

*On Global Citizenship and Imperialism Today:
Two ways of thinking about global citizenship*

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ABSTRACT

This lecture examines two important meanings and practices of global citizenship, often called ‘modern and diverse’ or ‘civil and civic’. The history of modern civil citizenship within European nation states is discussed first, and then the global spread of modern civil and cosmopolitan (global) citizenship and its underlying economic, legal and political institutions by means of Western imperialism and modernization. The history of diverse citizenship is examined in the same way and by means of a series of contrasts, first within Europe (civic citizenship) and then globally as glocal citizenship. The main argument is that many of the struggles over global citizenship from above or below are struggles over and by means of these two types of citizenship. The lecture is a précis of my larger work on global and glocal citizenship: ‘On Local and Global Citizenship’, chapter 9 of *Imperialism and Civic Freedom*, Volume 2 of James Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key*, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming summer 2008.

I. TWO CONTESTED WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

'Global citizenship' has emerged as the locus of struggles on the ground and of reflection and contestation in theory. This is scarcely surprising. Many of the central and most enduring struggles in the history of politics have taken place *in* and *over* the language of citizenship and the activities and institutions into which it is woven. One could say that the hopes and dreams and fears and xenophobia of centuries of individual and collective political actors are expressed in the overlapping and conflicting histories of the uses of the language of citizenship and the forms of life in which they have been employed. This motley ensemble of contested languages, activities and institutions constitutes the inherited *field* of citizenship today.

The language of 'global' and 'globalization' and the activities, institutions and processes to which it refers and in which it is increasingly used, while more recent than citizenship, comprise a similarly central and contested domain. Globalization has become a shared yet disputed vocabulary in terms of which rival interpretations of the ways humans and their habitats are governed globally are presented and disputed in both practice and theory. It thus constitutes a similarly contested *field* of globalization.

When 'globalization' and 'citizenship' are combined they not only bring their contested histories of meanings with them. They bring into being a complex new field that raises new questions and elicits new answers concerning the meaning of, and relationship between, global governance and global citizenship. When we enquire into global citizenship, therefore, we are already thrown into this remarkably complex inherited field of contested languages, activities, institutions, processes and the environs in which they take place. This conjoint field is the problematization of global citizenship: the way that formerly disparate activities, institutions and processes have been gathered together under the rubric of 'global citizenship', become the site of

contestation in practice and formulated as a problem in research, policy and theory, and to which diverse solutions are presented and debated.¹

Among the many contested meanings of global citizenship I will focus on two. Many of the most important struggles around the globe today are *over* these two types and the struggles themselves consist in the enactment of these two modes of citizenship in two corresponding practices of global citizenship. They have been interpreted in different ways under different names in a variety of activist and academic literature: for example, global citizenship from above *versus* global citizenship from below, low intensity *versus* high intensity global citizenship, representative *versus* direct, hegemonic *versus* counter-hegemonic, cosmopolitan *versus* place-based. I call these two families 'modern' and 'diverse' citizenship. I call modern citizenship in a modern state 'civil' citizenship and in a global context 'cosmopolitan' citizenship. The corresponding names of diverse citizenship are 'civic' and 'glocal'. 'Glocal' and 'glocalization' in the diverse citizenship tradition refer to the global networking of local practices of civic citizenship in contrast to the use of 'global' and 'globalization' in modern/cosmopolitan citizenship. I begin with a preliminary sketch of one aspect of the two meanings and practices of citizenship as a way of introducing them.

The most familiar aspect of modern citizenship is its role as the modular form of citizenship associated with the historical processes of modernization/colonization: (1) the modernization of the West into modern nation states with representative governments, a system of international law, decolonization of European empires, supranational regime formations and global civil society; and, in tandem, (2) the dependent modernization and citizenisation of the non-West through colonization, the Mandate System, post-decolonization nation-building and global governance. The language of modern citizenship, in its civil and cosmopolitan forms, presents successive idealizations of this type of citizenship as the uniquely *universal* practice of citizenship for all human societies. This allegedly universal mode of citizenship is also presented as the product of *universal* historical processes or stages of development under successive

discourses of progress – civilization, modernization, constitutionalisation, democratization and now globalization – that began in Europe and have been spread around the world by Euroamerican expansion and continuing hegemony. These two features of modern citizenship – a universal modular form of citizenship conjoined with a universal set of historical processes that bring it to the non-West under western tutelage – are articulated and debated in, respectively, modern normative theories of citizenship and social scientific theories of modernization from the eighteenth-century to today.²

In contrast, diverse citizenship is associated with a diversity or multiplicity of different practices of citizenship in the West and the non-West. The language of diverse citizenship, both civic and glocal, presents citizenship as a singular or ‘local’ practice that takes countless *forms* in different locales. It is not described in terms of universal institutions and historical processes but, rather, in terms of the grass roots democratic or civic *activities* of the ‘governed’ (the people) in the specific relationships of governance in the environs where they act and of the glocal *activities* of networking with other practices. The local languages of description (stories) of particular citizenship practices are accepted initially and then compared and contrasted critically along various axes and purposes with other practices in dialogues of translation, understanding and critique. Whereas modern citizenship focuses on citizenship as a universalizable legal *status* underpinned by institutions and processes of rationalization that enable and circumscribe the possibility of civil activity (an institutional/universal orientation), diverse citizenship focuses on the singular civic activities and improvisations of the governed in any practice of government and the diverse ways these are more or less institutionalised or blocked in different contexts (a civic activity/contextual orientation). Citizenship is not a status given by the institutions of the modern constitutional state and international law, but negotiated practices in which one becomes a citizen through participation.

II MODERN CIVIL CITIZENSHIP

The tradition of modern citizenship takes as its empirical and normative exemplar the form of citizenship characteristic of the modern nation state.³ Citizenship (both civil and cosmopolitan) is defined in relation to two clusters of institutional features of modern nation states: the constitutional rule of law (*nomos*) and representative government (*demos*). The constitutional rule of law is the first condition of citizenship. The ‘civil’ law (a formal legal order) and its enforcement by a coercive authority establishes (literally ‘constitutes’) the conditions of civilization, the city (*civitas*), citizenship, civil society, civil liberty and civility (hence ‘civil’ citizenship). By definition the ‘outside’ is the realm of the uncivilized: barbarism, savagery, the state of nature or war, or the uncertainty of informal, customary law and unenforceable natural law. A person has the status of citizenship in virtue of being *subject* to civil law in two senses: to an established and enforced system of law and to the ‘civilizing’, ‘pacifying’ or ‘socializing’ force of the rule of law on the subjectivity of those who are constrained to obey over time. This is why cosmopolitan citizenship and global civil society depend on some form of legalization or constitutionalisation of the global order analogous (in various ways) to the modern nation state.

Relative to the constitutional rule of law, modern citizenship is defined as a *status* (state or condition). This civil status is usually explicated and defined in terms of the historical development of *four tiers of rights and duties* (liberties) of formally equal individual subjects of an association of constitutional rule of law and representative government. This association is either the modern nation state, including its subordinate provinces and cities, or its analogous associations for cosmopolitan citizenship (international law, the United Nations, global governance institutions). I will start with the four citizenship rights and duties within modern nation states as these are the basis for modern/cosmopolitan global citizenship.

The first and indispensable tier of rights is the set of ‘civil liberties’ (the liberties of the moderns or ‘private autonomy’) of the modern liberal tradition. This set includes the liberty of the

person and of speech, thought and faith, the right to own private property and enter into contracts, and the right to formal equality before the law. In virtue of these civil liberties citizens are ‘at liberty’ to engage in these activities if they choose (an ‘opportunity’ status) and are protected by the law from ‘interference’ in the spheres where these rights can be exercised: of free speech and voluntary association, the market, and the law respectively. They are classic ‘negative’ liberties, protecting persons or citizens from interference in these spheres.

At the centre of these civil liberties is the modern liberty to participate in the private economic sphere and not to be interfered with in it – the right to own property and enter into contracts. This is the modern liberty to engage in the capitalist economy (market freedoms and free trade): to sell one’s labouring abilities on the market for a wage to a corporation or, for those with the capital, to establish a corporation, hire the labour of others and sell competitively the products on the free market to consumers. Private corporations gained recognition as ‘persons’ with the corresponding civil liberty of private autonomy (negative liberty) in the late-nineteenth century. Thus, paradoxically from a civic perspective, the first right of modern citizenship is to participate in the private realm and to be protected from interference by the *demos* (the citizenry and its representatives). This form of participation in the economic sphere (‘commercial society’) is primary - the liberty of the moderns.

The modern civil liberty of private property and contracts accordingly *presupposes* the historical dispossession of people from access to land and resources through their local laws and non-capitalist economic organizations; the accumulation of dispossessed workers into a ‘free’ market of wage labourers and consumers; the concentration of the means of production in private corporations; and the imposition of modern legal systems of property law, contract law, labour law, and trade law that constitute and protect the system of free markets and free trade. Modern citizenship, in its basic commitment to the civil liberty of private property and contracts, is grounded in and dependent on the spread of these institutions of capitalism. It is also the major justification for the spread of these economic institutions – they are the basis of modern liberty.

Moreover, it is not only the civil law acting alone that is said to civilise the uncivilized or less-developed peoples. 'Commerce' or 'economic liberalization' (a synonym for modern globalization), by rendering every person and society economically interdependent and competitive within an imposed structure of law, pacifies, refines, polishes, makes predictable, and thus - in tandem with representative government – leads humanity to perpetual peace.

The second tier of liberties of modern citizenship is defined in relation to the second cluster of modern institutions: representative government. They consist in the rights to participate in these institutions if one chooses. In the language of modern citizenship 'democracy' and 'democratic' are equated with and restricted to 'representative government' and 'democratization' with and to the historical processes that bring these representative institutions and rights to participate into being. Other forms of democracy, if they are discussed *as* democracies, are described as less-developed forms of the universal and regulative ideal of 'democracy' (as in the case of 'citizenship' above). These rights of the modern democratic tradition are called public autonomy or the liberties of the ancients. They comprise the ways the *demos* – the citizenry of a nation state as a whole – legally exercise their popular sovereignty. The exercise of these 'democratic' rights enables the people to have a say both within and over the laws and constitutions to which they are subject (and from which their citizenship derives) and thereby to balance the constitutional rule of law with the demands of democracy (the rule of the people). These civil rights include such liberties as: the right to vote for representatives in elections, join parties, interest groups, non-governmental organizations and social movements, stand for election, assemble, dissent and demonstrate in the civil or public sphere, freedom of the press, engage in democratic deliberations, litigate in the Courts, exchange public reasons over constitutional amendments or participate in a constituent assembly, and, at their fullest, to engage in some forms of civil disobedience and accept the punishment.

Like civil liberties and their institutional preconditions, these democratic liberties *presuppose* historically the dispossession of people from access to political power through pre-

existing local forms of government and citizenship and the channeling of democratic citizenship into participation in the official public sphere of modern representative governments and its global analogue of global civil society. These processes are described as freeing people from pre-modern forms of subjection and bringing democratic citizenship to them. Second, participation is equated with activities of public arguing (deliberating), bargaining (organizing, negotiating and protesting) and litigating over changing the laws, since political power is presumed to be exercised through the rule of law. The objective is to ensure that the law is not imposed unilaterally on those subject to it, but, rather, that they have a say, representatively, in making or amending the laws, and thus can see themselves as co-authors or, more accurately, co-articulators, of the laws to which they are subject *en passant*. The activity of participation thus replicates the ground plan of modern citizenship because the people participate *as* legal citizens exercising their democratic rights and within the constraints of modern civil liberties (even when the people act together and exercise the modern right of self-determination they do so within this juridical-representative framework).

The second tier democratic liberties of the modern are also circumscribed by the first tier civil liberties in three main ways. Their exercise is optional. A member of a modern political association is a citizen and the association is democratic whether or not one exercises rights to participate. Second, the primary use and justification of these rights in the modern tradition is to fight for laws that protect the private liberty of the moderns from too much governmental interference. Third, these rights cannot be extended and exercised in the private sphere (as in economic democracy in the workplace) for this would interfere with tier one liberties. When the leaders of the great powers today (the G8) speak of the spread of 'freedom' and 'democracy' in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, they are referring to the module of tier one (liberties) and tier two (democracy) rights of citizenship and their underlying institutions of the constitutional rule of law, markets, representative government, and the military as the enforcement institution.

The third and weakest tier of modern rights of citizenship comprises the social and economic rights of the modern social democratic tradition. These are the citizenship rights won by working class movements struggling within the historically established priority and constraints of tiers one and two liberties over the last two centuries in nation states and international law. They are a response to the horrendous substantive inequalities in wealth, well-being, living conditions and social power that go along with the unrestrained formal equality of tier one civil liberties and the limited democratic rights of tier two. The modern social democratic argument for them is that they are the *minimum conditions* of the worst off being able to exercise their civil and democratic liberties. The argument against them is that they violate the economic liberties of the moderns by interfering in the private sphere and economic competition, and thus always must be subordinated to tier one civil liberty and the limits of tier two. Under the current economic liberalization policies of states and institutions of global governance these rights are seen, at best, as means of enabling individuals to exercise their tier one and two rights.

The fourth tier of citizenship rights consists of modern minority rights of multiculturalism, religious and ethnic groups, non-state nations, and Indigenous peoples. These rights appear to some modern theorists to violate one of the premises of modern citizenship, the primacy of the individual legal subject. However, minority rights can be defined as rights that, first, protect the *individual members* of minorities from interference or dominance by the majority (and by the powerful within the minority) and, second, empower members of minorities to exercise their civil and democratic liberties in more effective ways than through the institutions of the dominant society. They thus can be designed to enhance, rather than to challenge, the spread of modern citizenship, and this is the major way that they have been implemented under modern nation states and international law. That is, they too presuppose the dispossession of ‘minorities’ of their own forms of legal, governmental and economic organization and processes of integrating them into modern forms of citizenship.

Within Europe, this modular form of modern citizenship became the paramount practice of citizenship during the centralization and consolidation of the modern constitutional representative nation state and the capitalist economy. Diverse local and regional forms of laws, governments, democracy and citizenship – of village commons and free city communes - where they were not destroyed completely, were marginalized or transformed and subordinated as they were brought under the rationalization of the central institutions of the modern nation state. Modern citizenship was nationalized at the same time as local citizenship was subalternized. The people were socialized by education, urbanization, military duty, industrialization and modern citizenship to see themselves first and foremost, not as citizens of their local communities, but as members of an abstract and ‘disembedded’ imaginary community of nation, *demos* and *nomos* of formally free and equal yet materially unequal citizens, with an equally abstract imaginary of popular sovereignty they mythically embodied and exercised through the individual liberties of modern citizenship attached to the central legal and representative institutions. These dispossessions and transformations, and the countless resistances to them, were described and justified in the social scientific language of modern citizenship as processes and stages of developments of modernization that freed individuals from the backwardness of pre-modern customary practices and made him and then her free and equal citizens.

Citizens and especially non-citizens – such as the poor, the propertyless, women, immigrants, excluded ‘races’, and others – struggled (and continue to struggle) within-and-against these processes in Europe. When they were not struggling for their local ways, they organized to be included in modern citizenship, to extend the use of political rights beyond the official public sphere, and to gain social and economic rights and minority rights that do more than protect individuals from the majority. These are ‘civic activities’ against the powerful actors who seek to circumscribe citizenship to tier one civil liberties and a limited module of democratic rights. Since these types of struggles are *for* new kinds of citizenship and *by means of* people who are not official citizens or official citizens who often act beyond the official limits of citizenship

of their generation, they cannot be called practices of citizenship in the modern tradition. They are acts of 'civil disobedience'. If these illegal struggles are successful and the extensions institutionalized, then the extensions are redescribed as a stage in the development of modern citizenship (as in the case of working class struggles giving rise to social and economic rights and suffragette movements giving rise to women's right to vote). Thus, what are seen as two of the fundamental features of citizenship from the civic tradition – the historical struggles for diverse local forms of citizenship and for extensions of national citizenship rights – fall outside of citizenship for the modern tradition with its institutional orientation.

III. THE GLOBALIZATION OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP

I want now to examine how the modular form of modern citizenship has been spread around the globe as 'global citizenship'.⁴ It has been and is being globalized in two forms. *First*, the module of a modern nation state and its institutions of modern *civil* citizenship, at some 'stage of development' towards its mature form, has been and continues to be spread around the world as the universal form of political association recognized as the bearer of legitimate political authority (sovereignty) under international law. *Second*, a modular form of modern *cosmopolitan* citizenship, also at some stage of development towards its mature form, has been and continues to be spread around the world as the universal form of global citizenship recognized as legitimate under international law and global institutions.

During the long period when Europeans were building modern nation states with institutions of modernizing citizenship they were also, and simultaneously, building these states as competing *imperial* modern nation states. As imperial states they built and defended vast overseas empires that colonized (in various ways) eight-five percent of the world's population by 1914. The imperial 'great game' of competing economically and militarily against other European great powers over the control and exploitation of the resources, labour and markets of the non-European world *and* the counter-actions of the non-European peoples *co-created* the modern west and the modern colonized non-west. After decolonization in the twentieth century, this unequal relationship continues between the former imperial powers (renamed the 'great eight' or 'great twenty') exercising 'hegemony' rather than 'imperium' through the post-WWII institutions of global governance and the renamed 'post-colonial' world of more than 120 nominally free and equal ('sovereign') yet substantively still *dependent* and *unequal* new modernizing nation states, constructed on the foundations of the former colonies. The spread of the institutions of modern citizenship beyond Europe can be understood only in the context of this

complex contrapuntal ensemble of Western strategies of expansion and non-Western strategies of counteraction.⁵

The institutional conditions of modern citizenship were spread in the course of European expansion by a deceptively simple strategy that linked a right of global citizenship to imperial power in a circular relationship. Initially formulated and exercised in different ways by the European imperial powers, this right of global citizenship for Europeans is called the right of commerce (*ius commercium*) or ‘cosmopolitan’ right. From the earliest phase of European expansion to today the great powers have claimed the cosmopolitan right of *their* citizens, trading companies, monopoly companies, and multinational corporations to travel to other countries and attempt to engage in ‘commerce’ in two senses of this term. The *first* is to travel the globe freely and converse with the inhabitants of other societies. This covers such activities as the right – and also as the *duty* - of Western explorers, missionaries, religious organizations, voluntary associations, and academics to travel to non-western countries to, first, study and classify their different customs and ways into developmental stages of different societies and races, and, second, try to free them from their ‘inferior’ ways and teach them the uniquely civilized ways of the West. This cosmopolitan right is the historical antecedent of the right of modern cosmopolitan citizenship of civil society associations (modern NGOs) and western academics to modernize and democratize people in the post-colonial world today by bringing them the institutional preconditions and forms of subjectivity of modern citizenship. The *second* sense of this cosmopolitan right is to travel and try to engage in ‘commerce’ (trade) with the inhabitants: to enter into contracts and treaties, gain access to resources, buy slaves, hire and discipline labourers, establish trading posts, and so on. At first it was used by the European powers to establish imperial monopolies over the exploitation of the resources and labour of non-European societies, but monopoly imperialism gradually gave way to ‘free trade’ imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

This right correlates with the duty of ‘hospitality’ of the host country to open their doors to free commerce in this dual sense. If they close the door to entry, break the contract or expropriate the property of a foreigner who has engaged in commerce, or if they expel the voluntary societies, then the appropriate recognized legal authority - under the old law of nations, or imperial law of the respective empire, or, later, international law - has a reciprocal right to open the door by diplomacy or military intervention, punish the violation of the cosmopolitan right and demand reparations or compensation (even for damages caused by the intervention). This correlative duty of hospitality - openness to free commerce - holds even if the cosmopolitan right was initially exercised unjustly: that is where a trading company used force and fraud to establish trade relations and contracts in the first place. This early-modern duty of non-European societies to open themselves to commerce dominated by the West continues to be one of the core duties of transnational trade law agreements today.

As with modern civil liberty within a modern state, this cosmopolitan right *presupposes* a number of institutions. The host country must either have or adopt the legal, economic and cultural institutions that make possible commerce in this broad sense (private property, corporations, contracts, wage labour, markets dominated by the West, openness to cultural conversion, protection of foreigners, and so on). The imperial power must either submit to and modify the local laws and institutions or impose a structure of commercial law that overrides and restructures them, such as Merchant’s Law (*lex mercatoria*), a vast system of global trade law that developed in tandem with western imperialism.

As we can see, this cosmopolitan right is a right of citizens of the civilized states to exercise the first right of modern citizenship (civil liberties) and a version of the second right (to participate) *beyond their nation state*, and to be protected from interference in so doing. The two cosmopolitan rights - of the trading company to trade and the voluntary organizations to converse and convert – also fit together in the same way as within the nation state. The participatory right to converse with and try to convert the natives complements the primary right of commerce since

the inhabitants are taught the requisite forms of subjectivity and modes of civil conduct that go along with the commercialization of their society and its gradual civilization: from the discipline of slavery and indentured labour at the bottom to the training of dependent elites at the top. From the perspective of the language of modern citizenship, the two rights of cosmopolitan citizenship appear to globalize the civilizing institutions of law, commerce and western civility across an uncivilized or semi-civilized or less-developed world, thereby laying the foundations for an eventual world of modern civil citizenship in modern nation states. From the perspective of the non-Western civilizations and of diverse citizenship, the two cosmopolitan rights appear as the Trojan horse of western imperialism.⁶

In practice, this strategy was employed to globalize modern citizenship in *three main ways*. *First*, settler colonies were established that *replicated* the basic features legal, political and economic institutions of the imperial country. These ‘new Europes’ were established in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand and later in Africa by dispossessing Indigenous peoples of their diverse civilizations, territories, resources and citizenship practices, exterminating eighty to ninety percent of the population (which was larger than Europe at the time), marginalizing those they could not enslave or indenture, importing 12 millions slaves from Africa onto plantations in North and South America and the Caribbean, and imposing the civilizing institutions of property and contract law and rudimentary representative government (colonial legislatures).

Second, by ‘indirect’ imperial rule, non-Western societies were opened to commerce by establishing a small colonial administration, often run by trading companies, to rule indirectly over a much larger indigenous population. A centralized system of western colonial law was used to protect the commercial rights of their citizens and traders, while also preserving and modifying the local customary laws and governments so resources and labour were privatized and subject to trade, labour discipline and investment dominated by the Western trading companies. Local rulers were recognized as quasi-sovereigns and unequal treaties negotiated. The local elites were made dependent on western economic and military power, undermining their accountability their local

citizens, and employed to introduce modernizing techniques of governance, train the local armies to protect the system of property, often against the majority of their own population. This was the major way that the institutional preconditions of modern civil citizenship were introduced in India, Ceylon, Africa and the Middle East.

The third and most recent way is through ‘informal’ or ‘free trade’ imperialism. Here the imperial powers permits local self-rule, and eventually self-determination, but within a protectorate or sphere of influence over which they exercise informal ‘paramountcy’ (now called ‘hegemony’ or ‘dominance’). By various informal means they induce the local governments to open their resources, labour and markets to free trade by establishing the appropriate modern local legal, political and economic institutions – the foundations for eventual modern citizenship, with civil liberties preceding and circumscribing the other rights. The means include: economic, military, technological, educational and aid dependency; the modernization of the population by Western experts and civil society organizations; bribes and threats; and frequent military intervention when local citizens resist. This requires in turn small but effective military bases strategically located around the world and supported by a global navy and (later) air force and satellite surveillance. The informal imperial powers are thus able to intervene whenever the local population tries to take control of their own economy through their own government and citizenship practices and thus violate the duty of openness free trade. This type of imperialism was introduced by the British in the nineteenth century, but the United States has become the global leader of informal or ‘open door’ imperialism, first in Latin America and then throughout the former colonial world by the end of the Cold War. The United States now has over 760 small military bases around the world and the Pentagon claims to exercise ‘full spectrum dominance’ over an informal global system of commerce and freedom.

The cosmopolitan right and its three modes of imposition were gathered together and formalized as *The Standard of Civilization* in the creation of modern international law during the nineteenth century. The European imperial nation states (and the United States after 1895)

declared themselves to be ‘civilized states’ in virtue of their institutions of modern statehood and citizenship (modern rule of law, open to commerce, representative government and modern liberty). As such they were the sole bearers of sovereignty and subject only to the laws they could agree to among themselves: ‘international’ law. Their modern institutions provided a ‘standard of civilization’ in international law by which they judged all other civilizations in the world as ‘uncivilized’ to varying degrees (depending on their stage of development) and thus not sovereign subjects of international law, but subjects of the sovereign powers through colonies, indirect protectorates, and informal spheres of influence. They asserted a right and duty of civilization under international law. ‘Civilization’ referred to the historical process of modernization and the end-point of a modern state like the European model. The duty to civilize consisted in the consolidation and international legalization of the imperial processes they began in the earlier period. The opening of non-European societies to European-dominated commerce, exploitation of their resources and labour, and the destruction or marginalization of ‘uncivilized’ ways that hindered this ‘progress’ were seen as the first steps in the civilizing mission. The second and equally important duty was to introduce into the colonies and protectorates more systematic and effective forms of colonial governance (or *governmentalité*) that would shape and form the dependent peoples and ‘races’ into civilized subjects eventually capable of modern self-government.

This global civilizing project under international law lacked an enforcement mechanism and the civilizing duty was left to the sovereign empires and their voluntary organizations. The destruction, exploitation, despotism, genocide and wars continued apace and increased after the failure of the Berlin Conference (1884) and the ‘scramble over Africa’, eventually cumulating in the barbarism of World War I (the ‘great war of civilization’). In response to these horrors and to control increasing demands for decolonization, the first concerted attempt to operationalize the civilizing duty under international law was the *Mandate System* under the League of Nations. The League classified the ‘subject’ peoples into three categories according to their level of

'backwardness' and gave the respective imperial powers the mandate to civilize them as they increased their economic exploitation, especially in the oil-rich Middle East.

This project was interrupted by the *decolonization* movements of the mid-century. Although the people fought for freedom from imperial dependency on the West or the Soviet Union and the development of their own forms of self-government and citizenship, the westernized nationalist elites (subject to economic and military dependency) and the informal means of the great powers ensured the continuation of the civilizing and modernizing processes. During the Cold War and the phases of post-independence dependency, the nation-building elites were constrained to destroy or subordinate local economies, governments and citizenship practices, entrench or extend the artificial colonial boundaries, centralize and nationalize governments into the armed nation-state module, open their resources to free trade and promise minimal institutions of modern citizenship, or face military intervention. The result tended to be constitutional and institutional structures that concentrated power at the centre, often entrenching the worst features of colonial administration, or replicating the concentration of power in both urban and rural regions characteristic of the divide and conquer model of indirect imperial rule (as in much of Africa).

During the same period, the great powers set up the institutions of global governance through which informal hegemony and post-colonial subalternity could be continued: the concentration of power in the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Trade Organization after 1995 (WTO) and its transnational trade agreements (such as TRIPS and GATTs), modernizing NGOs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States' system of global military dominance.

At the request of the newly independent states, the language of civilization was removed from international law and the United Nations. However, it was immediately replaced with the language of modernization, marketization, democratization and globalization with the same

grammatical structure, signifying universal processes of development and a single endpoint of modern citizenship and its institutions. These are now to be brought about, not by the 'civilizing mission' of the imperial powers, but by the 'global governance' of the informal federations or coalitions of the modern (or post-modern) states imposing 'good governance' through the global institutions (WB and IMF), their multinational corporations (exercising the cosmopolitan right of commerce), and official NGOs (exercising their cosmopolitan citizenship) building civil societies and civil subjects on the ground. As the leaders of the decolonization movements recognized after independence, they were thus conscripted into a familiar script, but now in a vocabulary of a world system of free and equal nation states that erased any reference to the imperial construction of this world and the persistence of imperial relations of inequality and exploitation.⁷

The difference from the old colonial strategies of spreading the institutional preconditions of modern citizenship is that the formerly colonized peoples are now seen as active, self-governing agents in these processes at home and in the institutions of global governance (the G120) - and thus bearers of modern civil and cosmopolitan citizenship - yet still under the enlightened leadership of the more advanced or developed peoples. International law provides the legal basis for this by promoting a 'right to democracy', and democracy is equated with tier one civil liberties (neo-liberal marketization) and a short list of democratic rights (elections). However, if, as often happens, the majority of the people become too democratic and seek to exercise their right of self-determination by taking democratic control of their own government and local economy, and thus violate their duty to open their doors to multinational corporations and subordination to a global economy, one of two strategies of modernization follow. They are either repressed by their own dependent elites, democratic rights are further reduced or eliminated, and the government becomes more authoritarian. Or, if the people manage to gain power, the repertoire of covert and overt informal means available to the great powers are employed to destabilize and undermine the government, bring about regime change, and institute structural adjustment policies that promote tier one civil liberties of individuals and corporations.

The coercive imposition of the global market and the market discipline of civil liberty is said to come first and lay the foundation for democratic rights. The result in either case is the suppression or severe restriction of democratic citizenship, the corresponding rise of a militarized authoritarian rule and market freedoms on one side and violent authoritarian resistance movements on the other. The countries that are subject to these horrendous oscillations are said to be 'failed states', military intervention follows, resistance intensifies, and instability continues.

The consequence is that a restricted 'low intensity' form of modern civil citizenship at the national level is promoted by an equally low intensity form of modern cosmopolitan citizenship of NGOs and multinational corporations under global governance and international law. The first wave of international human rights after World War II sought to give protection to the person from the worst effects of these processes (civil liberties) and to elaborate a set of global democratic, social and economic, and minority rights similar to those at the national level. However, these are hostage to implementation by nation states and thus subject to the processes described above. The second wave of international law brought into force a vast array of transnational trade law regimes (under GATT and the WTO) that override and restrict national constitutions and constrain weaker and poorer countries (the majority of the world's population) to open their economies and labour to free trade, unrestrained exploitation and pollution transfer by the dominant multinational corporations in order to gain loans, aid and debt relief. The third wave of international law after 9/11/01 consists of Resolutions of the Security Council of the UN promoting international security. These global securitization regimes, which are said to protect the security and liberty of modern citizens, often override the first wave international human rights, force national governments to enact security legislation that rolls back hard won democratic rights, thereby circumscribing democratic opposition to the war on terror and neo-liberal globalization, and they secure the tier one civil and cosmopolitan liberty of individual and corporate citizens in national and transnational law.⁸ This new formulation of the old cosmopolitan right to civilize is now the major justification for the continuation of Western

informal imperialism, as in Iraq and Afghanistan today. The result is not only the continued popular resistance, instability and escalating militarization and repression, as above, but also *growing global inequalities between the West and the non-West that are worse now than at the height of the ruthless phase of western imperialism in the late nineteenth century.*

840 million people are malnourished. 6,000,000 children under the age of 5 die each year as a consequence of malnutrition. 1.2 billion people live on less than \$1 a day and half the world's population lives on less than \$2 a day. 91 out of every 1,000 children in the developing world die before 5 years old. 12 million die annually from lack of water. 1.1 billion people have no access to clean water. 2.4 billion people live without proper sanitation. 40 million live with AIDS. 113 million children have no basic education. 1 in 5 does not survive past 40 years of age. There are one billion non-literate adults, two-thirds are women and 98% live in the developing world. In the least developed countries, 45% of the children do not attend school. In countries with literacy rate of less than 55% the per capita income is about \$600.

In contrast, the wealth of the richest 1% of the world is equal to that of the poorest 57%. The assets of the 200 richest people are worth more than the total income of 41% of the world's people. Three families alone have a combined wealth of \$135 billion. This equals the annual income of 600 million people living in the world's poorest countries. The richest 20% of the world's population receive 150 times the wealth of the poorest 20%. In 1960, the share of the global income of the bottom 20% was 2.3%. By 1991, this had fallen to 1.4%. The richest fifth of the world's people consume 45% of the world's meat and fish; the poorest fifth consume 5%. The richest fifth consume 58% of total energy, the poorest fifth less than 4%. The richest fifth have 75% of all telephones, the poorest fifth 1.5%. The richest fifth own 87% of the world's vehicles, the poorest fifth less than 1%. As a result of the globalization of modern citizenship and its underlying institutions the majority of world's population of the dispossessed are thus 'free' to exercise their modern civil liberty in the growing sweatshops and slums of the planet.⁹

In summary, the globalization of modern citizenship has not tended to democracy, equality and perpetual peace, but to informal imperialism, dependency, inequality and resistance. This tendency is a consequence of its basic universal/imperial orientation. From within the perspective of modern citizenship modern citizens see their modular form of citizenship as universal and superior and all others as particular and inferior, and see themselves as having the imperial right and duty to enter into other societies, free them from their inferior ways, impose the institutional preconditions of modern citizenship, which conveniently brings unconscionable profits to their corporations and unconscionable inequality to the people they are modernizing, and use violence and military rule against those envious 'anti-moderns' who resist. From the alternative perspective of diverse citizenship, this is neither freedom, nor democracy but five hundred years of relentless tyranny against local citizenship and self-reliance, the undemocratic imposition of institutions of low intensity citizenship over which the majority of the people have little or no effective say and in which they are subject to subordination, exploitation, horrendous inequalities and repression when they refuse to submit.¹⁰

IV. DIVERSE CIVIC CITIZENSHIP

Although modern civil and cosmopolitan citizenship is the predominant form of global citizenship, a multiplicity of other meanings and practices of citizenship co-exist and, consequently, the global field of citizenship is considerably more complex and contested than the view from the modern tradition suggests. I want now to turn and examine this field from the standpoint of diverse citizenship. I will mention *six general aspects of diverse civic citizenship* and contrast these with modern civil citizenship.¹¹

(1). First, rather than looking on citizenship as a status within an institutional framework backed up by world-historical processes and universal norms, the diverse tradition looks on *citizenship as negotiated practices* – as civic actors and activities in local contexts. The modern tradition in social science and political theory overlooks these activities because it presupposes that rights, rules, institutions and processes must be primary (the conditions of civilization) and human actors and activities secondary (what happens within the civil space constituted by the civilizing rights, institutions, rules and processes). The diverse tradition reverses this modernist, institutional orientation and takes the perspective of actual citizens in civic activities in the dwelling places they are enacted and carried on. Institutionalization of citizenship practices is seen as secondary; coming into being in countless unpredictable and open-ended ways out of, and in interaction with, the *praxis* of citizens – sometimes furthering, strengthening and formalizing these activities; other times dispossessing, channeling, canceling, downsizing, constraining, limiting and repressing (as we have seen).

(2). *The second way* the diverse tradition avoids the prejudice of mistaking one institutionalized form of citizenship as the universal model for all possible forms is always to take any specific civic activity in context as one local citizenship practice among countless others. They start from the local languages and practices of citizens *in* their forms of citizenship and

compare and contrast their similarities and dissimilarities critically with each other from various standpoints, either by engaging in other forms of citizenship or by civic dialogues of mutual edification among diverse citizens. There is thus no universal module of citizenship but, rather, a multiplicity of criss-crossing and overlapping practices of citizenship, of which modern citizenship can be seen to be one singular and imperious form masquerading as universal.

(3). *Third*, since civic activities of citizens are primary, people do not become citizens in virtue of a status defined by rights and guaranteed by the institutions of the modern state and international law. This status is simply to be a ‘subject’ of that system of laws and a ‘member’ of that association. Individual and collective agents *become citizens only in virtue of actual participation in civic activities*. Through apprenticeship in citizenship practices they acquire the linguistic and non-linguistic abilities, modes of conduct and interaction in relationships with others, forms of awareness of self and other, and use of civic equipment that are constitutive of citizenship as a practice. The difference in meaning between ‘citizenship’ as a status and as a negotiated practice is made in European languages by the distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘civilization’ (law-based) and ‘civic’ and ‘civicising’ (activity-based). Whereas civil citizens have the legally guaranteed opportunity to participate in the civil sphere if they chose, civic citizens engage in and experience ‘*civics*’ – the activities and practical arts of becoming and being a citizen, referred to as ‘civicism’. Civic citizenry are not seen as bearers of civil rights and duties but of the abilities, competences, character and conduct acquired in participation, often referred to as ‘civic virtues’. Civil citizens are civilized by the institutional rule of law, commerce and anonymous processes of civilization, whereas civic citizens criticise and reject this disempowering picture that conceals the real world of histories of civic struggles. They ‘civicise’ themselves. They transform themselves into citizens and their institutions into civic spaces by civic activities and the arts of citizenship, whether or not these activities are guaranteed by the rule of law or informal customs and ways, or neither. The civic citizen manifests the freedom of participation *in relationships with* other citizens. The civic citizen is not the juridical citizen of a

national or global institution but the 'free citizen' of the 'free city': that is, any kind of civic 'sphere' or 'world' that comes into being and is reciprocally sustained by the civic freedom of its citizens, from the deme, village, common, commune, grass roots federation to a global networks of such civic nodes.

(4). *Fourth*, whereas modern citizenship always exists in institutions, civic citizenship always exists in relationships. There are of two major kinds of civic being-with relationships: (1) relationships among roughly equal citizens acting together in relationships of solidarity, civic friendship and mutual aid (citizen relationships) and relationships between governors and citizens (governance/citizen relationships). Civic citizenship is the *vis a vis* of governance. To see the importance of this contrast we have to set aside the institutional language of the civil tradition (constitutions, rights, autonomous rules, jurisdiction, states and sovereignty) and look at what goes on within, beyond and often in tension with these institutions. What we see are individual and collective actors in citizen and governance/citizen relationships.

A relationship of governance is a relation of power, knowledge and mode of subjectification through which one agent or collection of agents (governors or government) tries to govern or conduct the conduct (thoughts and actions) of another agent or agents (the governed or all affected), either directly or indirectly, formally or informally, by innumerable means and strategies. They exist in small groups, families, workplaces, sweatshops, bureaucracies, colonial administrator and colony, in producing and consuming activities, in our relations to the environment, between multinational corporations and their suppliers and consumers, in the informal global relations of inequality, and so on. As modern states consolidated, the term 'government' came to be restricted to the official form of 'representative government', 'the governed' to the body of individual citizens with rights, the relationship between them as the 'rule of law', and 'civil democratic citizenship' as the right to participate in the official public sphere in relation to the rule of law and representative government. The diverse citizenship tradition sees this as one important set of representative governance relationships, albeit highly institutionalized

and abstracted. However, there are multiple, overlapping and criss-crossing local, national and global governance relationships in the broader sense that either do not pass through the modern national and global legal and political institutions or, if they do, they are often overlooked by the institutional perspective, to which we are subject, yet over which the governed often have little or no democratic say. This is the *field* of diverse citizenship.

A governance relationship is the site of citizenship from the civic perspective. In any governance relationship there is always a more or less restricted field of possible ways of acting, of conducting oneself in the relationship, even in the most tightly controlled cases (such as prisons and military training). As a result of this irreducible element of freedom and free play in a governance relationship, it is always a negotiated practice between the partners to some extent. Governance is not a unilateral phenomenon of subjection, but a much more complicated and open-ended *interplay* and *interaction* between governors and governed over time. This dimension of negotiation is the ground of civic citizenship. The governed begin to become civic citizens and initiate civic activities when they not only negotiate how to act in accord with the governance relationship in which they find themselves, but when they negotiate the relationship itself. Hence, from the perspective of civic citizens, a governance relationship is always a governance/citizen relationship. Classically this activity of civic negotiation (the public world of *negotium*) consists in (but is not restricted to): citizens organizing and non-violently calling a governance relationship into question (speaking truth to power), demanding that those who govern enter into negotiations over the acceptability of the relationship, negotiating a modification or transformation of it, implementing the changes, acting in the new relationship, reviewing it over time, and re-opening the negotiations again whenever the new relationship becomes unacceptable. In contrast to the institutional distinction between public and private in modern citizenship, this activity of calling any governance relationship anywhere into question and subjecting it to public examination and negotiation brings it out of the private sphere (of not being questioned) and into the public sphere of civic enquiry.

Opening the relationships we bear to the ongoing negotiation and experimentation of the partners (governors-citizens) is to ‘civicise’ them. They are no longer imposed monologically over the governed who are presumed to simply obey as subjects. They are transformed into civic and dialogical relationships under the shared authority of both partners. The partners become mutually subject to and co-authors of the relationship between them. Governors become ‘civic servants’, accountable to those they serve, and subjects become free citizens rather than unfree subjects or slaves (who have no say in their despotic relationships). To civicise governance/citizen relationships is also to ‘democratize’ them; for one ordinary, everyday sense of ‘democracy’ is that the people (*demos*) in their locale (*deme*) rule by exercising an effective say in and over the relationships in which they are both subjects and citizens. Civic citizenship is thus the practice of grass roots democracy. It civicises and democratizes the relationships in which the people find themselves *here and now*. Civil citizenship in contrast imposes a singular institutionalized process of civilization and democratization from above, often coercively and often over local forms of civic citizenship, on the imperial premise that institutions precede civic activity, and it restricts democracy to a small island of representative participation in a sea of non-democratic relationships in the private sphere. This is the initial and continuing unjust and anti-democratic foundation of modern citizenship from the civic standpoint. Democratic citizenship practices exist in everyday relationships long before institutionalization and they can be extended only by the same democratic means of non-violent civicisation from the ground up.¹²

(5). *Fifth*, the other general way civic citizenship is manifested is when citizens organize themselves in *citizen partnerships*: that is, relationships among fellow citizens as equals in which there is no governor/citizen distinction. Sometimes this is done in order to enter into negotiations with governors of various kinds (as above), as in cases of collective bargaining, and negotiating NGOs and social movements that are organized civically and democratically. But, in many other cases, citizens organize an activity entirely on the basis of citizen relationships for its own sake. The classic examples are the celebrated practices of direct democracy.

However, another important example is the cooperative movement. If the private corporation is both the basis and flagship of modern citizenship - the institution in which moderns exercise their civil liberties in competing, working, shopping and consuming, then the cooperative is the contrastive organization of the civic tradition. Here citizens ignore the civil division between (non-democratic) private and (representative) public spheres, between civil liberties and democratic rights. They participate as democratic citizens governing themselves directly in the economic sphere (and other spheres), civicising the relations of supplying, hiring, working, managing, and distributing. In contrast to individual and corporate competition in market relations, cooperatives are founded on the ethic of cooperation. In the place of competitive free trade, they practice fair trade: trade relationships based on non-violent democratic negotiations among all affected. In contrast to the goal of profit, coops are 'not for profit' but for living democracy and mutual aid. All the human creativity that is channeled into the world of commerce and profit by corporations is poured into experimentation with forms of democratic cooperation by the cooperative movements. The most astonishing feature of the countless cooperatives on the planet is that they manifest, in concrete and practical forms, actual alternative worlds of citizenship *within* the interstices of the dominant national and global institutions of modern citizenship. They do not organize to overthrow the state or the capitalist mode of production, or to confront and negotiate with governors to change this or that regulation. They *simply enact alternative worlds of citizen relationships* around various activities, refusing to abjure their civicism to privatization or governmentalization.

(6). *Sixth*, modern citizenship is 'egocentric'; oriented towards the protection of the liberty of individuals to be free from interference and to be free to exercise their autonomy in the private sphere (tier one rights) or in the official public sphere (tier two rights). In contrast, diverse citizenship in both citizen and governance/citizen relationships is ecocentric and commune centric. Civic activities are oriented towards *caring for* the public or 'civic goods' of the correlative 'city' - the community bound together by citizen and/or governance/citizen

relationships in dependency relationships with non-human animals and the environment they bear as inhabitants of the natural habitat. Civic goods are many and they too are subject to negotiation. They include such procedural goods as civicising relationships in many spheres and the character development and conviviality that come from participation, and such substantive goods as caring for the environment, economic self-reliance, mutual aid, fair trade, equality among citizens, and so on. When civic citizens call a particular governance relationship into question they do so under the general critical ideal that it fails to realize civic goods in some specific way or another. These are goods that make possible and enhance civic forms of life.¹³

Accordingly, civic citizens are thus care takers of dwelling 'places' in this broad sense that dissolves the modernist distinction between culture and nature, and they care for their relations to the natural world (the ground or mother of their civic life) as carefully as the cultural world. They also take their civic responsibility of caring for the goods of communities and members *in* dwelling places and placeways to be prior to protecting the liberty rights of abstract individuals. They translate the latter back into one important civic good among others (negative freedom) that must vie for attention in our discursive practices. They also reply that, in many cases, what oppressed individuals and minorities say they want is not protection from their own communities by a tier one right enforced by a distant national or international court, but democratic empowerment in their communities (civic freedom). In theories of modernity, this grounded civic ethic is discredited by redescribing it as a pre-modern stage of historical and moral development and as a particular ethos of care in contrast to the allegedly higher and universal theory of morality and justice for abstracted and autonomous individuals. And the 'public good' is redescribed as the spread of modern liberties and their underlying institutions. Notwithstanding this peculiarly modern stance, multilayered civic ethics of care in human and natural relationships have been and continue to be the more widely held political and ethical orientation of the world's peoples in their diverse cultures and traditions. Under the dawning awareness of the destruction of local communities, environmental devastation and climate change

caused by the last 500 years of western imperialism under the modernizing orientation (in which these public bads are ‘externalities’), not only ecological scientists but even former modernizers and globalisers have come around to see the good of this alternative way of citizenship.¹⁴

V. THE GLOCALIZATION OF DIVERSE CIVIC CITIZENSHIP

I want now to examine *two main ways* diverse civic citizenship has spread around the globe.¹⁵ The first trend is the persistence and recent renaissance of local forms of civic citizenship practices despite the globalization of modern citizenship. I illustrate this civic localization renaissance with three examples (numbers 1-3). The second trend is by the global civic federation and networkization of local diverse citizenship practices. I call this global networking '*glocalization*' and the networkers '*glocal citizens*' because they are grounded in and hyperextend the civic features of local citizenship. I use three examples to illuminate this glocalization trend (numbers 4-6).

I will also discuss these two ways of glocalizing civic citizenship in relation to the global crisis of citizenship we examined in section III. To recollect, the formal and then informal imperial spread of modern citizenship and the underlying institutions it sends on ahead to clear the way has led in many cases, at best, to a form of global cosmopolitan citizenship for official NGOs and multinational corporations; low intensity citizenship for dependent elites of the former colonies; the dispossession or marginalization of local citizenship and governance, the subordination of local economies and polities to global corporations and trade regimes; enormous inequalities; violent cycles of repression and resistance; and increasing environmental destruction. This crisis of modernity/coloniality has coincided with a crisis of democratic deficit in the representative democracies of the hegemonic states. The informal imperial networks of economic, legal, cultural, media, security, and military relationships not only bypass and undercut the diverse citizenship of billions of people who are governed by them. They also manipulate, downsize and disregard the representative and legal institutions of modern citizenship that are supposed to bring them under representative authority. These trends of globalization constitute a crisis of global citizenship that, viewed in isolation, is experienced as a pervasive sense of

disempowerment and disenchantment. I want now to move around and re-interpret them from the standpoint of glocal citizenship.

(1) *First*, despite these devastating trends, another world of legal, political and even economic diversity has survived and continues to be the *loci* of civic activities for millions of people. Another world of citizenship is not only ‘possible’ but ‘actual’ to some extent. The reason for this remarkable survival and renaissance in the post-colonial world, unknown to the dominant debate over global citizenship, is that western imperialism governs through indirect or informal means and thus depends on the active collaboration of imperialized peoples exercising constrained local self-government. Those who are not part of the westernized elite have been able to keep their diverse local citizenship practices alive to some extent within the broad parameters of informal dependency relationships. One of the most astonishing examples among many is the survival and resurgence of 300 million Indigenous peoples with their traditions of governance and citizenship after 500 years of genocide, dispossession, marginalization, and relentless assimilation. The lived experience of citizenship in the present age is thus different from and more multiplex than it is portrayed through the sweeping generalizations of globalization theories of both its defenders and critics.

Many existing diverse practices of governance have been corrupted into exploitative and despotic relationships by their dependency on indirect rule and others were non-civic from the get go. The point is neither to reject them simply because they are non-modern nor to uncritically accept them because they are different or traditional. It is rather to bring them into critical and comparative discussions with other forms of governance and citizenship and to explore ways citizens can civicise them by speaking and acting within them.¹⁶ In the modernized West a vast repertoire of local citizenship practices have also survived within the interstices of state-centric modern citizenship, such as traditional working class organizations and countless new and creative forms of coops and networks linking rural and urban citizens in countless ways and around countless civic goods (the environment, non-violent dispute resolution, low-cost housing,

anti-racism, organic farming, place-based pedagogy, neighbourhood security, and so on). These old and new citizenship practices and improvisations are multiplying rapidly today in the ‘turn to the local’ of a new generation disenchanted with the elite manipulation of representative citizenship.

(2). *The second* example of glocalizing civic citizenship is the array of movements to ‘democratize democracy’. The aim of these movements is to democratize the legal, political and bureaucratic institutions of modern representative democracy so that the people who are subject to them are consulted and have an effective negotiated say within them *wherever* power is exercised non-democratically and unaccountably, in ad-hoc processes of speaking out and ‘going public’ or in more formal modes of negotiation in which those who govern must listen and give an account. These are thus movements to ‘civicise’ the civil institutions of modern citizenship. Here civic citizens join hands with civil citizens engaged in the same projects from within – such as proportional representation, deliberative democracy, democratic constitutionalism, legal pluralism, civic *versus* civil security, and the various initiatives to democratize the UN and global governance institutions from within.¹⁷

(3). *Third*, since decolonization and the triumph of informal imperialism, millions of the world’s poor have been forced to migrate from the colonized world to the imperial countries to find work in a closely controlled global labour market. Despite the hardships of poverty, slavery, exploitation, racism, xenophobia, and second class or non-citizenship, these *postcolonial civic citizens* refuse to be servile subjects and exercise their civic citizenship in new and untoward ways instead, negotiating their diverse cultural ways into the public and private institutions of modern citizenship. This ‘journey back’ or ‘boomerang effect’ of formerly colonized peoples now civicising the imperial countries challenges the dominant imperial, nationalist and racist cultures encoded in modern citizenship institutions and creates new forms of multiculturalism and multi-civilizationalism, both in the urban centres and the diasporic relationships (‘transnational civic scapes’) they sustain with their former countries. These deeply multicultural communities

in ‘mongrel cities’ generate new kinds of citizen relationships of ‘conviviality’ among their members and with supportive local civic citizens groups.

These three examples and many others similar to them are existing practices of local civic citizenship. These worldwide local sources and resources of civic citizenship are much stronger and resilient than we think. They are the bases of glocal citizenship. Networks such as informal federations, NGOs, social movements and similar creative improvisations are the means by which glocal citizens link together and so glocalize these local civic bases. These networks are civic and glocal just insofar as they are (1) grounded in and accountable to the local civic nodes, and (2) hyperextend civic relationships (citizen and governance/citizen) and other civic aspects in their own organization and their relationships with others. If, in contrast, they see themselves as bringing the gifts of civilization and modern citizenship to the less-developed, then they are ‘modern’ (civil and cosmopolitan) networks. In addition to providing mutual learning and aid to their member civic nodes, they also crucially provide the civic means of democratizing the persisting global imperial relationships of inequality, exploitation, and dependency that are the major cause of the crisis of global citizenship. *Civic networks do this counter-hegemonic work in two mains ways.*

(4). As we have seen in section III, the persisting economic, legal, political, debt, media, educational and military relationships of informal imperialism are so unequal that, although the elites within the former colonies are able to have a say and negotiate (in global governance institutions and elsewhere), they (the G120) are barely able to modify these governance relationships, let alone transform them into governance/citizen relationships, and they are in turn scarcely in civicised relationships with their own people (the majority of the world’s population). Similarly, the hegemonic partners in the relationships – the great powers and their multinational corporations – are not held democratically accountable by their own citizens. Accordingly, *the initial role of a glocal network* is to link together glocally enough local citizenship practices of those who are governed by any of these relationships to single it out and contest it: to call its

existence and privacy into the space of public questioning and put enough soft power pressure on the responsible powers-that-be to bring them to negotiations in the most effective place or places. It is thus the glocalization of the whole practice of civic negotiation discussed in section IV.

Networked contestation and negotiation can take place anywhere and by anybody in the relationships (for example, in sweat shops and/or consumer boycott of sweatshop products, in the WTO or in protest against the WTO). It should not be the burden of the wretched of the earth to refuse to submit and act otherwise, as in the dominant theories of resistance, but of the most powerful and privileged to refuse to comply and engage in the work of glocal citizenship. In doing this, citizens in glocal networks are engaged in civicising and democratizing these imperial relationships by bringing them under the shared authority of all those subject to them *in* their local places and ways. If the negotiations take hold, the subaltern partner ceases to be ‘dependent’ but also does *not* become ‘independent’ (as was imagined in the unsuccessful theories of decolonization). Rather, the partners gradually become ‘interdependent’ on the ongoing democratic relationships between them (as in section IV). These innumerable practices of glocal negotiation comprise one non-violent path of de-imperialisation and democratization characteristic of the civic tradition.¹⁸

(5). *The second way* glocal networks work to transform imperial relationships into democratic ones is through the spread of cooperative relationships between partners in the North and Global South. These cooperative informal federations are not strategies of contestation and negotiation, but (as in section IV) of directly ‘*acting together as citizens*’; of creating non-violent civic relationships between partners in the Global north and the Global south. The relationships among all the partners in the network, and within each partner’s local association, are worked out civically and democratically as they go along. Although there are thousands of examples, perhaps the best known are glocal cooperative ‘fair trade’ and self-reliance relationships, such as the specific Fair Trade case, in contrast to competitive free trade; glocal networks of non-violent dispute resolution in contrast to war, militarization and securitization; and deep ecology networks

in contrast to (oxymoronic) sustainable development. Like their local cooperative partners, these glocal cooperative citizens play within the existing global rules in each case, yet they play a completely different game. They create and live ‘another world’ in their civic and glocal activities.

(6). *The World Social Forum* has emerged as one important forum (among many) where civic and glocal citizens can meet each year. It is to local civic and glocal citizenship what the *World Economic Forum* is to civil and cosmopolitan citizenship. The forum does not take a position, but, rather, provides a civic public sphere in which participants from diverse citizenship practices can enter into dialogues of translation, comparison, criticism, reciprocal learning and further networking. They share the knowledge of their different arts of citizenship with each other without granting modern citizenship the universal and superior status it claims for itself and on the presumption that each mode of citizenship is partial and incomplete, so each can learn its limitations from others. The forum also hopes to develop closer links of reciprocal learning between academic research on citizenship and the practices of citizenship we have been discussing, perhaps setting up popular universities of the social movements for this purpose, thereby deepening relationships of mutual aid.¹⁹

CONCLUSION: GANDHIAN CITIZENSHIP

If all the millions of examples of civic and glocal citizenship practices could be taken in in a single view, like the tradition of modern citizenship and globalization presents it inexorable progress, perhaps this would help to dissipate the sense of disempowerment and disenchantment the present crisis induces. But, from the situated standpoint of diverse citizenship, this cannot be done and the attempt would overlook the very diversity that the civic approach aims to disclose and keep in view. Civic empowerment and enchantment come not from grand narratives of universal progress, but from *praxis* - actual participation in civic activities with others where we become the citizens we can be. But this response raises the question of the motive for participation in the first place. The civic answer has always been the motivating force of role models or exemplars of the civic life.

Today there are millions of exemplars from all walks of life in all locales that move potential citizens of all ages to participate in civic/glocal practices that arguably make up the largest decentralized and diverse movement in the world.²⁰ But perhaps a particularly exemplary exemplar for our dark times of the kind of glocal citizenship I have sketched is Mahatma Gandhi and his lifelong struggle to rid the world of imperialism. His ordinary civic and glocal life continues to move millions of people to begin to act. The reason for this, I believe, is the sheer simplicity of the four citizenship practices his exemplary life manifests.

The first is active non-cooperation in any imperial (non-civic) relationship and with any corresponding idea of one universal civilization or cosmopolitanism for all. *The second* is civic organization and uncompromising non-violent confrontation and negotiation (*ahimsa*) with those responsible for imperial relationships, with the aim of converting them to non-violent, democratic relationships. *Third*, for these two activities to be effective they have to be grounded in the local practice of the alternative world you want to bring about. For Gandhi this consisted of

'constructive work' in local, self-reliant and self-ruling (*Swaraj*) - or civically organized - villages and respectful participation in their ways, and the setting-up of small self-reliant communities (*ashrams*). *Fourth*, for Gandhi, all this has to be grounded in 'experiments with truth' - a *spiritual* relationship to oneself in one's relationship with others, the environing world and one's gods (*Satyagraha*). Like the late Foucault, Gandhi believed that one could engage truthfully in these spiritual practices whether one was religious, in which case 'god is truth', or one is agnostic, in which case 'truth is god'. This is a spiritual relationship of working daily and truthfully on oneself and one's attitude in order to improve how one conducts oneself in these trying yet rewarding civic relationships with others: that is, the daily practice of making oneself an exemplary citizen.²¹

NOTES

¹ The endnote at the beginning of each section lists the background scholarship on which the section is based. The few endnotes within each section refer to specific literature that is not referred to in the scholarship list at the beginning or is particularly pertinent. For introductions to this broad field see Louise Amoore, *The Global Resistance Reader* (2005), Janine Brodie, 'Introduction: Globalization and Citizenship Beyond the Nation State', *Citizenship Studies*, 8, 4 (2004), 323-332, Nigel Dower, *An Introduction to Global Citizenship* (2003), Nigel Dower and John Williams, *Global Citizenship: A critical introduction* (2002), David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., *The Global Transformations Reader* (2002).

² I discuss the various theories of modern citizenship from Immanuel Kant to the present in the works listed in notes 3, 4, 11.

³ For the background scholarship to section II see Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (2007), David Held, *Models of Democracy* (2006), Micheline R. Ishay, *The History of Human Rights* (2004), Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath, *States and Citizens* (2003), David McNally, *Another World is Possible* (2006), James Tully, 'The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy', Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, eds., *The Paradox of Constitutionalism* (2007), 315-38.

⁴ For the background scholarship to section III, see James Tully, 'Law, Democracy and Imperialism', Emiliios Christodoulidis and Stephen Tierney, eds., *Political Theory and Public Law* (2008), 'The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy' (above, n.3), David Potter et al., eds. *Democratization* (1997), Tilly, *Democracy* (above, n.3).

⁵ Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking* (2000).

⁶ Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the making of International Law* (2005).

⁷ Alison Ayers, 'Demystifying Democratization: The Global Constitution of Neo-Liberal Polities in Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, 27 (2006) 312-38, Tony Evans and Alison J. Ayers, 'In the Service of Power: The Global Political Economy of Citizenship and Human Rights', *Citizenship Studies*, 10, 3 (2006) 289-308.

⁸ Security Council Resolution 1373. See Kim Lane Scheppele, *The International State of Emergency: Challenges to Constitutionalism After September 11*, MS. Forthcoming.

⁹ These are United Nations statistics from 2000. See Jeremy Seabrook, *The No Nonsense Guide to World Poverty* (2003), 52-3.

¹⁰ For the origin of the widely used term 'low intensity democracy' see B. Gills et al., eds., *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (1993). For the more recent scholarship see notes 4 and 15 and Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop* (2007).

¹¹ For the background scholarship to Section IV see James Tully, 'Democracy and Globalization', Wayne Norman and Ronald Beiner, eds. *Canadian Political Philosophy* (2001), 36-62, 'The Unfreedom of the Moderns', *Modern Law Review*, 65, 2 (2002), 205-28, John Pocock, 'Afterword', *The Machiavellian Moment* (2003).

¹² For recent critical work in this complex tradition of civic freedom see Aletta Norval, *Aversive Democracy* (2007), Linda Zerilli, *Feminism and The Abyss of Freedom* (2005), Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future* (2006).

¹³ James Tully, 'An Ecological Ethics for the Present: Three Approaches', Brendan Gleeson and Nicholas Low, eds. *Governing for the Environment: Global Problems, Ethics and Democracy* (2001), 147-65.

¹⁴ Emilio F. Moran, *People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations* (2006), John Borrows, 'Landed Citizenship: An Indigenous Declaration of Interdependence', *Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law* (2002), 138-59. The best known example of this movement is Joseph Stiglitz, the former head of the World Bank (see *Globalization and its Discontents* (2002)). See more generally, Majid Rahnema ed., *The Post-Development Reader* (2006).

¹⁵ For the background scholarship to Section V see James Tully, 'A New Kind of Europe?: Democratic Integration in the European Union' *CRISPP*, 10, 1 (2007), 71-87, 'An Ecological Ethics for the Present' (above, note 13), 'Communication and Imperialism', *Ctheory* (2006), www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=508, 'Law, Democracy and Imperialism' (above, n.4), 'The Unfreedom

of the Moderns' (above, n.1), Eunice Sahle, 'Global Citizenship and Transnational Civil Society: Theory and Practice, MS (forthcoming), Paul Hawken, *Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being* (2007).

¹⁶ Jeremy Mander and Victoria Tauli Corpuz, eds. *Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples Resistance to Economic Globalization* (2004), Mahmood Mamdani, 'Beyond Settler and Natives as Political Identities: Overcoming the Legacy of Colonialism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 43, 4 (2001), 651-64.

¹⁷ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ed., *Democratizing Democracy* (2007), Ian Loader and Neil Walker, *Civilizing Security* (2007).

¹⁸ Arturo Escobar, 'Beyond the Third World: imperial globality, global coloniality and anti-globalisation social movements', *Third World Quarterly*, 25, 1 (2004), 207-30.

¹⁹ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *The Rise of The Global Left: The World Social Forum and Beyond* (2006), Janet Conway, 'Citizenship in a Time of Empire: The World Social Forum as a New Public Space', *Citizenship Studies*, 8, 4 (2004), 367-81.

²⁰ See Hawken, *Blessed Unrest* (above, note 15).

²¹ Homer A. Jack, ed. *The Gandhi Reader* (1956). Mark Kurlansky, *Non-Violence: 25 Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea* (2007) and Thomas Weber, *Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor* (2004) for Gandhi's life and its remarkable influence on the spread of non-violent civic and global citizenship in the late 20th century. (For Foucault on spiritual practices, see Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject* (2005)). I am indebted to Boaventura de Sousa Santos for discussions of earlier drafts of this lecture paper.

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