by Makiko Kitamura

The program was divided into two parts: Part I, The United Nations and International Cooperation; Part II, Revitalizing the United Sates: Future Options and Japan’s Role. Although much discussion was focused on the UN and its evolving role in global events, this article will address Japan’s role in the international community, including the UN.

Commenting on the rhetoric concerning Japan, he lamented Japan’s present state, characterizing it as being plagued with a "small power mentality" when in fact, he argued, there exists a "big power reality." Japan must overcome this gap in order to engage effectively in global fairs.

"Historical Baggage" In Southeast Asia

A point of concern often raised when discussing Japan’s role in the international community, especially in Southeast Asia, is the "historical baggage" that Japan carries from it World War II acts of aggression and atrocities. Due to unresolved animosity toward Japan, the accepted argument goes, Japan cannot take on a legitimate leadership role in Southeast Asia. Such a role would only resurrect bitter memories and suggest resumption of aggression. Southeast Asia is undergoing a significant change in attitude toward Japan, which warrants more interaction between the two regions.

Although the issues in Northeast Asia have yet to be resolved, "Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia has grown to the point where it cannot avoid responsibilities in both the economic and security spheres."² Japan can no longer use its "historical baggage" as an excuse to avoid aiding and interacting with its ASEAN neighbors.

In fact, Japan seems willing to fulfil these expectations. Prime Minister Rytaro Hashimoto’s eight-day tour of five ASEAN countries this past January is a case in point. Besides the desire to strengthen regional relations of trust and confidence, talks between Hashimoto and ASEAN leaders revealed hopes of expanding relations beyond economic aid to further include political ties and cultural exchange. Hashimoto’s decision to proceed with this trip despite the concurrent hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru signifies the importance of relations between Japan and ASEAN.³

Going Beyond "Checkbook Diplomacy"

In addition to the expected expansion of its regional role in Southeast Asia, Japan is being called upon to contribute more actively to global affairs, specifically UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). In recent years, Western powers have sharply criticized Japan for its unwillingness to contribute in ways commensurate to its economic power. Japan’s intolerably slow and disappointing response to the Persian Gulf War in 1991 - $13 billion in support of the Allied forces - fuels this viewpoint. Even though Japan, the world’s second largest economy has a respected reputation as the world’s largest donor of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and as the second largest contributor to the UN. it has shown limited willingness to go beyond this :checkbook diplomacy."

The biggest obstacle in overcoming mere "checkbook diplomacy" has been Japan’s Peace Constitution (Heiwa Kempo). Drawn up after World War Ii, Article IX of the Constitution renounces war and the threat or use of force to settle international disputes. As part of the "peace clause" (senso hoki), Article IX is one of the most important principles, repenting for wartime atrocities, and declaring a firm position of pacifism. According to the Constitution, Japan’s military, the Self-Defense Force (SDF), is confined to, as its name suggest, self-defense. In recent years, reformist politicians have called for a revision of he Constitution so that Japan can be free of legal restrictions on international involvement. But this movement has been met with opposition from conservative politicians and the public’s steadfast belief in the ideology of the Constitution. Many Japanese still view the Peace Constitution as not only a document that is heroic and noble in its peaceful proclamation, but also as an important factor in Japan’s spectacular economic development, as it freed Japan of defense costs. There are even those critics who advocate exporting Japan’s pacific culture and ideology to the rest of the world. instead of importing and conforming to outside (i.e. American) notions of intervention. Revising the Constitution would be equivalent to renouncing Japan’s precious ideology.⁴

Nevertheless, Japan is beginning to show awareness of not only the expectations but also the irritation and impatience held by Western powers. As Mr. Akashi commented at the symposium, Japan needs to find a delicate balance between consideration of the past and assumption of responsibilities in the present and future. In fact, to achieve such a balance, efforts to reinterpret, if not revise, Article IX have been made.

Following much heated debate, Japan passed the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Law in June of 1992, which permitted the deployment of Japanese troops (SDF) overseas so that Japan could engage in a restricted range of UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, which started in late-September, 1992. The law, in the spirit of "active pacifism," forbade soldiers from engaging in armed combat or from monitoring ease-fires, thereby limiting their civilian role to providing food, rebuilding hospitals and roads and monitoring elections. It was monumental, however, in allowing the Japanese government to deploy ground troops abroad for the first time since World War II. Then Prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa saw this as an opportunity to end international criticism and to reassert Japan’s stature in foreign affairs.

Despite the initial enthusiasm, the situation took on a less positive tone when two Japanese volunteers were killed - one by an unidentified gunman and the other in a Khmer Rouge ambush. The deaths aroused a political furor in Japan, since the government had assured the people that no Japanese blood would be spilled during the Cambodia operations. Talk of withdrawal of forces became strident, placing Prime minister Miyazawa in a difficult position, torn between his concern for hypersensitive domestic public opinion toward Japan’s first overseas deployment of troops since World War II and Japan’s international reputation.

Cambodia became a crucial test case for more active Japanese diplomacy. The mission ended positively in the eyes of the Japanese public; troops stayed through the UN-sponsored election in May 1993, and were welcomed home as heroes. The international community, however, was less approving, pointing to extensive housing privileges granted to Japanese troops (out of concern for the fragile domestic situation) and twenty-four soldiers who, with the approval of the Japanese Government, abandoned their posts out of fear for their safety. Nevertheless, the Cambodia venture was a historic first step in building confidence and experience in the international arena.

Japan’s increasing confidence and initiative was evident as Japan sent troops to Mozambique and to Rwanda in late 1994, and to the Golan Heights on the Israeli-Syrian border in February 1996. In this most recent mission, the SDF performed in a full UN peacekeeping role without restriction to civilian functions.

A Permanent Seat?

In recent years, one persistent issue on the minds of the Japanese is Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and the general public covet this permanent seat, perceived as the permanent badge of international prestige. Not surprisingly, this issue is also entangled by Article IX and Japan’s global involvement.

Japan needs to find a delicate balance between the past, present, and future.

The Foreign Ministry, assuming that active contribution to UNPKO is the key to attaining this badge has been actively promoting almost continuous deployment of Japanese troops abroad. Its foremost goal is to familiarize the Japanese people with the idea of stationing Japanese troops abroad as peacekeepers. Politicians like Ozawa Ichiro of the Shinshinto (New Frontier Party), even advocate the establishment of a conventional standing Japanese army that befits an international power deserving of a permanent seat on the Security Council. Such an army, with full rights to engage in the full range of PKO, would be "answerable not to the Japanese Government but to the UN."⁵

With this interpretation, conflict with the Constitution need not arise. But Ozawa is part of a minority. Most of the Japanese public is not a s progressive. In a public opinion poll conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1994, 41.2 percent of respondents said Japan’s international contribution should be within the framework of the Constitution, and 38.8 percent said Japan should play no military role at all, even in PKO. Indeed, the media and the public at large require the most convincing about the merits of international engagements.⁶ As the Cambodia experience demonstrated, the stubborn pacifist constituency of Japan can be a significant factor in Japan’s foreign policy.

Looking Beyond PKO

Although they have not been widely heralded, Japan is already showing promising signs of international involvement. For a country with a strong pacifist tradition and ideology embedded in its people and policies for almost half a century, Japan has already taken steady strides toward tackling the responsibilities expected by Western powers.

On the other hand, one can say that Japan ins now being excessively sensitive to international criticism. The members of the present UN Security Council (US, France, China, Russia, and England) do not contribute troops to every single PKO, and therefore, Japan need not overextend itself either.

Certainly, Japan should broaden its realm of international contribution, but at present, Japan seems to be limiting its definition of such contribution to the military sphere. A plethora of other global concerns are in need of attention aside from PKO, such as nuclear arms reduction, environmental protection, human rights, and economic development. Japan has the capacity to contribute to these goals, and doing so should quell criticism of its overall military role.⁷

Winning a permanent seat on the Security Council will boost Japan’s confidence. This would induce Japan to take assertive and independent initiatives on various issues and become more than the United States’ junior partner. With this confidence, added to its "soft power" influence as the world’s largest foreign aid donor, Japan has great potential to bring much to the international community. The Japanese Government and its people need to recognize this, and to focus less on foreign criticism for it lack of military involvement. Realizing Japan’s "big power reality" means overcoming its "small power mentality" in a broader range of issues.