Securing Peace - The Case for a New NATO

BY OLIVER MIHALJEVIC

The Cold War is over - so why does NATO exist, and even expand, when the threat of a communist Soviet Union, the western military alliance's raison d'etre since 1949, is no longer there? Or is it? While the iminent danger in the form of a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact has certainly disappeared, peace in the whole of Europe remains an elusive goal amid regional insecurity and a post-cold war power vacuum.
In July 1997, at the NATO meeting in Madrid, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were officially invited to start accession negotiations with the aim of joining the Alliance in 1999. The significance of this event is best summed up by the words of NATO's Secretary General, Javier Solana: "NATO has come out of the Madrid Summit stronger and with a new sense of purpose." The expansion of the military alliance into Eastern Europe would thereby ease European security concerns by filling the existent power vacuum and consolidating democracy in the former communist bloc countries. The historic goal of a peaceful and whole Europe would seem to be within reach.
The other view, as expressed by the diplomatic historian George Kennan, sees NATO enlargement as the most fateful error of American policy in the post cold-war era. As the argument goes, the alliance's expansion would hinder the development of Russian democracy by creating new dividing lines in Europe. Moreover the effectiveness and credibility of NATO would suffer in view of new policy commitments.
Who is right? Who should we believe?
Let us start by recognizing that the need for building a new NATO for a new Europe is real. Laszlo Kovacs, the Hungarian foreign minister, recently said: "What we seek from NATO is long-term security guarantees." While this is true for many Europeans on a regional basis, the justification for American support of NATO expansion raises global security concerns. In a recent essay Richard Pipes, professor of history Emeritus, at Harvard University, poses the question of whether today's Russia is still an enemy: Because it has not "made a clean break with its Soviet past", he asserts, the situation in Russia remains unpredictable. Specifically, the fall from superpowerdom has created in Russia a dangerously volatile mix of a disillusioned people and embittered generals scheming to reinvigorate the old military glory. The result has been the emergence of a modified Brezhnew doctrine, namely that "Moscow regards any country that was once part of the Soviet Union as falling within the sphere of its security interests." Examples of Russia utilizing military power repudiate democracy are ample: Georgia in 1992, Tajikistan in 1994 and Chechnya as recent as 1996.
Consequently, the common perception of Russia as a western-oriented country seems justified when considering its search for economic growth, but becomes ostensibly naive when assessing Moscow's commitment to peace. The fact that Russia's armed forces remain deployed in every one of the ex-Soviet republics, with the exception of Azerbaijan and the Baltic states, should serve as a source of continued concern in that respect. Taking into account the war in Bosnia and the crisis in Albania, it becomes clear how insecure Europe stands on the eve of the 21st century. Consequently, the need for additional security is strongly felt among many Europeans. As they look upon NATO as the guarantor of a future in peace, what will NATO's response be?

The answer lies in the creation of a comprehensive strategic environment with the current expansion reflecting only part - albeit an essential one - of a new commitment to wider Euro-Atlantic stability. It consists of a substantially enhanced Partnership for Peace program, a newly inaugurated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, enhanced dialogue with the Mediterranean, and ultimately a radically reformed NATO command structure. In managing Europe's long-term evolution, NATO relies on the importance of its partnership arrangements: the recently signed Charter with the Ukraine and the Founding Act with Russia demonstrate this. The latter attests to NATO's concern for good relations with Moscow, and makes clear that the "new" NATO is not directed against a specific enemy. Instead, NATO expansion seeks to stabilize the continent by uniting its democratic forces under the common aim of securing peace.

The start of the accession talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in July 1997 was just the first step of the expansion process. Binding national referendums throughout the three countries will follow. Since polls indicate overwhelming popular support for NATO-entry, nothing stands in the way of the signing of the official Protocol of Accession at a ministerial meeting in Brussels in December. Early 1998 will mark the beginning of the ratification procedures by the Alliance's member states. Thus, for the three countries to become full NATO members, they need to secure the approval of their own people as well as the parliaments of NATO's current member states.
In the United States, the ratification procedure promises to generate heated debate: arguably, no issue since the Vietnam war has so divided the foreign-policy establishment. The arguments surrounding the expansion of NATO center around three major concerns: How much will it cost and who will pay the bill? How will it affect future US-Russian relations? Will the enlargement diminish NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance?
While the Pentagon estimates the cost at $28-35 billion over the next ten years, the recent balanced-budget agreement has forced the Clinton administration to push the financial burden onto its European allies. Together with the new members they would have to come up with the largest share, whereas the US would provide $150-200 million annually. Such a prospect coupled with the requisite military modernization has already led to increasing defense budgets in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Moreover the cost debate has revived the issue of responsibility sharing within NATO: The Europeans, especially the French, demand a greater say in the alliance's affairs. Specifically, they want a change in leadership in NATO's southern European command, which has traditionally been in American hands. These disagreements blocking a streamlined military command structure within NATO are set to be resolved later this year.

The question of future US-Russian relations may be central to any debate about the expansion of NATO. Opponents of the enlargement argue that it would adversely affect Russian interests and further complicate the negotiations on strategic arms reduction: While the US Senate has ratified the SALT II treaty, the Russian Duma has yet to take it up. This argument, however, has been weakened by the signing of the Founding Act between NATO and Russia in May, whereby Russia officially acquiesced to the expansion of the alliance. Moreover, a joint council was created which, in effect, ensures that Russia will be consulted on important NATO decisions in the future. Critics of the Act, on the other hand, assert that it not only gives Russia a voice on NATO affairs, but allows Moscow to hold the alliance hostage. This concern leads to the question of a possible dilution of NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance.
Article 5 of the NATO charter states that members are obliged to consider an attack on any one of them as the equivalent of an attack against them all. As President Clinton made clear in a May address to graduating cadets at West Point, this means that US soldiers could be asked to put their lives on the line for a new NATO member. Indeed, much American resentment towards NATO expansion emanates from such a possibility. Is it justified?

James Kurth, a leading scholar on the subject, recently asserted that the current NATO expansion is in need of a grand buttressing idea, which would warrant the commitment of the American people. As much as the idea of the "West" was the rallying cry for the old NATO, the idea most relevant to the new NATO could be free markets. This view misses two important points. First it assigns to NATO economic tasks such as market liberalization, which the European Union could pursue more effectively. Secondly, it totally ignores the need for security. The view that European security is in the best interest of the United States could indeed provide the necessary coalition of support among the American people. As the example of Bosnia demonstrates, American troops can be put in even more danger, if NATO fails to act in time to deter aggression. The existent power vacuum in Eastern Europe (in view of the above outlined Russian unpredictability and Europe's failure in Bosnia), serves as an invitation to regional conflict.
Donald Kagan, professor of history and classics at Yale University, has likened the current European situation to the "peaceful blue sky of 1925, when Germany was weak and disarmed, torn by internal strife and governed by the democratic Weimar Republic" - much like today's Russia. He warns that the hollow security commitments made by Britain must not be repeated today. He argues that the expansion of NATO is "worse than useless unless it is backed by the military power needed to fulfill the pledges we are undertaking."
Consequently, George Kennan is right when he voices concern over the credibility of the "new" NATO. The inclusion of Eastern European countries has to be accompanied by a military component, which must not be compromised by Russian interference. Yet in attributing to NATO expansion a divisive element for Europe, the facts prove him wrong. The Bosnian tragedy characterizes the current reality of European (lack of) security. This is why people on both sides of the Atlantic demand new peace guarantees. And this is why we need a new, expanded NATO.

Letter from the Secretary General, NATO review, July-August 1997, No. 4: p. 3. Bloomberg (electronic news), October 18, 1997. Richard Pipes: "Is Russia Still an Enemy?", Foreign Affairs, September/October 1997, Vol. 76 No. 5: p. 65. "Mainly friendly Russia", The Economist, November 1-7, 1997: p. 49 . "NATO sets command structure deadline", Financial Times, October 2, 1997: p. 3. James Kurth, "NATO Expansion and the Idea of the West", Orbis, Vol. 41, No. 4, Fall 1997: p. 555. Donald Kagan, "Locarno's Lessons for NATO", The Wall Street Journal, October 28, 1997: p. A22 .

Oliver Mihaljevic is a student at Yale College.