THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Thursday, tomorrow afternoon, in open session, but will sit in closed session. That is to say, we will sit tomorrow, Thursday, from 10 till 1 in open session, and we will sit in the afternoon in closed session.

On Saturday morning, the Tribunal will sit in open session from 10 till 1.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am aware that yesterday when I submitted the Document USSR-494, the necessary copies of this document were not submitted to the Tribunal. I am very sorry about this, and I would ask you to accept the necessary copies now which I am going to submit.

[The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand.]

Let us go back, Defendant, to your warning issued in August 1939. If I understood you correctly, you said here before the Tribunal that this warning was issued in connection with the military situation of the time; is that correct?

VON NEURATH: With reference to the military situation nothing had happened at that time; absolutely no political tension had become noticeable in the meantime; therefore, it was not directly in connection with the military situation. There was certainly nothing wrong yet at that time.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is regardless of the military situation, all right. Do you acknowledge that by this order of yours, or by this warning, you had introduced a system of hostages? Do you admit that?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am going to repeat the question. I am asking you, do you acknowledge that by means of this warning of August 1939-I am submitting this document as evidence under Document Number USSR-490-that by this order you were setting up a system of hostages? Do you admit that?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand.

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MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was it correctly translated to you just now?

VON NEURATH: Yes; the translation did not come through on the last question, or rather the last sentence. I did not understand the last sentence.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, I will put it to you that you know the document well.

VON NEURATH: Yes; but I did not understand the last sentence of your question.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall try to say it in such a way that you will understand it now. In this order of yours, in the penultimate paragraph, it is stated, '`The responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be borne not only by the individual perpetrators, but by the entire Czechoslovak population." This means that not only guilty persons have to be punished, but there were punishments set up for innocent people too. With this order you inaugurated the mass terrorism against the Czech population.

VON NEURATH: Not at all. It only meant that the moral responsibility for any possible acts was to be laid to the account of the Czech people.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, in Lidice, was this not applied in practice? Was it only a question of the moral responsibility there?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In this order you state the following: "Those who do not take these necessities into account will be considered enemies of the Reich." To the enemies of the Reich you applied only the principles of moral responsibility and nothing else?

VON NEURATH: Yes, if someone did not obey orders, then naturally he was punished.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is exactly what I am trying to determine and that is why I put this question to you, that just by this order of August 1939 you started the general terrorism of a massacre and punishment of innocent people.

VON NEURATH: Well, I do not know how you can draw this conclusion from this warning.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We are going now to the deductions which we can make out of this. In the report of the Czechoslovak Government, submitted as evidence, Document USSR-60, which is a report on the final result of the investigation of the crimes committed by you and your collaborators, all this has been stated.

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And you just flatly deny all this documentary evidence. I am not going to argue with you regarding this document, but I am going to read into the record some of the testimony by the witnesses; and I would like you to reply whether you corroborate this evidence or whether you deny it. I am going to read into the record an excerpt from the testimony of the former Minister of Finance, Josef Kalfus, of 8 November 1945.

The Tribunal will find these excerpts on Page 12 of the English text, Document USSR-60.

Kalfus stated:

"The economic system introduced by Neurath and after him by the later German regime, was nothing else than systematic, organized robbery. As to the occupation of decisive positions in the Czech industry and finance, it should be pointed out that, together with Neurath, a vast economic machinery was installed, which immediately occupied the chief positions in industry. The Skoda Works, Brno Armament Works, steel works at Vitkovice, important banks- Bohemian Discount Bank, Lander Bank, and Bohemian Union Bank-were occupied as well."

Do you corroborate this evidence?

VON NEURATH: I talked about this matter in great detail yesterday, and I refer you to my statement I made yesterday. I have nothing to add.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thus, you do not corroborate this evidence?

VON NEURATH: Not in the least.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The former, President of Bohemia, Richard Bienert, during the interrogation of 8 November 1945, stated-Mr. President, this excerpt is on Page 13 of the English text of the Document USSR-60:

"When we got to know him more closely, we noticed that he, Neurath, was ruthless toward the Czechs. As the Landesprasident of Bohemia I knew that it was Neurath who subjected the political administration in Bohemia and Moravia to German control, both the state administration and the local government as well. I remember also that Neurath caused the abolition of the local school counsellors, and the appointment of German school inspectors in their place. Neurath ordered the dissolution of the regional representative bodies; he caused Czech workers to be sent to the Reich from April 1939 onward in order to work for the war machine of the Reich. He ordered the closing down of the Czech universities and of many Czech secondary and elementary-schools.

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"He abolished the Czech sport clubs and associations, such as Sokol and Orel, and ordered the confiscation of all the property of these gymnastic organizations; he abolished...the Czech recreation homes and sanatoria for young workmen and students, and ordered the confiscation of their property. The Gestapo carried out the arrests, but on the order of the Reich Protector. . . I myself was arrested on 1 September 1939, as well."

Will you still deny this testimony?

VON NEURATH: No, no. About all the matters which are listed here, I spoke yesterday in great detail. I do not intend to repeat it all over again now. Moreover, it- seems strange to me that Mr. Bienert of all people, who knew perfectly well what I had ordered and what my relations were to the Gestapo and so forth, that Mr. Bienert of all people should say things like that.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. Let us look at some other testimony. The former Prime Minister of the so-called Protectorate, Dr. Krejci, during the interrogations on 8 November 1945, stated . . .

Mr. President, this excerpt can be found on Page 17 of the English text of the Document USSR-60. Krejci testified:

"I know that the gymnastic associations were disbanded and their property confiscated at the order of the Reich Protector, and their funds and equipment handed over to be used by German associations such as SS, SA, Hitler Youth, and so on. On 1 September 1939, when Poland was attacked by the German Army, arrests took place on a large scale, especially arrests of army officers, intellectuals, and important political personalities. The arrests were made by the Gestapo, but it could not be done without the approval of the Reich Protector."

I am reading into the record one more excerpt from the next page of the testimony:

"As far as the Jewish problem was concerned, the Government of the Protectorate was forced by the Reich Protector into a campaign against the Jews, and when this pressure had not the desired result, the Germans-or the Reich Protector's office-started persecuting the Jews according to the German laws. The result was that tens of thousands of Jews were persecuted and lost their lives and property."

Are you going to deny this testimony, too?

VOW NEURATH: With reference to the order which you mentioned at the beginning, concerning the sport clubs, I have to tell you that that was a police measure which I had not ordered; and

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I go on to repeat, as I said yesterday, that the arrests at the beginning of the war were carried out by the Gestapo, by direct order from Berlin, without my even having heard about the matter. I did not learn about it until afterward. Finally, with reference to the Jewish problem which is mentioned in the end, the statement which is contained in the Indictment, I think, namely, that I had attempted to get the Government of Czechoslovakia to introduce anti-Jewish laws, is an incorrect statement. I, or rather my State Secretary, talked to Mr. Elias, as far as I know. I myself have never talked to him. I talked to Mr. Hacha only afterward on a later occasion, when there was an attempt to introduce racial laws with reference to the Czechs; Mr. Hacha objected to this and I told him he did not have to do this, as this was my responsibility.

The introduction of the anti-Jewish laws was carried out by a decree of mine, to be sure, because as early as the beginning of April 1939, I had received orders to introduce the anti-Jewish legislation in the Protectorate which was not incorporated in the Reich. I delayed this step until July by means of all sorts of inquiries in Berlin, so as to give time to the Jews to prepare themselves in some way or other. These are the actual facts.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Tell me, do you know Dr. Havelka?

VON NEURATH: I know Herr Havelka, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: He knew exactly about your conversation with Hacha?

VON NEURATH: Well, how much he knew about that, I do not know. Herr Havelka came to see me once or twice. He was Transport Minister, I think.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is quite correct. He was the Minister of Transport, but before that, he was the head of the chancellery of Hacha's office.

Havelka, during his interrogation on 9 November last year, gave the following testimony, which can be found on Pages 18 and 19 of the English text of Exhibit USSR-60-I am quoting an excerpt: "He"-Neurath-"was not interested in the Czech nation and interventions of Cabinet members and Dr. Hacha pressing Czech demands were on the whole without any result.

"There were the following actions in particular:

"Arrests of Czechoslovak officers, intelligentsia, members of the Czechoslovak Legion of the first World War, and politicians. At the time of the attack on Poland by the German Army about six to eight thousand persons were arrested. They were hostages. The Germans themselves called them 'held in protective custody.' The majority of those hostages

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were never interrogated, and all steps taken at the office of the Reich Protector in favor of these unfortunate men remained without any result. "Neurath, as the only representative of the Reich Government in the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, was responsible for the execution of nine students on 17 November 1939. The execution was carried out soon after..."

THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, would it not be better and perhaps fairer to the defendant to ask him one question at a time? You are reading long passages of these documents which contain many questions. Perhaps you could take these two paragraphs you read now about the arrest of officers and ask him whether he says those are true or untrue, and then go on to the other paragraphs you want. It is very difficult for him to answer a great number of questions at one time.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, he has these documents before him and he is acquainted with the testimonies in question, but I will take into consideration what you have just told me. I will speak about the shooting of the students separately.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you corroborate this part of the evidence which I have just read into the record regarding the hostages?

VON NEURATH: About the arrest of the members of the socalled Vlayka, at the beginning of September 1939, I have spoken earlier, and I spoke in detail about that yesterday.

I said that these arrests-I am repeating it once more-were carried out by the Gestapo without my knowledge. Herr Havelka's statement, that no steps had been taken in the interest of these people, is untrue. He ought to know that I continuously fought for these people and that a large number of them were released through my efforts.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, let us go over to another question. Here, before this Tribunal, a certain document has already been introduced several times under Document Number USSR-223. This is the diary of Frank.

Mr. President, I am not referring to Karl Hermann Frank, who was sentenced to die for his crimes, but it is the Defendant Frank that I am speaking about. This excerpt has already been quoted here, but I should like to put a question to the defendant about it. I shall read it into the record. During an interview with a correspondent of the Volkischer Beobachter in 1942, the Defendant Frank stated as follows:

"In Prague, for instance, some red placards were put out saying that seven Czechs were being shot that day. Then I told

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myself if I had to issue an order for such placards to be put up regarding every seven Poles who were shot, then there would not be enough timber in Poland to manufacture enough paper for such placards."

Please tell me if it is true that such red placards were put up in Prague?

VON NEURATH: I mentioned that yesterday. I have already said yesterday that this was the poster where my signature was misused, and that I had not seen it in advance. That is that red poster.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, if you have not seen these posters, will you please look at them. We are going to show it to you right now.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I know it very well.

THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, he did not say he had not seen it. He said it was put up without his knowledge.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am going to come back to this, but I should like to establish that these were the red posters which were mentioned by Frank in his diary, and I should like to submit this poster under Document Number USSR-489.

I should like to read it into the record; it is very short and it will not take much time. The text is as follows:

"In spite of repeated serious warnings, a number of Czech intellectuals, in collaboration with émigré circles abroad, are trying to disturb peace and order in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia by committing major or minor acts of resistance. In this connection it was possible to prove that the ringleaders of these resistance acts are especially to be found in the Czech universities. Since on 28 October and 15 November these elements gave way to acts of physical violence against individual Germans, the Czech universities have been closed for the duration of 3 years, nine of the perpetrators have been shot, and a considerable number of the participants have been arrested.

"Signed, The Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Freiherr van Neurath, Prague, 17 November 1939."

You state here that you never signed this warning? Have I understood you rightly?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. I have already explained yesterday or the day before how this came about, namely, in my absence.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, you should not repeat what you have already stated.

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I am going to read into the record a certain statement by Karl Hermann Frank of 26 November 1945, connected with the subject It can be found on Pages 46 and 47 of the Russian text. The English text will be submitted. Karl Hermann Frank, giving evidence regarding this poster, the text of which I have just read into the record, stated:

"This document was dated 17 November 1939 and was signed by Von Neurath who did not object either to the shooting of the nine students..."

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to something connected with this document. The document is neither dated nor is it signed, at least not the copy I have. It does not make it at all clear from whom the document originates, and I should like to take this opportunity to protest against the reading of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, is there not a certificate about the document?

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Not in my copy.

THE PRESIDENT: Well...

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, will you permit me to explain this misunderstanding. Dr. Von Ludinghausen has the full text of the Document USSR-60. The English text was also submitted to the Tribunal. This document was quoted yesterday by Dr. Ludinghausen. There is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this document signed by the plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Government, and there is the date, too.

Now, just to facilitate the proceedings, we have submitted another copy of Frank's testimony to Dr. Ludinghausen, and it would be very easy to determine that there is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this statement which is dated 17 November. ..

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to say the following about this point: When I received this long indictment from Colonel Ecer of the Czech Delegation, the document did not have any additions or appendices, except texts of laws. I therefore endeavored to obtain these additions because reference had been made to them. I then received only one annex to an appendix, or supplement "Number 2"; the others I received in the same condition as the one which I have here.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, will you wait a minute? Will you kindly tell us what document it is you are referring to?

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: It is USSR-60.

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THE PRESIDENT: USSR-60-well, that is the Czech report, is it not? ~

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: That is the Czech report, which is about this thick [indicating] in German; that is the one in question. Annexes have also been issued to this, and these annexes, I repeat, were not made available to me; that is, I made a personal effort to get them, but I received only one which is not identical with this document and which I received much later and in the same condition as that which I hold in my hand now, that is to say, without a heading, without a signature, and without a date, and most certainly without any certificate as to when, where, and by whom this supposed statement of Frank's was taken down.

THE PRESIDENT: Let us hear what General Raginsky has got to say about it.

As I understand General Raginsky, he says there is a certificate identifying that document and what is being supplied to you is merely a copy, which may not have the date and may not have the certificate on it, but which is the same as the document which is certified.

Is that what you said, General Raginsky?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you now show Dr. Von Ludinghausen the certificate and the document which is certified?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This certificate can be found on Page 44 of the Russian text in the appendix to Document USSR-60 and it is signed for General Ecer by Colonel of the General Staff Corps, Novack. This certificate was submitted, in due course, by us to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to take up the time of the Tribunal about this particular document? It seems to me we are wasting a lot of time.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: After all, it is important. Otherwise I cannot find out whether it is genuine. That is certainly my right. ~

THE PRESIDENT: I was asking General Raginsky whether he wanted to persist in the use of the document. Is it worth while? I do not know what the document is or what it says.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I consider that is not necessary, because this document has already been submitted to the Tribunal a few months ago and accepted by the Tribunal as evidence. I really do not understand the statements by Dr. Von Ludinghausen.

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THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not show Dr. Von Ludinghausen that there is a certificate which applies to the document which you put in his hand? ~

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, certainly, Mr. President. I am holding in my hand the Russian text of the certificate. I am quoting the Russian text and I can present it to Dr. Von Ludinghausen so that he can be convinced. The original document has been submitted to the Tribunal and is in the possession of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there not a German translation of the certificate and does not the certificate identify the document? Is there a German translation of the certificate?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Just at the moment I do not have it, but during the intermission I shall be glad to produce the original German document.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, the Tribunal is told that this document was put in before and the certificate of General Ecer was put in at the same time, certifying that this document is a part of the Czech report. In those circumstances, the Tribunal will allow the document to be used.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, then I have another objection to the use of this document.

As is known, if any interrogation transcripts or affidavits from witnesses are presented, the Defense have the right to summon these witnesses for an interrogation. The former State Secretary Frank, who has made this statement, is, however, as is known, no longer among the living. Therefore, I also object for this reason to the use of this document.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, this document was offered and accepted in evidence during the lifetime of this man, K. H. Frank. That is one reason for accepting it.

The document is admissible under Article 21 of the Charter and was submitted under that article and there is no such rule as you have stated, that the Defense are entitled to cross-examine every person who makes an affidavit. It is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal and therefore that objection is rejected.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to hold you any longer on this matter but I wanted to show that this was an unnecessary delay as Dr. Von Ludinghausen used the document himself to introduce some extracts from the testimony of Frank in his document book.

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Now I shall read into the record some statements made by Frank. This document, I repeat, is in connection with the warning dated 17 November 1939 which we just exhibited to this Tribunal, and signed by Von Neurath, who did not raise his voice either against the shooting of the nine students nor as to the number of students who were to be sent to concentration camps, and he did not really request any changes in this legislation.

[Turning to the defendant.] Did you hear the testimony, Defendant?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I have read it.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY Do you deny this?

VON NEURATH: But most definitely. There was no possibility whatever of my doing so because I was not in Prague and consequently I could neither have had any knowledge of it, nor could I have signed it or passed it on.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. You still insist on stating that the Police never informed you regarding the arrests which were made and other police measures which were taken? Do you state that firmly?

VON NEURATH: I did not say that they never informed me, but that they always informed me afterward. My information always came from Czech sources.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was not the state of affairs such that the Police regularly reported to you regarding the important events which took place?

VON NEURATH: Not at all. In particular I never learned anything about what they were planning, at least not until afterward- or if I had learned it from Czech sources and then made inquiries with the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. I am going to read an extract from the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, dated 7 March 1946. This testimony was submitted by me to the Tribunal yesterday and it was partially read by me already. Will you give a copy of the testimony, USSR-494, to the defendant, please?

Frank states:

"The Reich Protector, Von Neurath, regularly received reports on the most important events in the Protectorate which had some bearing on the Security Police, from me, from the State Secretary, as well as from the Chief of the Security Police. For example, Von Neurath was informed in the special case concerning the student demonstrations in November 1939 both by me and by the Chief of the Security Police. This case dealt with Hitler's direct orders demanding the shootings of all the

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ringleaders. The number of ringleaders was to be fixed by the Prague Stapo and the Reich Protector was informed about this. In this case an estimate on the number of the ringleaders was left to the discretion of the State Police, or rather to the approval of the Reich Protector. Reich Protector Von Neurath signed the official dispatch announcing the execution of these students, thereby approving this action. It can therefore not be said that in this case the Reich Protector was merely responsible for the carrying out of the general Hitler order which deals with the execution of all ringleaders, but that he is also responsible for the fixing of the number of ringleaders, namely nine. I informed him in detail about the interrogation and he signed the poster.

"If this had not met with his approval and had he wished to revise it, as for instance, making it less severe, which he had the right to do, then I should have had to abide by his decision."

Now do you deny these statements?

VON NEURATH: Yes; I do not know how many times I have got to tell you that I was not in Prague at all.

And besides I do not know under what sort of pressure Frank might have made these statements. It does not give the date, but you just said that he made this statement on 7 April, and therefore a few days before his execution.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I should like the Tribunal to note that the defendant is deliberately distorting the facts. I repeated several times that these statements were made by Frank on 7 March and not on 7 April, or 2 days before the execution, as you are telling me now.

The document is before you and you can look at it yourself and see the date.

VON NEURATH: All right, then 7 March instead of 7 April. I think I said 7 April because I did not see the date at the. top. But as I have said-I think I have already told you three times-I could not have known anything at all about it because I was not there.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well. But you are making too many mistakes. Yesterday when giving testimony you were not very clear as to the number of students, either.

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember what I said yesterday, but I could hardly have made so many mistakes; I do not know if there were one or two less.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I would like to remind you. Yesterday, in reply to a question by Sir David, who submitted to

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you Document 3858-PS, from which it was evident that after the closing of the higher institutions of learning, 18,000 students found themselves out of school...

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go over Sir David's crossexamination again? Surely we have said that we do not want h go over the same subject twice.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to go back to the very same thing, and I do not want to add anything to the questions put by Sir David who has carried out a very detailed interrogation. I wanted only to establish the truth. When the defendant stated yesterday that in the document which was submitted by Sir David there was a mistake-that in Prague there existed only two institutions of higher learning and that 12,000 students could not have been arrested, this was not correct. The question was not merely about the closing of two Prague universities, but, on the basis of the order of 17 November 1939, there were closed the Czech university in Prague, the Czech university in Brunn, the Czech Higher Technical School in Brunn, the Czech Higher Technical School in Prague...

THE PRESIDENT: We heard all this yesterday, and we do not want to hear it again. We heard all about the closing of the university in Prague.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, Mr. President. I just wanted to state that not 2 universities were closed, but 10 institutions of higher learning.

I have just a few questions left which I should like to put to the defendant.

[Turning to the defendant.] You received many awards from Hitler, as is evident from the documents, and as you yourself stated. For instance, on 22 September 1940 you received the Iron Cross for Military Service. For what kind of services did you receive this award from Hitler?

THE PRESIDENT: Surely we went into this yesterday, did we not, in Sir David's cross-examination, or in the examination-in-chief, I forget which? I think it was the examination-in-chief-all these decorations which were given the defendant.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to revert to these orders, but I should like to ask the defendant, for what special services he received the Iron Cross from Hitler in 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: All right, ask him that.

VON NEURATH: Unfortunately, I cannot tell you. I cannot tell you what sort of merits I am supposed to have displayed. The award

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of this order of merit was made generally to all higher officials who were in service at the time.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, I am not going to insist on your reply. I just wanted to state here that you received this award in 1940 after the mass terror was applied against the Czechoslovak population.

VON NEURATH: I do not know that I am supposed to have carried out a mass terror.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, if you do not understand, we are not going to argue about this question.

In February 1943, in connection with your jubilee, various articles about you were published in many newspapers. I am not going to submit all these papers to the Tribunal or quote these articles, but I should like to read just two excerpts from the newspaper Frankischer Warier of 2 February 1943. We shall submit to you one of the copies of this so that you can follow me as I read this document into the record.

This newspaper is being submitted to the Tribunal under Document Number USSR-495.

In connection with your anniversary, it was stated:

"The most outstanding events in the field of foreign policy after Hitler's coming to power, in which Freiherr von Neurath played a most important role as Reich Foreign Minister and with which his name will always be connected, are: Germany's leaving the Geneva Disarmament Conference...the reuniting of the Saar to Germany . . . and the denouncing of the Locarno Pact."

And further on:

"Reich Protector Freiherr von Neurath was repeatedly decorated by the Fuehrer for outstanding services in the interest of the people and the Reich. He was decorated with the Golden Party Badge of Honor, received the rank of SS Gruppenfuehrer, was a knight of the Order of the Eagle, and received the Gold Badge of Honor for Faithful Service for his 40 years of diplomatic service.

"In appreciation of his outstanding services in the field of military efforts in the post of Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, the Fuehrer decorated him with the Military Cross, First Class."

Are the facts correctly stated in this article?

VON NEURATH: If I had to investigate the correctness of every article written by some journalist or other, I would have had a lot

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to do. These statements are the opinion of a journalist and nothing more.

THE PRESIDENT: That was not the question. The question was whether they were correctly stated, as a matter of fact. You can answer that.

VON NEURATH: Yes-no.

THE PRESIDENT: Which do you mean, "yes" or "no)'?

VON NEURATH: The decorations are correctly stated. Apart from that it is not correct.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have no further questions to put.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ludinghausen, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I had the feeling and impression, probably not without reason, that Herr Von Neurath was visibly tired and strained after the previous examination and that he was no longer in a position to do complete justice to the questions which were put to him. This, after all, is not surprising, if one considers that Herr Von Neurath is in his seventy-fourth year and besides that he is also suffering from a fairly serious heart disease. I feel obliged, therefore, to refer back to various points of the cross-examination of yesterday and put a few questions to him.

[Turning to the defendant.] Herr Von Neurath, you stated yesterday that because of the excesses of the SA and other radical groups in 1933 and later, you frequently protested to Hitler. What was the reason why you remonstrated with Hitler directly and did not raise your objections at the Cabinet meetings which were still taking place at that time?

VON NEURATH: I had already learned from personal experience that Hitler could not stand contradiction of any kind and that he was not amenable to any kind of petition if it was made before a fairly large group, because then he would always develop the complex that he was facing some sort of opposition against which he had to defend himself. It was different when one confronted him alone. Then, at least during the earlier years, he was accessible, thoroughly amenable to reasonable arguments, and much could be achieved in the way of moderating or weakening radical measures.

Moreover, I should like to mention again that just after the excesses mentioned in Mr. Geist's affidavit there was a meeting of the Cabinet, during which strong protests were raised against the repetition of such occurrences by various ministers including non-Nazi ministers. At that time Hitler thoroughly agreed with these objections, and declared that such excesses would not be allowed to

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recur. Shortly afterward he also made a speech in which he publicly expressed an assurance to this effect. From then until June 1934 no more excesses took place.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But in April 1933 there was the well-known anti-Jewish boycott, which lasted 24 hours, if I am not mistaken?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that was one of Herr Goebbels' provocations. But actually there were no excesses and acts of violence whatsoever on that occasion. It was confined merely to boycotting.

Moreover, the fact that no further disturbances arose in that case was the result of a joint intercession by Herr Von Papen and myself with Hitler and especially with Hindenburg. A perfectly correct description of this episode is to be found, as I recall, in an article of Time for April 1933, which is also contained in my document book.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, it was submitted in my document book, Document Number Neurath-9.

[Turning to the defendant.] In connection with the events that occurred at that time, arrests, and so forth, Sir David yesterday referred particularly to the arrest of the well-known author Ossietzski. Do you recall that this Ossietzski had already been sentenced to a fairly' long prison term by a German court even before the seizure of power?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I remembered that afterward. I remember that even before the seizure of power-I do not know under which government-Herr Ossietzski had been sentenced by a Reich court to a fairly long term in the penitentiary for high treason, but he had not yet served it, and consequently was arrested again.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to ask you another question with reference to the report submitted by the Prosecution yesterday. It is the letter of Ministerial Director Kopke on 31 May 1934. That is Document D-868. In this report, from the information noted down by Herr Kopke, do you see any proof that the Foreign Office was drawn into the subversive activities of the Austrian Nazis?

VON NEURATH: No, not at all. This has to do with a report which Ministerial Director Kopke made to me about a visit by Herr Wachter, whom he described as an Austrian with a sense of responsibility. This Herr Wachter had tried to establish a connection with the Foreign Office and with Hitler in order to draw attention to the dangers arising from the growing radicalism of the Austrian Nazis. The head of the Political Department, Herr Kopke, identifies himself with Wachter regarding these apprehensions and agreed to make an oral report to that effect.

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I do not think that anyone can doubt that my attitude was not quite the same as that of Herr Kopke and I passed this report on to Hitler in order to draw his attention to the matter.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution-or rather, Sir David-referred yesterday to reports which deal with the treatment of the Czech problem by you and Frank. This is Document 3859-PS, a letter which you sent to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, on 31 August 1940, for the preparation of your oral report to Hitler. Were these reports, that is, the one drafted by Frank, identical with the memorandum mentioned in the Friderici document of 15 October?

VON NEURATH: Yes, apparently these are the same reports.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, during your examination you spoke about the Friderici document, which you said was based on plans of the SS, various Party circles, and the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube district, regarding a deportation of Czechs to the Eastern Territories. You went on to say that in order to stop these plans, which you yourself described as nonsensical, you had Frank prepare this memorandum in which a less radical solution was recommended, which later had also been approved to a certain extent by Hitler; and that in reality nothing happened, which was what you intended, and that the idea of incorporation had practically been buried. Is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. This entire affair and the origin of these memoranda are extremely difficult to explain. It can be understood only from the entire domestic political development. The efforts of the Gauleiter of the surrounding districts to divide up the Protectorate had proceeded rather far. They had all submitted memoranda and Herr Himmler backed them up. All these memoranda envisaged a radical solution of these problems; that meant there was reason to fear that Hitler would comply with the wishes of these Gauleiter. In order to stop this I had to make several proposals which I myself had said were impracticable, and I identified myself with them primarily so as to declare them absurd later on.

That is the only explanation of the origin of these memoranda. I did not draft the memoranda myself, but that was done in my office, in accordance, to be sure, with instructions given by me.

This was, however, and I should like to emphasize this expressly, a purely tactical maneuver to get at Hitler, because I was afraid that he would follow the radical suggestions made by Himmler and his associates. I did actually manage to get Hitler to issue a strict order, which is what I had requested, to the effect that all these plans were no longer to be discussed, but that only the so-called

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assimilation plan was left, which could be carried out only over a period of years; and, as a matter of fact, nothing more happened, and that was exactly what I was aiming at.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: A decree was submitted by the Prosecution yesterday, which was issued to the German authorities in the Protectorate, regarding the treatment to be given of the German-Czech problem publicly. That is Document 3862-PS, dated 27 June 1941. Is that in any way connected with these memoranda or the discussion you had with Hitler about it?

VON NEURATH: Yes, it is most closely interconnected, and I think I said so yesterday. In the following year the same agitation started all over again for this Germanization and partitioning of the Protectorate, and I opposed it, and, once the question was decided, I prohibited it from being reopened.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: A document was submitted yesterday, USSR-487, the Chief of the Security Police, addressed to State Secretary Frank, dated 21 July 1943, that is to say, after you had resigned. From that document the Prosecution are attempting to draw the conclusion that, in accordance with a decree dated 5 May 1939, you appointed the leader of the SA and Security Police in Prague as your political expert.

In what way did the latter act in this capacity? Did he act at all?

VON NEURATH: No, he did not; that is just it. It is clearly apparent from this letter of reminder, dated 21 July 1943, that he never became at all active in this respect.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to state here that the question was incorrectly put. This document is not dated in the year 1943 or 1942, but it is dated 21 July 1939.

VON NEURATH: May I remark here that it makes no difference, as nothing had happened. I did not appoint any political expert.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What measures followed Documents 3851-PS and 3858-PS, which were introduced yesterday by the Prosecution, and which were proposals submitted by various departments and department heads of your administration regarding the utilization for labor of the students who became unemployed through the closing down of the Czech universities?

VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday that this apparently concerned a proposal from an adviser which never even reached me, but was rejected by my State Secretary before it got to me. Just how I could possibly be held responsible for the contents of a draft submitted by an adviser, I cannot understand.

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DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to put one more question to you regarding the German-Austrian agreement of July 1936. As is mentioned in a report by Dr. Rainer to Burckel which the Prosecution have already submitted-I refer to Document 812-PS-is it correct that Hitler, immediately after the signing of that agreement, had personally declared to Dr. Rainer and the Austrian Nazi Leader Globocznik that this agreement of 11 July 1936 was signed by him in all honesty and sincerity, and that the Austrian National Socialists, too, should under all circumstances adhere strictly to this agreement, and that they were to let themselves be guided by him in their conduct toward the Austrian Government?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is correct. As I think I said to you yesterday, I believe I can also remember that Rainer actually confirmed it when he was here on the witness stand.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I would like to put a last question . . .

THE PRESIDENT: He answered these questions perfectly clearly, according to his view, yesterday.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I am all through now. I should like to ask him only one more question in conclusion of the entire examination of my client.

[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution and also Sir David brought the following charge against you yesterday: They charged that although by your own admission you were not in agreement with the Nazi regime and its methods, and although you considered many of the things that occurred reprehensible and immoral and abhorred them, you did not resign, but remained in the Government. Will you please explain that to us once more?

VON NEURATH: I have already mentioned in the beginning that I had given my promise to Hindenburg to enter the Government and to remain there as long as it was at all possible for me to follow a course unfavorable to any use of violence and to protect Germany from warlike entanglements. That was my task and nothing else. But it was not only this promise I had given to Hindenburg, but also my sense of duty, and my feeling of responsibility toward the German people, to protect them from warlike entanglements as long as it was at all possible, which bound me to this office. Beside these considerations all my personal wishes, which were quite different, had to take second place.

Unfortunately, my power and influence as Foreign Minister did not reach far enough to enable me to prevent pernicious and immoral actions in other spheres, as for instance, that of domestic

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policy, although I did try in many cases, not least of all in the Jewish question itself.

However, I considered that my highest duty was to carry out the work assigned to me and not try to escape it, even if in another sphere where I had no influence, things occurred which hurt me and my opinions very deeply.

There may be many people who have different ideas and a different attitude than I. I experienced similar attacks when I placed myself at the disposal of a Social Democrat Cabinet in the year 1919 after the first revolution; at that time, too, the strongest attacks and the most serious accusations were made against me.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yet you yourself have struggled hard with your conscience, you have often told me.

VON NEURATH: Yes, of course I have. It is not easy to belong to a government with whose tendencies you do not agree, and for which one is to be made responsible later on.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this completes my examination. I would suggest we adjourn now and then I might be permitted to begin the examination of my witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have some questions to ask?

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Mr. President, I ask permission for my client to be absent from the session this afternoon and tomorrow, because I have important questions to discuss with him.

THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop?

DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. HORN: Thank you.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President, yesterday afternoon General Raginsky asked whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's foreign policy. The interpreter just told me that she translated it wrongly. She translated it "whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath's policy." This question, therefore, has not been answered yet; consequently, I ask permission to ask Baron von Neurath whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's foreign policy.

VON NEURATH: No, in no way. I never talked to Rosenberg about matters of foreign policy.

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DR. THOMA: Then I ask that the transcript be corrected accordingly, so it should not read "whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath's policies," but "whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's policies."

THE PRESIDENT: The record will be corrected.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): I want to ask you just a very few questions. You will remember that the Baroness von Ritter said that after the 5th of November 1937 you recognized-I want to read it exactly:

"When Herr Von Neurath had to recognize for the first time from Hitler's statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered severe heart attacks."

That is a correct description, is it not, of what you then recognized?

[The defendant nodded assent.]

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you stated that you spoke immediately after that meeting to General Beck and General Von Fritsch. Do you remember?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I think you said to Sir David that you did not speak to the Defendant Goering. What I am asking you now is whether you spoke of what Hitler had said to anyone else during the next 2 or 3 months. Did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office?

VON NEURATH: I spoke to my State Secretary.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And with whom else from the Foreign Office?

VON NEURATH: No one, for Hitler had laid down the condition that silence should be preserved about all these meetings; and for that reason I did not speak with my officials about them. They knew nothing. They had learned nothing from the military men, either.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you speak to the Defendant Von Papen when you saw him next?

VON NEURATH: No. I believe I did not see him at all at that time.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you discuss it with anybody else before your resignation?

VON NEURATH: No.

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THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I have only one other question. You recognized, did you not, that Himmler would use methods which you would not approve of; is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, but only gradually; that could not have been foreseen from the beginning.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is just what I wanted to know. When did you first realize that? When did you first begin, just as well as you could tell? About when did you realize what sort of man Himmler was?

VON NEURATH: That was very difficult to recognize, because Himmler had two faces; he was a perfect Janus; one could not see immediately what his real thoughts were at all.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not asking you what he was like. If you would just try to remember, you certainly realized that at some time. Did you know it in 1937? You knew it in 1937 or 1938? Certainly in 1938, did you not?

VON NEURATH: Probably in 1938, but it is hard for me to give a date at the moment.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not want a specific date. My point is that you knew it before you went to the Protectorate; you knew what Himmler was before you went to the Protectorate, of course? There is no question about that, is there?

VON NEURATH: Yes, certainly.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.): Did you ever express yourself openly against the policy of the Hitlerite Government?

VON NEURATH: I am sorry, but the translation was not good.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your explanations made before the Tribunal you stated that you were not in agreement with the policy of Hitler's Government, either on individual questions or taken as a whole, as well. Is that true?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you ever express yourself openly with a statement of your disagreement with Hitler's policy?

VON NEURATH: I did so more than once.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In what manner was it, then? I am asking you about your public statements, either in the press or while addressing any meeting?

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VON NEURATH: No. It was no longer possible either to have a voice in the press, or to hold a meeting. It was quite out of the question. I could only speak to Hitler personally or, at the beginning, in the Cabinet in protest against this policy. There was no freedom of the press any longer, any more than in Russia. In the same way no meeting was possible. Consequently...

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you about Russia; I am asking you about your expressing your views publicly. In other words, you never expressed them.

VON NEURATH: No.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in that way nobody in Germany could know, or did know, about the fact that you were not in agreement with the policy on the part of Hitler's Government?

VON NEURATH: I always expressed myself quite unmistakably about it, but not in articles, nor in meetings either; but otherwise I always expressed myself clearly about it.

Am; TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, but only in your tete-a-tete with Hitler, only personally to Hitler. You said so, did you not?

VON NEURATH: No; I tell you I said that to everyone who would listen, but I could not do so in public meetings, in speeches, or in articles.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And you remained a member of the Government in spite of the fact that you were not in agreement with the Government's policy; is that so?

VON NEURATH: Yes, for that very reason.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In order to counteract his policy?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know the results of such counteracting?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What were the results of counteracting the policy of Hitler's Government?

VON NEURATH: Well, I am not in a position to give the details on that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In particular, as to the question of aggression, were you against the joining of Germany and Austria?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

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THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The German Government, in spite of this, joined Austria to Germany; is that so?

VON NEURATH: I believe it has been clearly expressed here that at the last moment Hitler did that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the seizing of Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the German Government, in spite of this, seized Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: I was no longer a member of the Government at that time.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But as a statesman whose opinion should have been considered, you, of course, expressed your opinion against it, did you not?

VON NEURATH: Always.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on Poland?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in spite of that Germany did attack Poland.

VON NEURATH: I repeat, I was no longer a member of the Government. I learned of it only at the last moment.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on the U.S.S.R.?

VON NEURATH: Yes, more so indeed; I always wanted the exact opposite. I wanted co-operation with the Soviet Union, I said that as early as 19...

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And still Germany attacked the Soviet Union?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Judging from your explanations, Hitler must have known about your political opposition and your disagreement with his policy; is it correct?

VON NEURATH: He knew that very well, for I resigned in 1938 for that reason.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes. And you know how Hitler made short work of his political opponents?

VON NEURATH: In the Reich, yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And so far as you were concerned, in spite of the fact that you sided with the opposition, nothing happened; that is true, is it not?

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VON NEURATH: I did not understand.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as you were concerned, in spite of the fact that you declared yourself for the opposition, nothing of the kind happened?

VON NEURATH: No, but I always expected it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And could you not tell us whether Sir Nevile Henderson, in his book, the Failure of a Mission, expressed the facts concerning you personally correctly or not? Do you consider that Sir Nevile Henderson expressed the facts correctly concerning you personally? Does he express them correctly?

VON NEURATH: I must admit frankly that I read this book by Sir Nevile Henderson only once, 3 or 4 years ago. I cannot remember now what he said about me. I heard excerpts from it here once or twice but I cannot say what he writes about me.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But I assume that you are familiar enough with the excerpts presented by your defense counsel in his document book?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

Thai TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Now, for instance, that which is expressed in his excerpts so far as you are concerned, is it correct or not?

VON NEURATH: I assume so, yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is to say, it is correct. And is it quite correct what he writes in reference to your membership in the Party? He writes that "Baron von Neurath himself remained in the regime of Hindenburg, and he was not a member of the Nazi Party."

VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe I have said so repeatedly here in the last few days.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And further on he informs us that "he (Neurath) became a member of the Party later."

VON NEURATH: I have already explained how that happened. In 1937 I received a Golden Party Badge without my...

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, we have heard that before, but is it true or not that you became a member of the Nazi Party later, as Sir Nevile Henderson states?

VON NEURATH: No, I...

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So this particular part is not correct, is it?

VON NEURATH: I received the Golden Party Badge with Hitler's statement that this involved no obligations towards the Party.

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THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We have heard this already. That means that in Sir Nevile Henderson's statements not everything is true as far as your person is concerned?

VON NEURATH: I do not know. With the best intentions I cannot remember what Sir Nevile Henderson wrote about me.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the last question I have, which is in regard to your memorandum: I did not quite understand the explanations which were given by you to Sir David and later to your defense counsel. Now, in forwarding Frank's memorandum, in the fetter' addressed to Lammers, you wrote that you considered this memorandum absolutely correct. Is that true?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. I should also like to tell you the reasons. This memorandum...

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You already explained the reasons before. I just wanted to establish the fact that you really wrote this.

VON NEURATH: Up to now I have not told the reason why I wrote this to Lammers. The reason why I wrote to Lammers to this effect was that he was the one who submitted this memorandum to the Fuehrer. So I had to write to the same effect.

THE PRESIDENT: There are two subjects I want to ask you about and the first relates to the letter that you wrote on the 31st of August 1940. That is the letter which General Nikitchenko has just referred to; you remember that?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

THE PRESIDENT: And you remember that you said in that letter that you fully agreed with the memorandum which your Secretary of State Frank had drawn up independently of you. He said that "Germanization provides for the changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; and secondly, the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich or special treatment for these and all destructive elements." My question is: What did you understand by "special treatment"?

VON NEURATH: Well, as far as I read this extract at all at the time, I had in no way ever thought of the term "special treatment" as it has become known here during the Trial. I was certainly not at all in agreement with this attitude of Frank as represented in the report, and I only had the intention of frustrating this whole affair in order to sidetrack it. The content of these reports was only intended to present this to Hitler in Hitler's language, or in the language of Himmler and others, in order to dissuade him from it later on.

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THE PRESIDENT: Was it not misleading to write to Herr Lammers with the view that it should be put forward to Hitler, saying that you fully agreed with the memorandum with which you did not agree?

VON NEURATH: Mr. President, as things were, I could not write to Lammers. I did not intend to carry out anything which is written in there, but since Lammers was presenting this to Hitler, I first had to tell him I agreed with it. Afterward I reported to Hitler and gave him an explanation in a personal conference during the meeting with Frank and Gurtner which has been mentioned here.

THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is that you do not know what was meant by "special treatment"?

VON NEURATH: No; in any case I did not know at the time.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, there is one other question that I should like to put to you. You remember when you were called on the 11th of March 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, and you wrote the letter of the 12th of March 1938, in answer to the memorandum which you received from the British Government through Sir Nevile Henderson. You knew Sir Nevile Henderson quite well, did you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And in that letter you said this:

"It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development; especially the assertion, which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is pure invention. According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect."

And then you go on to say what you allege was the truth of the matter. You know now, do you not, that your statements in that letter were entirely untrue?

VON NEURATH: That did not come through.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you heard any part of the question that I was putting to you?

VON NEURATH: Unfortunately not.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that you did not say so earlier. Do you remember the 11th of March 1938 and being called in to represent the Foreign Office, and you have told me just now that you knew Sir Nevile Henderson quite well?

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VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you remember the letter which you wrote on the 12th of March 1938?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you admitted to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that the statements in that letter were untrue?

VON NEURATH: Untrue, yes-not entirely. They are presented incorrectly.

THE PRESIDENT: What steps did you take to find out whether or not they were true?

VON NEURATH: I did not learn of the incorrectness of this presentation until much later.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to my question. I said, "What steps did you take to find out whether the statement was correct?"

VON NEURATH: The statement which Hitler gave me I first simply presumed to be true. I certainly could not check up on it in any way.

THE PRESIDENT: Why should you assume it to be true when it was in contradiction of what the British Government had stated?

VON NEURATH: I had no other knowledge of the events which had occurred and therefore could only say what I knew.

THE PRESIDENT: You had the letter, the protest from the British Government, had you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You knew Sir Nevile Henderson perfectly well?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you then wrote this letter contradicting the statements which had been made on behalf of the British Government; that is right, is it not?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you took no steps to check the facts which had been stated to you by Hitler? Will you answer that, please?

VON NEURATH: Yes. Your Lordship, how was I to do that? There was no one else who knew about it. It was only what Hitler had commissioned me to tell the Foreign Office. The draft of this note was drawn up by the Foreign Office according to the information which I had received from Hitler. I had no other chance to clear this up.

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THE PRESIDENT: There were all the other persons who were concerned with the matter whom you could have communicated with, but your statement is that you did nothing?

VON NEURATH: I can only repeat that I had no opportunity to procure any other information. No one knew about it except Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that Goering did not know about it? '

VON NEURATH: Perhaps Goering knew about it.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to the dock.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to call the first witness, the former Ministerial Director, and head of the political section in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Kopke.

[The witness Kopke took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

GERHARD KOPKE (Witness): Gerhard Kopke.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Dr. Kopke, how long have you known Herr Von Neurath?

KOPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath for over 40 years His career is well known. Therefore I can limit myself to stating that we worked together as vice consuls in London, as legation counsellors in the Foreign Office and later, after Herr Von Neurath became Minister in 1932, until my resignation in 1935. In the meantime Von Neurath was in Copenhagen, Rome, London, and for some time at his home, and finally in Prague. We met only occasionally when I was in Berlin, and we kept up a comparatively lively correspondence with each other as old friends. I myself was employed in the Foreign Office during the entire period. From 1921 on I was director of the Legal Department, and from \923 I was director of the political, so-called Western Department, which I directed until I left the service. I voluntarily tendered my resignation at the/ end of 1935.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the attitude, the fundamental attitude of Herr Von Neurath on domestic and foreign policy, but only on broad lines?

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KOPKE: In domestic politics, Herr Von Neurath stood close to the conservative circles but he was never a member of the Conservative Party. From this basic conservative attitude and also because of his outstanding character traits of loyalty to duty and reliability, he had the confidence of Reich President Von Hindenburg, and retained it without interruption until the latter's death. Herr Von Hindenburg esteemed Von Neurath as a prudent, moderate, reliable diplomat. Men of other party inclinations also had confidence in Von Neurath. I shall mention only the deceased Reich President, Ebert, who recalled Neurath to office during his term.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Von Neurath's appointment as Reich Foreign Minister in the summer of 1932?

KOPKE: The appointment of Herr Von Neurath as Reich Foreign Minister was based on a personal wish of President Von Hindenburg. Neurath did not become Foreign Minister within the Von Papen Cabinet, but became Foreign Minister as the special confidant of President Von Hindenburg.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then how did it happen that Von Neurath remained Foreign Minister in the new Hitler Government also?

KOPKE: Von Neurath did not participate so far as I know in the negotiations with Hitler about the assumption of power. If I can rely only on my memory, he was sick abed with a heart disease during the decisive days, but he remained Foreign Minister, again at the special wish of Von Hindenburg.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us anything about the attitude, the relationship of Neurath to Hitler?

KOPKE: I should like to remark by way of introduction that I cannot testify on this subject from my own immediate observation. I was never present at conferences which Herr Von Neurath held with Hitler. I myself never had any official conversation with Hitler whatsoever. But, according to Neurath's own description, and according to the information which I received from other important personalities in the course of time, I had the impression that, especially in the first years, Hitler treated Herr Von Neurath carefully and politely. To what extent this was out of respect for the Reich President, whose regard for Von Neurath was, of course, known to Hitler, I cannot say. In any case, Neurath was never actually in the confidence of Hitler and was not in the small circle close to Hitler, the powerful men of the Party. After the death of President Von Hindenburg, Von Neurath remained because he had promised the Reich President to do so. During the following

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period also, Neurath repeatedly attempted to exercise his moderating and calming influence on the Party. However, I know that as disappointments and differences of opinion multiplied, Herr Von Neurath tried many times to separate from Hitler. In this connection I can recall two occasions on which he offered his resignation, and one of these appeals he showed me. It was in writing and must have been dated from the beginning of the year 1936. For at that time I had already resigned and visited Herr Von Neurath as a friend in a purely private capacity.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now can you also give us a brief picture of Neurath's attitude toward the National Socialist Party?

KOPKE: At first Herr Von Neurath adopted an attitude of reserve toward the Party and in particular its leading men. To my knowledge he was personally acquainted with hardly any of these men, since, indeed, he had lived most of the time abroad. Neurath was convinced that by reason of his years of experience as an old diplomat and supported by his confidential position with the Reich President, and the latter's moderating influence, he would succeed in working in accordance with his policy, which was directed toward compromise and understanding.

Before me, and I believe also before his other colleagues, Neurath frequently referred to experiences of this sort which he had had with Fascism in Rome. He occasionally said that such revolutionary elements-should just be allowed to develop and that these hotheads would come to their senses if they were given time and opportunity to gather experience themselves in responsible positions.

By the way, Neurath also shared the opinions of State Secretary Von Bulow in this respect. He retained this State Secretary of Reich Chancellor Bruning, and also protected him until his death against repeated attempts of the Party to get rid of him.

Moreover, I should like to mention a small detail which was very valuable to us in the of lice at the time. When State Secretary Von Bulow, who was generally popular, died suddenly, Neurath managed to get Hitler to attend the funeral at the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church. The old officials of the Foreign Of lice saw in that a gratifying and reassuring sign for the strong position of our Minister in relation to the Party. This event, which in itself is perhaps unimportant, happened exactly 10 years ago today.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: As head of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, you were one of Neurath's foremost coworkers, and can surely tell us what was the dominant tendency of Neurath's foreign policy.

KOPKE: Neurath's political attitude on the whole was, in accordance with his whole character and his years of experience in politics,

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inclined toward compromise, waiting, negotiation. Measures backed up by ultimatums and attempts at solution by violence did not suit Von Neurath's temperament. Neurath was neither a gambler nor a fighter by nature.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to individual important foreign political events which occurred during the period in which you worked under Herr Von Neurath and were head of the political section.

In October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Now, I should like to ask you whether this step of Germany's, leaving the Conference and the League of Nations, was based on any aggressive or belligerent tendencies for the moment or for the future?

KOPKE: No. As far as the picture of the events mentioned by defendant's counsel was clear to us, the experts, it was as follows: No one of us in the Foreign Office thought of warlike plans or preparations for war. It was only done to proclaim as impressively as possible that Germany would no longer allow herself to be considered a nation without the same rights and obligations as other peoples.

In the same way the militarization of the Rhineland was not based on any aggressive intention, either for the moment or for the future.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In the next few years, in 1935, Germany's military sovereignty was reintroduced, and a year later, the demilitarized Rhineland zone was remilitarized. I should like to read you one sentence from the affidavit of the former minister and interpreter Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Office. He says the following with regard to the events in the spring of 1935:

"The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between France and Russia on 2 May 1935 followed the proclamation of the establishment of a German Air Force and the introduction of general compulsory military service in March 1935."

Will you please give us a brief review of the historical development of these matters which led to the reintroduction of military sovereignty in 1935 and to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936?

KOPKE: I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, we have had the historical development of these matters over and over again. Surely we do not want it from this witness.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Only very briefly, only the dates, in proper order, Mr. President; no explanations about it. I should

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only like to emphasize strongly once more how the individual events are connected with each other.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have the dates in their minds. We really have had these dates in our minds for some months.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Very well. If the Court believes that it does not need to be informed about it, I must, of course, dispense with it. Then I come to a last...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put any question you really want to put about it, but you said, "Will you give us the historical developments from the 2d of May 1935?" We have heard that over and over again.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President. I was interested only in the following: From this affidavit of Herr Schmidt which I have just quoted, one could directly follow...

THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, whatever you want to ask about this affidavit.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then I shall formulate the question as follows:

[Turning to the witness.] I have just read this sentence by Herr Schmidt, and I have also told you what can be read from it; namely, that the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact of 2 May 1935 was the result of the restoration of military sovereignty. Is that true or what was the case?

KOPKE: That question is difficult to answer if one merely considers these two events in chronological order. The conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact was on 2 May 1935; the restoration of military sovereignty was already in March 1935.

However, the negotiations for this treaty of assistance go back much farther, and I should like to recall the fact that the critical stage, into which these negotiations had entered before the restoration of military sovereignty, is shown very clearly in the report of the French Military Committee's reporter in which the latter speaks quite openly of a close entente between the two nations. That was on 23 November 1934.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to another question and should like to ask you whether you know the opinions and attitude of Von Neurath concerning the Austrian question, at least during your time?

KOPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward the Austrian question for a much longer time than the period when we worked together during his term as Minister, for as a southern German he was always particularly interested in the problem and

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I recall many conversations which I had with him even when I was still a vice consul. His attitude and intentions had always been to make the relations between Germany and Austria closer in the economic sphere, chiefly in the interests of Austria, and politically to guarantee a similar policy by treaties, but otherwise not to encroach on Austria's independence; that is what we in the Foreign Office had already learned several years before he became Minister, from our experience with the customs union, which at that time was actually intended only in an economic sense. The fact that this attempt was quite generally considered as a political union gave pause for thought and should have warned everyone who had resolved to touch this hot iron again. Therefore, Neurath during his period of office, whenever he discussed the problem with me and worked on it, thought along just these lines.

I should like to add here that the critical time on the Austrian question was probably after I left office. Moreover, even Hitler originally shared Neurath's moderate conception, as was shown in his conversation with Mussolini in Venice in the summer of 1934. Especially interesting, however, are the remarks which Hitler made on the Anschluss problem to Sir John Simon during the negotiations in Berlin in March 1935. At that time Hitler expressed himself to the English statesman about that as follows:

If the people in London knew Austria as well as he did, they would believe his assurance that he could not want to increase our economic troubles by adding another field of economic difficulties. Germany did not want to interfere in this country at all. He was perfectly aware that any interference in Austrian affairs, even if it meant carrying out the wish of the Austrian people themselves for an Anschluss, could not be legalized. That was Hitler's opinion at that time.

Neurath also rejected all interference in Austrian internal affairs and strongly condemned the attempts which could be noticed in Party circles to give direct support to the Austrian National Socialists. During my time Neurath did everything he could to keep the Foreign Office out of the internal political struggle in Austria.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Still one more question. Up to the time of your resignation at the beginning of 1936, was there ever any talk in the Foreign Office of attacking Czechoslovakia or not observing existent treaties with Czechoslovakia?

KOPKE: Never, neither the one nor the other. Our economic and political relations with Czechoslovakia were, as long as I was in office, very good. We had no occasion whatsoever to change them, not even the slightest.

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DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And now my last question. Can you tell us anything about Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward the race question?

KOPKE: On this question Neurath was completely opposed to the Party attitude. In this connection I should like to recall an experience which Neurath told me personally.

When the Jewish legislation was about to be proclaimed the Reich Minister of Justice Gurtner came to him in great excitement and told Von Neurath that he, Gurtner, had warned Hitler in vain against proclaiming these quite impossible laws. He strongly urged Herr Von Neurath as Foreign Minister to point out the enormous dangers which this madness could set loose abroad. Neurath told me that he did this immediately, but that all his efforts had been in vain.

Neurath's personal attitude on the Jewish problem was thoroughly conciliatory and reasonable, in keeping with his generally kind personality and his religious attitude. Among many examples I should like to refer here to only one, which is the following:

During the time when we were in London together, the Jewish doctor at the Embassy was also one of the closest friends of the Neurath family. When he had to leave London during the World War and was homeless and without employment, Neurath immediately took active steps to help his old friend.

As Reich Foreign Minister also, Von Neurath always helped non-Aryan colleagues, although that brought him often under attack from the Party circles and was not always easy.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask any question?

[There was no response.]

Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Tribunal will, of course, not consider that the Prosecution are accepting every statement of the witness; but I do not think that it would be a useful appropriation of time to cross-examine him. Therefore, I shall ask no questions.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Sir David. Sir David, would it be convenient to you and to the members of the defendants' counsel to discuss the questions of supplementary applications for witnesses and documents at 2 o'clock?

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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord, it would be very convenient to me. I do not think there are many serious matters about which there will be serious dispute.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I thought there were not. Very well, we will do that then.

The witness can retire.

Dr. Von Ludinghausen, call your next witness and then we can have him sworn before the adjournment.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: May I ask that Dr. Dieckhoff be allowed to follow Dr. Kopke?

[The witness Dieckhoff took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name please?

HANS HEINRICH DIECKHOFF (Witness): Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: Now the Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, My Lord, the first application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath with regard to M. Francois-Poncet. That has been dealt with; that is covered.

Then, My Lord, the next is an application from Dr. Marx on behalf of the Defendant Streicher to put in an affidavit by the publisher, Herr Gassner of Der Sturmer. My Lord, the publisher is intended to deal with the question of the rise and the circulation of Der Sturmer during the years 1933 to 1935. The Prosecution have already submitted to the Tribunal that they did not think that that was relevant when an application was made to call Herr Gassner as a witness. The Prosecution still take the same position. My Lord, it is for an affidavit, and we leave to the Tribunal as to whether they would like the affidavit, but the Prosecution fail to see the relevance of that evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Would Dr. Marx like to say something about that now?

DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Mr. President, I have just discussed this matter with Defendant Streicher; and he tells me that the witness, Herr Gassner, whom I have proposed to call and from whom an affidavit had been proposed, would only be in a position to speak about the publication figures of Der Sturmer from the year 1941 onwards. That, of course, is of no interest whatever to the defense. I shall, therefore, forego the affidavit and rely on what the witness Hiemer has said in that respect. Therefore, it will not be necessary at all to procure the affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is by Dr. Kranzbuhler on behalf of the Defendant Doenitz for further consideration and admission of the affidavit of the former fleet judge, Jackel, by reason of the course of the cross-examination.

My Lord, I think the most convenient course would be if the Prosecution do not object to the application at this time but reserve the right, when Dr. Kranzbuhler makes the use- that he desires of the affidavit, to consider whether we shall then object.

THE PRESIDENT: This is really evidence in rebuttal, is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, in rebuttal of the points raised in the cross-examination. It is very difficult to decide whether one should make a final objection until one knows what use Dr. Kranzbuhler is going to make of it. I suggest that we do not object at this stage.

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, these applications and the Tribunal's orders granting the witnesses are always subject to that provision.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, then the Prosecution makes no further objection.

My Lord, then there are two applications on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath, a request for minutes from the interrogatory of the...

THE PRESIDENT: They have both been withdrawn, have they not?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, they have? I was not certain.

My Lord, then Dr. Thoma makes application on behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg for three matters: The exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant; the entry of Dr. Strauber 27 May 1944; and third, a note of the Ministerialrat, Dr. Beil.

My Lord, the Prosecution feel that these documents are cumulative, and they leave it to the Tribunal with that suggestion-that the case is already well covered. I do not know if Dr. Thoma wishes to say anything further.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I should like to refer to it quite briefly, as apparently there is an error in the matter of Dr. Beil. It is a question here of the interrogatory. I have sent to Beil an interrogatory which has not yet been returned. Otherwise, there is nothing that I know about this matter; but I have made an application which has not been mentioned yet. I applied for some of Rosenberg's writings, Tradition and Gegenwart, new speeches and translations, to be included in the document book, for these deal with questions which were discussed on the occasion of Gau educational meetings and discussions and which also deal with such questions as the peaceful living together of the nations of Europe, religious tolerance, his advocacy of an ideal humanity, and similar writings. I request that these articles be admitted. Apart from that, I have no further applications to make; and for the rest I leave the decision, of course, to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: If I understand what you said aright, Dr. Thoma, you were not referring to any of the applications which are before us. The applications which are before us are an exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant in the autumn of 1944; another is an entry which Dr. Strauber made; and the third is a note of Dr. Beil; you have not referred to them, have you?

DR. THOMA: Yes, that is right. I have to confess that these applications are completely new to me. These applications must have been made by Rosenberg on his own initiative, because I

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cannot find any trace of them. Or perhaps an error was made in the memorandum to the Tribunal. I do not know the applications.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, the copies of the applications are before us, and they appear to be signed both by the Defendant Rosenberg and by yourself.

DR. THOMA: In that case, this must have happened months ago. I cannot remember; this is from 3 June.

THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, you do not want them?

DR. THOMA: Application Number 3 is settled.

I have re-read the applications just now, and I do remember them. I ask you to make a decision favorable to the defendant.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord!, the next applications are for a number of documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Papen, and the Prosecution have no objection to this.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them-certainly Numbers 3, 5, and 13-have either been admitted or rejected, I think.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. I had a note opposite 13. I really think they have been dealt with, My Lord; they are in the books, and I do not think any further discussion is required.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in the book?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think so, My Lord I do not know if-Dr. Kubuschok says he agrees with me.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Bormann, a request for a decree of Hitler's and a decree issued by Bormann in 1944. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to these.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand the meaning of the last one. Can you tell me what it means?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I took it myself that it was "to" the SD, instead of "of" the SD-the appertaining of members of the head of lice of the National Socialist Party of the SD. I am afraid that that guess on my part does not meet with approval.

DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): My Lord, this concerns a decree from Bormann in which he prohibits members of the Party Chancellery belonging to the SD. It is a decree of Bormann's applying to the Party Chancellery.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the remaining applications are on behalf of the Defendant Goering, the admission of an affidavit by Baron van Gersdorff, and a book by Joseph Chapski.

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My Lord, my Soviet colleague has dealt with that by submission in writing, dated 20 June. I did not propose to say anything further about that, My Lord. Colonel Pokrovsky is here if Your Lordship would like to hear him further.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already made an order with reference to this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship has.

THE PRESIDENT: We made the order on 9 June, apparently, that for the Defendant Goering three witnesses could be produced either personally...

Perhaps we had better hear from Dr. Stahmer about this.

DR. OTTO STAMMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): Mr. President, that is the way I understood the decision of the Tribunal. I had applied for five witnesses. The Tribunal ordered that I could produce only three out of the five witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: That is right.

DR. STAMMER: Then with reference to the affidavit nothing was said, as far as I can remember, in that particular decision, so that I had assumed that I would be free to ask for admission of affidavits insofar as the Tribunal considers them necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, after the Tribunal had made that order about limiting the number of witnesses to three, did you not receive a communication, to which you have replied, I think, suggesting that possibly you might be able to dispense with actual oral witnesses and do that whole part of the case by affidavits?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I received that communication; and I have already negotiated about the matter with the Russian Prosecution. We did not quite reach an agreement, however; and therefore I made a written application to the Tribunal a few days ago. ,

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but was not the agreement which you were trying to arrive at an agreement that only three affidavits should be produced on either side? Or was it more than three?

DR. STAMMER: No. The question which remains and which we have not agreed upon is whether I will be given the opportunity to read a few of the affidavits here.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Dr. Stahmer, I think the position is, then, that unless you are able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution, we shall have to abide by our previous order.

DR. STAMMER: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: You will make further efforts to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution and let the Tribunal know.

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DR. STAHMER: I will.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if your Lordship will grant me the indulgence of mentioning three exhibits. They all refer to the diary of Admiral Assmann, My Lord, which was introduced during the cases of the Defendants Doenitz and Raeder. There are three exhibits concerned.

The first is Document D-879. We thought that would be more complete if a connecting page was put in to make the continuity of the exhibit. For that purpose, My Lord, the Prosecution asks that Exhibit GB-482 be withdrawn and that there be submitted the two pages which were originally in it with a connecting page. That is merely adding a connecting page, My Lord.

The second is Document D-881 .. .

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to that on the part of the Defense?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think so, My Lord; I have not heard of any.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the documents relate to, did you say?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-n Yew: The diary of Admiral Assmann, who was on the staff of the Defendant Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is only a question of putting the exhibit in proper form.

The second document, My Lord, is D-881, which is another passage from the same diary, on 23 February 1940. I promised Your Lordship that I should put in an exhibit when I dealt with the diary in cross-examination; and, My Lord, the exhibit has been prepared, and I want to put it in under the Number GB-475. That is, Document D-881 will become Exhibit GB-475.

The third, which is in the same position as the second, is Document D-892. That exhibit has now been prepared and will become Exhibit GB-476. Copies are available for the defendants and will be given to them after the approval of the Court is given.

THE PRESIDENT: And copies, of course, will be supplied to the Court as well?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, My Lord. They are just awaiting the formal approval of the Court, and they will be submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David, that is all right.

Then, Sir David, we will consider the other matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.

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THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

Yes, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I just wanted to use this opportunity to submit to the Tribunal the affidavit of Robert Scholz, the Chief of Special Staff Rosenberg. It has been translated into English and French, and I should now like to submit it under Exhibit Number 41 to the Tribunal. I have already shown it to Mr. Dodd, and he has not objected.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, I wanted to ascertain whether and up to what date after this session we may submit affidavits and documents. The reason is that during recent days I have received two affidavits and a document, the relevance of which we have not yet definitely decided upon.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like to know when the Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense think would be the best time to deal with these matters which are outstanding and with any evidence which either the Defense or the Prosecution may wish to bring in rebuttal.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I have not had the chance of discussing it with any of the Counsel for the Defense; but I should have thought at the end of the evidence. One might reasonably hope that the evidence will finish this week. It might be possible to deal with it on Saturday morning or on Monday, and suit the Counsel for the Defense, and, of course, as the Tribunal decides.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal, I think, will expect the Defense Counsel and the Prosecution to be ready, directly when the end of the evidence comes, to deal with all these additional questions which are outstanding and also with any applications that they may have with reference to rebuttal.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I wanted that to be clearly understood, that it will be expected that it is to be done immediately the evidence closes. That, I think, answers Dr. Kraus' point about the affidavits and documents. That would be the most appropriate time.

Sir David, have you got any ideas as to how long that would take?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think a very short time. I should have thought that 2 days or thereabouts would see it through. I have discussed it with Mr. Dodd, and that was the view we took.

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In about 2 days at the outside?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the outside, My Lord, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.

[The witness Dieckhoff resumed the stand.]

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Witness, since what date do you know Herr Von Neurath?

DIECKHOFF: Since t913; I met him when I joined the Foreign Of lice. He was legation counsellor in the Foreign Office at that time. I then met him again in Constantinople, and there I had contact with him. Then I did not meet him again until 1930.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In what capacity did you have dealings with Herr Von Neurath beginning with 1930?

DIECKHOFF: Herr Von Neurath was then, from 1930 till 1932, Ambassador to London; and I was head of the Department "England-America" in the Foreign Office.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: How was the co-operation during that time between the Foreign Office-that is, yourself-and Herr Von Neurath, who was then Ambassador to London?

DIECKHOFF: The co-operation was excellent.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath's appointment to the position of Reich Foreign Minister?

DIECKHOFF: I remember that most of the leading officials of the Foreign Office were greatly upset by the sudden departure of Bruning, whose steady and moderate policy we approved at the time. We submitted to the change in the person of the Foreign Minister only because Neurath replaced Bruning and we knew that Herr Von Neurath was a man of high standards and an experienced diplomat. Furthermore, we knew that he had represented Bruning's policy in London; and we expected that as Foreign Minister he would continue Bruning's policy.

I welcomed Herr Von Neurath, I think it was on 2 June, at the station in Berlin when he arrived in Germany. From conversations with him I gathered the impression that he very much disliked to leave London and to take over the Foreign Ministry. But he said to me, "I do not think I shall be able to refuse the wish of the old gentleman." That, of course, was Reich President Von Hindenburg.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What position did you hold yourself during the time when you worked under Herr Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry?

DIECKHOFF: At first, I remained at the head of the England America Department until 1936. Afterward, in April 1936, I took

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over the re-established political department. In June State Secretary Von Bulow died, and in August 1936 I was appointed acting State Secretary in the Foreign Office. I remained in that provisional position until March 1937, and then I became Ambassador to Washington.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, as Foreign Minister, retain the old officials of the Foreign Of lice?

DIECKHOFF: He retained the old officials in practically all the leading positions of both the domestic and the foreign service. The State Secretary Von Bulow for instance remained for 4 years, until his death, in the same position in the Foreign Office.

He sent Ambassador Von Hoesch to London as his successor, and he sent Ambassador Von Hassell to Rome, and Ambassador Koster to Paris-all of these were old diplomatic officials.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us from your own experience during your activities what the aims of Neurath's foreign policy were?

DIECKHOFF: It was the aim of Herr Von Neurath to maintain good relations with all states and thereby to re-establish gradually Germany's status of equal rights which we had lost in 1919. This was the same policy that had been pursued by Stresemann and Bruning. Herr Von Neurath was aware of the difficulties of Germany's position. He talked to me about it repeatedly. He was under no misapprehension about it. He saw things realistically. His tendency was to exercise moderation.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Herr Von Neurath's entry into Hitler's Government, which was formed on 30 January 1933?

DIECKHOFF: I know about this only what I was told by State Secretary Von Bulow when I returned to Berlin from leave at the beginning of February 1933. According to this, Herr Von Neurath had no part in the formation of the new Cabinet, that is, Hitler's Cabinet. Apart from that, he was sick during that time. He heard of the plan of making Hitler Reich Chancellor and of forming a new government. He wanted to discuss it with Reich President Von Hindenburg in order to obtain certain reservations for himself; but he came too late and could not obtain these reservations. In spite of this, he retained the Foreign Ministry in the new Cabinet because he did not want to refuse the wish of the Reich President.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward the National Socialist domestic policy?

DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath, soon after 30 January 1933 viewed the domestic policy with some anxiety, chiefly

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because he felt that it strongly affected our foreign policy. When, in June 1933, I visited him in London, where he attended a conference as head of the German delegation, he told me about his anxieties; but he thought that these things would die down and that developments would be similar to those in Fascist Italy, where things had been very wild in the beginning, but had settled down afterward. He was hoping that the same would happen in Germany.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I am coming now to the year 1936. One of the principal questions which dominated that year was the Austrian problem. Can you tell us what Herr Von Neurath's attitude was toward the repeated interferences of German circles in the internal affairs of Austria?

DIECKHOFF: Yes. Herr Von Neurath considered such German interference in the internal affairs of Austria not only inadmissible but damaging. He told me so repeatedly. He was striving for an improvement of the economic relations with Austria and thereby trying to improve gradually the political relations also. He wanted to leave the sovereignty of Austria untouched. This was also the aim of the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria, that is, the economic strengthening of Austria and thereby the reestablishment of good political relations between the two countries.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you hear anything before March of 1938 that Hitler had the intention to incorporate Austria into Germany, if necessary, with force?

DIECKHOFF: No.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever hear anything before 1938 that Hitler had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or even to attack Czechoslovakia?

DIECKHOFF: No.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Hitler was in full agreement until November 1937 with the peaceful policy which Herr Von Neurath pursued with regard to both Austria and Czechoslovakia and also with regard to the other European countries?

DIECKHOFF: Until Herr Von Neurath's resignation in February 1938, I always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by Herr Von Neurath; and I never heard or learned anything to the contrary.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know what the thoughts, the considerations of Herr Von Neurath in 1935 were regarding the question of rearmament, that is to say, the re-establishment of Germany's military sovereignty?'

DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath held the view that Germany, by the declaration of the Western Powers on 11 December

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1932, had been granted equality of rights; and he considered her to have the indisputable right to rearm after all disarmament efforts had failed.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put the same question to you, with regard to the considerations and attitude of Herr Von Neurath, with reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland.

DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath was aware of the seriousness of this problem, for he knew that the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland was interconnected with the Locarno Pact; but I know that he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact in the Franco-Russian Agreement of Mutual Assistance concluded in May 1935 and that as a result of the ratification of this pact, or its going into effect, he firmly believed that Germany had the right to re-establish military sovereignty in the Rhineland.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was the general political situation in those days? Taking it into consideration, was it not justified to assume that sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem would be arrived at in any case?

DIECKHOFF: At any rate, the actual development after 7 March 1936 showed that the Western Powers, though they did not agree to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, nevertheless very quickly acquiesced in the fait accompli.

I was at that time, during the second half of March 1936, for 2 weeks in London on behalf of the Reich Government; and I had the opportunity to discuss this matter with many Englishmen; and the view I found in the widest circles was that as Germany had been granted equality of rights one could not deny her the right to remilitarize the Rhineland. In some circles I even found the view that it was a relief that the remilitarization of the Rhineland, which was due sooner or later in any case, was carried out so quickly and comparatively painlessly.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And now one last question. What do you know about Herr Von Neurath's resignation from the position of Reich Foreign Minister in February 1938?

DIECKHOFF: I was Ambassador to Washington at that time and I was completely surprised by Foreign Minister Von Neurath's sudden departure. I did know that there were many things he did not agree with and that he had asked several times to be allowed to resign. I also knew that he was ill; he suffered from a neurotic heart. I also knew that he had passed his sixty-fifth birthday, which gave him the right to retire. But I was surprised all the same, particularly as I did not know the details at that time. I regretted the resignation of the Foreign Minister, in whose peace policy I

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had confidence, very much. I remember that the official circles -in Washington also regretted the departure of Herr Von Neurath very much, for Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles approached me a few days after this event and told me that the American Government regretted the departure of this man who had pursued a moderate policy.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants' counsel wish to ask him any questions?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: One single question, Witness. You said that if Von Neurath assumed the office of Foreign Minister, you had expected that he would continue Stresemann's and Bruning's policy. According to your knowledge did he actually continue this policy of Bruning's after he became Foreign Minister?

DIECKHOFF: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on the same basis I intimated with regard to the last witness, the Prosecution do not desire to take up time by asking any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your permission to call my third and last witness, Dr. Volkers, into the witness stand.

[The witness Volkers took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

HANS HERMANN VOLKERS (witness): Hans Herman Volkers.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Witness, you were twice the personal adviser to Herr Von Neurath; first in his position as Foreign Minister and later in his position as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that correct?

VOLKERS: Yes; since 1920 I was a member of the Foreign Office, and I spent all my time abroad. Under Stresemann I spent 4 years in Geneva as Consul General and as the permanent German representative to the League of Nations; and in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and became personal adviser to the newly,

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appointed Foreign Minister, Herr Von Neurath. I remained in that position for a year; and then, upon my own request, I was sent to Madrid as Embassy Counsellor, and later I became Minister to Havana. In 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office to act as personal adviser with the title of chief of the office of Herr Von Neurath, who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector in Prague.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did this appointment as personal adviser to Herr Von Neurath in Prague take place on the basis of any personal relations or merely for professional reasons?

VOLKERS: Only for professional reasons. Until I was his attaché in Berlin I did not know Herr Von Neurath.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was the attitude of the officials of the Foreign Ministry toward Herr Von Neurath's appointment as Foreign Minister?

VOLKERS: I had the impression that the officials of the Foreign Office were generally most satisfied that in view of the difficult internal political situation an old professional diplomat and expert minister took over the direction of the Foreign Ministry, because they saw in that a guarantee for a steady foreign political course; all the more so as it was known that Herr Von Neurath had the special confidence of Reich President Von' Hindenburg and because he enjoyed, due to his entire personality and his equanimity, the special recognition and veneration of all the officials of the Foreign Office. '

When Hitler came to power I had the impression that he was skeptical and reserved toward him. He did not belong to the circle of the closer associates of Hitler, and during the time I was with him he never attended these evening conferences which Hitler held in the Reich Chancellery in those days.

Gradually, however, the pressure on the Foreign Office increased more and more. The Auslands-Organisation was created and the office of Ribbentrop started a competitive enterprise into which were called all sorts of people/who had been abroad. They made all sorts of reports which went directly to the Fuehrer without being controlled by the Foreign Office. And then later on the head of the Auslands-Organisation was installed as commissioner in the Foreign Office while Prince Waldeck was transferred into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At that stage the pressure became so strong that finally one could not fight against it any more.

But the fact that the Foreign Office had isolated itself for so long and that it was still evading the pressure of the Party, that, I think, is certainly the merit of the then Foreign Minister and his

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State Secretary Von Bulow. When the Jewish laws were then introduced into the Foreign Office, too, I know that Herr Von Neurath protected, as far as that was possible, his officials. I was in Stockholm during the last 2 years of the war and met there two former colleagues of mine with whom I am close friends. One is Ministerial Director Richard Meter who used to be in charge of the Eastern department and who had to leave quite soon and who often told me in Stockholm how grateful he was to Herr Von Neurath for not only having enabled him to take with him his family and his furniture and everything when he went abroad but also that Herr Von Neurath, until the collapse, continued to pay him his monthly pensions in Swedish kroner.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was your position and your activity in Prague in the Government of the Protectorate?

VOLKERS: My position in Prague with the Government of the Protectorate was approximately the same as the one I had 7 years earlier when I had been personal adviser to the Foreign Minister in the Foreign Office in Berlin, with the exception that in the Foreign Office there is a special protocol department and a chief of protocol, whereas in Prague I was also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs, and that was really my chief occupation. I was head of the so-called Office of the Reich Protector, not to be confused with the principal authority, with which I had nothing to do. When I came to Prague in the summer of 1939 the office already had been functioning for several months. My predecessor was one Legation Counsellor Von Kessel from the Foreign Office. Apart from myself two other officials from the Foreign Office, who were subordinated to me, belonged to the Office of the Reich Protector, also one Count Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech and who was engaged by the Reich Protector because he was hoping to establish, especially through him, good relations with the Czechs.

The office was responsible, apart from the general and usual routine matters, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of personal petitions. In the course of time we had to set up a special department, because later on, when the many arrests took place, we received so many petitions, most of which were addressed to the Reich Protector personally.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, surely this is very remote from anything we have got to consider, and all the previous evidence this witness has given has been cumulative evidence which has not been cross-examined upon before; and now what he is saying is all very remote to anything we have to consider.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In fact, I have already come to an end, Mr. President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer the following questions from his own knowledge.

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[Turning to the witness.] What can you tell us from your own observations and experiences about the attitude of Herr Von Neurath toward the Czechs?

VOLKERS: I can give you only general impressions. As I have already told you, I had nothing to do with the actual activities of the office but was attached to Herr Von Neurath personally only for his private affairs and all ceremonial matters. But I. do know, and he told me, that when he took over his position as Reich Protector, he did so with the intention of treating the Czech population as justly and decently as possible in order to create, by smoothing out the differences, a healthy basis for a peaceful living, side by side, of the two nations. He told me frequently that he was appointed Reich Protector, that is, protector of the Czechs; and we knew that the last German Ambassador in Prague, Dr.Eisenlohr, had often reported that the last Czechoslovakian Government, for their part, had been prepared to effect an Anschluss with Germany. He was an opponent of using military measures, and Herr Von Neurath told me when I came to Prague-I think it was in September 1938-that he had expressed himself very strongly against their use and that he together with Goering had visited Hitler in Munich in order to dissuade him from that.

In my office I experienced again and again that Herr Von Neurath-shall I go on-was very open-handed toward the Czechs with regard to petitions. He had a lot of sympathy and understanding; he examined each individual case, and that was very well known among the Czechs. And as we in this office had the possibility of submitting each single request and petition of Czech individuals directly to the highest chief, the Czech petitioners very frequently and gladly used this channel because the prospects for a positive action on their private requests and petitions through the highest local chief promised to be much more favorable than if they were quickly processed by the authorities concerned in the Government. Particularly this practice brought us in conflict with the State Secretary...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Ludinghausen, this witness is simply making speeches, you know. You are not asking him any questions at all. He is simply going on...

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Witness, what do you know about the personal and official relationship between Von Neurath and the President of State Hacha?

VOLKERS: According to my observations, the personal and official relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State Hacha was excellent; and I believe that this was not merely a matter of form, but I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath

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really and sincerely liked the President of State because he considered him a very decent and upright man who, under the existing circumstances . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your counsel has heard enough of your answer, surely you can stop.. .

VOLKERS: Very well.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was the relationship between Herr Von Neurath and the State Secretary attached to him, Frank?

VOLKERS: That was a very bad one. Herr Von Neurath told me already at the time when I assumed my office that he had had considerable difficulties with him because of his definite anti-Czech attitude, as a Sudeten German-an attitude which a Reich German could not easily understand. He had always hoped, however, that Frank, who was not a civil servant but an outsider, would gradually follow his policy and adapt himself to the civil service staff. But unfortunately this was not possible. I do not know when...

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you describe to us briefly what the actual official powers of Herr Von Neurath and Frank were in relation to each other?

VOLKERS: Herr Von Neurath was the superior of the State Secretary. The State Secretary was in charge of the entire internal administration, which was a very large one. Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who I think has been examined already before this High Tribunal, worked under him. Besides being State Secretary, Frank was also the Higher Police and SS Leader.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, did Herr Von Neurath have a certain influence on this part of Frank's activities, that is to say, in his capacity as Higher SS and Police Leader?

VOLKERS: The way conditions were he had practically no influence. I do not know whether in the beginning the matter had already been legally settled. In practice, however, the Police and the State Secretary were completely independent from Herr Von Neurath regarding police measures. This had some connection with the situation in the Reich, where Himmler, too, led the entire Police and SS, having taken the police powers away from the Ministry of the Interior. As far as I can remember, the matter was legally settled in the autumn of 1939 to the effect that the Police was independent and that Herr Von Neurath was to be informed afterward of all measures taken.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: You mean by that the decree regarding the organization of the administration and the German Security Police in the Protectorate, under date of 1 September 1939?

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VOLKERS: Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to the administration and the second part to the Police.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that the wording of this decree is contained in my document book under Number Neurath-149.

THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence?

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you that I have presented it.

[Turning to the witness.] Was Herr Von Neurath at least informed afterward, in accordance with the instructions, of the police actions which Frank carried out independently?

VOLKERS: The Chief of the Police was an SS man by the name of Bohme. He used to report to the Reich Protector several times each week. I do not believe that he informed him in advance of intended police actions. We never heard anything like that. Whether he reported such actions afterward and in their entirety is something which I cannot say. The rule was that the Reich Protector sent to him, for comment, the various petitions from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested and that Bohme would bring them along when he came to report. That was generally the way the Reich Protector was afterward informed.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Well then, when Herr Von Neurath was later on informed of such police measures, no matter in which way, did he make attempts for the suspension of arrests or for any limitation and mitigation of such police measures?

VOLKERS: As I have already told you, we had set up in the small office of the Reich Protector a special department for the purpose of receiving such applications. This department, which of course was directly under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector, did everything possible in order to reassure the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these local departments, the local police chief and also State Secretary Frank, usually took a negative attitude. Again and again the Reich Protector would then appeal directly to Himmler and very often to the Fuehrer himself. I know and remember that there was a very excited correspondence with Himmler and that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly complained to the Fuehrer about this.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you judge, or can you tell us how far Herr Von Neurath, as Reich Protector, apart from the Police and police measures, was free and independent in his political and economic measures and orders, or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving those?

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VOLKERS: When I came to Prague there were all sorts of other offices beside that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich Commissioner for Economy who, as far as I can remember and as I heard at the time, had already begun to exercise his functions when the Office of the Reich Protector had not yet been established. Then there was a Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and there was the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Even the Party agencies were not centrally organized. Prague and the north belonged to the Sudetengau under Gauleiter Henlein; the whole of Moravia belonged to the Niederdonau Gau, under Gauleiter Dr. Jury; and the west belonged to a third Gaul All these Gauleiter tried, in turn, on their part...

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, is it not, and quite unnecessary detail?

DR. VON LUDI