidence of how this organization performed its role as "the protective troops" and "the fighting shock troops" of the Party. All this may well be said already to be a matter of historical fact. In the words of the Indictment, the SA was developed by the Nazi conspirators, before their accession to power, into a vast private army, and utilized for the purpose of creating disorder and terrorizing and eliminating opponents. It is said that the violent and criminal activity of its members, if indeed any such activity existed at all, was purely defensive--forced upon it in order to protect its members and their Party leaders from the violence of the Communist and other political parties. It is for you to judge the value of that evidence. In doing so, you will have it in mind that all the documentary evidence upon this question, which is being submitted to you in the Defense document book, is of Nazi origin and authorship. You may think

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that that description of the SA as a defensive organization is wholly inconsistent with the evidence you had from the witness Severing, from Gisevius, and in the affidavit you have had from the American Consul, Geist.

My Lord, I set out part of the evidence. Again I don't propose to read it to the Tribunal today. I remind you of what Severing told you about the rowdy battalions and arrogance, and I ask the Tribunal to look at the last word of the quotation, at the top of Page 52:

"The observation of the so-called armed organizations during the years of my office was one of my most important tasks. The toughest organization of all these turned out to be the SA. They were the rowdy battalion, and with the arrogance with which they sang their songs they forced themselves into the streets. They cleared the streets for themselves where there was no opposition for them.... Wherever the SA could exercise their terror unhindered they acted in such a manner. "Those were not ordinary little fights between political antagonists during election fights. That was organized terror."

The Stahlhelm witness, Gruss, confirmed the evidence that Severing gave. "I believe," he said, "that, on the whole, Severing describes it correctly."

It is my submission that the evidence of SA criminality during the years 1933 and 1934, from the coming into power of the Nazi Government until the Roehm purge, is well established and may be dealt with shortly. The same violence, the same disregard for the law and for the rights and privileges of all but themselves, continued. It is sufficient to remind you of what Gisevius said--and again, My Lord, I remind you that is the statement of Gisevius about the use of the SA auxiliary police, about private prisons, about arrests; and again, if I may quote the last sentence of that quotation:

"The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses, the SA confiscated property, the SA cross-examined people. The SA put people into jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the customs from the period of the liberal system. ...Woe to anyone who got into their clutches! From this time dates the bunker, that dreaded private prison, of which every SA storm troop had to have at least one. Taking away became the inalienable right of the SA....The efficiency of a Standartenfuehrer was measured by the number of arrests he bad made and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the effectiveness with which he 'educated' his prisoners....

"Brawls could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the fight went on; only the blows were now struck in the full enjoyment of power."

Gisevius went on to describe in more detail the illegal arrests of political opponents by members of the SA, the prisons they established and the treatment meted out to their victims. He said:

"It was the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later encouraged the sadistic murders in the concentration camps."

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Having heard Schaefer, first Commandant of Oranienburg, cross-examined, have you the slightest doubt that atrocities were committed by SA men in that camp? You have the evidence of the witness Joel that the SA established a concentration camp at Wuppertal on the initiative of the local SA commander. At Hohnstein and at Bredow also SA guards were torturing and murdering their prisoners (787-PS, USA-421). You will remember the letter written in June 1935 from the Ministry of Justice to Hitler himself:

"In the camp serious mistreatment of the prisoners has been going on at least since the summer of 1933. The prisoners were not only, as in the protective custody camp at Bredow near Stettin, beaten into a state of unconsciousness for no reason with whips and other tools, but were also tortured in other ways..." (787-PS, USA-421).

Comment is unnecessary, except to emphasize that sadism and illegal arrests of this kind were being practised and carried out by SA men throughout the Reich. I quote:

"Within 6 weeks of the Nazis' coming to power in January 1933 the German newspapers were quoting official sources for the statement that 18,000 Communists had been imprisoned, whilst 10,000 prisoners in the jails of Prussia included many Socialists and intellectuals" (D-911, GB-512).

Sollman, Social Democrat member of the Reichstag, was taken to the Brown House in Cologne to be "tortured, beaten and kicked for several hours" (3321-PS, USA-422). In Nuremberg a man called Pflaumer was beaten on the soles of his feet until he died (D-923, GB-615). In Munich the former editor of the newspaper The Lower Bavarian Peasant, Dr. Alois Schloegl, had his house wrecked and was himself ill-treated (D-906, GB-616). These are only a few of the incidents of this kind which the Prime Minister of Bavaria describes when he says, I quote: "Of their total number throughout Germany there can be no count" (D-930, GB-617).

This was no political revolution. This was no self-protection from Communist opposition. These men were the servants of the Government with the sure knowledge that all Government agencies--the press, the law, and the Police--were under orders to condone and to assist. They ran no risks; their victims had no court nor protection to which they could appeal. This was nothing but sheer sadism, criminal brutality, encouraged by the Party and the SA leadership. You have the evidence of Geist, the American Consul:

"I personally can verify that the Police had been instructed not to interfere.... These officers told me that they and all the other police officers had received definite instructions

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not to interfere with the SA, the SS, or the Hitler Youth" (1759-PS, USA-420).

Defendant Goering, speaking on 3 March 1933, described the role that the SA were to perform from then on. He declared that the Communists would be suppressed by the brown shirts. The Police would not be used as in a bourgeois democracy; I quote:

"I do not have to give justice; my aim is only to destroy and exterminate, nothing else.... The struggle to the death in which my fist will grasp your necks I shall lead with those down there--those are the brown shirts" (1856-PS, USA-437).

Let me deal in rather greater detail -with the activities of the SA during those years, after 1934. It has been suggested that following the Roehm purge the SA diminished both in numbers and in importance and that the criminal activities of its members ceased. That its numbers were reduced is unquestionable--I have indicated the evidence of the reasons why. That it waned in importance is also true to the extent that official favor was bestowed more and more upon the SS for reasons that are well known. Nevertheless, the SA, both in the eyes of its own leaders, its members, and of the Nazi Party authorities, remained politically and militarily an important and vital force.

By June 1934 the political opponents of the Nazi Party had been suppressed or incarcerated. Little wonder that we have less evidence of those incidents of "mastery of the streets" which filled the history of Germany during previous years. But the aims of the organization remained the same--fanatical support of the policy of the Nazi Government, the suppression of such opposition as remained, particularly the Churches and the Jews. And in addition intensive preparation for aggressive war.

Already the SA and the SS had been employed in the action to dissolve the trade unions. The Church and the Jews remained an ever present problem. I have already referred to the Nazi Party's policy of suppression of all Church influence, but I would remind you of the part the SA was playing in this fight during the years after 1934. You remember the incident in Freising church in February 1935, when the Kreisleiterin instructed all her Nazi women to accompany SA storm troopers to attend the service in Freising church. It was SA men who arranged for the bells to ring during the Cardinal's service. It was SA men who afterwards led Hans Hiedl out into a field at night and beat him unmercifully for his resentment at the interference with the service, and I set out Hans Hiedl's account of the story (1507-PS, GB-535).

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"The leader took a handkerchief from his pocket and tied it over my mouth. He then pressed me to the ground and held me while the two others started beating me. They gave me about 15 to 20 heavy blows from the seat down to the ankle of the left foot. The gag became loose and I screamed loudly. They then let go of me and helped me up. I was given strict instructions not to tell anybody about this incident if I wanted to keep my business. They then gave me a kick and told me 'Now run home in a trot, you black brother.'"

Are you impressed with the defense that that was only an isolated incident? When you consider the evidence of wholesale and widespread acts of violence which had characterized the SA in the eyes of all Germany and the world during the years of Nazi struggle, can you doubt that similar incidents were taking place throughout Germany in 1935 and afterwards, whenever the occasion presented itself? Does the very nature of an organization such as this change within a few months? If the nature and aims of the SA had changed, why should the SA-Mann have been publishing articles in 1937 and 1938 decrying the Church in such articles as:

"My dear Franciscans"

"The Black Balance--Political Catholicism"

"The Church wants to dictate to the State"

"Unmasked Political Catholicism"

Finally,

"Does the Vatican want War?" (3050-PS, USA-414).

If the violent manners of the SA had been converted during these years, why should the official organ of its Supreme Leadership have been recounting stories of its early battles? Their titles tell their tale:

"We subdue the Red Terror"

"Nightly street battles on the Czech border"

"The SA breaks the Red Terror"

"Bloody Sunday in Berlin" (3050-PS, USA-414)

and that description of "9 November 1923 in Nuremberg" when, during the height of the disturbances, someone shouted, "The Jewish place will be stormed! Out with the Jews!" (3050-PS, USA-414).

The part the SA played in the ever-increasing persecution of the Jews dissolves any doubt there may be of the continuing criminality of that organization during the years after 1934. Of the boycott in April 1933 Goebbels had written in his biography:

"1 April 1933: All Jewish stores are closed. At their entrances SA sentries are standing" (2409-PS, USA-262).

It was only an example of how tbroughout all Germany the SA provided the Nazi Government with a means of putting its

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policy into effect. The instructions issued by the Defendant Streicher and his committee had directed:

"The SA and the SS are instructed to warn the population by means of pickets from entering Jewish enterprises once the boycott has started" (3389-PS, USA-566).

You have the evidence of Kurt Schmitt, Minister of Economics and member of the Reich Cabinet until January 1935:

"... I have to say that the SA gained a more and more disastrous influence as a destructive element in economic and Jewish matters..." (4058-PS, USA-922).

You have the evidence of their own witness, Freiherr von Waldenfels, who was asked: "Did the SA take an active part in the persecution of the Jews after 1934?" and answered:

"As far as I have been told stories--yes. I myself saw the looting of shops in Munich, but whether that was done by order or whether it originated with individuals I cannot say."

He tried to minimize the significance of the SA after 1934, but his evidence was quite clear.

"Question: 'In their less important role did they continue the policy and practice that they had been carrying out before, the persecution of the Jews?'

"Answer: 'There is no doubt.'"

Goebbels, speaking to the SA in October 1935, reminded them that they were the "strongest arm of the Movement" and that the Nazi Government was an "anti-Jewish Government" (3211-PS, USA-419).

if the active persecution of the Jews was not a continuing role of the SA, after 1934, why should Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA, speaking to the Diplomatic Corps and deputies of the foreign press in January 1936, have had to explain away the title with which the foreign press so often branded the SA--"The bearer of a barbaric and uncivilized race struggle"? (2471-PS, USA-413). Why should all these articles have been appearing in the SA-Mann almost monthly during-the years 1935-1939 in wording so similar to that favoured by Der Stuermer? The titles are sufficient to indicate their nature. I only draw attention to three: "Murder, the Jewish Slogan"; "Jewish World Revolution in the U.S.A."; "Gravediggers of World-Culture" (3050-PS, USA-414).

And if the members of the SA were not in fact continuously and actively persecuting the Jews after 1934, how is it possible to account for the part they played in the demonstrations of November 1938? You will remember the instructions received by

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the SA 50th Brigade at Darmstadt in the early morning of 10 November:

"On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer all the Jewish synagogues within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire immediately.... The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes" (1721-PS, USA-425).

You will remember also the reports of the different SA Fuehrer to the SA Group Headquarters of the Electoral Palatinate--in the area of the 50th Brigade, 35 synagogues blown up, destroyed by fire, or wrecked; in Mannheim, 21 synagogues, churches, or meeting houses; in the area of Standarte 174 of 151st Brigade, all the synagogues destroyed and Jews taken into protective custody; in the area of Standarte 250, 11 synagogues destroyed, all shop windows of Jewish stores broken, the Rabbi and several prominent Jews taken into protective custody by the Gestapo "for their own safety," the "infamous Rabbi Neuburger," who was known because of his foreign connections, taken into protective custody "at the instigation of the SA," together with all male Jews from various villages; in the area of Standarte 17, two synagogues completely burnt down and several Jewish stores demolished; and the report from the 51st Brigade--"Completion of the matter of the synagogues. Everything has been carried out up to Roehlsheim."

Then, My Lord, I give some further details and I ask Your Lordship to leave the next paragraph and go on to the last paragraph on that page, where I say:

Those events in the Mannheim district cannot have been, as the Defense would have you believe, an exception to the policy of the SA Leadership and to the general behavior of SA members in the rest of Germany. Altogether 267 synagogues were destroyed that night. We can properly ask: Why should the 50th, 51st, and 151st Brigades alone have received instructions to destroy all synagogues? Why should Juettner himself have issued to, all SA units the orders from Hess that all offices of the Party and its branches which had safeguarded valuable property were to hand it over to the nearest office of the Gestapo?

We ask you to say that that evidence is in itself conclusive. Nevertheless you have in addition the report of the proceedings of the Supreme Party Court in connection with the murders of Jews which took place during those demonstrations. Fifteen SA men committed murder. They did so all over Germany: in East Prussia, in Dessau, in Hanover, in Bremen, in Saxony, and in Munich. Were they, too, all isolated incidents?

Goering's biographer wrote of the SA in 1937:

"The present reorganization of the Security Police is hardly noticed by the public. Their ranks are strengthened by the SA, the most reliable instrument of the Movement" (3252-PS, USA-424).

Hardly could any organization have received a more damning testimony. I pass to the preparation for war and wartime activities

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Immediately after the Nazi Party came to power the SA became the embryo army with which the Nazis commenced their preparation for aggressive war. Geist, the American Consul, tells you: "Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 hordes of storm troopers and SA were much in evidence practising military exercises. They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently encountered, the storm troopers deployed in fields and forests engaged in military technical exercises. This was all part of a general plan to prepare Germany's manpower for war" (1759-PS, USA-240).

Geist's assumption is confirmed by Lutze himself, writing in 1939: "But already in 1920, at the founding of the SA, the Fuehrer established the extensive mission of this SA.... The SA shall be the bearer of the military thought of a free people. In the same sense the Fuehrer said in his book Mein Kampf: 'Give the German nation 6 million perfectly trained bodies in sport, all fanatically inspired with the love of the Fatherland and trained to the highest intensive spirit, and a National Socialist State will, if necessary, have created an army out of them in less than two years.'

"The men never forget the mission of the Fuehrer to require the military training of the German man and to reconstruct the military spirit in the German people" (3215-PS, USA-426). What use is it for SA witnesses to come now and tell this Tribunal that "The SA did not have any military character and did not desire to have it.... The SA always preserved the nonmilitary character of its training program."

There is abundant other evidence of the military character and purpose of the SA and of its intensive training and preparation for war.

Dr. Ernst Bayer, writing on the orders of the Supreme SA Headquarters in 1938, yet again describes the aims of the SA: "The SA was commissioned to obtain an increase and preservation of a warlike power and a warlike spirit in the German people" (2168-PS, USA-411).

As early as May 1933, Von Reichenau. suggested that the Supreme Command of the SA should be represented on the Reich Defense Council, and I add that there was a pencil note showing that that has already been done (2822-PS, GB-205).

A regular officer was appointed to the SA to assist them in "military" training. "For the purpose of camouflage... he was to wear SA uniform" (2823-PS, USA-429). We know the form which the training took from 1933 until 1939 from the training directives and other documents--some issued by Lutze himself--shooting, grenade throwing, judging distance, map-reading, and marching

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(2820-PS, USA-427; 1849-PS and GB-610; 2401-PS, USA-430; D-918, GB-594). We know also that as early as July 1933 the SA had formed specialized units such as signals and motorized companies and separate air wings. The SA Command was anxiously stressing the need for secrecy in the case of any publications, I quote, "which might give other countries an opening to construe German infringement of the terms of the Versailles Treaty" (D-44, USA-428).

The publication of pictures "enabling other countries to prove the alleged formation of technical troop units" was forbidden. It is hardly necessary again to quote Dr. Ernst Bayer to see the purpose of these technical units, but I quote him:

"There originates in these technical units of the SA a trained crew whose capabilities and knowledge are not the last things of extraordinary value in the service for defense of the country" (2168-PS, USA-411).

Similarly he wrote of the Reiter Corps:

"...At present the SA each year is able to furnish many thousands of young trained cavalrymen to our Wehrmacht" (2168-PS, USA-411).

Can we doubt that every member of the SA knew to what end all this was leading when the Chief of Staff himself was saying publicly that the training principle of the SA was "always the spiritual, moral, and physical culture of militarization of the whole German nation"? (3050-PS, USA-414).

In March 1934 permanent liaison had been established between the SA and the Reich Defense Ministry in connection with all "A" tasks. Juettner has explained what these "A" tasks were -- "training and border protection." Did border protection mean preparations for the military seizure of the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia?

In that same month of 1934, the SA were in fact forming in the Rhineland an armed staff with a heavy machine gun company (D-951, GB-607).

Early in 1934 the SA were also making plans--I quote:

"...to have the Austrian formations in Bavaria march into Austria around 8 or 9 February. Then a military dictatorship would be proclaimed" (4013-PS, GB-608).

The account of the part the SA played in the abortive Dollfuss Putsch is before you. When the time eventually came for the Anschluss, SA units were among the first to enter Austria (3050-PS, USA-414).

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David--

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship--

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I continue with the military activities of the SA, with the last sentence on Page 62.

In Czechoslovakia the SA provided the chief support for the Sudeten Free Corps. In October 1938, a few weeks after the Munich crisis, the OKW liaison officer with the Free Corps reported:

"Supplies had been organized by the SA, ...arms supplied by the Austrian SA. With magnificent camaraderie and unselfishness, the SA Leadership had looked after the Free Corps materially. Equipping and feeding remained in the care of the NSDAP and the SA."

My Lord, I add, to remind the Tribunal that in the appendix to that document there will be found a list of the prisoners, the booty taken by the Free Corps, and the casualties inflicted by them in what was a time of peace. This support to the Free Corps was certainly included in "border control," as Juettner himself admitted.

The crimes of the SA did not end with the outbreak of war. Again I quote from the witness Juettner:

"At the beginning of the war with Poland the SA Group Sudeten carried out transports of prisoners of war into the camp. Other SA groups in the East may have been used for similar purposes. Later on the SA Leadership and the SA as an organization had nothing to do with this question."

When you consider the evidence you have heard of the appalling conditions in which these prisoners from the East were transported into their camps, are you satisfied that that task of guarding transports was as innocent as it appears?

Juettner has also left us a report, dated June 1941, describing the activity of the SA in the war. In the communication zones its members gave assistance to the Political Leaders in their tasks of education and orientation. 21 groups of SA men were being used for guarding prisoners. The organization of the SA groups in Danzig, Posen, Silesia, and the Baltic provinces is described in these words:

"In these regions also, as before in the fight for power, the SA was the assault unit of the Party.... In these regions also SA service, practically speaking, is directed towards strengthening the defensive forces. It was therefore necessary to overcome the inferiority complexes of the racial Germans, the result of Polish suppression, and to bring their appearance and bearing into keeping with SA standards" (4911-PS, GB-596).

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How sinister these innocent words become in view of all the evidence of what was, taking place in these eastern and Baltic provinces.

The administration of the ghetto of Vilna was in the hands of the SA and its inmates were guarded by SA guards. Some of these Jews were made to live enchained in deep pits where the SA

"...fastened chains round both ankles and round the waist; they weighed 2 kilos each and we could only take small steps when wearing them. We wore them permanently for 6 months. The SA said that if any man removed the chains he would be hanged" (D-964, GB-597).

Their work consisted of digging up mass graves:

"We dug up altogether 80,000 bodies .... Amongst those I dug up I found my own brother" (D-964, GB-597).

At Vilna, too, SA guards were forcing the Jews to extract the gold from, the teeth of their dead brothers with prongs, washing it in benzine and packing it into, 8 kilogram boxes which the SA officer in charge personally took away.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I believe that the statements which were just made refer to Affidavit D-964, the submission of which by the Prosecution was rejected by the Court. It is Affidavit GB-597. The whole affidavit is reproduced in print here on Page 64, and the contents of the statements just made have been taken from this affidavit, the submission of which is not approved.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I respectfully disagree with Dr. Boehm I have the affidavit in front of me, D-964, which has the exhibit number GB-597. Paragraph 7 reads:

"Our work consisted in digging up mass graves, removing the bodies and burning them."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But, Sir David, what Dr. Boehm was saying is that we rejected the affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, not this affidavit. I distinctly remember reading it. It has an exhibit number.

I selected one affidavit dealing with each kind, and this one of Szloma Gol was the affidavit I selected with regard to Vilna.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Boehm, what ground do you have for saying that it was rejected? If it was rejected, you must have some reasons for thinking so? Where is the transcript? Do you have the transcript with you?

HERR BOEHM: I am of the opinion that this affidavit was among those affidavits the submission of which the Court rejected. At the moment I cannot look into this, but I shall be glad to do so after the

session, in order to make sure that this is correct. I believe that

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this affidavit belonged to the affidavits which were rejected on account of the conclusion of the submission of evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: This was not one of the 11 affidavits which were rejected?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord. Your Lordship will, remember that I had about a half dozen Jewish witnesses from the Baltic provinces, and the Tribunal said that I could call three, and that they were to be available for cross-examination by Dr. Boehm

The deponent of this affidavit, Szloma Gol, was one of the three that I selected, and I put in this affidavit, which received the Exhibit Number GB-597.

My Lord, that is the recollection of myself, of Colonel Griffith-Jones and of Major Barrington, who were helping me at the time. And the fact that it has an exhibit number is prima facie evidence that the Tribunal accepted it.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better go on. If Dr. Boehm can produce evidence that it was rejected, it will be stricken from your speech and will be disregarded.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, My Lord.

The ghetto of Schaulen; south of Riga, was in charge of the SA. 700 to 800 men were there, recognizable by their brown uniforms and swastika armlets.

"In August 1941 the SA surrounded the whole ghetto and numbers of them went into the houses and took out women, children, and old men and put them into lorries and drove them away. I saw all this myself. It was done exclusively by SA. I saw them take children by the hair and throw them into the lorries. I did not see what happened to them but a Lithuanian told me afterwards that they had been driven 20 kms. away and shot. He said he had seen the SA make them undress and shoot them with automatic pistols" (D-969, GB-600).

The SA guarded the ghetto of Kaunas where 10,500 Jews were shot in the dreadful "action" of 28 October 1941. So also did they guard the labor camps of Sakrau, Mechtal, Markstedt, Klettendorf, Langenbielau, Faulbrueck, Reichenbach, and Annaberg in Upper Silesia, where Poles, Frenchmen, Belgians, Dutch, and Greeks slaved a