The Supreme Nature's Essence:

1) F-ness is an essential property of S if and only if other things 
being equal, being F makes a being a better being than any property 
incompatible with F-ness would.
	a) This criterion assumes that besides being a better or worse 
	being of a certain kind, there are better and worse kinds of 
	being. The Supreme Nature (= S) is the best possible kind of 
	being.
	b) It does not follow from "other things being equal, being F 
	makes a being a better being than any property incompatible with 
	F-ness would" either that 
		i) "Being F always makes a being a better thing of its 
		kind"--being wise would not make a ring a better ring. OR
		ii) "Whatever is F is a better being than whatever is not
		F"--e.g. a person who is just but not intelligent is a 
		better being--according to Anselm--than a person who is 
		intelligent but not just; yet both properties are 
		essential to S. 
	c) It follows that all of S's essential properties are compatible 
	with one another. for suppose that F-ness and G-ness both satisfy 
	the criterion, and that F-ness and G-ness are incompatible with 
	one another. It follows that:
	F-ness makes a being a better being than any property 
	incompatible with it (including G- ness) 
	& G-ness makes a being a better being than any property 
	incompatible with it (including F- ness)
	But it is a contradiction both that F-ness makes a being a better 
	being than G-ness and that G-ness a being a better being than F-
	ness. (Monologium, ch. 15)
2) To be F per se is
	i) incompatible with being F per aliud
	ii) better than being F per aliud (Monologium, ch. 1)
3) Therefore, if F-ness is essential to S, S is F per se (Monologium, 
ch. 16)

Argument that S is Simple:

1) Whatever is compounded depends for its existence on its components.

2) Therefore, whatever is compounded exists through its components. (1)

3) S does not exists through another but exists per se (Monologium, ch.3).

4) Therefore, S is not compounded.

Argument from the Rationality of Creation: (Monologium, ch. 9)

1) Nothing can be rationally made unless there is in the reason of the maker an exemplar, a form, or likeness, or rule according to which they are made.

2) Created things are rationally made.

3) Therefore, before the world was created, it was in the reason of the highest nature how it should be. (1,2)

Argument for the Identity of S with S's word: (Monologium, ch. 12, 29)

1) Nothing can or ever could exist besides S and its creatures. (ch. 5-6)

2) Whatever was created by S was created by S though S's expression.

3) Nothing is created through itself.

4) Therefore, S's expression is not a creature (2,3)

5) Therefore, S's expression is identical with S. (1,4)