A FISHY SITUATION

by Maina Tilton

A long running dispute in the Pacific Northwest has disrupted US-Canadian relations. The Canadians are irate over America’s unfair fishing practices and the future of the salmon population hangs in the balance.

The United States and Canada are at a stalemate in what the Seattle Times has called “the region’s most complicated and long running international dispute” - the allocation of Northern Pacific salmon stock. The twenty-year salmon dispute is a compelling example of the struggle to control natural resources in a world of scarcity, and for Canadians it is another manifestation of the American “Me-first” mentality.

The two countries have been pursuing each other’s salmon for decades due to the fact that the species migrates from their original fresh water habitat to the ocean and then returns home to spawn. Canadian officials do not deny that American fishermen have the right to harvest Canadian salmon; they only ask that the catch be limited in order to keep the stock hearty enough to support the country’s fishing industry and ecosystem. America’s Greedy Nets The Pacific Salmon Treaty of 1985, signed by the U.S. and Canada, established principles of equity in the division and conservation of salmon, and represented Ottawa’s attempt to protect its fish while in U.S. waters. Although successful in the beginning, the pact faltered in 1992 when established ceilings and long-term harvest limits expired, forcing the two nations to negotiate yearly quotas on salmon catches. Since then, negotiations have been hindered by the lack of a binding arbitration clause. The salmon run began on July 1st, but the negotiations to establish catch quotas began last February. From the beginning, both nations complained of the other’s unwillingness to compromise. Canada voiced the same complaint that it has made since the mid-1980’s - that the U.S. is over fishing. In 1985, the U.S. intercepted 2.4 million more salmon than Canada, and its total catch is on the rise. Last year, U.S. fishermen captured 5.3 million more salmon than their Canadian counterparts. Acording to the Canadian Department of Oceans and Fisheries, about 75 percent of the pink salmon and nearly 100 percent of the sockeye salmon caught by Washington state fisheries come from Canada. The same report claims that only 25 to 30 percent of Canada’s salmon catch originated in the U.S. Although the issues in Northeast Asia have yet to be resolved, "Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia has grown to the point where it cannot avoid responsibilities in both the economic and security spheres."2 Japan can no longer use its "historical baggage" as an excuse to avoid aiding and interacting with its ASEAN neighbors. In fact, Japan seems willing to fulfil these expectations. Prime Minister Rytaro Hashimoto’s eight-day tour of five ASEAN countries this past January is a case in point. Besides the desire to strengthen regional relations of trust and confidence, talks between Hashimoto and ASEAN leaders revealed hopes of expanding relations beyond economic aid to further include political ties and cultural exchange. Hashimoto’s decision to proceed with this trip despite the concurrent hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru signifies the importance of relations between Japan and ASEAN.3

Wanted: Third Party Arbitration Refusing to admit any wrongdoing, U.S. negotiators claim that Canada is over fishing. Both nations, in an attempt to solve the distribution dilemma, selected New Zealand Ambassador Christopher Beeby in 1996 to act as a neutral arbitrator. Both sides agreed that if either side did not approve of Beeby’s adjudication, his findings would be voided. Beeby sided with Canada and suggested that the U.S. should monetarily compensate the country for lost revenue or reduce its catch. The U.S., following its usual course, refused to accede to the ruling. This year’s point of contention involves the division of sockeye and coho salmon. Basil Ambers, an aboriginal member of the Canadian delegation, blames the deadlock on the U.S., explaining, “It’s simply because the Americans aren’t willing to make a deal.” In fact, the U.S. wants a greater percentage of the Fraser River sockeye catch and demands that Canada limit its harvest of U.S. bound coho. While the U.S. wants to catch approximately 20 percent of the Fraser River sockeye, Canada will agree to only 16 percent. The Chretien government’s inherent lack of leverage has made negotiations difficult. While it wants the U.S. to limit its sockeye catch, Ottawa cannot threaten to over-fish U.S. coho due to the substantially smaller numbers of coho salmon than sockeye. Perhaps out of frustration, Canada has had to resort to other tactics. The salmon dispute is further complicated in the U.S. by regional interests that have an implicit veto over Washington’s actions. For example, Alaskan fisheries are being criticized by Canada and even by the U.S. federal authorities for their fishing practices. Ottawa’s statistics reveal that 60 percent of the sockeye and 27 percent of the coho salmon caught off Alaskan shores originate in Canada. Oceans and Fisheries also announced that 60 percent of the chinook caught by Alaskan fisheries originate in Canada, and only 10 percent of Alaska’s total catch consists of its own fish. Curbing the Alaskan fisheries is difficult since the industry provides a large part of the state’s economic as well as cultural identity.

Unfair Play Since the expiration of the Treaty’s fishing ceilings, Canada has resorted to tactics that the U.S. considers to be in violation of international law. Ottawa has responded that it is only trying to protect a vital economic and environmental resource. May of 1997 was a particularly difficult month for North American relations. On May 21, it became evident that U.S. negotiator Mary Beth West did not possess jurisdiction over the Fraser River salmon phase of the dispute. The Canadian negotiator proceeded to walk out of the talks. Later, four U.S. boats were seized off Vancouver Island after failing to register with Oceans and Fisheries. Although this action brought the public’s attention to the dispute, the owners of the boats were fined a token $220 and then released. Although U.S. authorities criticized Ottawa’s action, they were aware that the U.S. has a similar law and that Canada normally does not enforce registration regulations. It had little choice but to take some sort of unilateral, if only symbolic, action to restrain U.S. craft from depriving Canada of its fair share of the local salmon catch. Later, the agitated premier of British Columbia suggested that Canada terminate U.S. naval privileges in its waters in order to express Ottawa’s displeasure over Washington’s conduct. After the seizure of the vessels, an equally incensed Senator Murkowski (R-AK) suggested that the Coast Guard escort U.S. boats through Canadian waters to deter more seizures. As the quarreling intensified, the July 1 deadline approached. Friendly Neighbors, Again? Late June brought a reconciliatory move by Canada-a final offer to reduce its coho catch in return for a U.S. reduction in its sockeye yield. The U.S. refused the first offer and once again, turned down Ottawa’s offer to abide by neutral arbitration. This left observers wondering why the U.S. was so reluctant to face arbitration if it strongly felt in the right? The salmon run started July 1, with both disputants setting their own quotas. The Pacific salmon imbroglio may be characteristic of the contentious attitude that Washington has been taking when natural resource allocations are at stake. Although Ottawa’s and Washington’s inability to establish fishing limits will not immediately affect the industry, in the long run it could grievously damage the salmon population, negatively affect the environment, and further sour already frayed U.S.- Canadian relations.

Maina Tilton is a political science major at McGill University.