The Pol Pot Files, 1975-1977
The following documents translated by the CGP from the Santebal
archives at the Documentation Center of Cambodia comprise selected
1975-77 correspondence to and from the Prime Minister of Democratic
Kampuchea and General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party
of Kampuchea, Pol Pot, alias Brother Pol, alias "Comrade
Secretary", alias 870, or Brother 87.
N0001045
(01 bbk)
Telegram Nº 15
To Comrade Brother Pol with respect,
We'd like to report the withdrawal of people from the East [Eastern Zone] to the North [Northern Zone]. There are some disagreements, and [there is] disrespect for Angkar's advice at the receiving points, as noted below:
On 30 November, both sides agreed on the acceptance of people whom the East will send to Stung Trang [District] and Preah (sic) [Prek] Prasap [District]. Preah Prasapv will take [people] from Chhlaung District, and Stung Trang will take [people] from Peam Chileang District and Kraoch Chhmar District. The Region and Districts have gathered adequate numbers of people as we wanted. They have to withdraw from Region 21. We have already transported them to the other side of the river. Both of the [receiving] points absolutely refuse to accept Islamic people. They take only pure Khmer people. So the people who were withdrawn on the 30th have big problems.
I immediately gave advice to the Region and Districts to stop this [action] temporarily and wait for advice from Brother and the Northern Zone. Comrade Pauk probably is not aware of these problems. I advised the Region and Districts to take the Islamic people back to their villages. According to the final decision of the meeting, we must not send the Islamic people to Kracheh [Province]. The Northwest and the North have to accept them, so that we can keep them away from the Mekong River to help ease the atmosphere. However, they do not accept them. Brother, please make a decision regarding this problem.
In principle, the Zone withdrew fifty thousand people to the North. More than one hundred thousand additional Islamic people remain in the Eastern Zone. We only withdrew the people in important places along the river and at the border. We did not withdraw the people from Tbaung Khmum. This withdrawal is the dispersal strategy according to the decision that you, Brother, had discussed with us before. But if the North refuses to accept them, we'll continue to do our best to keep charge of the Islamic people. This is not a problem.
But we will not have enough people to reach the one hundred fifty thousand, if the Northern Zone will not accept the Islamic people.
Best wishes to [you] Brother, for good health and success.
copies
sent to:
Brother Noun
Brother Doeun
Brother Yem
N0001119
(02 bbk)
To Brother Pol with respect, All comrades who are based at the O Vay border have reported: 1. They met with us and warned us to withdraw from O Vay immediately. They claimed that it is their territory. But we did not withdraw. Since the meeting on 7 February, they announced that they will not meet with us anymore. They said that the agreement on 20 January has been unsuccessful. They will not recognize it anymore. 2. From 12 February to 15 February, yesterday, [they] came in to our temple(s) continuously. Our side tried to protect the line by fighting back. We did not allow them to cross into our land any further. Four of them got injured. One on our side was injured. We immediately advised our brothers: 1. O Vay has been our land since our ancestors' time. We must stand firm to protect our land. 2. [We] must constantly raise awareness of the spirit of the revolution, understand the enemy situation clearly, spread the forces in small units and use guerrillar-war tactics to attack the enemy everywhere. Do not let them advance as they want. Establish a good reputation by destroying them in every place, to the greatest extent possible, if they dare to cross into our land. 3. Besides the military plans, we are keeping to our negotiations as planned because we want to solve the problems through politics not through bloodshed. We had noticed that they are very stubborn and uncouth. Because of that, settlement through politics is not yet possible. But we have decided to pursue it further. We request more advice from Angkar. About the connection with Teu Kam, if there is a possibility, please Angkar, do advise. We'll try to do our own investigation. Best wishes for happiness + success. Ya
16 February 1976
N0001158
(02 bbk)
Telegram Nº 21
676 characters [khtung]
To Comrade Brother Pol with respect, According to Comrade Chhouk's report, Region
24, about the situation along the border, as noted below: 1- On 13 March 1976, Peam Chor District's Unit
ordered [their people] to search the forest and [they] caught
five Vietnamese who were hiding there. They had mosquito nets,
rice, and salt in Sambor Forest. We shot and killed two of them.
Caught three alive, and jailed them at the security station. On 14 March 1976, we caught two more Vietnamese
in the eastern forest of Peam Chor's district office. And they
also had rice, salt, and mosquito nets with them. On 16 March 1976, we caught three more Vietnamese
in our territory, about one kilometer form the border. At the
same time, the Vietnamese soldiers fired three 82 mm. cannon
shells about five hundred meters into our territory at Tonle
Tauch where our soldiers were staying. But nothing was destroyed. 2. About the situation of the grenade throwing
at Sre Lvea, Preach Sdech District, on 7 March 1976, [which]
caused the death of two of our soldiers, and four got injured.
The person who threw the grenade was caught on the morning of
the same day. He was a santisamphoan warrant officer.
The purpose of throwing the grenade was to sabotage our plan
to build the embankment system. This made people scared of sending
their children to work (lek dei). We tortured him and
found about twenty of his contacts in Preach Sdech district.
The contacts are from South Vietnam. Situation in Region 23, Kampong Ro District: On 13 March, six Vietnamese drove two tractors
into our territory, Samyaong Subdistrict. They drove over the
mines that were buried underground to protect the border. One
of the tractors was completely destroyed and all the people
who rode in it were killed. The other tractor was heavily damaged.
They dragged it back on 18 March 1976. They brought their soldiers
to Kbal Cham across from Thna Thnang. There were some thunderous
tanks over there. Looking at the situation, it seemed that they
wanted to attack us. But nothing has happened yet. In Region 21: Tramoung District in Vietnam. They built the
road across our land at the corner, South of Snuol. According
to [our] map reading of that part of the territory, they built
the road across our land hundreds of kilometers, crossing from
North to South and straight into their territory. We have raised
the issue of not letting them build the road across like that
but we don't know what the resolution will be. But if they won't
stop building it, [we] will take many 80mm cannons to attack
and stop them from building it. [We'd] like to ask for advice
from Brother on this issue. Warmest revolutionary solidarity date: 21/3 Chhon
Copies sent to: Brother Nuon, Brother Khieu,
Brother Van,
the Office, Archives
N0001187
(02 bbk)
Telegram Nº 94
1100 characters [khtung]
To Brother Pol with respect: I'd like to report to Brother about the enemy
situation, the people's situation and the situation regarding
the increase of production, in the Northern Zone as noted below: 1. The enemy situation: In the Northern Zone
as a whole, enemies haven't taken any strong action that could
have a bad influence on the people or on increasing production.
In general, it is very calm. But at the same time there has
been some action, such as the propaganda that the revolution
is too strict. They propagandized against the cooperatives,
against the construction of an embankment system, and propagandized
about starvation. In reality, there were some conflicts which
appeared in Chamkar Leu District. The enemies were former soldiers,
in association with Chams and former chiefs of the Cooperatives.
They took [Lon] Nol's picture and his speech which was written
on March 18, 1970, to place on trees near Trapeang Krabao village,
Chamkar Leu District. As for other actions, they burned down
forests, destroyed crops such as banana trees, jackfruit trees,
etc. The Zone had advised the Regions to pay attention
and investigate the enemy's activities mentioned above. With
the investigation, we caught some of the former chiefs of the
Cooperatives. They also have infiltrators. We investigated
and planned according to the situation. 2. The situation of the masses: In general the
base people and the new people truly believe in the leadership
in politics as well as in consciousness. In fact the
people all over the Zone, old [base] and new, are very busy
building a new embankment system according to the direction
that Angkar had indicated. At the same time, they, in solidarity,
are helping each other out with food as well as shelter. But the difficulty for the Northern Zone people,
is a lot of fever and diarrhea. The problems came from working under the hot
sun. People took cold baths instead of hot baths regularly. The plan indicated to shorten the work time
as the Party had stated. Moreover, we encouraged people to use
hot water. 3. The situation regarding the increase of production.
In the Northern Zone as a whole: The plan of growing rice at the beginning of
the year is very vigorous. Every Region is busy sowing the rice
seed at the beginning of the year. And also, early this year
[we] started to plant some rice-seedlings that were sown before.
In Sting Trang District, Chamkar Leu District and Baray District
[people] are busy transplanting rice. According to the report
at the beginning of this year, rice that was sown and rice that
was transplanted are growing very well. The embankment system: [people] are very busy
building the embankment system. The number of [embankments]
is the same as in the earlier report. And the later [embankments]
haven't yet been included. According to the estimation, 30 percent
of the rice fields will be finished successfully. [We] are busy building water gates for every
rice field. Some of the irrigation channels are made from concrete
and some are made from wood. [People] are busy collecting fertilizer with
the strong intention to follow the plan that the Party had stated. Also [people] are busy with ploughing and raking
the rice fields that belong to the Cooperatives and the State. According to the situation regarding increased
production, which is in full swing, I believe that it will be
successful as in Angkar's plan. The difficulty of increasing production as we
examined it closely is that: Animals such as cows and water buffaloes that
are used for production have cholera, scarlet fever and die
in every Region. At Sre Veal Kraom a lot of them have died.
These problems have a bad impact on the movement to increase
production. More importantly, these problems also have a bad
impact on the work of ploughing Sre Kraom's rice fields. The
plans have been arranged, ideals as well as viewpoint. [We]
are gathering all the resources and equipment to work in each
and every place, and trying to find medicine to cure the cows
and the water buffaloes more efficiently. At the same time, our comrades in every region
are being told to make clear lists of the water buffaloes and
the cows so as to enable us to have some knowledge about them
and make it easy for us to organize them for work. About arrangements for the leader: The Zone
has organized the chief commanders of the production increase
as in the above. The Zone's Chief takes responsibility for politics
and conscience, organizes and investigates every activity, arranges
meetings to exchange experiences about those problems; the meetings
should be held once every eight days. Regions also arrange for the chief commanders
to lead the increase of production plan. Districts also arrange for the chief commanders
to lead the increase of production plan. And detailed plans were made to guide the work
efficiently. Today the Zone's Chief has gone to regions and
districts to organize the chief commanders of the increase of
production. Whether [they are] right or wrong, I'll report [about
them] later. Please, Brother, give some comments on the above
report. Best wishes to Brother for good health and success. Comrade Pauk. Date: 2 - 4 - 76 Copies sent to:
Brother Nuon, Brother Khieu, the Office, Archives
N0001295
Telegram Nº 63
200 characters [khtung]
To Angkar 870 with respect,
Enemy situation along the border: On the night
of 10 June and in the morning until noon of 11 June, the enemy
launched eight 105 mm. cannon shells into the place where [incomprehensible
text]. On 13 June, 8 Thai people crossed into our territory
at Lakh 46, 20 kilometers from the border. Again in the same
day, 30 [Thai people crossed into our territory] at Lakh 43.
Both times, we shot at them and they ran back to their land. [Regarding] the thing that Comrade Pauk reported,
we are impressed and have already started the investigation.
We are putting pressure on some people who accused Comrade Number
2, who is already gone, of being the head of the imperialists
with the American since 1972. So it becomes clearer about the
basic element. To examine the element closely from 1977 and
1978, it is true. Wait until 17 June [when] I'll go to meet
[you], I'll report one more time. With highest friendship Date: 15 June Nhim
Received on 15 June, at 22:00
N0001374
(04 bbk)
Minutes of the Meeting,
Soldiers Duties in Kampong Saom.
Date: 3 - 8 - 76 ------------- People who attended: Comrade Secretary, Comrade
Von, Comrade Khieu, Comrade Mut, Comrade Nget, Comrade Dim,
Comrade Touch took the minutes. I. Report about Army situation. Comrade Mut 1. arrangement of guarding forces: a. Weapons on the land in Kampong Saom:
The City of Kampong Saom has four 105 mm cannons, one 40 mm.
cannon, six 37 mm cannons and two of 12.7 mm. In Ream and Kang Keng there are six 105 mm cannons
and 12.8 mm. cannons. b. Weapons on every island: Especially
on the islands that are far away such as Wai Island, Tang Island,
Pring Island, Rung Island and Seh Island, we placed many artillery
pieces and air defence: 105 mm. and 106 mm. c. The forces: One Regiment (3 battalions)
is based on Wai Island, Tang Island, and Rung Island. One Battalion
is on Seh Island. Another Battalion is on the island close to
the [Seh Island]. [They] have more then 100 hectares of land
for cultivating rice. There are rubber plantations and coffee
farms on Seh Island. 2. Production increase: On every island,
our brothers cultivate rice, grow edible fruit trees such as
coconuts, rambutan and durian. 3. Enemy situation: a. Thai side: There are motor--boats
sneaking in to catch fish. Before, they came as one or two [boats].
Now they come as groups from 30 to 40 ships. b. Vietnamese side: Now we haven't seen
an activity. We floated a buoy 2 kilometers from Seh Island
to mark the place to shoot them, but they stole it. 4. Number of ships: - [We] have five
BCS ships. There are problems with the blow torches for the
broken ships. The ships that carry goods don't have oil for
the steering wheel. The engines are also broken but the frames
still look good. [We] have five BI ships for carrying goods:
One is 500 horsepower, and another one is 400 horsepower and
the other three are 250 horse power. The training ships do not have petroleum and
#20 motor oil. II. Comrade Secretary's advice: 1. About the enemy situation: At the present time nothing captivates our
attention such as the acts of invasion [or] violation of
one's sovereignty. Reason: Firstly, we are able to sustain the
protection militarily. They meet with us every time they come.
They are afraid of our military strategy. Secondly, enemies
are in difficult states, both West and East. Thirdly, because
our foreign political relationships help to ease the situation. But, even with the situation like this, we
have to have a standpoint as the foundation: Both enemies,
the West and the East, try to find opportunities to attack us
and to benefit from us. Through these, in the West are the American
imperialists, Thailand and the traitors. They hold onto their
plans to invade us. They attack us, especially at Koh Wai, Koh
Tang, and Koh Pring. It is difficult for us because these islands
are far away. If they come, they will take these three islands.
They won't take Koh Rung and Koh Kong. Now the situation is easier [than before]. Enemies
have become greatly weakened. But, we have examined the situation
and have noticed that their capabilities are the islands. And
the violation of the fishing area is not an important problem.
That is not an invasion of the territory. Their ambition is
to fish. American imperialists want traitors to establish
[bases] on the islands. It is difficult for them to come themselves.
They won't come. They could use [their] forces to assail us
for one month or half a month in order to allow traitors to
get onto the islands. But the American imperialists are also
afraid of us. One thing that makes them afraid is we did not
invite them. And the another thing is that they don't have traitors
to bring onto the islands. But ideally, we have to be careful. A way that they could destroy us is the airforce,
such as in Siem Reap. They pay close attention especially to
oil refineries, ports, warships, and railroads. 2. The defence stratagem: 1. raise the
consciousness of having high security for both the armed forces
and the economy; destroy the consciousness of pacifism and carelessness, 2. organization of the military strategy: We
organized it already. But it needs to be strengthened and
to be expanded. Especially on the distant islands. Strengthening
and expanding human forces and weapons. Contacting and transporting
supplies such as rice and salt. [We] constantly need to stock
it for every year. So at least it can last for six months. And
the drinking water also needs to be stocked for at least six
months. [We] need to use cement to build basins. In the future [we] also must be careful.
We have to transform Koh Wai and Koh Tang into military bases.
We have to strengthen and expand [the idea] of transforming
[those places] into edible fruit forests and vegetable farms.
They are army bases and also economic bases, long-lasting, for
many generations and for thousand of years. In the future, we
will already have bases when we search for oil. So we must have
plans to clear up the forests to destroy malaria and to protect
the health of our soldiers. At the same time, we need to find natural appropriate
place(s) to build wooden port(s) to protect against waves. In
the future if we search for oil, we will also have airport(s)
that can be used for economic and military purposes. If [we
are] in war, we will use fighter planes for protection. We can
organize more fishing areas; fishing and also holding guns for
defence. Doing this will be more effective than using radars
because [we] can investigate and get to know the situation.
Every fishing group will have constant contact with our islands,
and will perceive the situation regarding enemies' ships. If
the enemies threaten [us], we contact [our] patrols. Our fishing
boats are the nets protecting the islands. So, we must organize according to the long term
military stratagem. We will improve it every year. So, we will
have fishing boats as safeguards -- [we will] have artillery
on the islands -- and one fighter plane to help defend [the
islands]. It won't be important if we only have radars and patrol
boat(s). The important things are the guards. In order to implement this plan we need: big
warship(s). The biggest expenditure for defence is on ships.
The expenditure on airplanes is smaller than on ships. Our implementing
plans on the coast include: ships for defence, the places and
planes for protecting the ships. We must know how to take care
of our medium-sized ships. But those ships are not enough. We
need to build small wooden speedboats for fighting along the
coast so that planes and ships cannot attack us because we are
small and fast. Plans: From 1977, [we] need to have shipyard(s)
to build these types of small boats. [We] need lumber cutting
shop(s). As military strategy, we cut lumber for the shipyard(s)
to build speedboats. Military tactic: Don't expose the big
ship(s). We should find hiding places. Pull them out of the
water. In wartime, we'll put them [back] in the water. We should
keep only one or two [ships in the water]. So we need to build
rails to pull them out of the water. If [we] keep them in the
sea, [they] will get rusty. We use them when we need them. Our
warships need to be guarded. [We] keep only one or two [ships]
at the port. [We] cannot keep the ships at the port because
the enemies can attack us any time from now on to the year 1980.
We should use only small boats for chasing and patrolling. We
should build boats only 20 meters in length for chasing purposes.
We can place DK-75s or DK-57s and 12.8 mm. [artillery on them],
and [each] has a 400 horsepower [engine]. And [they] can go
30 kms. per hour. 1977: [we] will build from 10 to 20 boats.
If [we] keep doing this until the year 1980 our nets will be
thick. The enemy will be afraid of us because we will have many
small speedboats all over the sea. Building [boats] ourselves is better than purchasing
them from others. They are the constant patrol boats. [We] do
not need helm oil or radars. [We] do this so that it can serve
the demand of our movement. Plans for the artillery: [We] agree with
the plans that have already been arranged. Suggest [we] pay more attention to shooting
planes down. So, [we should] use many 12.7 mm. and 37 mm. artillery
pieces as the groundwork. And [use] the American 20 mm. and
40 mm. as the support. At the same time [we should] use DK-75's to
shoot at ships. It will be more effective. And DK-82's should
be kept in the warehouses for the infantry to use. In the future
we can start to use 85 mm. artillery. And the 105 mm. artillery
are effective for now but they won't be good for the future
military stratagem. Suggest to the Artillery Unit to organize as
noted below: Koh Kong needs to place 105 mm. and 75 mm. [artillery].
If [we] place only two B.C.S, it won't be enough. Koh Smach or Choy Chobon need to place artillery
at the projected spots. In the future we will place more 85 mm. artillery. If we have artillery to protect [us] this way,
our fishing boats won't be afraid of them [the enemies]. We
can benefit more from using artillery than from using boats
for defence purposes because it doesn't demand gasoline, and
enemies will be afraid of this. If we only use two B.C.S, they
won't be afraid. We have only this plan. If we keep our warships
in the sea, five years later they will be damaged. Cargo ships: also need to be built --
100 ton capacity, 200 ton capacity and 300 ton capacity... etc.
[We] need to build 4 to 10 of them per year for carrying [goods]. Oil refineries: need to put more artillery
to defend the air space, 12.8 mm and 37 mm. artillery. Be prepared
for their ground attacks. They won't attack from the sea. 3. Matters of production increase, besides
rice: [We] need to prepare any [crop] that is strategic,
such as every kind of potato, edible fruits and every kind of
beans. [We have] a lot of possiblity [to grow] mung beans. At
the same time, [we] need to grow kapok trees. We increase production this way to provide for
ourselves, help the people, and help to build the country. Rubber plantations: [We] can pull out
[the rubber trees] because [we] no longer benefit from them.
Use these lands to grow strategic crops as [mentioned] in the
above. Plan them in hectares as in industrial style. Plan of [growing] kapok trees: In the
year 1977, 100,000 trees [need to be planted]. Economically,
kapok trees give more fruits than coconut trees -- easy to plan
and easy to take care of. 4. Equipment shortages: such as oil,
screws and equipment for the navy. [You] must make a list and
request to the higher authorities every year. If [you] don't
have oil, do not use plundered oil. It can damage the ships.
So, we should query Comrade Chinese about what kinds of oils [we] use for the ships. How much [do we] use per year? How do we use them?
N0001411
(04 bbk)
Telegram Nº 85
310 characters [khtung]
To m. (Office) 870 with respect, We sent the report of the Eastern border, Region
20 with the Comrade who brought the Chinese to meet Brother
Van, [and] had the meaning as below: 1. Region 20: On 10 - 5 - 77, in a village west of Tnaot Temple,
the soldiers of Pornhea Krek heard the sound of the enemy cutting
down trees and digging the ground to camp from 11 pm until 4
am. The enemy hit the tree as their signal from the north of
Tnaot Temple to the south. On the morning of 11 - 5 - 77, five
of them slithered closer to the base. Bombs exploded and killed
water buffaloes, and we heard their trucks bringing in their
soldiers or transporting equipment along the Route to Kampong
Roteh and stopping at Veal Roam, southwest of Tnaot Temple.
At 8pm, they shot guns into the air cotinuously. 2. Region 24: We received the news on
11 - 5 - 77, it said that the situation in Region 24 is calm. Best wishes for good health and success Morning of the 13 - 5 - 77 Comrade Lin
Received on the 13 - 5 - 77 at 18 : 30
N0001415
(04 bbk)
Telegram Nº 54
274 characters [khtung]
To m. [Office] 870 with respect, 1. On 25 - 5 - 77, at the product-growing area,
crushed one Vietnamese person to death on the spot. 2. On 18- 5 - 77, 2nd battalion caught 2 Vietnamese.
They were caught at Kevseima line and Sre Preach. Those Vietnamese
were on Thieu's side. They were a warrant officer and a second
lieutenant. They wanted to go to France. They said Vietnam is
too difficult to live in. There is a lot of starvation and conflict
and unrest. 3. On 13 - 5 - 77, Region's Unit lost one life
and had one person seriously injured. Enemy attacked near the
Office Tochuoy and Tosra, 50 meters away from the Office. According
to our investigation, there were not enemies from the outside.
We suspected that the Unit is under Saom and Chhin orders. We
already reported to San. Unit 920 still has activities but we
continue to catch them. On 25 - 5 - 77, we sent comrade(s) to study
the secret code. [We] received information about the creation
of collectives. Adding: The Vietnamese problem has already been
decided. Warmest revolutionary solidarity. date: 20 - 5 Chhan
Received on 21 - 5 - 77 at 21: 00
N0001417
(04 bbk)
Telegram Nº 16
355 characters [khtung]
To Chief 870 with respect, I'd like to report the situation in Oudameanchey: 1. On 27-4-77 at 1 : 30 at night [in the morning],
an enemy threw grenade(s) at the Ampil District office, at the
place of Comrade ............? who was the secretary
of Ampil District. [He] died there, and one district messenger
was slightly injured. 2. On 25-4-77, bandits came down from the mountain
at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. We shot and hit [some] of them,
and they ran away. We followed their blood trail and saw 12
of them [hiding] in the stream. 3. On 26-4-77, the internal situation of the
soldiers along the border: Two soldiers deserted and took two
AKs with them. Strategy: 1. I ordered to advise Brother Sae's section
to observe the situation in Ampil District in order to examine
the causes closely. If there is a cause, [I] will report to
Angkar later. 2. I Advised Comrade Soeun to pay close attention
to comprehend the enemy situation along the border in order
to be self-reliant in demolishing them. 3. I advised him to have plans to educate both
cadres and soldiers through politics and conscience, strengthen
the order as always, and analyze the details about the cadres
and soldier that deserted. For example: Until now [we] noted that 13 traitors have deserted
and have taken 13 weapons, pistols and long guns. Through all
the events, some of the deserters were within the platoon, some
were in the unit and some were soldiers. For other issues, [I] will let Comrade Sy go
to do the work later. Best wishes for good health and success. With the warmest revolutionary solidarity. Date: 30 - 4 - 77
Received on 1 - 5 - 77 at 12 : 50 Comrade Pauk
N0001418
(04 bbk)
Telegram Nº 89
278 characters [khtung]
To m. 870 with respect, We 'd like to ask how all the Brothers are doing. We'd like to report some of the plans involved
with the Region. Lately, foreign visitors have constantly come
in and out of Region 505. Those guests usually stayed and
ate [there]. The Region took care of them constantly. According
to the people's reports, the hosts such as comrades who work
at the airport section and the radar section have unpleasant
feelings toward the Region. We still don't know what side should
take responsibility for that matter. Usually when the visitors
flew in, comrades from those sections always come to ask for
places, cooks and food for the guests. We always provided them
and let the airport section be in charge. But this time was very unusual. Besides, the
comrades who came with the guests demanded a lot of snacks and
fresh fruits and food for the guests to eat. We didn't understand
about that at all. [We] didn't know whether the guests were
workers or cadres. [We] prepared food for them as usual. And
[our food is] not abundant. Only coconuts that we always have.
The other kinds of fruits we have according to the season. And
we don't have flour to make snacks. For the people based at
the place, we provide them with 40 hectares of land, 7 to 8
pairs of oxen and water buffaloes. Besides, we provide them
fish, meats and vegetables. We even went to villages to ask
for vegetables, seeds for them with the thought that they are
new to the place, they can't solve everything by themselves.
These things also cause some disappointments. Suggestion: We suggest that if there are visitors
coming to our place, please Angkar let us know ahead of time.
If it is possible, please let us know what kind of guests are
coming. Please, M. 870, notice this. Happiness and success 1 - 5 - 77 Yi Received on 2 - 5 - 77 at 10 : 30
Copies sent to: Um Umnuon, Brother Van, Brother Von, Brother Khieu, the Office,
Archives
