Papers to be presented at the 2007 Conference:
(Click here to read the original call for papers)
“Hermeneutics, Identity and Society: American Women’s Approaches to the Qur’an" [abstract]
Juliane Hammer, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
“Hermeneutics as Translation: An Assessment of Islamic Translation Trends in America" [abstract]
Martin Nguyen, Harvard University
“From Imam to Cyber-Mufti: Navigating the Supermarket of Islamic Identities in America" [abstract]
Saminaz Zaman, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
“Kemal A. Faruki: An Islamist, a Modernist ” [abstract]
Mark Gould, Haverford College
“The Problems of Conscience and Hermeneutics: A Few Contemporary Approaches” [abstract]
Ayesha Chaudhry, New York University
“Gender, Tradition and Change: Some Reflections on the Deobandi Presence in America” [abstract]
Fareeha Khan, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
“Tradition in Motion: Pluralizing Islamic Law through the Incorporation of Custom” [abstract]
Youshaa Patel, Duke University
“From Liberal Theology to Liberation Theology: An Islamic Hermeneutics of Social Justice" [abstract]
Junaid S. Ahmad, College of William and Mary; Fahd Ahmed, CUNY School of Law; Itrath Syed, Duke University
“Islam in the U.S. and Britain: Tribalism and Pluralism ” [abstract]
Vince Biondo, California State University at Fresno
“The Case for Minarchist Libertarian Political Islam" [abstract]
Anas Malik, Xavier University
“Pooh-Poohing Pluralism: Itjihading Hadith to Build A Theology of Exclusion” [abstract]
al-Husein N. Madhany, University of Chicago
Full Abstracts:
Title: Hermeneutics, Identity and Society: American Women’s Approaches to the Qur’an
Abstract: For more than a decade Muslim women have engaged in various kinds of critical and often feminist scholarship on women and gender issues in Islam. One particular field of such scholarly engagement has been the re-approaching of the Qur’anic text from various women’s hermeneutical and scholarly perspectives. The proposed paper will examine the writings of four prominent scholars in this field, namely Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, Nimat Barazangi and Kecia Ali. Rather than presenting an assessment, comparison or critique of their respective Qur’anic hermeneutics which share several similarities but are also significantly different, the paper has two other important goals. The first is to trace and discuss how their writings reflect various levels of gendered Muslim identity and how these identities have impacted their scholarly agendas and hermeneutical techniques. Significantly, all four women are part of the American academic system, a fact that raises important questions about the nature of knowledge categories and the apparent tensions between conceptions of classical Islamic knowledge and western academic approaches to the study of Islam and Muslims. The paper will also argue that the authors’ identities are deeply connected to issues of scholarship and community activism as well as an active engagement with the American public sphere and its prevalent assumptions about Muslim women and Islam. In a second step the paper will question the usefulness of labels such as feminist and progressive as reflected directly or indirectly in the writings. In particular the common assumption that writing from a woman’s perspective is necessarily progressive in nature will be challenged. Part of the paper’s strategy to reevaluate these labels is to discuss possible practical application of the authors’ agendas for change in Muslim communities and societies with regards to Qur’anic interpretation and gender issues. In limiting themselves to the Qur’an itself, or alternatively proposing changes to fiqh based on Qur’anic reevaluation, they propose differing foci of societal change. Which impact would the enactment of their agendas for change have in particular on American Muslim communities and would these changes be “progressive”? [return to list of papers]
Title: Hermeneutics as Translation: An Assessment of Islamic Translation Trends in America
Abstract: The term “hermeneutics” is bandied about in current discourses with little effort to define and contextualize the term itself. Rarely is the word given its necessary precision or substance. This paper has a twofold objective to address this lacuna in the field of Islamic studies. First, it seeks to define “hermeneutics” broadly, according to its historical-philosophical meaning, but then bringing it to bear on Muslim communities in the West. Namely, this paper asks how can “hermeneutics” better illuminate our understanding of what constitutes the Islamic “tradition” in the United States. In what ways can the vocabulary of hermeneutics, including such terms as “the fusion of horizons” and “the classic”, help us to better understand the processes affecting and transforming the Muslim community’s conception of “tradition” in the U.S.
Meaning more than simply interpretation, “Hermeneutics” also entails translation and participation. It is upon this point that the second objective of the paper is built. Taking the Muslim communities of America as a case study, an analytical survey will be made of the different translation projects engaged in bringing Arabic Islamic texts into English. Attention will be paid to the translations produced by Muslim and non-Muslim academics, Muslim publishing houses, Sufi groups, and religious organizations and institutions. What genres of classical Islamic literature are being translated, with what objectives, and for which audiences? Special consideration will be made for translations of the Qur’an, as it represents the most widely translated Islamic text into English, though the intention will be made to cover all major genres. Finally, while, mention will be made of efforts taking place on the internet, the paper will focus primarily on published, in-print translations. [return to list of papers]
Title: From Imam to Cyber-Mufti: Navigating the Supermarket of Islamic Identities in America
Abstract: Pluralism, in terms of both religious and ethnic diversity, has always defined Islam in America. In contrast to South Asians in Britain or Turks in Germany, no single culture or sect dominates the popular or intellectual Muslim discourse. Instead, Muslim individuals and communities in the United States increasingly rely on Islamic hermeneutics to structure their identities. Often contradicting or even completely disregarding traditional or scholarly definitions, words like “Sufi” or “Wahabbi” instead become identitarian markers on a par with national or ethnic affiliation.
Earlier studies of American Muslims concentrated largely on mosque-attending or so-called “mosqued” Muslims. Mosque-building went hand in hand with Muslim community building. While earlier Muslim immigrants chose their mosques based largely on ethnic membership or convenience in location, today American Muslims increasingly choose their mosques based on a favored hermeneutical approach. For example, a family may travel further to support a more progressive imam.
The popularity of internet forums, discussion groups, and ask-a-mufti style question and answer pages has led to even greater venue shopping. Considering their ties to their home countries and the absence of any structured Islamic administration, Muslim immigrants have always consulted a wide variety of extra-legal or civil society sources including families, community leaders, imams, lawyers, literature, as well as the burgeoning number of resources found on the internet. However, while their predecessors sought counsel for practical religious or legal matters, more young Muslim Americans explicitly look online for an Islamic identity. This development is simultaneously quintessentially American and radically transnational. First, the diversity and democracy of Islam in America encourages Muslims to newly interpret Islamic law and the foundational texts. But while the preponderance of choice stems from the American landscape, the communities chosen may connect American Muslims to kindred spirits around the world.
These communities based on hermeneutic approach are less local than ethnic or immigrant communities yet not as universal as the concept of ummah. Instead, they serve as cyber-mosques of like-minded believers. The creation and popularity of communities based on modes of Islamic interpretation has important implications for Islam in America. This paper will examine those implications through a close study of mosques, dawat circles, and online cliques in the Boston area. It will look carefully at how hermeneutically-based identity overlaps with or contradicts a culturally-based Islamic identity. It will especially delve into the importance of the internet in establishing and disseminating the new markers and vocabulary of Islam in America. The paper will build on previous research for a completed dissertation on Amrikan Shari’a or the position of Islamic law among American Muslim immigrants . [return to list of papers]
Title: Kemal A. Faruki: An Islamist, a Modernist
Abstract: Kemal A. Faruki formulated one of the most sophisticated, modernist versions of Islamic law available in the literature, while, at the same time, arguing for the construction of an Islamic State in Pakistan. He grounded a progressive interpretation of Shari'a in fundamental tenets of Islam. For example, to avoid attributing omnipotence and omniscience to men, shirk, attributing God-like characteristics to anything other than God, he argued that ijma', the consensus that guarantees the truth of interpretation, had to be limited in time and space. Such a consensus had to be subject to revision in new times and new places. To avoid hypocrisy, acting as if one was a committed believer when one was not, he argued required religious tolerance within the state, where no one would have an incentive to pretend to be a believer. These arguments constituted an understanding of Islamic law as grounded in fundamental religious principles that had the potential to facilitate the reinterpretation, if the not he problematization, of legal/religious precepts.
In this essay, I systematically reconstruct Faruki's argument and show how it contributes to (Western) jurisprudence. It demonstrates that the meaning of a legal tenet depends on its application and thus transcends the Habermasian disjunction between justification and application. It also makes manifest the Dworkinian contention that principles are (partially) constitutive of the law. Further, it demonstrates that any successful progressive jurisprudence is dependent on these related insights.
I also examine why Faruki's argument has been unsuccessful in the competition over how Muslims should interpret Islam(ic law). While he constructs a lucid argument deriving from fundamental dogmas of Islam, I contend, with Weber, that religion gains its power to motivate and legitimate actions from the value-commits that emerge from it, commitments that may differ from its avowed tenets. I examine the logic of religious commitment in Islam, and ask if Faruki's argument is compatible with it. I contend that these commitments derive from the notion of fitra, humans' affinity for God, which suggests that Muslims have the capacity to follow God's precepts, and Islamic eschatology, which suggests that each Muslim will be evaluated on the last day in light of his or her adherence to the precepts embodied in Shari'a. The crucial question is then: are Faruki's arguments compatible, not only with fundamental tenets, dogma, in Islam, but also with the logic of Islamic religious commitments, which are manifest in precepts codified in Shari'a?
Finally, I explore the role of reason in the interpretation of Shari'a precepts. Pope Benedict argued recently that Christians are less prone to violence than Muslims because Christian scripture must be interpreted in light of right reason, a natural law manifest independently of scripture. In Christianity, God is understood to act justly, in accordance with right reason, while in Islam God's actions and precepts constitute what is just. In consequence, we might contend, the relationship between principles and precepts differs in the two religions. I will conclude by exploring this possibility, by arguing that the capacity to problematize previously accepted precepts is crucial to a modernist jurisprudence, and by asking if we find in Faruki an interpretive strategy that allows for the creation of positive law, one which allows for the creation of new law, sometimes through the reconstruction of what was accepted previously as the law, while adhering to principles that are authentically Islamic . [return to list of papers]
Title: The Problems of Conscience and Hermeneutics: A Few Contemporary Approaches
Abstract: Chapter 4, Verse 34 of the Qur’an is crucial in the investigation of the (in)equality of genders in the Qur’an. The verse declares that men are qawwamun (guardians) over women and further prescribes three steps that men may undertake if they fear nushuz (disloyalty/rebellion/recalcitrance) from their wives. The first of the three steps that husbands may undertake is that they admonish their wives verbally, and/then shun them in bed, and/then strike/beat them. Abdullah Yusuf Ali translates this verse as follows:
(Husbands) are the protectors and maintainers of their (wives) because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband’s) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next) refuse to share their beds, (and last) spank them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance): For Allah is most High, Great (above you all).
As can be seen, Yusuf Ali displays his discomfort with the prescription of wife-beating in this verse by taking two apologetic steps. One, he interprets the three prescriptions of verbal admonishment, shunning in bed and beating to be sequential rather than simultaneous, and two, he qualifies the unqualified Qur’anic prescription of beating by adding “lightly” in parenthesis. This explicit prescription of wife-beating under certain circumstances, then, violates notions of justice and gender egalitarianism that many contemporary scholars bring to the text. These conscientious objections arise in part because this verse stands in counter-distinction to verses in the Qur’an that promote reciprocity, mutual love and respect in marriage, and encourage the establishment of justice.
This paper explores the methods employed by contemporary believing scholars who seek to reconcile the notions of justice and gender egalitarianism that they bring to the text with their belief that the Qur’an is the literal word of God. The attempts at reconciling the tensions raised by the prescription of wife-beating in turn lead to a conversation regarding the interrelated issues of a) the relative privileging of Qur’an and sunnah, b) the relationship between text and community, and c) the role of historical precedent in contemporary interpretations.
Within current scholarship, I identify three trends, which I refer to as traditionalist, revisionist and reformist. My analysis of works in each methodology will consider the approaches adopted by scholars, the shortcomings they have come up against and the questions that remain. I propose that while the traditionalist and revisionist trends are crucial steps in current scholarship, as they recognize the tension between notions of gender justice and the text of the Qur’an, they are ultimately inadequate in the methods they offer for the reconciliation of these tensions. The reformist approach builds on the traditionalist and revisionist approaches and moves beyond them both, although, as will be seen, it is still in its formative stage [return to list of papers]
Title: Gender, Tradition & Change: Some Reflections on the Deobandi Presence in America
Abstract: South Asian Muslims comprise the largest sub-category of Muslim Americans after that of African American Muslims. They are prominent in the masjid scene in every Muslim community in America, and they are also some of the biggest financial contributors to the establishment and continued function of many of the larger and smaller mosques across America.
Their contribution is important not only in terms of percentages and economics; the South Asian Muslims also plays an important role in the intellectual dynamics of Muslim American communities. Most South Asian American ‘ulama and imams trace their religious roots to the Deobandi school of India and its particular form of articulating the religious sciences and pietistic ideals. Other Muslim Americans may not be aware of these intellectual roots, but there are certain tropes that easily come to mind when searching for the traces of Deobandi thought in Muslim American practice: the existence of men-only mosques in major cities (often they are referred to as the “tablighi” mosques); the vehement insistence on full gender segregation among mosque attendees; the existence of mosques that are particularly Hanafi in their method of prayer, prayer timings, etc.; and the presence of South Asian/South African/British/and now even North American madrasa-trained imams who have a particularly “Deobandi” way of approaching the problems in their community (with their approach often being branded as being “too rigid”). The fact that the ever-expanding Tablighi Jamaat, no longer a South Asian but a global phenomenon, takes its guidance on legal issues from Deobandi scholars is yet another factor which demonstrates the strong presence of Deobandi thought among Muslim Americans.
Deobandi thought is squarely within what one would term “traditional Islam.” But many Muslim American proponents of adhering to “tradition” may not easily recognize the Deobandis as being one of them, perhaps because of the group’s particular South Asian identity, or perhaps because of the common perception that not only are the Deobandis too foreign, but also too inflexible to make a positive contribution to the practice of American Islam.
Studying the origins of the Deobandi movement, as a phenomenon of traditional Islam creatively evolving and developing within a minority Muslim population in the modern period, provides important lessons for how the power of tradition can be harnessed in our contemporary world. Examples of the ways in which certain founding figures within the Deobandi school used the tradition itself to change and adapt Hanafi practice provides lessons not only for Deobandi scholars in America who may (wrongly or rightly) be accused of uninformed rigidity, but also for scholars and thinkers in general who are struggling with the issue of bringing about change while still maintaining the stamp of legitimacy and authority that comes from working from within the tradition [return to list of papers]
Title: Tradition in Motion: Pluralizing Islamic Law through the Incorporation of Custom
Abstract: If the advent of modernity represents not only unprecedented technical advancement but also the emergence of a spiraling plurality of new social practices can an implicitly universalizing tradition such as Islam adapt to these transformations? Pre-Modern Muslim jurists have realized that ethico-legal transformation is necessary to manage growing contingencies resulting from the expansion of Islamicate civilizations, having developed legal mechanisms to manage this ongoing tension between a multiplicity of local social practices and the limitations of universal norms.
One such mechanism is custom which has essentially served as the vernacular through which culture has been incorporated into Islamic law. Taking on the persona of an American Muslim “Traditionalist,” I comment in English on a commentary written in Urdu by the Indian polymath Shibli Nu’mani (d. 1914) who translates and comments on a treatise, Nashr al-Urf, written in Arabic by the last great Damascene Hanafi jurisconsult, Muhammad Amin Ibn Abidin (d. 1836).
Ibn Abidin’s best known work, Durr al Mukhtar, is a commentary on the Radd al-Muhtar by al-Haskafi (d. 1677) and is considered by many to be the final word on Hanafi law. In India his works are studied in madrasas for aspiring jurisconsults where he is known by the title, al-Shami, referring to his Syrian nationality.
In Nashr al-Urf, or The Diffusion of Custom, Ibn Abidin attempts to manage the hierarchy of authority in the Hanafi school of law, in particular the zahir al-riwaya, which comprises the soundly transmitted opinions of Abu Hanifa (d. 767), Abu Yusuf (d. 798), and Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 805), and also includes a minority of opinions from other jurists as well.
Ibn Abidin argues that custom is discarded if it contradicts a textual ruling in every way. However widely disseminated custom must be considered in those instances where it only partially disagrees with a textually based ruling or conflicts with a ruling based on analogical reasoning (Qiyas). Qiyas establishes general rules by extending a ruling based on one case to other cases. By giving priority to custom, Ibn Abidin restricts the application of qiyas. Moreover, Ibn Abidin argues that custom specific to a particular locale or group of people (local custom), in cases of necessity (darurah), should have the capacity to override the zahir al-riwaya. Working within the Hanafi legal tradition, Ibn Abidin uses custom to legitimize a plurality of local social practices.
However, should the later jurists ignore custom, disregarding their predecessors’ methodology, according to Ibn Abidin these jurists might then harm the laiety, contradicting the fundamental objectives of the divine law which is to bring ease. For Ibn Abidin the order of the entire world rests upon these principles of bringing ease and repelling hardship; a benefits analysis that considers the public interest is essential.
Towards the end of his commentary on Ibn Abidin’s treatise, Shibli rhetorically queries, “After (reading) such texts who can argue that in Islamic law, progression and the capability of coping with the exigencies of necessity does not exist?” Shibli thus argues through the mouthpiece of Ibn Abidin (and I thus argue through the mouth piece of Shibli) that Traditional approaches to Islamic law maintain an ability to accommodate pluralism in local social practices; Islam in America is no exception [return to list of papers]
Title: From Liberal Theology to Liberation Theology: An Islamic Hermeneutics of Social Justice
Abstract: Liberal theology in Islam substantially draws from a liberal individualist rights discourse. There is a lack of an awareness that there is only so far that the vehicle of liberalism can take liberal Muslims. Further, liberal Muslim discourse seems devoid of a specific political agenda that goes beyond establishing a functioning liberal democracy. Issues relating to property, ownership and a more general analysis of social relations, hierarchical modes of organization, and the concentration of private power remain under-interrogated. In addition, liberal Islamic theology often speaks from a discursive location rather distant from the ‘victimized, oppressed’ Muslims it supposedly desires to help. Liberal Islam is a work in progress. It is open ended, responsive and yet circumscribed by the structural limitations of the liberal project.
Contemporary ideas about an Islamic theology of social justice and liberation in Islam claim a reach that extends beyond liberalism and for which structural transformation is the goal. Such a theology is one that strives to place religion in opposition to social, political and religious structures that demand uncritical obedience and moves towards a freedom of all people from all forms of injustice and oppression. Liberation theology tries to realize this in collaboration and solidarity with those whose social and economic liberation it seeks. It derives its inspiration from the Qur’an and the struggles of all its prophets and it does so by engaging these in a process of shared and ongoing theological reflection for ever-increasing liberative praxis.
From this perspective, to engage in Qur’anic hermeneutics in a situation of injustice is to do theology and experience faith as solidarity with the oppressed in a struggle for liberation. This represents a break from traditional and modernist theology. Islamic liberation theology emphasizes that in conditions of injustice Islam can only be experienced as a liberative praxis of solidarity. Traditional theology obsesses on rituals and legalities and loses the spiritual and emancipatory content of religion. Modernist theology on the other hand is located in and addresses itself to the secular privileged world and the serious thinkers within it. It is liberation theology which strives to locate itself in and address the marginalized world. Further, it distinguishes itself as faith that emerges from praxis, and understanding God’s world is an ever disclosing path that one comprehends better the more one strives with the lesser of God’s people. Liberation theology does not claim to provide eternal truths, but attempts simply to lay out a trajectory that creates truths – truths that emerge from the struggles of life and truths that help create a history in favor of the subaltern.
An Islamic hermeneutics of social justice claims that it can counter the fears and anxieties of traditional scholarship. It neither demands that Islam stay uncritically in step with changes in society, nor does it reduce the Qur’an to abstract principles that are open-ended and with no measures against self-serving interpretations. Such a worldview suggests that social change is not about clean breaks; it is rather a constant critical engagement with one’s tradition and reclamation of religious, social, political, and economic space by those – the social majorities – who have been excluded from speaking. [return to list of papers]
Title: Islam in the U.S. and Britain: Tribalism and Pluralism
Abstract: The media portrays the United States as being in a culture war between exclusivist religionists and inclusivist secularists since the 1960s. Such an approach overemphasizes the importance of secularism in American History. Instead, a longer historical view reveals that the real culture war is within religion itself, where inclusivists compete with exclusivists for control. American Islam is being formed within this context and it is impossible to understand the struggle within Islam without recognizing the struggle within Christianity and Judaism. Modern America was formed from the Civil War and the arrival of Jewish and Catholic immigrants. Though a majority of Jews, Catholics, and Southern Protestants assimilated to the northern view, the Christian south has gained in political power since 1965. The arrival of American Islam coincides with the rise of the Christian south and thus American Muslims are divided over how best to assimilate.
A comparison with the troubled Muslim communities in Britain underscores the successes of Islam in the Untied States. In Britain, communities that are internally tribalistic and outwardly exclusivistic have been involved in a series of violent riots. On the other hand, communities that are not regionally-specific and perform outreach to non-Muslims are more likely to be embraced. As a minority community, American Muslims should model themselves after their successful British, Jewish, and Catholic counterparts. As we begin to recognize the continued relevance of religion in the world today, then we will be able to accept that the real culture war is not between religionists and secularists but between inclusive pluralists and exclusive tribalists within the Abrahamic faiths [return to list of papers]
Title: The Case for Minarchist Libertarian Political Islam
Abstract: Islamists have frequently looked to the political ideologies and methods in their time- Leninist vanguardism, for example- and adapted them with “Islamic” symbols.
Every so often people suggest that a decentralized organic society is the best political model for an Islamic state. But it is thin on theory and explanation, and not only because it minimizes the role of the formal state apparatus. Imad Ahmad and the Minaret Foundation have made a case for affiliating political Islam with libertarian values. This essay develops this view further by using tools from the New Institutionalist school in political economy combined with a constructivist appreciation for the impact and malleability of ideas.
Islamism is often portrayed as having authoritarian or totalitarian tendencies. For many nonMuslims and Muslims, it is presumed that Islamic law must be imposed on societies, and this curtails and constrains the scope for choice that people and communities enjoy. Yet an alternative understanding exists under which political Islam is a close fellow traveler to libertarianism. The Medina Compact, the Hilf ul Fudul, and other historical and juristic institutions provide support for an experiment in libertarian political Islam. This remains experimental because despite strong historical and jurisprudential roots, current circumstances necessitate that the social forms will look new and innovative, and because serious pitfalls exist.
This paper argues that American libertarian tradition is well-suited to this experiment. Crucially, minarchist libertarianism, rather than an anarcho-syndicalist form, is most appropriate. The minarchist libertarian Islamic polity has a central government, but its functions are limited, and there many additional and active governance institutions. The prohibitions against oppression and the fact that moral choice is constantly promoted support this argument. A strong central government can be easily tempted into oppression and this restricts moral choice by people in society, whether individually or as groups. A true Islamic state would be constantly engaged in deliberations, and have many different possibilities for how people can live their lives- it would be pluralistic. [return to list of papers]
Title: Pooh-Poohing Pluralism: Itjihading Hadith to Build A Theology of Exclusion
Abstract: According to Khaled Abou El Fadl, “one of the core related issues that we Muslim intellectuals must confront is: Do the bin Ladens of the Muslim world actually find justification for the ugliness that they perpetuate in any interpretive tradition in Islam? Does this level of intolerance and criminality find support, however flimsy or absurd, in some of the interpretations of the past?” I agree with Abou El Fadl that the answers to both questions are a resolute, “Yes.” My case study is an analysis of verses in the Qur’an that are interpreted to pit Muslims against non-Muslims in the world, whether in Iraq, England, or even America. The existence of Islamic extremists—however small in number—operating within democratic Muslim countries as well as non-Muslim countries can no longer be ignored, and their religious rhetoric must be acknowledged, understood, and systematically dismantled.
It is our responsibility as intellectuals to understand the logic of Muslim extremists without interpretively dismissing their arguments as the understandings of medieval civilizations, or worse, as invalid theologically in the modern world, both of which are an opportunistic and dangerous fad amongst many in the academy today. This paper is one step in understanding extremist logic. But before we can adequately (and collectively) address the use of jihad in militant exegesis, rhetoric, and culture, it is of fundamental value to understand the theological position of Christians and Jews according to the sources of authority often cited in most mosques across the democratic Muslim world and the non-Muslim world today, the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Christians and Jews are two religious communities included within ahl al-kitab, or the people of the Book. They are accorded a different status from other non-Muslims within the Qur’an because their communities had been “witnesses of previous revelations” brought by former prophets of God.
Their position in the afterlife according to the Islamic source texts seems contradictory when reading verses in the Qur’an and the narrations attributed to the Prophet Muhammad recorded in the sahihain, the two most authoritative collections of ahadith. On the one hand, there are some ahadith and ayat that indicate that they are condemned to the Hellfire while other excerpts seem to indicate otherwise.
One verse in the Qur’an seems antithetical to the ahadith regarding the fate of Christians and Jews who do not accept Islam and the Prophet Muhammad as God’s final Prophet and Messenger. In surah al-Baqarah (the bulk of which was revealed between 2 and 3 AH ), ayah 62 we read a verse that bodes well for the Christians and Jews:
Verily, those who believe and those who are Jews and Christians and Sabians – whoever believes in God and the Last Day and does righteous good deeds – will have their reward before their Lord; On them will be no fear, nor will they grieve.
However, a narration in Sahih Muslim provides a different outlook:
It is narrated on the authority of Abu Hurairah [who first met the Prophet in the town of Khaibar in the month of al-Muharram in 7 AH ] that the Messenger of God, may the peace and blessings of God be upon him, said: By Him in whose hand is the life of Muhammad, anyone among the community of Jews or Christians who hears about me and does not believe in that with which I have been sent and dies (in this state), will be among the denizens of the Hellfire.
Are the above excerpts contradictory? How do classical muhaddithun and mufassirun from one tradition analyze the above scriptural texts? Are there any other specific mention of the Jews and Christians’ destinies in the Qur’an or ahadith? What is the final fate of the Christians and Jews on Judgment Day? In this paper I will attempt to answer these questions. Ibn Kathir mentions that surah al-Baqarah was revealed to Muhammad between the years in which the Battle of Badr and the Battle of ‘Uhud were fought. In the first part of this paper, I examine the content of the ahadith on this topic. Through analyzing classical commentators’ insights on the hadith cited above, I determine that the muhaddithin confirm the literal meaning of this hadith. Citing another hadith that specifically discusses the events leading to the condemnation of all Christians and Jews, variations of which are mentioned in both Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, I resolve that the Hadith literature leaves no doubt that the Christians and Jews are destined to Hell if they have heard of Muhammad and die as disbelievers in him and Islam. In the second part of my paper, I analyze how classical mufassirin within the dominant Islamic tradition understand the ayah cited above vis-à-vis the hadithain that damn ahl al-kitab to the Hellfire. I close the argument with evidence from the Qur’an not mentioned by these muhaddithin and mufassirin, which confirms the literal interpretation of the hadith mentioned above. Finally, I discuss the value of these interpretations as they pertain to extremist logic and the rhetoric found within mosques across the non-Muslim world today. I conclude that although an overwhelming amount of evidence exists in support of the sealed fate of the Christians and Jews who die not knowing of Muhammad, more research within differing genres of tafasir spanning the history of Islamic civilizations may widen the interpretation of those who are saved on the Day of Reckoning. [return to list of papers]